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PREFACE
When I began work on this dissertation, I considered using a few' key events in 
American and Panamanian relations like the January 1964 Canal Zone riots in order to set up an 
argument about how geography affects political relations. It probably does not come as a 
shocking revelation to say that Panama’s political relationship with the United States is Gamed 
by its relative geographic location, since that much at least probably makes sense just looking at 
a map. But when [ realized that there have been a series of political conflicts between 
Americans and Panamanians since the middle of the nineteenth century I was convinced that 
something persistent and inescapable must be behind it. What I never would have expected was 
that in order to understand how geography affected political relations 1 found myself drawing 
upon divisions within Panamanian society that can be traced back to the middle of the sixteenth 
century, and comparing how continental morphology affects global maritime communication.
This preface will serve as a user’s guide to the dissertation. My use of time is somewhat 
unconventional. The reader is plunged into descriptions of two geographic phenomena that 
operate on very different scales o f time and space. Only later does it become clear how the 
intersection of these two phenomena in Panama is important for understanding political 
conflicts between the United States and Panama. Femand Braudel proposed the use of multiple 
time, separated into short, medium and long-term phenomena. I found I could not impose 
Braudel’s three-part structure of time without losing the flexibility I required to present the 
influence of widely varying spatial dimensions relevant to Panama’s internal social divisions as 
well as its use for global maritime communication. Structures of time drive their own spatial 
patterns. In order to present the particular local and global Panamanian spatial phenomena that I 
was interested in, 1 used an approach that privileged space over time. Stmcturing space, 
however, left time to its owu devices. The result is an historical analysis absent of a firm 
chronological order.
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Temporal duration bad to be generously altered in order to bigblight tbe persistence of 
key spatial phenomena. Tbe only analogy 1 can liken tbe chapter organization to is switching the 
lens of a compound microscope, representing tbe time and scale of analysis, whereby your field 
of view is suddenly changed even though you are looking at the same drop of water. 1 found 
that even when I switched my analytical lens I could still see evidence of two persistent spatial 
patterns. One is that Panama is divided sociogeographically between the maritime cities and the 
interior. Another is that Panama's relative location is strategic for maritime communication on a 
global and hemispheric scale. Switching my analytical lens required understanding diSerent 
kinds of disciplinary perspectives and source materials. I used the works of Panamanian 
sociologists and historians in Spanish for the sixteenth through the early nineteenth centuries, 
diplomatic correspondence and archival materials for the nineteenth century, and collections of 
U.S. government documents, congressional hearings and maritime statistics for the twentieth 
century. Please note that references to diplomatic correspondence include the author, the 
recipient and the date sent. All diplomatic correspondence unless otherwise cited is from 
volume five (Chile and Colombia) of the compilation "‘Diplomatic correspondence of the United 
States: Inter-American affairs, 1831-1860” by Manning (1930). Refer to the "List of 
Documents in Volume V found at the beginning of the book which lists letters by the author, 
recipient and date -  separated into letters either to or from Colombia -  followed by a  reference 
to the page where the letter begins.
Because this dissertation is a detailed study of political conflict, a baseline o f normal 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Panama was not presented. The reader may 
be falsely led to believe that political relations between the U.S. and Panama have been nothing 
but a series of riots and diplomatic conflict. For some reason that I as yet do not fully 
understand, political conflicts seemed to electrify Panama’s underlying local and global 
geographies in a way that normal diplomatic relations could not.
VI
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Tbe overall organization o f the dissertation privileges the persistently spatial over the 
ever changing temporal. The introductory chapter introduces the two main geographic 
phenomena under investigation and suggests how they interacted behind the scenes o f political 
conflict between the United States and Panama. The second chapter on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty is presented after the introduction in order to prepare the reader for the initial argument. 
The intent of the second chapter is to cast doubt on conventional understanding that the 1903 
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty is the cause of problems between the United States and Panama The 
reader is encouraged to consider that if  the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was not the root cause of 
political conflict between the United States and Panama, then something else was.
Part One takes the reader on a geohistorical leap in time to examine the underpinnings 
of Panamanian society and its effect on political relations with the United States. Using the 
theoretical implications of Edward Fox's work in his geographic history of French politics. 1 
was able to expand the implications of work by Panamanian sociologists and historians on early 
Panama to cover contemporary Panamanian political relations with the United States. Panama is 
inherently divided between an inland and a maritime society, with the maritime society tending 
to be the more politically and economically dominant one. After independence in 1903. the 
maritime-commercial leadership of the Republic of Panama was ftced with honoring the close 
relationship they had negotiated with U.S. representatives in an internal political environment 
where old regional and social rivalries with the interior became matters of national economic 
welfare.
Part Two takes the reader on another geohistorical leap by putting an interoceanic canal 
across Panama in the large-scale context of the territorial expansion of the United States on the 
West Coast of North America and across the Pacific Ocean. By assuming the extraordinary 
obligation of protecting the neutrality of the Isthmus o f Panama by guaranteeing Colombia's 
sovereignty in an 1846 treaty, U.S. policymakers intended to prevent the encroachment of
vu
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European powers over strategic points affecting U.S. national security. The fifth and sixth 
chapters are intended to cast doubt on the idea that the Panama Canal, at the time o f its 
construction by the United States, was indispensable for the growth of American commerce. 
While not denying that the Panama Canal may have been built in expectation of future 
commercial growth, the fifth and sixth chapters suggest that the Panama Canal was not as 
commercially useful as one might think thus setting up the argument that the United States also 
had strategic purposes in mind at the time, namely, to control the logistical reach of coal-driven 
battleships operating in American waters.
Having immersed the reader in two geographic and historical phenomena operating on 
ver\: different scales of time and space in Part One and Part Two, Part Three demonstrates how 
they fit together. The eighth and ninth chapters form a transition to Part Three by examining the 
ambiguities arising out of issues o f sovereignty, territoriality and U.S. constitutional law when it 
came to the United States presence on the Isthmus of Panama. Conventional notions of 
sovereignty over territory proved incapable of managing the unconventional intersection 
between United States imperatives and Panamanian domestic rivalries.
Part Three shows that the geographic phenomena described in Parts One and Two were 
the real culprits operating behind the scenes of political conflict. Conflicts between the United 
States and Panama were not the result of bad diplomacy or because two representatives sitting 
at either end of a long table could not come up with the right treaty. Conflicts occurred because 
two geographic phenomena that lay behind and beyond the boundaries of the sovereign state 
began to cross each other's paths on the Isthmus of Panama begirming around the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Panama's internal political competition, generated by longstanding social 
and geographic divisions, created a situation where all sides felt pressured to assume an 
antagonistic posture with the United States and demand treaty concessions beyond what might 
even seem to be within Panama's reasonable national economic interest. Proactive opposition
VIII
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elements even provoked U.S. interposition, the byproduct of the role Panama played for United 
States national security and commercial ambitions overseas, as a  means of political protest 
against their internal rivals. The final chapter presents a post-2000 scenario when U.S. 
interposition could be provoked because o f disputes between canal labor leaders and the 
Panama Canal Authority.
Finally, a  note on instances where the terms American and Panamanian were used. 
Before the independence of the Republic o f Panama in November 1903. Panamanians were in 
fact Colombians. For matters of simplicity, the term Panamanian was used to refer to natives or 
naturalized residents of the Isthmus of Panama at any time in their history.
Given the fact that national labels must cross language and country lines, matters of 
political sensitivity often arise when one is not aware of the most conunon term describing a 
nationality within a foreign country or when speaking in a foreign language. Some confusion 
may exist about the use of the word American to refer to citizens of the United States in a work 
of research dealing with Latin America. The confusion probably originates from a literal, but 
essentially incorrect, translation of the Spanish word norteamericano into English as North 
American.
It would not be the most correct use o f language for a person from the United States to 
refer to themselves as americano in Spanish. The Spanish word americano does not generally 
mean a citizen of the United States in a Latin American country. Rather americano is a much 
broader geographic term, rather than a national term, referring to any resident of the Western 
Hemisphere. In Spanish, a person from the United States is usually referred to as 
norteamericano or estadounidense. Therefore, people from the United States speaking Spanish 
should refer to themselves as norteamericano, reflecting the most common term for U.S. 
citizens, particularly when visiting foreign countries. On the other hand, in Canada it may be 
less appropriate for a person from the United States speaking Spanish to use the word
LX
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norteamericano. Instead, U.S. citizens might make an effort to use the word estadounidense. It 
would obviously not be sensible or correct for citizens o f the U.S. speaking English in Canada 
to carry over a Literal translation of the Spanish word norteamericano and refer to themselves as 
North American. For that matter, it might not be appropriate for a person from Britain visiting 
the U.S. South to refer to everyone as Yanks or Yankees, even though that designation reflects a 
common term for Americans in Britain.
It is the prerogative of the citizens of a state to designate their own national label in 
their own countrv, with the understanding that in different languages or countries there exist 
other terms. Given that this is a dissertation written in English at a United States universit}. I 
felt that when I made informal references to U.S. citizens I should use what is by far the most 
common term in the United States, i.e.. American. No matters or personal or political agenda 
should be inferred.
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A b s t r a c t
This dissertation examines the recurring conflict between the United States and the 
Republic of Panama regarding the Canal and the Canal Zone by analyzing three salient 
geographic issues: first, the extent to which international commerce or national security 
required the building of a canal in Central America; second, ambiguities arising out o f notions 
of sovereignty and extraterritoriality in United States constitutional law: and third, the poUtical 
controversies between an inland society and a maritime society in Panama itself.
The theoretical implications of Edward Fox's work in his geographic history o f French 
politics and the works of Panamanian historians and sociologists studying eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century Panama were used to offer an explanation of Panama's contemporary 
political relations with the United States. Panama has historically been divided between an 
inland and a maritime society, with the maritime society tending to be the more politically and 
economically dominant one. After its independence in 1903, Panama's internal political 
competition created a  situation where all sides felt compelled to assume an antagonistic posture 
with the United States and demand treaty concessions beyond what might even seem to be 
within Panama's reasonable national economic interest.
The interpositionist role of the United States in Panamanian affairs is the product of a 
longstanding commitment. The United States has assumed sole responsibility for protecting the 
neutrality of interoceanic communication across Panama since the middle of the nineteenth 
century. The goal was to prevent European powers from threatening a maritime choke point 
affecting U.S. national security and potential commercial expansion. The project to construct an 
American Panama Canal was, therefore, a product o f commercial as well as military concerns. 
Contrarv' to conventional thinking about the nature o f  U.S.-Panamanian relations, this 
dissertation examines how the influence of the United States, at times, became the means by 
which Panamanian opposition leaders leveraged political pressure against internal rivals.
X lll
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C h a p t e r  i .  In t r o d u c t io n
Political conflicts between the United States and the Republic of Panama have been 
common. The stock explanation for this circumstance is that something went wrong 
diplomatically, the scapegoat being the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. The 1903 Hay-Bunau- 
Varilla Treaty was the agreement that paved the way for the United States to exercise sovereign 
jurisdiction in the Canal Zone and construct the Panama Canal. Conventional thinking finds that 
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was a one-sided concession dealt to representatives of the 
Republic of Panama in their weakest hour, under American military protection two weeks after 
declaring independence from Colombia. Article III of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty seemed to 
transfer sovereignty of the Canal Zone to the United States. Sovereignty in the Canal Zone was 
allegedly not demanded of Colombia in the 1903 Hay-Herrân Treaty for exactly the same 
purpose in exactly the same location. Thus it makes sense to say that hard-line positions by- 
Panamanian representatives during treaty negotiations and even the random violence of activists 
such as during the January 1964 Canal Zone riots were simply expressions of frustration against 
a bad treaty. However, the problem with blaming the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty for 
conflicts between the two countries is that conflicts on the Isthmus of Panama involving the 
United States predate the treaty by more than half a century. This opens up the interesting 
possibility that conflicts between Americans and Panamanians might be due to something more 
fundamental and persistent than momentary diplomatic relations.
A few' analyses o f American and Panamanian relations see the Canal Zone as an 
American enclave and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty as the instrument through which the 
United States maintained a conciliatory urban elite in power. Given the presence of this U S - 
dominated elite. Panamanians generally believe there were few independent Panamanian 
political accomplishments -  save Amulfo Arias' January 1931 coup and the October 1968 
military coup by Omar Torrijos Herrera and other officers of the National Guard. Both the 1931
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and the 1968 coups are interpreted as nationalist backlashes against the enclave-dependent 
Panamanian business elite. American intervention in December 1989 is regarded as the counter­
coup by the United States on behalf o f  the Panamanian elite business class against the military 
government and a throwback to earlier periods o f American intervention and favoritism.
Diplomatic conflicts over the terms of a treaty often arise because the conditions 
prevailing when a treaty was originally signed change over time, making the articles of a treat} 
no longer satisActory to one party or another. In the search for explanations about why 
international conflicts occur, conditions changing at macrotemporal and macrospatial scales are 
seldom acknowledged because they are not familiar fiâmes of reference to the diplomatic 
historian. Diplomatic history has typically rested on a close examination o f events, with such 
"events"’ leaving a paper trail of dispatches, negotiations and treaties — all of which chronicle a 
'spatial and temporal waltz, each step or misstep of which the historian has to capture.' 
Although 1 rely on the documentation provided by historians (and political scientists). I have 
found it instructive to place the chronicle o f U.S.-Panamanian relations in a wider context, that 
enables me to view how the American project to construct an interoceanic canal became 
entangled with centuries-old social and political divisions within Panama. According to the dual 
Panama thesis presented here, the occasional conflicts between Americans and Panamanians do 
not represent simply the breakdown o f diplomatic relations. Conflicts occur because a unique 
geographic relationship forces an extraterritorial intersection between an expanding American 
polity and long-standing, though ambiguous, Panamanian national interests.
1.1 BEYOND THE STATE IN MaCROSPACE: AMERICAN GEOGRAPHIC IMPERATIVES
During an address at the Georgetown University School o f  Foreign Service on 29 April 
1958. Panamanian Ambassador Ricardo M. Arias stated:
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The foreign policy o f my country during the past SO years has been to exert every effort 
in order to obtain at least for Panama, conditions similar to those granted to Colombia 
in January 1903.'
Despite this revealing remark, the 6c t is there is no meaningful difference between the 1903 
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama and the 1903 Hay-Herrân Treaty with Colombia.
During negotiations for the Hay-Herrân Treaty with Colombia, representatives of the 
United States softened the phrase "in perpetuity"’ to read "for the term of one hundred years, 
renewable at the sole and absolute option of the United States.” American representatives also 
included an article in the treaty with Colombia stating that the rights and privileges granted to 
the United States would not affect the "sovereignty of the Republic of Colombia over the 
territory within whose boundaries such rights and privileges are to be exercised There seems 
little difference between the Panamanian grant in perpetuity” and the Colombian grant "for the 
term of one hundred years, renewable at the sole and absolute option of the United States.” Nor 
does the article guaranteeing Colombia’s sovereignty represent much of a departure from the 
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama. The sovereignty article in the Hay-Herrân Treaty- 
meant that the rights and privileges granted to the United States in the treaty would not affect 
the ultimate claim o f sovereignty held by the Republic of Colombia within whose boundaries 
American sovereign rights and privileges would be exercised. In essence, the sovereignty article 
in the Hay-Herrân Treaty with Colombia confirmed that the United States had no intention of 
annexing Colombian territory. But it did not prevent the United States from exercising 
sovereign jurisdiction in Colombian territory. Secretary of State John Hay argued a similar 
point during an early debate over the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty in the summer of 1904. Hay
U.S. Congress (1977b).
■ U.S. Congress (1977b. 203-4).
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claimed that the Republic o f Panama maintained titular sovereignty' over Canal Zone territory 
but sovereignty amounting to no more than a barren scepter.''^
The reason why there is little difference between the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with 
Panama and the Hay-Herrân Treaty with Colombia is because both were just implementing 
agreements. The two treaties were written to conform to details long since established about 
how a canal under American control would work. Perpetual control o f a Canal Zone was not 
some idea bom in haste by the Frenchman and Panamanian representative Philippe Bunau- 
Varilla in his New York hotel room during the middle o f the night on 15 November 1903. The 
U.S. Congress had previously required in the June 1902 Spooner Act that the President sign a 
treaty acquiring, "perpetual control of a strip of land [in] the territory of the Republic of 
Colombia, not less than six miles in width." meaning a buffer zone three miles on either side of 
the canal.'* In January 1902. the U.S. Isthmian Canal Commission made its final report 
recommending that a strip o f land (dimensions unstated) should be acquired in Panama and the 
"grant must not be for a term of years, but in perpetuity.”^
This short-term foreshadowing of the treaty was itself anticipated by earlier 
expectations and legal innovations. The basis for American perpetual control in a buffer zone 
around an interoceanic canal in Panama begins as early as 1787. Article I Section Eight o f the 
United States Constitution gives Congress broad powers to regulate commerce, powers through 
which Congress can approve federal funds to build an interoceanic canal. Yet according to 
Article IV Section Three. Congress can only exercise its powers to regulate commerce in a 
United States territory or possession. For Congress to be able to build an interoceanic canal in 
Panama the surrounding territory had to be under the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States.
 ̂U.S. Congress (1977b).
■* U.S. Congress (1977b, 178).
* U.S. Congress (1977b. 151).
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American policymakers and entrepreneurs may have promoted the Panama Canal 
project to expand the reach of American foreign commerce. Such an interpretation might argue 
that economic depressions like that of the 1890s spurred the search for an overseas solution to 
domestic overproduction and set the stage for American construction o f the Panama Canal 
which opened in August 1914. However, throughout the nineteenth century American foreign 
waterborne conunerce had largely been a trans-Atlantic trade. After 1869, domestic 
transportation between the Atlantic and Pacific Coast relied on the transcontinental railroad 
system and it is not clear how advantageous a Panama Canal would have been even for 
coastwise shipping between coastal cities like New York and San Francisco. At the time the 
United States began construction of the Panama Canal in 1904, the majority of American 
waterborne commerce was not between locations that would benefit by being re-routed through 
the Panama Canal. Use of the Panama Canal by American foreign waterborne commerce 
eventually did "take-off as anticipated, but not until after World War Q and the growth of trade 
between the East Coast of the United States and East Asia. In fact, since World War II the 
proportion o f American foreign waterborne commerce passing through the Panama Canal has 
continued to increase slightly. The expectation that a Panama Canal would promote American 
foreign commerce was probably forefront in the minds of United States representatives. 
However, expectation of future utility cannot carry the full burden o f  explaining why Americans 
were so intent on building a Panama Canal by themselves.
Even had American foreign commerce been in a position to use the Panama Canal at 
the turn of the century, which as it turned out it was not, representatives o f the United States 
should have been satisfied with any interoceanic technology suitable to convey American 
commercial cargo. Yet representatives o f the United States were absolutely intent on preventing 
the involvement of foreign nations or foreign private enterprise in a Panama interoceanic canal 
project. The statements of powerful United States policymakers both private and public belie
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the geopolitical agenda behind American thinking. The American Panama Canal was largely a 
project designed to prevent foreign powers from controlling strategic points near American 
waters. American representatives did not want a Panama Canal as much as they wanted a canal 
under American control. What representatives o f the United States would never permit was a 
canal under European control.
Even as early as the period when new territories west of the Appalachian Mountains 
were being added to the United States, places like the Isthmus of Panama were eyed as part of 
an extraterritorial American frontier protecting the continent against the encroachment of 
foreign maritime powers. The United States established its far-flung extraterritorial frontier by 
preemptive control over sites for strategic naval bases in Caribbean states or Pacific Islands. 
The extraterritorial frontier expanded^ as buffer zones around these strategic points through 
treaties or other agreements permitting the U.S. Federal Government to exercise greater 
sovereign power, rights and authority. In some cases, an extraterritorial buffering of American 
jurisdiction solidified into a United States territory. Such was temporarily the case in the 
Philippines around the base at Manila, and permanently in the case of the Hawaiian Islands 
around the base at Pearl Harbor.
The extent to which the United States has been able to exercise extraterritorial control 
over a place like the Isthmus of Panama is without comparison in modem times. The 
morphology of the world’s continents gives only three places in the world, Panama, Suez and 
Malacca, a relative location to qualify as a global maritime choke point. No other contemporary, 
non-resident power can still claim unilateral control over one of the three global maritime choke 
points. The original means of American extraterritorial control in Panama was Article XXXV of 
the 1846 Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty. Though an unsuccessful first attempt. Secretary of State 
William Marcy presented a plan to Colombia in 1857 to expand and solidify the rights and 
obligations of Article XXXV of the Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty. The 1857 plan was to turn the
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transit route and the terminal cities into an independent municipality under American 
protection. After Panamanian independence in 1903, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty transformed 
extraterritorial control from Article XXXV of the Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty into a Canal Zone, a  
foreign territory under United States jurisdiction. Although the territorial buffer zone has been 
stripped away in a process to be officially completed at noon on 31 December 1999. the legacy 
of the original rights and obligations from Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty 
remains behind in the 1977 Permanent Neutrality Treat} . The Permanent Neutrality Treaty  ̂
outlines unilateral rights of American interposition against any threat to the neutrality of the 
Panama Canal.
Never timid about asserting American geographic imperatives, representatives o f the 
United States were ambivalent about dedicating federal funds to build the Panama Canal. To 
construct the Panama Canal meant dedicating an enormous amount of federal resources. Most 
importantly, to have a canal under American control meant abrogating the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty with Britain, which stated that neither Britain nor the United States would have sole 
control over an interoceanic canal in 'Central America.'^ Federal funds and an acceptable 
agreement with Britain were not forthcoming until after 1901.
In ± e meantime, in 1878 a French company seized the opportunity to construct an 
interoceanic canal across the Isthmus of Panama. What is more, the French company took
 ̂ Representatives of the United States who were dissatisfied with having their hands tied by the 1850 
Clayton-Bulwer Trea^ claimed that Panama was not a part of “Central America.” Secretary o f State 
Frederick Frelinghuysen even argued for unilateral abrogation of the treaw during the 1880s. 
Frelinghuysen argued that since conditions had changed so much since the treaty was originally signed it 
was not longer appropriate to honor “The President does not think that the United States are tailed upon 
by any principle of equity to revive those provisions of the Clatyon-Bulwer treaty which were specially 
applicable to the concession of August. 1849, and apply them to any other concession ... The conditions 
of 1882 are not those of 1852. The people of the United States now have abimdance of surplus capital for 
such enterprises ... The legislative branch of the Govenunent of the United States may also desire to be 
free to place the credit of the United States at the service of one or more of these enterprises. The 
President does not feel himself warranted in making any engagement or any admission respecting the 
extinct provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which would prevent or interfere with such a purpose ... 
[The United States] hold themselves free hereafter to protect any inter-oceanic communication in which
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advantage of the safe environment for private investment that the United States Federal 
Government \vas obligated to provide through Article XXXV o f  the 1846 Bidlack-Maliarino 
Treaty, which stated that the United States would protect the neutral use of interoceanic 
communication across Panama, in effect, protecting the French company's operations. The 
United States Federal Government did not consider the French company a desirable capital 
partner, as it clearly was a  European interest outside of its direct jurisdiction and potentially 
vulnerable to a hostile third party takeover. The bankruptcy of the French company in 1888 
demonstrated that constructing an interoceanic canal would be neither easy nor cheap especially 
for a private enterprise. The French company's bankruptcy also cast uncertainty over the 
company's remaining assets including a considerable amount o f excavation and exclusive rights 
to construct an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus of Panama. American acquisition of the 
French company's contract and assets meant there would eventually be a canal under American 
control. But perhaps the real opportunity in Panama for the United States was to foreclose on 
the possibility that other European interests would acquire the French company's property and 
assets.^
Once free of the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty via the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. 
Congress passed the Spooner Act in 1902. The Spooner Act instructed the President to acquire 
an exclusive privilege for the United States Federal Govenunent to build and operate a canal 
across the Isthmus of Panama, and if not in Panama then Nicaragua. The Colombian 
constitution allegedly prohibited any alienation of Colombian territory to a foreign sovereigiu 
something Colombian opposition leaders used to obstruct the Colombian president's efforts to
they or their citizens may become interested in such way as treaties with the local sovereign powers may 
warrant and their interests may require” (Cited in Hoyt 1966-7, 14).
United States representatives aüso signed an agreement (1914 Bryan-Chanunoro Treaty) acquiring 
exclusive rights to construct a canal in Nicaragua, thereby solidifying an American monopoly over the 
two best routes for an interoceanic canal across Central America.
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conclude ratification o f the 1903 Hay-Herrân Treaty.* Representatives o f the United States had 
worked with representatives of Colombia to engineer an acceptable compromise that put two 
sovereigns in the same space at the same time through the 1903 Hay-Herrân Treaty. The 
problem was that ratification of the Hay-Herrân Treaty came on the heels o f a three-year 
Colombian civil war. Early 1903 was not the best time for a Colombian President to test his 
leadership by supporting an agreement ready-made for a strong domestic opposition to label as 
unconstitutional or unpatriotic the signing away o f Colombian sovereignty over a national asset.
Not to be dissuaded, representatives o f the United States found themselves working 
with representatives of an independent Republic of Panama. Nevertheless, there still remained 
the problem o f how to get two sovereigns in the same space at the same time. The improvised 
solution in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 was a federalist transfer of sovereign 
authority creating a strategic Canal Zone jurisdictional buffer in perpetuity .
1.2 BEHIND THE STATE IN MaCROTIME: THE TWO PANAMAS
When the Committee of Provisional Government of the Republic of Panama ratified the 
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty in late 1903 Panamanian representatives had several opportunities to 
make amendments to the treaty or even begin an entirely new set of negotiations had they 
chosen to do so. Panamanian representatives were within their power to mark up the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty in Panama City after it was signed in Washington. The Committee of 
Provisional Government made little effort to modify the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. The 
treaty was satisfactory to the national interests o f the Republic of Panama as they were defined
* In The Panama Canal: A Study in Institutional Law and Diplomacy (1911). former Panamanian 
President Harmodio Arias explained that the rejection of the 1902 Hay-Herrân Treaty by the Colombian 
Senate was due to a pridehil quirkiness within the Latin American mind when it comes to. "the 
coexistence of two public powers in a given territory, the one national, the other foreigiL” Anas said: 
"Whatever faults or shortcomings Spanish Americans may have in coimection with public or civic duties, 
tliey are extremely jealous o f foreign encroachments on their sovereign rights, and, Üierefore, they cannot 
but regard with anxious care a measure that not only would curtail the national jurisdiction, but supplant
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in 1903. But soon after 1903, the national interests of the Republic of Panama came to be 
defined differently.
The new democratic environment that had been created on the Isthmus o f Panama in 
1903 compelled ambitious political hopefuls to cultivate support among the middle-class and 
the rural interior, claiming that they and not the opposition party would be the patrons of 
Panamanian welfare. Political opposition movements among the middle-class and rural interior 
began to take on a life of their own by the 1930s. Incumbent administrations found themselves 
under increasing internal pressure to demonstrate that they could deliver on the promise to 
expand Panama's maritime-commercial opportunities for the middle or lower classes and the 
population of the western interior. Opposition leaders like Amulfo Arias expected that the 
derived benefits o f the Panama Canal and Canal Zone would permit the implementation of such 
grand Panamanian designs. To fail to take an aggressive posture with the United States over 
benefits supposedly denied to Panamanian citizens by the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was 
to fail the true national interests of the Republic o f Panama.
Political opposition movements among the Panamanian middle and lower classes and 
the rural interior are the legacy of something very old and fundamental about Panama. Two 
contrasting societies have lived side by side on the Isthmus of Panama since early colonial 
times. The Republic of Panama is a composite o f two societies trapped within a  single state by 
circumstances o f history. Panama's first society was a maritime-commercial one, dominated by 
a mercantile elite. The original descendents o f Spanish conquistadors, the first elite of the 
Isthmus of Panama had few opportunities for landed settlement in the interior. Somewhat out of 
necessity elite families chose to make their livelihoods on the direct and derived benefits of the 
transit trade.
it as the necessary result of the coexistence of two public powers in a given territor} . the one national, the 
other foreign” (Arias 1911 [1970), 60).
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With the decline in the transport o f silver across the Isthmus of Panama during the late 
seventeenth century, the focus of elite status and upward mobility shifted away from the once 
prosperous maritime cities to the western interior and the Azuero Peninsula. Vfany maritime- 
commercial families were compelled to migrate inland or leave the Spanish Audiencia of 
Panama entirely. Inland elite operated in a  largely autonomous, subsistence arena o f economic 
activity. After the rebirth of the transit trade during the middle of the nineteenth centurv', the 
focus of elite status and vertical mobility shifted back to the maritime cities. Elite families 
returned to maritime-commercial pursuits, cultivating social and business relationships with 
immigrants and foreign commercial agents to control the direct and derived benefits o f the 
Panama Railroad and the Panama Canal. Other elite families whose ancestors may have 
migrated to the interior from the maritime cities during the late seventeenth or eighteenth 
century remained behind to pursue the status and security of life in the territorial-administrative 
interior through their control over land.
The early maritime-commercial elite o f the Isthmus of Panama evolved within a unique 
political arrangement. Panamanian commercial eUte used family ties within the ranks of 
regional and municipal Spanish-American administration to defend their commercial interests 
against the influence of outside Spanish and Peruvian merchants. At the same time, the 
Panamanian elite depended upon Spanish military officials for protection from foreign attack. 
After independence from Spain in 1821, the territory of the former Audiencia o f Panama 
incorporated itself into Simon Bolivar's Gran Colombia. Following the breakup of Gran 
Colombia into the states of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia -  with which Panama remained 
-  an incompatibility developed between Panamanian ambitions and Colombian authority. The 
Panamanian upper echelon believed that conservative Colombian policymakers in Bogota 
would frustrate their liberal economic ambitions. Farmed by the growing interest of 
governments and entrepreneurs from Europe and the United States, the Panamanian maritime-
II
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commercial elite rebelled in 1830-1, 1840-1, 1863, and 1899-1901. The urban elite did not 
sponsor rebellions on the Isthmus of Panama against Colombia for foil independence. Rather 
the elite simply wanted more control over their commercial interests by achieving federal 
statehood or shifting Panama's political dependency to a more liberal state or even a 
protectorate of the maritime powers. However, the territorial-administrative leadership o f the 
western interior centered in the city of Santiago de Veraguas did not share the maritime- 
commercial elite's political vision for Panama. During the 1830-31 rebellion, an armed force 
from Veraguas. not a Colombian armed force from Bogota, put down maritime-commercial 
intrigue in Panama City. This represents one of the first political manifestations o f a  dual 
Panama, a division that would become increasingly important after the separation o f Panama 
from Colombia.
When full Panamanian independence was made possible by United States military 
intervention in November 1903, the dominant maritime-commercial elite found itself the master 
of a sovereign state on the Isthmus of Panama. No doubt the understanding was that the 
commercial elite would act as the proper custodians of the Isthmus of Panama coincident with 
American interests. After 1903. the maritime-commercial leadership of the Republic o f Panama 
was faced with honoring the close commercial and jurisdictional relationship they had 
negotiated with American representatives in an internal political environment where old 
regional and social rivalries with the western interior became heady matters o f national 
economic welfare. Maritime-commercial elite leaders felt particularly pressed by the rural 
Panamanian middle and lower classes migrating in large numbers to the transit cities. The 
geographic and social upward mobility once the exclusive realm of maritime-conunercial elite 
social networks in the past became the aspiration of the middle-class. For the maritime- 
commercial elite, defending their interests against middle-class jobseekers risked alienating a 
source of electoral support in an increasingly competitive political environment.
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Panamanian activist groups like Accion Comunal (^Community Action 1 led by 
Amulfo Arias gained support among urbanized middle and lower-class residents. Arias used 
slogans appealing to the interior population like ^Panamenismo” (literally Panamanian-ism^ or 
"Panama for the Panamanians”) and with rhetoric demanding sovereignty over the Canal Zone. 
This rhetoric amounted to a call for administrative control over all Panamanian territory, 
including the Canal Zone. Inland opposition leaders focused their criticism against the 
maritime-commercial elite leaderships' high-profile foreign relations with the United States and 
encouraged student activists, whose social origins were largely from the middle-class, to take 
the demand for control over canal-derived benefits into the streets. The net effect o f Panama's 
internal political competition was a situation where all sides felt pressured to assume an 
antagonistic posture with the United States and demand treaty concessions beyond what might 
even seem to be within Panama's reasonable national economic interest.
1.3 En ta n g l em en t  a t  t h e  In ter sec tio n  o f  Am e r ic a n  G eographic  Im pe r a t iv e s  a n d  th e  
T w o  Panam as
Continental morphology made a conflict of interest between Americans and some 
Panamanians (of the country's interior) likely. But the striking thing about the last 150 years of 
American and Panamanian diplomatic relations is the extent to which representatives o f Panama 
and the United States have chosen to indulge the roles that their geographic predicament finds 
for them. Representatives o f the United States claimed that their use of and control over the 
Isthmus of Panama was an American geographic prerogative not to be encroached upon by 
foreign powers nor unnecessarily burdened by the sovereign of the Isthmus. Representatives of 
Panama (and Colombia before 1903) claimed that they stood to be compensated for use of the 
Isthmus of Panama's relative geographic location, which they considered their exclusive 
national asset.
13
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In order to rectify the expansion of American national interests with evolving 
Panamanian domestic politics four major agreements have been concluded/ The first was the 
1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty with Colombia (New Granada) which remained in force for half 
a century.'” The second major treaty was the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, modified in 1936 
and 1955. The third and fourth major agreements, the Panama Canal Treaty and the Neutrality 
Treaty, were both ratified in 1978. The two recent Panama Canal treaties replaced the 1903 
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and established guidelines for American and Panamanian obligations 
in preserving the canal s neutrally after 1999.
Apart from occasional internal debate in the United States. Panamanian opposition 
movements drive bilateral relations between the Republic of Panama and the United States. 
Revealing of the influence that Panamanian opposition leaders have in Panama's foreign 
relations with the United States is how they have provoked the most serious conflicts between 
Americans and Panamanians. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, ambitious Panamanian 
leaders have taken advantage of circumstances which far from trying to prevent the 
interposition of the United States in their afiairs in feet encouraged it. with its virtual guaranty 
of forcible application, for Panamanian domestic ends.
Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty between the United States and 
Colombia was the first treaty designed to satisfy the American imperative, guaranteeing liberal 
and neutral use of the Isthmus for American citizens and property in transit. However. Article 
XXXV included the peculiar condition that the United States would guarantee the neutrality of 
the Isthmus of Panama by guaranteeing the sovereignty of Colombia. At the time, it was felt 
that this was the best way to insure the Isthmus' neutrality. In reality. Article XXXV of the 
Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty was an entangling alliance.
” In the meantime, the United States and Britain had signed their own agreement concerning who would 
control a  Central American canal. The 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty abrogated the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty and satisfied the American desire to unilaterally control and fortify an interoceanic canal.
14
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Conflicts over Article XXXV o f the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty were the United 
States' introduction to the inevitable down-side of entangling alliances with foreign nations, 
what President George Washington a half-century earlier had warned Americans abouL In April 
1856, Panamanian State's Rights' activists provoked a violent riot against American 
passengers on the Panama Railroad to try to expose the incapability o f the Colombian 
government to provide a safe environment for American passengers and cargo in transit. The 
Panamanian hope, nearly realized in an 1857 treaty, was that the United States would take 
matters into its owm hands and declare the maritime cities o f the Isthmus of Panama as 
American protectorates.
It was not entirely out of the question that the United States might have tried to 
purchase or annex the Isthmus of Panama during the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Territorial annexation was an option that American representatives pondered seriously for many 
strategic non-adjacent areas in the Caribbean and Pacific including Cuba, Santo Domingo, and 
the Hawaiian Islands. Americans typically desired continuing to work through Article XXXV of 
the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty, as compared to the less desirable creation of a protectorate, 
while enabling Americans to control the territory without assuming the responsibihties o f a 
sovereign, as the former option was free of imperial or colonial associations
Provoking United States intervention by creating a violent situation against Americans 
as in April 1856 was a perverse but rare means by which Panamanian opposition leaders, 
maritime before 1903 and inland after 1903. would use American interests and treaty 
obligations for domestic political purposes. The January 1964 Canal Zone riots are probably the 
only comparable breakdown in American and Panamanian relations in contemporary times. The 
January 1964 riots began as a flag-raising issue between American and Panamanian students. 
However, the riots served the Panamanian political opposition. The acting leadership of Panama
See Appendix for a list of interoceanic railway and canal treaties, and other agreements.
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was caught in a position o f  having to use force against middle-class student activists. These 
actions permitted the opposition to claim that the incumbents were motivated by conunercial 
self-interest in support of an American enclave. The incumbent administration also suffered 
embarrassment and political criticism at the hands o f concerned United States representatives 
who were unwilling to stand aside and witness an incompetent attempt to suppress domestic and 
possibly Communist-inspired insurgency in an area o f strategic national interest.
To counter the potential for more occurrences like the January 1964 riots and believing 
that the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treat} was the major source of discontent. United States 
diplomats began negotiating a full replacement for the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty Political 
leaders in the United States had generally resisted abrogating the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty. American representatives felt that United States interests were satisfied with the treaty 
as it stood. Conservative Americans like California Governor Ronald Reagan argued that 
modifying the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty threatened American geographic imperatives in 
Central America and the Caribbean as well as American prestige around the world. Abrogating 
the treaty would open the way for foreign influence, in the wake of American withdrawal from 
direct involvement in the Canal Zone and the everyday operations of a Panama Canal. Other 
Americans notably President Jimmy Carter in 1977 and 1978 argued that American strategic 
interests and the international image of the United States were in fact better served by replacing 
the 1903 treaty, demonstrating that the United States respected its partnerships with smaller 
Latin American countries.
Operation Just Cause in December 1989 represents a well-known instance where 
Panamanian activists encouraged American intervention against domestic rivals in light of 
American treaty relationships. In the case of December 1989, the maritime-commercial business 
elite organized a  political opposition called the Civil Crusade (Cruzada Civilista) and lobbied 
for American intervention against the paramilitary order supporting General Manuel Noriega
16
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based on the threat he ostensibly posed to the neutrality o f the Panama Canal. The hope was that 
in the course of aggressively pursuing its own interests the indirect result of United States action 
would reverse the legacy o f the military coup that had usurped the political power of the 
maritime-commercial elite leadership three decades earlier.
Although conventional thinking about the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty indicates that;
As to the roots of Panamanian discontent it seems clear in retrospect that the 
complications which grew out of the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty -  for seventy-five 
years the centerpiece of U.S. relations with Panama -  could have been avoided."
1 believe that complications arising over the issue of sovereignty in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treats' were largely unavoidable. Given the domestic and strategic imperatives of American 
politics, no Panama Canal trea^ was likely, or constitutionally possible, that did not confer 
sovereign rights, power and authority over strategic Canal Zone territory to the United States. 
And no Panama Canal treaty with the Republic of Panama no matter how like or unlike the 
Hay-Herràn Treaty would have escaped being a controversial issue in Panamanian politics 
because of fundamental differences between the commercial and inland Panamanian societies, 
that not only reflected fundamental divergence in organization but also were exacerbated by the 
building of the canal under the terms of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.
Two societies bom of contrasting geographic and historical conditions, inhabiting the 
same state and dueling for political control are no doubt common phenomena around the 
world.'' In the case of Panama, the morphology of the Western Hemisphere and American 
geographic imperatives magnified the implications of provincial social and political differences 
among Panamanians. Domestic political contests in Panama have come to entangle an
Moffett (1985. 21)
'■ Fox (1971); Genovese and Hochberg (1989).
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expanding United States for the last one hundred and fifty years and will probably continue to 
do so. Consideration of future scenarios is included in the last chapter before the conclusion.
1.4 BRAUDELIAN FREEDOM OF THINKING
It takes a very special effort to consider less easily referenced scales of analysis, no less 
an effort than what a physicist does in contemplating subatomic processes at microscales 
beyond direct perception. It may seem strange to probe contemporary American and 
Panamanian relations by drawing upon the history of Panamanian society since the middle of 
the sixteenth century, or analyzing American foreign policy by comparing the morphology of 
continents at a global scale. Yet &scinating alternative explanations presented themselves when 
the scale of analysis was expanded far beyond what in any conservative estimation might have 
even seemed necessary. One interesting paradox was that a small area was very: strongly 
influenced by long-term phenomena, i.e., the Isthmus of Panama by the geographic evolution of 
its two societies. Whereas an extremely large area was affected by a relatively rapid 
phenomena, i.e., the Caribbean and the Pacific by the expansion of the United States during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. There may be no necessary cormection between temporal 
change and spatial scale. Short-term events can transform very large areas and very long-term 
phenomena may only persist in small areas, or vice versa.
The willingness to entertain spatial and temporal scales o f analysis well beyond our 
everyday frame of reference could be called a Braudelian' freedom of thinking following the 
geohistorical social science work of Fernand Braudel. The well-noted difficulty in using 
Braudel's style of thinking is to link the most durable phenomena of history with the most 
rapidly changing. In addition, invoking a longer time or spatial scale of analysis can create 
enormous burdens in terms of the amount of evidence that has to be reviewed. Braudelian 
thinking should not be a matter of intellectual taste encouraging unnecessary spatial and
18
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temporal leaps if the subject is more than adequately explained by more immediate scales of 
analysis. Not to mention the fact that taking unnecessary leaps in scale is an embarrassment of 
Braudel's unique insight into the nature of multiple historical time. The shift to the longue dureé 
or the longest time span in Braudel's conception of history is entirely appropriate if some 
important anomaly compels one step by step from the surAce of history to the depths of time or 
widest horizons of spatial scale. Yet even a purely exploratory look at wider scales of analysis 
may be worth the effort. The problem is that social scientists are often too timid to indulge their 
capacity for Braudelian freedom o f  thinking, instead preferring to stay within very 
circumscribed neighborhoods of historical time and spatial scale.
Many different authors have provided thoughtful and well-documented arguments in 
order to explain the persistence of conflict between the United States and the Republic of 
Panama. Consideration o f their arguments revealed problems or anomalies that suggested a 
further course of explanation lying beyond the most immediate scale o f reference. The pursuit 
of these further courses of explanation took things profoundly, and often surprisingly, into a 
geographic and historical background that most authors were not inclined to 6thom but which 
seemed to explain things better. The fact that many authors studying American and Panamanian 
relations chose not to pursue wider geographic and historical realms o f inquir\ makes their 
explanations not so much mistaken as prematurely abandoned.
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C h a p t e r  2. T h e  H a y -H e r r â n  T r e a t y  a n d  t h e  H a y -B u n a u -V a r h x a  T r e a t y
There should be no difTerence between the terms of the Hay-Herrân Treaty signed 22 
January 1903, but rejected by the Colombian Senate, and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty signed 
18 November 1903 and ratified by the Committee o f Provisional Goverrunent of the Republic of 
Panama (Junta de Gobiemo Provisional) on 2 December 1903. The two agreements concerned 
exactly the same project in exactly the same location at practically the same time. The only 
difference was that in November 1903 a new Republic o f Panama was sovereign over the 
Isthmus of Panama.
Arguments over the relationship of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama and the 
Hay-Herrân Treaty with Colombia must be considered. The problem with interpretations by 
Major (1984), McCullough (1977), DuVal (1966) and others is that they caimot explain why the 
Panamanian Provisional Government had no choice but to ratify the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 
immediately and without modification. The mere fact that the Republic of Panama was 
dependent on the United States for military protection against Colombia during the period of 
treaty negotiation is not really evidence that Panama was threatened by possible Colombian 
military action. Being protected by the United States should have eliminated the potential for a 
Colombian invasion.
Major (1984, 116) said that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty gave vastly more to the 
United States than the Hay-Herràn Treat} and that the change in Panamanian sovereignty in 
1903 was merely expedient to a treaty.’̂  Major (1984) closely examined how a series of 
penciled treaty drafts and proposals based on the 1903 Hay-Herrân Treaty were modified to 
become the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, and who appears to have made the modifications.'^
Ameringer (1966, 52) notes Secretary of State Hay as saying that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was 
“vastly more advantageous” to the United States.
''' Major (1984) lists his sources fi'om the National Archives including a State Department copy of 
amendments of Senator John Tyler Morgan to the Hay-Herrân convention; an American draft treaty dated 
10 November 1903; a revised American draft dated 15 November; Bunau-Varilla’s suggested
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Major's basic insight is that it was U.S. Secretary of State John Hay, not special envoy Philippe 
Bunau-Varilla, who penciled the first important modifications to the Hay-Herrân Treaty thereby 
deleting its pledges of sovereignty. Hay presented his draft proposal to Bunau-Varilla. who 
penned modifications to Articles I through YU, including the all-important formulation of 
conditional sovereignty, "if it were sovereign," in Article III
Hay included sovereignty pledges in the Hay-Herrân Treaty with Colombia out of a 
necessity to present a more palatable treaty to the Colombian legislature in early 1903. This 
would appear to reveal Hay's real feelings about American sovereignty on the Isthmus of 
Panama. If necessity did not demand that the treaty contain sovereignty pledges. Hay would 
never offer them. Major ( 1984) claims that Hay did not feel compelled to include sovereignty 
pledges, and even more, felt that the Colombian threat compelled Panamanians to accept 
American jurisdiction on the Isthmus of Panama. Major (1984, 117) says:
In March 1903 the [Hay-Henân| treaty ... passed the U.S. Senate by the huge margin 
of seventy-three to five. Eight months later, after the breakaway of Panama, the 
situation was transformed. The infant republic was utterly reliant on American 
protection against a Colombian reconquest of the isthmus, and Hay did not have to 
appease local opinion with the compromises he had offered earlier. Moreover, he knew 
that in Bimau-Varilla he was dealing with a man who was prepared to go to extreme 
lengths to obtain a canal treaty. Hay therefore stripped away the window dressing 
which had covered American predominance and left Panama with barely a shred of 
autonomy .... [and] Hay was well aware that Panama would have to agree to the 
amendments.
amendments to the second U.S. draft, dated 17 November, the second U.S. draft as amended in the light 
of those suggestions: a coimterdraft by Biuiau-Varilla, dated 17 November; and an American stunmaiy of 
the counterdrafL McCullough (1977. 390) states that on 15 November. Bunau-Varilla had received a copy 
of the Hay-Herrân Treaty with "minor penciled modifications.” It appears fi’om a glance at McCullough’s 
footnotes that he is using Bunau-Varilla’s own accoiuiL 
According to Bimau-Varilla’s (1913. 368) own accotmt, after an all-night review of the treaty handed to 
him by Hay on 15 November he began rewriting the draft treaty at 6:00 AM on 16 November and 
finished it at 10:00 PM that night, assisted by his fhend and attomqr Frank Pavey. Major does not clarify 
what role he finds for Pavey in drafting the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. DuVal (1966, 384), for his part 
says that though the ideas were Bunau-Varilla’s, Pavey did the actual legal drafting.
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As for special envoy Philippe Bunau-Varilla. Major (1984. 121) states that the Article QI 
formula of conditional sovereignty was the centerpiece of Bunau-Varilla's counterproposal, 
intended to expedite ratification in the Senate:
[I]ts donation of the equivalent of sovereignty to the United States was clearly designed 
to make his project irresistible to the administration and to the Senate when the time 
came for ratificatioa
In sum. Major finds two reasons for the discrepancy between the Hay-Herrân Treaty 
and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. First was Secretary of State John Hay's unwillingness to 
make pledges o f Panamanian sovereignty unless compelled by necessity. Second was Hay's 
perception that he had negotiating leverage with the Republic o f Panama because of its delicate 
militaiy situation with Colombia, and with Panamanian representative Philippe Bunau-Varilla's 
because of his personal financial interest in the French New Panama Canal Company 
{Compagnie Nouvelle). However, there are problems with this line of thinking.
Major (1984, 121) claimed that the Article HI conditional sovereignty clause was the 
centerpiece of Bunau-Varilla's counterproposal, "and its donation of the equivalent of 
sovereignty to the United States was clearly designed to make his project irresistible to the 
administration and to the Senate when the time came for ratification.'^ Bunau-Varilla's actions 
were invariably intended to expedite ratification o f the treaty, to ensure that the money from the 
sale of the Compagnie Nouvelle went to France, and possibly also to ensure his name in historv'. 
But there is something left unexplained about Bunau-Varilla's efforts. President Roosevelt had 
nearly a two-thirds majority or enough to pass a  treaty in the U.S. Senate in 1904, which alone 
increased the treaty's likelihood. The Hay-Herran Treaty itself was approved by the Senate 
without amendment just a few months prior, on 17 March 1903, by the overwhelming majority 
of seventy-three to five. It would be exactly the same assemblage of Senators that gave
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overwhelming support to the Hay-Herràn Treaty, those o f the Fifty-Eighth Congress, who 
would also be considering the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.
Why Bunau-Varilla would conclude from these facts, ones he must have been aware o f  
that it was absolutely necessary to draft an even more conciliatory treaty in order to insure its 
swift ratification in the Senate seems a  mystery. A precedent of a  seventy-three to five vote in 
the Senate should have guaranteed its success. Besides, the real debate in the Senate was not 
about the canal treaty but about Roosevelt and the Republican Party. Even Colombian observers 
of Congress never questioned the outcome. As it turned out, the Eiay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 
passed the U.S. Senate without amendment on 23 February 1904. by the vote o f sixty-six to 
fourteen.
The American need to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Canal Zone is 
entirely more interesting than Secretary of State John Hay's diplomacy during treaty 
negotiations in mid-November 1903. An American need to exercise sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction in the Canal Zone is underscored by specific geographic imperatives at the turn of 
the century and ambiguities in U.S. constitutional law. both to be explored later in Part Two.
Major also claimed that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty did not give Panama the 
guarantee of public order that the Panamanian foreign minister (Francisco De la Esprielia) had 
asked Bunau-Varilla to seek. Major also claims that since the time of the 1846 Bidlack- 
Mallarino Treaty, the United States Government had refused to interpret its commitment as an 
obligation to maintain internal security in Panama. Major's intent might have been simply to 
point out how the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty conceded greater benefits to the United States 
without imposing greater obligations, such as maintaining public order. But not all facets of 
United States privilege and obligation with the Republic of Panama concerning internal order 
were listed in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty alone. Article 136 of the 1904 Constitution of the 
Republic of Panama stated:
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The Government of the United States may intervene in any part of the Republic of 
Panama to reestablish public peace and constitutional order in the event of their being 
distiubed. provided that that Nation shall, by public treaty, assume or have assumed the 
obligation o f guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty o f this Republic 
[emphasis added).
Article I o f the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty confirmed that the United States guaranteed 
and would maintain the independence o f the Republic of Panama. Also, the Spooner Act of 
1902 specifically called for American jurisdiction in the Canal Zone and terminal cities to 
maintain order and public health. In fact, thetu the United States did lend the guarantee of 
maintaining internal and constitutional order in the Republic of Panama, indirectly, by means of 
the treaty. The 6 c t that the United States agreed to do this, at the behest of Panamanians, is very- 
important to note. One of the incentives that prompted leading members of the Conservative 
Party in Panama to support the treaty may have been expectation of political support, not 
against the Colombian army, but against rival Liberal party leaders within Panama.
2 .1 THE False  Threat  of a Colom bian  Atta ck  on  Panama
Consider both sides of any potential threat of Colombian military action against the 
Isthmus of Panama. One is Colombia's capability to mount a successful attack. Another is the 
response by United States military forces if a Colombian attack occurred. Colombia's capability 
to moimt a military offensive is a tactical and logistical question. Subsequent military action by 
United States forces to prevent, or fail to prevent, a Colombian offensive is mainly a political 
question. The implication that the Roosevelt administration would actually reverse the policy of 
3 November 1903. and choose to allow Colombian reinforcements to attack Panama if. 
immediately following treaty negotiations, the Republic of Panama did not ratify the treaty
Hoyt (1966-7. 39) says that Article 136 of the 1903 treaty was put in at the proposal of Secretary of 
State Elihu Root who had proposed a similar article for a treaty with Cuba.
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forthwith without modification is so absolutely implausible that it is difficult to imagine how 
even the perception o f such a threat could have affected treaty negotiations to any extent, least 
of all to the extent Major, McCullough and others claim. On the other hand, consider that 
Colombia had the desire but not the means to carry out its plan to reintegrate Panama by force. 
Also consider that the United States had the means but not the political will to prevent 
Colombia from doing so. Panamanians may have been afraid of Colombia's desire, without 
necessarily having an adequate sense of Colombia’s actual means. Panamanians may have also 
been unclear on the United States desire to use its own forces against a Colombian attack.
Nonetheless, it was impossible for a Colombian army to attack the Isthmus o f Panama, 
overland or by sea. There has never been a military offensive of any scale to successfully cross 
Darien, the territory separating Panama and Colombia at the northwestern comer o f South 
America, and certainly not in the middle of the rainy season (May to January) when overland 
movement would be next to impossible. Throughout late 1903 and the dry season in early 1904, 
U.S. Navy and Marine forces had been monitoring Colombian troop movements on both coasts 
of Darien for signs o f activity in preparation for an overland attack on the port cities o f the 
Isthmus.*  ̂On 15 December 1903, a United States warship (USS Atlanta) patrolling the north 
coast of Darien discovered the existence of Colombian forces under the command o f General 
Daniel Ortiz. Their purpose was either to cross Darien or to set up a base o f operations in the 
eastern part of the Isthmus. Colombian preparations eventually came to nothing.'* Opting for 
such a potentially difficult overland march would only make sense if it were firmly believed by 
the Republic o f Colombia that their troops could not be transported to Panama City and Colon 
by sea.
' A letter from Admiral Coghlan to the Secretary of the Navy dated 21 November 1903, states; 
"[Referring to Colombian General Reyes] Said they have ordered the Colombian forces to do nothing 
hostile till further orders from them” (DuVal 1966, 361).
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The most sensible way fbr Colombian reinforcements to reach the Isthmus, as had been 
always been the case before, was by sea. But reinforcement by sea was not an option for the 
Colombian military at the time because United States warships were concentrated at Panama 
City on the Pacific side (USS Boston, USS Marblehead, USS Concord. USS Wyoming), and 
Colon on the Caribbean side (USS Nashville. USS Dixie. USS Atlanta). U.S. naval forces would 
have prevented any Colombian naval force from entering the major harbors or attacking the 
cities. Unless Colombian forces planned to land on the Atlantic and Pacific harbors 
simultaneously, they would also be 6ced with the prospect of having to seize the Panama 
Railroad for the transit of their troops. Otherwise. Colombian troops would be forced to find 
another means of crossing the Isthmus.
Regardless of the problem posed by using the Panama Railroad, the naval superiority of 
United States warships flanking the ports of the Isthmus would have been for the Colombian 
military as impenetrable an obstacle as crossing Darien during the rainy season, and potentially 
more costly. There existed no realistic Colombian maneuver to attack the Panamanian cities 
without at the same time engaging United States warships There would have had to have been 
at least tacit approval by the United States in order for Colombia to even consider mounting a 
military expedition by sea to either of the two ports o f the Isthmus of Panama and use the 
Panama Railroad for the transportation of their troops. Colombian representatives solicited 
United States consent several times immediately following the revolt, one even promising 
instant approval of the Hay-Herran Treaty, but of course all were rebuffed.*^
DuVal (1966. 362-378). It is ironic that Bunau-Varilla himself, advising Secretary of State Hay and 
Secretary of War Elihu Root about Colombian General Reyes' threat to attack Panama overland in 
January 1904. pointed out the unfeasibility of any invasion through Darien (Ameringer 1966. SI).
A letter from Beaupre to Hay on 6 November 1903 mentions a series of unanswered requests. General 
Reyes claimed that if the United States landed its owm troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty 
according to 1846 treaty, the Colombian government would declare martial law and declare treaty ratified 
by decree, or. would convene a friendly congress in May to approve a trea^, whichever the United States 
preferred. Reyes asked several questions, relayed on behalf of Colombia’s minister for foreign aSairs: 
"Will you allow Colombian Government to land troops at those ports to fight there and on the line of 
railway? Also if the Government of the United States will take action to maintain Colombian right and
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To suggest that tacit approval for any reason would be given by President Roosevelt 
allowing Colombian reinforcements to proceed past U.S. warships stationed in the harbors of 
Panama City and Colon, and engage revolutionary forces assembled by a nation already 
recognized by the United States and France as an independent sovereign state is difficult, but 
not impossible, to imagine.^ But would the Roosevelt Administration would have done this 
because the Committee of Provisional Government in Panama had failed to ratify the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty without amendments, reservations or understandings? If Theodore 
Roosevelt bad dealt public and partisan criticism for their policy not to allow Colombian troops 
to suppress the Panamanian secession in order to secure a  6vorab!e Isthmian canal treaty, 
imagine what the response in the United States and abroad would have been if the Roosevelt 
Administration suddenly reversed field and allowed Colombia to invade the Isthmus, turning a 
practically bloodless revolt into a human tragedy, simply because the Provisional Government 
of Panama would not ratify the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty without modification. That it might 
be an issue in the upcoming 1904 presidential elections would be an understatement. 
McCullough (1977, 396-7) says:
The notion that Roosevelt would abandon Panama at this point, that he would leave the 
jimta to the vengeance of Colombia, that he would now suddenly turn aroimd and treat 
with Bogota, was not simply without foundation, but ridiculous to anyone the least 
familiar with the man or the prevailing temper in Washington. Nothing of the kind was 
ever even remotely contemplated at the White House or the State Department.
sovereignty on the Isthmus in accordance with article 35. the treaty of 1846. in case the Colombian 
Government is entirely unable to suppress the secession movement there?” Beaupre said that he w'as 
unable to elicit from the minister for foreign affairs a confirmation of the promises Reyes made about 
ratifying the treaty. In a letter from Hay to Beaupre on 11 November 1903. Hay stated that he had already 
telegraphed him on 6 November that the United States had entered into relations with the provisional 
government of the Republic of Panama. Reyes’ questions, therefore, were moot. Also. Hay stated titat 
permitting Colombian troops to land would "precipitate civil war and disturb for an indefinite period the 
free transit which we are pledged to protect” Ô-1-S. Congress 1977b).
The United States was the first nation to recognize the Republic of Panama and entered into relations 
with the Committee of Provisional Government on 6 November 1903. By the time Hay and Bunau-
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Despite McCullough’s (1977, 396) own statement that this 'ultimate knife at the throat” was a 
"wholly spurious” threat, he apparently Ails to see any problem in the supposition that such a 
wholly spurious threat was believed by members of the Provisional Government in Panama."' 
The fact that the Provisional Government of Panama was actually supposed to have believed 
that Colombian repossession of Panama and with United States consent demanded they had to 
consider immediate ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treat} truly bears explanation.
Suppose that some mechanism could be found allowing Colombia to re-establish 
control over the Isthmus of Panama peacefully. It is impossible to see why Secretary of State 
Hay or President Roosevelt would consider a now vindictive Colombia, the second time around, 
to be in a position to offer a better treaty." If anything, the Colombian Senate probably already 
used up such an option when, after the unanimous rejection of the Hay-Herràn Treat}, the 
United States turned to an independent Republic of Panama. The only option other than 
Panama, Nicaragua notwithstanding, would have been if the United States recognized the 
independent sovereignty of a yet smaller nation on the Isthmus composed o f a strip of territor} 
along a canal route and the terminal cities, when and if such a 'Republic of the Transit Zone' 
ever decided to secede from the Republic of Panama.
No credible evidence exists that officials of the Roosevelt Administration or Congress 
ever insinuated to a member of the Committee of Provisional Government of the Republic of 
Panama that they would consider allowing Colombian forces to attack or repossess the Isthmus 
of Panama if Panamanians did not ratify the original draft of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.^ In
Variila were exchanging draft proposals for the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, France had also recognized 
Panama (16 November 1903).
McCullough (1977. 396-7) emphasized the impact of a cable from Bunau-Varilla to Panamanian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco V. de la Esprielia on 25 November 1903.
"" Consider if Colombian troops were allowed to invade Panama, and Panamanian forces defeated them. 
Then the Roosevelt Administration would either have to negotiate with a vindictive Republic of Panama 
or decide whether to involve U.S. military forces in subjugating Panama on Colombia’s behalf.
^  McCullough (1977, 396) said that on 25 November 1903, Bunau-Varilla sent a cable to the Provisional 
Government’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco de la Esprielia and said that if Panama did not ratify 
the treat} immediately, "the almost certain consequence would be an immediate suspension of American
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fact, statements and most importantly actions absolutely abound to the contrary, that it was the 
policy of the United States not to allow Colombia to re-establish its control over the Isthmus of 
Panama by force or any other means. It is nonetheless interesting to consider that each time 
American diplomats said they would never think of abandoning Panamaiuans, it recused the 
possibility of their doing exactly that in the minds of Panamanians In a situation such as late 
1903, where adversaries exist and paranoia regarding intentions abound, such a circumstance is 
not entirely unbelievable. The question is. does this circumstance explain why Panamanians 
accepted the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty?
2.2 WHO Represented  the  Republic of Pa n a m a 's Interests in 1903?
It is generally understood that Philippe Bunau-Varilla, Panama's representative in the 
treaty, invented the threat of Colombian repossession of the Isthmus of Panama in order to 
expedite its signing and ratification in Panama.''* It is also generally understood that Philippe
protection over the new republic and the signing of a canal treaty with Bogota." McCullough (1977. 396) 
believed; "Possibly, as would be suggested. John Hay had something to do with this astonishing message. 
Bunau-Varilla never implied as much, but Hay was to remark later in a letter to Senator CuUom that we 
insisted on immediate ratification.” The "as would be suggested" is probably a reference to DuVal s 
(1966. 389) claim: "How much of this message was originated by Bunau-Varilla and how much by Hay 
may never be known. Hay stated later that We insisted on an immediate ratification of the treaty by the 
Panama Government, and they acceded to our wishes. ' It caused consternation in the Panama 
government It got actiort but it also laid the foundation for the Panamanian hatred of Bunau-Varilla. and 
they call it his 'great treason.’” Hay’s statement to Senator Cullom that he and Bunau-Varilla ("we”) 
insisted on its inunediate ratification is far from evidence that Hay specifically threatened removing 
American protection. That Hay, in his capacity as the U.S. Secretary of State, would have insisted on 
immediate ratification after the treaty was signed was to be expected and does demonstrate anything 
about whether or not Hay assented to some kind of idle threat McCullough unfortunately neither 
footnotes nor in any other way justifies the idea that Hay had something to do with Bunau-Varilla’s cable 
to De la Esprielia. or any other threat of removing American protection Ameringer (1966. 47) offers the 
possibility of some kind of connection between Bunau-Varilla’s threat and Secretary' of State Hay based 
on the fact that Bunau-Varilla sent Hay an English translation of his alarmist message of 25 November 
1903. DuVal (1966, 387-88) believed that there was a connection between Bunau-Varilla’s threat and the 
Roosevelt Administration based on the fact that by 19 December 1903. the Utiited States had changed its 
policy of protecting the entire state of Panama to concentrating on the vicinity of the Panama Railroad. 
DuVal (1966, 390) claimed, '’there can be very little doubt that ratification was necessary for the life of 
tlie Panama Republic. ” None of these authors establish a credible connection between Bunau-Varilla’s 
threat and Secretary of State Hay.
Philippe-Bunau-Variila was officially designated by Arango, Arias and Boyd as the Panamanian 
representative with full powers to negotiate a treaty, according to their cables of 5 and 6 November 1903
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Bunau-Varilla, who was not a citizen o f Panama and had not been resident on the Isthmus for at 
least a decade, acted less like a representative o f the Republic of Panama and more like a 
representative o f the Compagnie Notcvelle or perhaps just himself during treaty negotiations.
It does not appear the Committee o f Provisional Government ever took an initiative to 
ask Secretary of State Hay or President Roosevelt to confirm Bunau-Varilla's warning in his 
cable of 25 November 1903, that if the treaty was not ratified immediately and without 
modification upon its arrival in Panama, Colombian forces would be allowed to repossess 
Panama. In feet, between the time of Bunau-Varilla's cable on 25 November and the arrival of 
the treaty in Panama on I December 1903. Panama Railroad Company Vice-President E. A. 
Drake wrote to a  company representative. George Beers, instructing him to inform the 
Panamanian government that Bunau-Varilla's claim was false and that they should replace him 
with Pablo Arosemena. Ameringer (1966) says that Bunau-Varilla had gone to the Panama
(U.S. Congress 1977b. 258). [From Panama 5 November 1903] “Secretary of State. iVashington: We 
notify you that we have appointed Senor Philippe Bunau-Varilla confidential agent of the Republic of 
Panama near your Government and Dr. Francisco V. de la Esprielia minister of foreign affairs. [Signed] 
Arango. Boyd. Arias.” [From Panama 6 November 1903) “Secretary of State. Washington: The board of 
pro\isional government of the Republic of Panama has appointed Senor Philippe Bunau Variila envoy 
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary near your Government with full powers to conduct diplomatic 
and financial negotiations. Deign to receive and heed him. [Signed] J. M. Arango. Tomas Arias. Federico 
Boyd. Foreign Relations." These actions of the Conunittee of Provisional Government were 
aclurowledged by U.S. Vice-Consul-Geneial Ehrman in his communications to Secretary of State Hay. 
[From Panama 6 November 1903. Cable firom Ehrman to Hay] “ .... Bunau-Varilla has been appointed 
ofilcially confidential agent of the Republic of Panama at WashingtoiL” [From Panama 6 November 
1903. Cable from Ehrman to Hay] “Felipe Bunau-Varilla has been appointed envoy extmordinar} and 
minister plenipotentiary to the United States of America.” Bunau-Varilla says about his own appointment, 
in a telegram from New York to Secretary of State Hay on 7 November 1903 (U.S. Congress 1977b. 
259). “In selecting for its first representative at Washington a veteran servant and champion of the 
Panama Canal, my Government [Panama] has evidently sought to show that it considers a loyal and 
earnest devotion to the success of that most heroic conception of human genius as both a solemn duty and 
the essential purpose of its existence.” Ameringer (1966. 32) referred to a passage from John Bigelow 's 
diaiy dated 19 October 1903 (which can be found in Clapp 1947.313-4). The diary entry said that Bunau- 
Varilla was appointed as envoy because of a deal with Manuel Amador going back to 17 October 1903. 
Ameringer says. “[In a meeting on 17 October, Bunau-Varilla] reaffirmed his opinion that the United 
States would act. but stated that the Panamanians would have to take the first step in order to create the 
conditions for American intervention. He promised that once the rebellion had occurred he would send 
$100.000 for immediate e.\penses and insisted as a condition for his aid that he be appointed minister to 
the United Slates.” Ameringer (1966. 32-3) explained why Amador’s made this pledge: “Although 
Amador accepted the condition, he probably did not intent to go through with it. but in the end did so
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Railroad offices in New York demanding that Drake detain one of the company steamers 
scheduled to leave Colon the same day the treaty was arriving in order to give the Committee 
the chance to send it back on that ship. Drake refused to concede to Bunau-Varilla's demand, 
even after Bunau-Varilla claimed that unless the steamer was detained Colombia would seize 
the opportunity' of delay to attack the Isthmus. The cablegram dated 30 November 1903 states;
[From New York, 30 November 1903. 6:10 PM to] Beers, Panama: Several cables 
urging immediate appointment of Pablo Arosemena have been sent to the Junta 
(provisional government) since Friday. We are surprised that action has not taken place 
and suppose it is only because minister of the Republic of Panama [Bunau-Varilla] is 
trying to disturb the Junta by cabling that there is great danger that Washington will 
make a trade with Reyes and withdraw warships and urge his retention because of his 
alleged influence with President Roosevelt arid Senators. This is absolutely without 
foundation. Mr. Cromwell has direct assurances from President Roosevelt, Secretary 
Hay, Senator Hanna and other Senators that there is not the slightest danger of this. 
Evidently the minister’s pretense of influence is grossly exaggerated. We have the 
fiiUest support of Mr. Cromwell and his friends who have carried every victory for us in 
the past six years. Junta evidently does not know that objection exists in Washington to 
the minister of Panama, because he is not a Panaman but a foreigner, and initially has 
displeased influential Senators regarding character of former treaty. He is recklessly 
involving the Republic o f Panama in financial and other complications that will use up 
important part o f  indemnity. Delegates [Amador. Boyd and Arosemena] here are 
powerless to prevent all this, as minister of Republic of Panama uses his position of 
minister to go over their heads. He is sacrificing the Republic's interests and may at any 
moment commit Republic of Panama to portion of the debts of Colombia, same as he 
signed a treaty omitting many points o f advantage to Republic o f Panama — and which 
would have been granted readily -  without waiting for delegates, who were to his 
knowledge within two hours of arrival. With discretion inform Junta and cable me 
immediately synopsis of situation and when will Junta appoint Pablo Arosemena, 
Answer to-day if possible. Drake.^
Even more irregular than Bunau-Varilla's personal agenda to expedite a treaty as 
quickly as possible was his relationship with the other members of the Provisional Government 
after their arrival in Washington on 19 November 1903.^ It was not mere coincidence that only
because of the rapid movement of events, the degree of precision with which Bunau-Varilla seemed to 
redeem his pledges, and the conviction that he was too influential to alienate.”
^  Cited in DuVal (1966, 394). DuVal does not mention Beers’ reply.
On 19 November 1903, De la Esprielia wrote, ”Your Excellency is requested to inform us of the cause 
which led you to sign the treaty before conferring with the delegates Amador and Boyd. Conununicate to 
us the modifications introduc^” (DuVal 1966, 385). The next day, 20 November 1903, De la Esprielia 
wrote: ’’Explanation received from Amador-Boyd on the powerful reason which made you sign the treaw
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hours after the treaty was signed the special commission' consisting of Federico Boyd. Manuel 
Amador Guerrero and later Pablo Arosemena was just arriving in Washington from New 
York.'^ McCullough suggests that after Boyd and Amador had arrived. Bunau-Varilla sent 
several cables to the Provisional Government’s Secretary of Foreign Relations, Francisco V de 
la Esprielia. so that he could press ratification of the treaty in Panama behind the backs of the 
‘special commissioners. Ameringer (1966), on the other hand, says that Bunau-Varilla was in 
constant communication with De la Esprielia in accord with his responsibility as envoy. 
McCullough ( 1977) says there were several instances of disagreement and personal jealousy 
between Bunau-Varilla and the special commission. McCullough (1977, 395) states that in the 
days that followed the arrival of Boyd and Amador:
Boyd kept insisting that Bunau-Varilla had acted without authorit}. illegally, 
specifically contrary to his written instructions. Bunau-Varilla. with marked impatience, 
assured him that any such protestations were quite pointless, ‘as everything is finished.’
Ameringer (1966. 42) says something different:
Actually, the Panamanians. Amador and Boyd included, cooperated well with him. 
Criticism of the treaty in Panama developed slowly.
annuls anterior cable sent to-day on this subject to Yom Excellency” (DuVal 1966. 385). From this cable 
it appears that Amador and Boyd had confirmed Bunau-Varilla’s actions to De la Esprielia.
'  Federico Boyd, a businessman, was one of the original executive members of the Committee of 
Provisional Government along with two other men (Arango and Arias). Amador, a medical doctor for the 
Panama Railroad, would in the next year serve as President of the Republic of Panama. According to 
Alba Carranza (1967) and official cables, Amador was never an executive member of the Committee of 
Provisional Government but its Secretary of Finance. Pablo Arosemena is not mentioned by Alba 
Carranza (1967) as an executive member of the Committee of Provisional Government or its cabinet 
Arosemena was an attorney and may have been included for his legal knowledge. There is some 
confusion in McCullough’s (1977) account about who "Arosemena” was. McCullough seems to think 
that it was Carlos C. Arosemena, one of the main conspirators. However. Alba Carranza (1967) and the 
cable from Ehrman arc specific about "Pablo Arosemena.” Pablo Arosemena would have been only a 
year yoimger than Amador, not to be confused with the youthful Carlos C. Arosemena. Nonetheless, a 
picture on the front page of the New York World dated 18 January 1904. depicting the arrival of the
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It is difficult to reconcile McCullough s understanding of Boyd's feelings towards Bunau- 
Varilla's efforts in the treaty and the fact that according to Ameringer (1966. 46) when the 
treaty was sent back to Panama 24 November 1903, Boyd had already signed it.
It is also unclear why Boyd, Amador and Arosemena were chosen to go to the United 
States, what they hoped to accomplish, what their relative responsibilities relative to Bunau- 
Varilla were supposed to be, and to what extent they themselves kept in communication with De 
la Esprielia and others in Panama. Felix Ehrman, United States Vice-Consul-General, cabled 
from Panama on 10 November 1903, about the departure of the special commission saying;
Federico Boyd, a member of the Committee of the GovenunenL Amador Guerrero, 
both delegates, on the way to Washington to arrange in a satisfactory maimer to the 
United States the canal treaty and other matters. Pablo Arosemena. attorney, proceeds 
next steamer...
The next day. on 11 November 1903, Ehrman sent a telegram stating:
I am officially informed that Bunau-Varilla is the authorized party to make treaties. 
Boyd and Amador have other missions and to assist their minister.
McCullough (1977, 388) says about this cable:
Who had thus informed the American vice-consul remains obscure, but in actuali^ the 
written instmctions for Bunau-Varilla being carried north from Colon were quite to the 
contrary. It was quite clearly specified that the envoy extraordinary was to 'adjust' a 
canal treaty, that all clauses in the treaty were to be discussed in advance with Amador 
and Boyd, that he was to proceed in everything strictly in accord with them.'"
McCullough (1977) claims the Panamanian source o f Ehrman's cable “remains obscure.” Given 
that in his two earlier cables dated 6 November 1903, Ehrman was merely confirming actions
special commission from Panama shows both Pablo and Carlos Arosemena with Amador and Boyd
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already taken by the Committee it would follow it was either the three members o f the 
Committee in Panama (Arango, Arias and Espinosa B.) or more probably De la Esprielia had 
informed Ehrman. This, in fact, seems to be the case. On 10 November, the day before 
Ehrman's telegram. De la Esprielia cabled to Bunau-Varilla;
We approve that you have repudiated reports the commissioners are coming to discuss 
and sign the canal treaty, powers which are entrusted to Your Excellency. Amador and 
Boyd have no mission before the goverrunent of the United States except that 
communicated to you yesterday, that is. for the purpose of avoiding delays.^
Taking into account De la Espriella's cable to Bunau-Varilla on 10 November it does 
not appear that Boyd, Amador and Arosemena were sent to negotiate, nor participate directly in 
the drafting of the treaty. Bunau-Varilla's responsibilities were neither temporary nor 
subordinate to those of the special commission, despite what McCullough (1977) and 
Ameringer (1966) assert about De la Espriella's written instructions carried by the special 
commission. No word ever seems to have been given to the United States directly from the 
Provisional Government in Panama changing Bunau-Varilla's status. And no word came 
indirectly from U.S. representatives in Panama or in person from the special commission' after 
it had arrived in the United States in any way changing or adjusting the earlier official 
communications about Bunau-Varilla's responsibility as envoy.^
(DuVal 1966.403 ante).
^  It is reasonable to ask whether this telegram by De la Esprielia superseded whatever written instruction 
Boyd and Amador were carrying with them.
^  The written instructions ftom De la Esprielia were carried by Boyd and Amador in a letter from De la 
Esprielia to Bunau-Varilla dated 9 November 1903. Ameringer (1966, 36) says the Committee through 
verbal instructions had empowered Boyd and Amador to make démarches directly with the United States, 
"in case of necessity in the interests of the Republic.” Regarding the written instructions. Ameringer 
(1966. 36) outlines the three main points: "First, De la Esprielia entrusted Bunau-Varilla with the 
negotiation of a treaty in which all agreements contracted betAveen the United States and Colombia as of 
November 3, 1903 would remain eftective between the United States and Panama, providing they [did] 
not affect the sovereignty of Panama, which [was] ftee, independent, and sovereign.' Second. Bunau- 
Varilla was to negotiate a treaty whereby the United States would protect the sovereignty, territorial 
integrit}', and public order’ of Panama. Third, a treaty for the cortstruction of a canal by the United States 
was to be drafted .... all clauses’ of that treaty were to be previously consulted’ with Amador and Boyd.
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The last communication directly from the Committee o f Provisional Government to the 
United States was the telegram of 6 November 1903. to Secretary of State Hay, assigning full 
treat) negotiating powers to Bunau-Varilla. The situation was not altered when Boyd and 
Amador met with Hay.^ As far as the United States Government had been informed by 
representatives of the Provisional Government the last word on Bunau-Varilla's responsibilities 
was the cable sent to Bunau-Varilla by De la Espriella on 10 November 1903. indirectly 
confirmed through Ehrman s note to Hay on 11 November 1903. that Bunau-Varilla was the 
designated treaty envoy/*
Even granting the logic of assigning Bunau-Varilla as envoy to negotiate the treaty, the 
fact that a treaty was signed with U.S. Secretary o f State Hay on 18 November 1903, before 
Boyd. Amador and Arosemena had arrived to discuss the treaty's stipulations did not 
necessarily preclude Boyd and Amador from relieving Bunau-Varilla of his duties if he had not 
acted in accordance with their wishes. Boyd, as one of the three original executive members of 
the Committee of Provisional Government, should have had every right to do so when he
You will proceed in everything,’ De la Espriella told Bunau-Varilla. 'strictly in agreement with them. 
The treaty’s provisions, he concluded, must not be any less favorable for Panama than were those of the 
Hay-Herran ueaty for Colombia.’”
An irregularity in the special commission’s status as an official delegation was that they were 
introduced to Hay through Bunau-Varilla. not directly. McCullough (1977) does not say whether Boyd 
and Amador were met by United States representatives immediately upon their arrival in New York, as 
would have been the case if it were an officially recognized delegation. Ameringer (1966. 41) said that 
Boyd and Amador were met first by several reporters and photographers then Joshua Lindo. the man who 
had originally brought Amador to Bunau-Varilla on 24 September 1903. and finally Roger L. Famham. a 
close associate of influential attomey and Panama lobbyist William Cromwell.
McCullough’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1978 on the 
circumstances of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 appears mistaken He stated: “There is no 
question whatsoever that the treaty was signed without the consent or the expressed endorsement of the 
designated representatives of the Panamanian Government When they arrived here the treaty was a fait 
accompli. Funhermore. when the treaty was put on the boat to be sent back to Panama to be ratified by 
the new Panamanian legislature, the then special envoy from Panama. Philippe Bunau-Varilla. notified 
the Panamanians in Panama that if they did not go ahead and sign the treaty, the administration was going 
to turn around and support the Colombian position, which was to suppress the revolution, and go ahead 
and complete negotiations for the old Colombian treaty, which had f^ed  in the Senate at Bogota. This 
was a totally spurious act on the part of Bunau-Varilla, based on no information of truth, because that was 
the last thing in the world that Theodore Roosevelt would have done. Had we done that we would have 
been writing the death sentence for the Panamanian junta which had started the new republic [sic| of
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arrived. Not only that. De la Esprieila's written instructions to Bunau-Varilla specifically 
empowered Boyd, Amador or Arosemena to make démarches directly with the United States 
Government "in case of necessity in the interests of the Republic.'’̂ ' They never did.
As for the end of negotiation after the signing of the treaty, the 6 c t that a treaty is 
merely signed is hardly the end. In feet, it is just the beginning. Every state has its own internal 
procedures for treaty ratification. In the United States, the treaty process begins when a  treaty is 
signed but is not completed until 1) a signed treaty, after having been examined or approved by 
the Secretary o f State and the President, is officially presented to the Senate. 2) the treaty has 
been given advice and consent to ratification plus any amendments, reservations, 
understandings or other modifications by a two-thirds majority of the Senate, and 3) documents 
of ratification are exchanged with the foreign nation by the time limit set in the treaty. In 
Panama, treaty ratification seems to have proceeded in the following way. The Committee of 
Provisional Government ratified the treaty, then certain municipalities within the Republic of 
Panama ratified the action of the Committee. The names of the three members of the Committee 
of Provisional Government (Arango. Arias, and Espinosa B.) plus six ministers of the Cabinet 
(Morales. De la Espriella. Mendoza. Amador. De Obarrio. and Facio) appear on the document
Panama. Bunau-Varilla was holding a knife to the throat and they were left with no choice but to say yes. 
we will go ahead with tliis treaty” U.S. Congress (1977b. 36).
Bunau-Varilla may have been aware of the possibility he might be replaced w hen he urged rapid action 
on Secretary of State Hay on 17 November 1903. stating: "So long as the delegation has not arrived in 
Washingtoru I shall be &ee to deal with you alone, provided with complete and absolute powers. When 
they arrive, I shall no longer be alone. In fact, I may perhaps no longer be here at all” (DuVal 1966, 382). 
Recall also the cable from Drake to Beers quoted above saying that several cables had been sent urging 
the Committee to replace Bunau-Varilla with Pablo Arosemena.
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of ratification dated 2 December 1903/^ Subsequent to that date, the various municipal councils 
of the Republic of Panama ratified the actions o f the Committee of Provisional Govenunent.^ 
Several options remained for Boyd, Amador and Arosemena after the signing of the 
treaty on 18 November 1903, if they felt that the treaty was unsatisfactory . One option was to 
ask for a signed understanding to the treaty fi'om Hay, without changing any wording in the 
draft, as a condition to presenting it to the Provisional Government. Another option was to 
negotiate a supplementary treaty. Du Val (1968. 386) says that in the meeting between Boyd. 
Amador and Secretary of State Hay on 20 November 1903, it was suggested by Hay himself 
that the commissioners seek authorization to ratify the treaty on behalf o f Panama right on the 
spot. For doing so. Hay promised to consider any objections by negotiating a supplementary 
treaty The commissioners rejected that option, but it was not an entirely bad suggestion and
Federico Boyd’s name does not appear despite Ameringer’s (1966) statement that Boyd signed the 
treaty before it left the United States. DuVai (1966. 388) noted that Bunau-Varilla sent a cable to De la 
Espriella on 24 November 1903, stating: ”Has approval of Commission. Amador and Boyd. Boyd has 
signed as member of Government Junta.” It may have been that because Boyd was replaced by Espinosa 
Batista on the Committee while on the commission to Washington. D C., common practice when a 
Panamanian executive leaves the country. Boyd’s signature was not needed but Espinosa Batista's was.
The mimicipalities which unanimously ratified the Committee’s actions dining their various special 
sessions between 2 and 6 December 1903. include: Caleb re. Panama. Aguadulce. Nata. Santiago de 
Veraguas. Sona. Montijo. Pese. Los Santos. Las Minas, Ocu. La Chorrera. Buenavista, Portobelo. David. 
Las Palmas. La Mesa. Taboga. Gatun, Rio Jesus, and San Francisco. I was not able to determine whether 
this represents all of the municipalities in Panama.
McCullough (1977. 395) claims that Bunau-Varilla had scolded the commissioners as having made a 
“decidedly bad impression” on the Secretary of State. McCullough’s reference for this statement is not 
clarified and may not be a correct interpretation. On 21 November 1903. Bunau-Varilla cabled De la 
Espriella (cited in part in Duval 1966 386-7) that a system of returning the trea^ to Panama to be ratified 
instead of ratifying it on the spot caused a bad impression.” Bunau-Varilla said: “As it is not within the 
power of the Commission, and as this one. being moved by respectable considerations of delicate 
susceptibility, has declined to ask the Government for such powers, we have notified Secretary Hay that 
the treaty would be sent by the mail steamer of next Tuesday, arriving at Colon on December 1: and that 
the Commission would recommend with all its might the immediate ratification by the Government and 
the immediate expedition of telegraphic instmctions. so that I may notify ratification to Government here. 
This system, though inspired by the best intentions, caused a bad impression because the Government of 
Washington is accused by its own enemies and those of the Canal to have acted with an undignified haste 
in its recognition of the Panama Republic. These enemies make much of the fact that the newborn 
Republic displays less haste and wants to accomplish detailed formalities. The slight moral wound 
therefrom is demonstrated by the decision, which was just taken, not to send the treaty to the Senate 
before its ratification by the Panama Government” DuVual (1966. 387) said that the message goes on to 
say that telegraphic news of ratification could not arrive until 2 or 3 December, thus “there would not be
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might have been better for the interests of the Republic o f Panama. As it was the Provisional 
Government ratified the treaty without modification on 2 December 1903, without the promise 
for a supplementary treaty from Hay.
Another option was to travel back to Panama along with the treaty and during the treaty 
ratification procedure at home add whatever amendments, reservations or understandings to the 
treaty as signed on 18 November 1903, that should have been included. The U.S. Senate had not 
yet considered any draft of the treaty and might not do so until the Provisional Government had 
ratified the treaty in Panama. There was little danger in adding even an amendment least o f all 
less complicated features like a reservation or understanding and then sending the modified 
version back to the United States for President Roosevelt to present to the Senate for their 
consideration.^^ Ameringer (1966), citing a 17 January 1904. article from the New York World, 
says that Senator Marcus Hanna (R-Ohio), one of the influential advocates of the Panama route, 
had offered this very piece of advice to Boyd and Amador in their meeting in Washington set up 
by William Cromwell. Ameringer (1966, 45) says:
enough time to include a reference to the canal in the President’s Message to Congress.” Is this the real 
reason for Hay’s haste?
In a letter from Hay to De Obaldia dated 24 October 1904 (U.S. Congress 1977b. 442), Hay reminded 
De Obaldia that when the U.S. Senate was considering adding amendments to the treafr, Panamanian 
Foreign Minister De la Espriella had commended Biuiau-Varilla on his written statements of 
understanding, and the fact that it would help forego any amendment process: ”You will recall that when 
this convention was being considered by die United States Senate the opposition to its confirmation 
suggested the poss[i]bility that the Republic of Panama might advance, thereafter, the contention now 
presented. Thereupon, the matter was brought to the attention of Mr. Bunau-Varilla. the duly accredited 
representative of the Republic of Panama .... In response, the representative of the Republic of Panama 
by a letter dated 19 January 1904, advised the United States as follows ...” He recited part of Bunau- 
Varilla’s letter that because of "ail the delays consequent upon such a procedure, at a time when the 
enemies of the treaty can take advantage of them to precipitate war on the Isthmus as a supreme weapon 
against the construction of the canal and the final realization of the treaty which insures it. [etc.j”. (in a 
letter from Hay to Obaldia dated 18 August 1904 (U.S. Congress 1977b, 442). Afterwards, Hay cited a 
letter from the Government of Panama to Bimau-Varilla: ”Your excellency: Most opportune indeed was 
your excellency’s communication of January 19 to the Secretary of State, dissipating, as it did. the new 
obstacles raised to prevent the prompt approval of the treaty by the American Senate. All the matters 
which your excellency mentions were at the same time discussed with the honorable Mr. Buchanan 
[signed F. V. de la Espriella] .”
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The Ohio Senator advised them against hasty ratification and recommended that the 
treaty be sent to Panama, where, he felt it should be posted publicly and fieely 
discussed for at least ten days before the jimta took actioiL̂ ^
Postpotiing discussion of the treaty until it arrived in Panama could have been a face- 
saving measure for Boyd. Amador and Arosemena. They could have simply said that though 
they agreed with the treaty as signed in Washington, several other members of the Provisional 
Committee felt that a slight modification was necessary for the national interest of the new 
republic. This would hardly have been impossible since Panamanian representatives were not 
only completely within their rights to do so but wielded a certain degree of bargaining leverage 
themselves as a result of the November secession. The Republic of Panama was the only 
sovereign nation the United States could treat with for a canal in Panama. There were no other 
realistic options, unless the Nicaragua project could be flaunted per the terms of the Spooner 
Act."" A negotiation with Colombia was out of the question.
Consider Roosevelt's immediate needs in late 1903. Roosevelt's credibility depended 
on his being able to demonstrate that his bold policy to support and recognize an independent 
Republic of Panama would pay off for the United States. His administration, therefore, was 
under pressure to deliver an interoceanic canal treaty. This predicament may explain Secretary 
of State Hay's haste in urging ratification to the special commission in their meeting on 20 
November 1903. But haste might have also forced Hay to consider subsequent Panamanian 
modifications if they had been submitted, especially if it meant nothing more than what had
 ̂ (t is not clear from Ameringer (1966. 45). but this meeting between Boyd. Amador and Hanna may 
have occurred on 20 November 1903.
Major. McCullough and other authors do not suggest this in their books. They focus only on threats 
from Colombia Ameringer (1966. 36) noted a cable between Bunau-Varilla and de la Espriella on 8 
November 1903. in which Bunau-Varilla used the possibility of pro-Nicaraguan forces in the U.S. Senate 
delaying ratification in refusing to send $75.000 to the Provisional GovemmenL Ameringer (1966. 39-40) 
argues that Bunau-Varilla used a coalition of Nicaragua advocates. Democrats, and anti-imperialist 
Republicans, rather than Colombia, as the specter urging speedy ratification. Nonetheless, if this coalition 
had been entirely unsuccessful during the Hay-Henan Treaty’s ratification, it is not clear why they would 
have been any more successful a second time unless merely in reaction against American complicity in 
the secession of 3 November 1903.
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been included in the Hay-Herran T re a ty .T h e  fact that in the 20 November 1903, meeting 
between Hay and the special commission Hay had promised a supplementary treaty to clear up 
any deficiencies suggests that Hay urgently desired a treaty, any treat>\ so his administration 
would have an agreement in hand to show the American public.
Expediting the canal treaty was key to Roosevelt's and the Republican Party's 1904 
reelection campaign. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty would justify Roosevelt's actions during 
the Panamanian secession and deflect the expected Democratic attacks based on the moral 
principle that the end does not justify the means. As it turned out. moral ruminations in 
Congress and the press concerning Roosevelt's actions did not make much of a dent in his 
political reputation, even in places controlled by the political opposition.^ The fact that a treaty 
had been signed, sealed and delivered without delay or complication less than a month after the 
November 1903 revolt endowed Roosevelt with the peculiar political virtue of expedience, 
simply getting things done.
Self-awareness of diplomatic leverage was either lost on Panamanian representatives or 
not utilized. The alleged internal dissent and personal difficulty between the special commission 
and Bunau-Varilla over whose views would be those of the Republic o f Panama for the purpose 
of treaty negotiations, the 6ct that this supposed confusion over responsibilities never seems to 
have been resolved through any official word to the opposite negotiating party in the United 
States, the fact that members of the Provisional Government 6 iled  to challenge or even 
officially question Hay or Roosevelt as to the obvious implausibility o f Bunau-Varilla s claim 
that the United States would fail to protect the Republic of Panama fi'om a Colombian threat.
When General Reyes of Colombia arrived in Washington. DC. on 28 November 1903. to try to 
negotiate a settlement with Roosevelt. Ameringer (1966, 47) says he was supported by former 
Democratic President Grover Cleveland and advised by Cleveland’s own attorney-general. Wayne 
MacVeaglL If anything, this kind of Colombian threat’ manipulated by the Democratic Party to discredit 
the Roosevelt Administration in an election year compelled Roosevelt to expedite a treaty. The situation 
could have been taken advantage of by a shrewd representative of the Provisional Goverrunent 
Graham (1983).
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and the 6 c t that if  representatives of the Provisional Government really and truly felt the treaty 
unacceptable they nonetheless failed to exercise any of the legitimate options remaining to them 
to modifV' it -  all seem to speak of a serious lack o f initiative least of all good judgement on the 
part of the Provisional Government of Panama. If  Major (1984), McCullough (1977) and others 
are correct in their view of Panamanians failing to exercise their responsibilities or any of the 
options open to them, and most of all the Provisional Government's actually believing in 
Bunau-Varilla's unsubstantiated threat without even so much as inquiring to Secretary of State 
John Hay whether it was true, then one is merely left to ask -  exactly how bungling are we are 
supposed to think Panamanians are? There must be other explanations for the Provisional 
Government's thinking.
2.3 Other  Explanations for Panamanian T hin king  in Novem ber  1903
Secretary o f State Hay said in a letter to Senator Spooner on 20 January 1904. that if the 
Senate attempted any amendments, requiring the Provisional Government to ratify the modified 
treaty a second time, the United States would be passing up the opportunity to take advantage of 
the post-revolutionary euphoria in Panama. Hay wrote:
If we amend the treaty and send it back there some time next month, the period of 
enthusiastic unanimity, which ... comes only once in the life of a revolution, will have 
passed away ... You and I know too well how many points there are in this treaty to 
which a Panaman patriot could object
The passage is often quoted to imply that United States representatives on their part knew quite 
well that the treaty was against the best national interests of the Republic of Panama Criticism 
that Hay knew the treaty was lopsided might be valid if  representatives of the United States 
were supposed to have negotiated not only their owu interests but those o f the Republic of 
Panama as well. I f  nothing else the quote implicates the Provisional Government o f Panama for
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its inability to correct what seemed patently obvious to others, if in 6 c t approving the treaty 
was not in their interests.
The Provisional Government in Panama must have been aware o f its potential 
bargaining leverage as well as the 61sity of the claim that the United States would abandon their 
nation. Panamanian leaders probably believed the treaty was acceptable to their immediate 
fiscal needs as well as their long-term national interests. They also may have decided to make 
good on an unwritten obligation to the United States for military aid on 3 November by 
ratifying the treaty without modification. Regardless o f any of Bunau-Varilla s alarmist cables, 
the Provisional Government chose not to modify the treaty feeling that a show of conciliation 
and good faith on their part was sufficient to secure the much needed SIO million endowment 
and the future national interests of Panama. Expedience alone may explain letting Bunau- 
Varilla remain as principal envoy rather than challenging his efforts or complicating matters by 
relieving him of his duties and putting Pablo Arosemena or someone else in his place Recalling 
the cable from Drake to Beers, the Committee may have simply overestimated Bunau-Varilla's 
ability to open doors in Washington and New York, believing him not easily replaced.
In Arias to Barrett, 27 July 1904. Arias said he had assumed that Panama's expeditious 
ratification of the treaty without modification would somehow guarantee the loosest possible 
interpretation of its terms by the United States, especially so as not to impair Panama's ability to 
exercise its "fiscal and economical sovereignty."’ Arias said:
Although the Republic of Panama, when negotiating with the United States the treaty of 
the 18* of November, 1903. could not offer any obstacle whatsoever to tire wishes and 
convenience of the United States, it did observe, nevertheless, with pleasure, when 
approving without restrictions said treaty, that the United States had waived in favor of 
the Republic of Panama that which was neither needed by the United States nor by the 
canal enterprise, but which for the Republic constitutes the most effective guaranty of 
its existence -  in other words, fiscal and economical sovereignty within and without the 
canal zone.'*'
" U.S. Congress (1977b. 427).
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In a letter from De Obaldia to Hay on 11 August 1904, De Obaldia appears to be claiming that, 
at least in the minds of the Provisional Government, they had signed the Hay-Herràn Treaty.
As an indispensable antecedent of the Hay-Varilla convention must be regarded the 
Hay-Henân trea^. concluded January 22. 1903, approved by the United States Senate, 
and rejected by the Republic of Colombia. Both treades were concluded with the same 
principal object -  viz. to facilitate for the United States the construcdon of a ship canal 
between the Atlandc and Pacific oceans. In neither case was it the intendon of the high 
contracting parties to conclude a treaty for the cession of territory or for the absolute 
renunciadon of sovereignty on the part of either of them (referring to Article IV of H e^  
Herràn] .... a promise which has not been destroyed by the fact that the Hay-Herran 
treaty no longer exists, for the declaration in which it is embodied expresses the 
purpose of follo>ving a dank and honest policy, accepted and condrmed afterwards by 
the Senate of the United States .... [Ajnd it had a decisive influence on the Govenunent 
of my country in causing it to approve utueservedly and without modidcadon the 
Varilla-Hav convention.^
Representatives o f the Provisional Government, most of whom were members o f the 
Conservative Party with the notable exception of Pablo Arosemena, were probably also 
focusing on how ratification o f the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty would affect the internal political 
challenges they faced within the new Republic of Panama. For a long time, Panamanian leaders 
understood that the United States was to be the foreign maritime power that would protect, 
construct and operate the interoceanic canal. The United States Goverrunent had demonstrated 
countless times since the middle of the nineteenth century that it would endeavor to deny the 
canal project to any other maritime power or foreign private interests. Given the unavoidable 
nature of American involvement in Panamanian afBurs, it would have been prudent for 
Panamanians to consider how that involvement could be used for their own political agenda.
As the story is related by McCullough (1977), Manuel Amador's apparent ability to 
solicit an American warship (USS Nashville) in the critical hours before 3 November revolt 
simply by sending an urgent telegram to Bunau-Varilla, emboldened the Panamanian
U.S. Congress (1977b. 430).
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secessionist movement and gave credibility to Amador s leadership (McCullough, 1977. 362-4). 
Major ( 1984) points out that just after independence, Panamanian Secretary of Foreign Afiairs 
Francisco V de la Espriella had petitioned the United States through envoy Bunau-Varilla to 
seek a guarantee o f constitutional order through Article 136 of the Panamanian Constitution of 
15 February 1904. Members of the Conservative Party supported Article 136 but members of 
the Liberal party were against it."*̂  The feet that De la Espriella and other Conservative Party 
leaders sought this very important guarantee while the Liberal Party was opposed indicates a 
significant partisan difference in thinking. No paramilitary force or armed opposition within the 
new Republic of Panama could threaten an administration supported by the United States 
through Article 136 of the Panamanian Constitution. Considering the establishment and 
garrisoning of the Canal Zone as stipulated in the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and 
American imperatives to create a safe enviroiunent for American transits, it was inevitable that 
the United States Government might become by defeult the arbiter o f Panamanian political 
conflicts. It would have been incredibly foolish for Panamanian politicians not to seize an 
opportunity to enlist United States support, particularly if a rival fection might attempt to do the 
same.
Crucial to an understanding o f Panamanian politics in late 1903 is the feet that the 
Conservative Party leadership was not in a position of strength against Liberal opposition. 
Though the victors of Colombia's War of One Thousand Days, the Conservatives were 
traditionally not the leading party in Panama. Prior to its independence, the Liberal Party 
dominated Panama and the War of One Thousand Days was nearly lost to a  Liberal army under 
the command of Benjamin Herrera. After independence on 3 November 1903, Conservative 
leaders controlled the presidency and the National Assembly for a decade despite challenges 
from the Liberal Party, with whom there was at least initially a  coalition government. In 1906.
Conniff(l992. 72).
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when the Liberal Party obtained only 3 o f 28 seats in the National Assembly and its members 
and faithful took to the streets. Canal Zone authorities demanded that the Liberals disperse or 
face U.S. troops.
Political division and blame over the approval of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty- 
surfaced in the Republic o f Panama as early as the summer of 1904. Ideally, the political party 
that could claim they delivered the canal treaty to the citizens of Panama would be in a very 
strong position. But uruealistic expectations of wealth umnet could be taken in the same way as 
being defiauded. Panamanian citizens may not have fully appreciated that the granting of 
sovereign rights, power and authority to the United States in the Canal Zone put limits on the 
commercial and fiscal benefits they could reasonably expect. Probably, as Ameringer seems to 
think, opposition leaders transformed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 into a specter of 
diplomatic extortion and fiaud perpetrated by an alleged conspiracy between the United States 
Federal Goverrunent and Philippe Bunau-Varilla and, most important, approved by an 
incompetent and self-interested Conservative leadership.
In a letter from Barrett to Hay dated 20 August 1904, Barrett noted how ‘certain circles' 
possibly members of the Liberal Party were criticizing the Provisional Government s handling 
of the treaty negotiations, in particular a letter written by Bunau-Varilla explaining certain 
provisions of the treaty. Barrett explains:
There is indignation in certain circles against the original position taken by Bunau- 
Varilla and criticism of the junta of that time for allowing their ministers to write such a 
letter, but they recognize that it commits the Panama Government and that it absolves 
the United States Government from blame for alleged arbitrary interpretation of the
treaty."”
Secretary of War Taft’s statement before the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals, April 
18, 1906 explained how the terms of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty were being drawn into
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domestic politics. The roots o f ‘'"anti-American” feeling during the first years of the Republic of 
Panama were essentially domestic. Taft noted that the Liberal opposition was quick to publicly 
attack the Conservative administration as taking a conciliatory attitude towards the United 
States in order to create popular resentment against the Conservative Party. McCain (1965. 42) 
said that members of the Liberal Party attempted to mar Taft’s visit with a demonstration, "for 
they feared that an amicable adjustment of the Panamanian grievances would strengthen the 
administration for the approaching municipal elections.” The nature of the internal political 
competition was to appear more passionately "anti-American, ” i.e.. the more ardent patron of 
the Panamanian people with respect to the direct and derived benefits of the Panama Canal. As 
Taft explained it:
Doctor Amador was President of the Republic. He was the head of the Conservative 
party. Pablo Arosemena was vice-president and the head of the Liberal party. In the era 
of good feeling between all parties succeeding the revolution they were elected on the 
same ticket. The parties soon divided again when the patronage came to be distributed. 
The moment the people understood the effect of the introduction of the Dingley tariff 
between the Zone and the Republic, they resented the act as an indication of a desire on 
the part of the United States to grab the land of the Zone for its commercial purposes, 
and to exclude all Panamanian[sj from the profitable business which they had expected 
to do with the people of the Zone, gathered there by the United States for the great 
work. The opposition party — the Liberal party -  was quick to seize upon this as a 
ground for attacking the fCJonservative administration on the theory that the 
Government had yielded to the United States and had sacrificed the interests o f the 
Republic. The attitude o f the Liberal party, o f course, reacted upon the course o f the 
[CJonservative administration, and both parties were at once driven into hostility to 
any proposition o f the United States looking to the operation of its governmental 
control over the Zone at those many points where it came in close contact with the 
jurisdiction of the Republic [emphasis added]
The Conservative Party managed to control the Presidency imtil the victory of a Liberal 
Party candidate named Belisario Portas in 1912. Belisario Portas won the election by appealing 
to the lower and middle-class and interior rural groups. Similarly, ambitious leaders like 
Amulfo Arias relied on nationalist’ middle-class, rural interior support throughout his political
^  U.S. Congress (1977b. 442).
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career from the 1930s until the 1980s. Perhaps the most famous leaders of the middle-class and 
rural interior were the officers o f Panama's paramilitary police like Juan Antonio Remôn 
Gantera and Omar Torrijos Herrera. Omar Torrijos made Panama's rural interior traditions the 
core of his power via the institution of the National Guard from the time he and other guard 
officers seized power in a military coup in 1968 until his death in 1981. Manuel Noriega 
manipulated the nationalist rhetoric of the middle-class and the rural interior but is less 
interesting than other Panamanian political leaders. Noriega inherited, more than he crafted, a 
political institution in the National Guard.
2.4 BEHIND AND BEYOND THE HAY-BUNAU-VARILLA TREATY
One cannot argue the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was forced on the Provisional 
Committee of Government without also arguing that Panamanians in late 1903 were absolutely 
incompetent as treaty negotiators. The Provisional Committee of Government expedited 
ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty because it met their immediate national interests. 
The treaty fulfilled an unspoken obligation to the United States, demonstrated Panamanian 
leadership and the Conservative Party's administrative control of the new Republic, and 
guaranteed the country's future commercial wel&re with a Panama Canal agreement and a $10 
million endowment. As Taft made clear later in 1906, Liberals and Conservatives assumed an 
antagonistic posture with the United States in an attempt to one-up each other as patron of the 
Republic's national interests in the eyes of the Panamanian electorate.
The success of the Liberal Party in organizing a  political opposition among the rural 
interior and the lower and middle-class to win the presidency in 1912 represents much more 
than simply the changing of the guard in terms of elite political leadership. The divisions that 
produced the 1912 Liberal Part} victory , the 1931 Amulfo Arias coup, the 1968 National Guard
U.S. Congress (1977b. 510).
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coup and many other events in Panama are the flickering shadows of a social and geographic 
division that predates the formation of the Republic o f Panama by almost three hundred years.
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Pa r t  I: T h e  T w o  Pa n a m a s
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C h a p t e r  3. T h e  T w o  Pa n a m a n ia n  So c ie t ie s
Prevailing understanding about domestic politics within the Republic of Panama is that 
there really is no such thing as domestic politics within the Republic o f  Panama. Zimbalist and 
Weeks (1991, 137) say:
[P|olitical instability in Panama resulted from both the absence of a ruling class in the 
usual sense at the time of independence and the overwhelming hegemony of the U.S. 
presence that made a mockery of the term "domestic Panamanian politics.” From 
Washington’s point of view, no such category o f  Panamanian internal af6irs existed. .. 
The distortion of Panamanian politics by the U.S. presence took many forms, and one 
of the important ones in the long term was the debilitation of the upper classes. In 
Panama as in few other Latin American countries (perhaps pre-1959 Cuba would also 
qualify), the elites depended upon the support of the U.S. government to rule (agairt 
never as obviously as in December 1989).... The U.S. government treated Panama as a 
client state, unwilling to tolerate independent political developments or politicians.
Ropp (1982) and Zimbalist and Weeks (1991) see the ruling elite of the Republic of Panama as 
a politically dependent merchant class. Like other societies dominated by a commercial class. 
Panama's urban merchant elite did not conunand real political power because they lacked 
control over land and industrial production. Panama's business elite made up for their political 
weakness by relying on the United States Federal Goverrunent. Zimbalist and Weeks (1991. 9- 
10) explain:
We make this argument specifically for Panama, though it is also relevant to other 
societies dominated by a cortunercial class. .. Formal subservience to the U.S. 
goverrunent. while perhaps offensive to national pride, helped resolve the central 
political difRculty of the corrunercial ruling class: political control of a population over 
which it had little direct economic dominion.
A pivotal event in Panamanian history was the 11 October 1968. military coup by- 
officers of the National Guard.^ For years, the withdrawal of the United States Federal 
Government from Panamanian domestic politics had been undercutting the support for
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Panama's social and economic elite. The 1968 military coup is considered the inevitable result 
of a contradiction between the elite's monopoly over political leadership and their lack of direct 
economic dominion over the majority of the working population. National Guard ofGcers like 
Omar Torrijos Herrera and Manuel Antonio Noriega established themselves as Panama's new 
leadership class, manipulating nationalist symbols but in effect ruling because of their control of 
the paramilitary police.
Ropp (1982) and Zimbalist and Weeks (1991) misapprehend the Panamanian urban 
elite as products of nineteenth and early twentieth century American favoritism. Both Ropp 
(1982) and Zimablist and Weeks (1991) seem to think that only nationalistic political coalitions 
are authentically Panamanian. A cosmopolitan political elite shunning conventional nationalist 
sentiments appeared to them as an aberration of foreign dependency on the United States, an 
enclave-dependent society. What these authors do not consider is that the commercial elite of 
the Republic o f Panama may be much more geographically and historically evolved.
3 .1 A Brief History  of the  Republic  of Panama  as an  Enclav e-Dependent  State
During the United Nations Security Council meeting in Panama City on 15-21 March 
1973. Panamanian representatives referred to the Canal Zone as a practically a colony o f the 
United States;
It was Panama's fundamental aspiration that the regime for the Panama Canal should be 
adjusted to the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Panama hoped, its 
representative declared, that the Security Council, following the new policy of 
preventative diplomacy, would be able, during its stay in Panama, to realize that in the 
so-called Panama Canal Zone there was a colonialist situation, because that Zone was a 
real enclave that was foreign to the national jurisdiction, dividing Panama’s territory 
into two parts, preventing the political, economic and social integration of the country
and thus rurming counter to clear provisions of the Charter General Torrijos said
that Panama could not accept the economic subjection of one coimtiy by another, or 
politicaL economic or cultural penetration, since there was nothing other than neo-
In a similar argument. Ropp (1982) calls Amulfo Arias’ New Year’s Eve armed coup of the 
Presidential Palace in 1931 as the watershed event in Panamanian history.
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colonialism, a veiled and disguised colonialism that appeared in the form of economic 
systems with conditions, assistance aimed not at the development of the country but at 
control over the people (U.S. Congress 1977b. 1450-1?).
Rhetorical statements by Panama's Ambassador to the United Nations Juan Antonio Tack and 
Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera were designed to be politically provocative, given a rare 
opportunity to make bilateral relations with the United States the issue before a special meeting 
of the United Nations Security Council in March 1973. Tack and Torrijos proclaimed that the 
United States was engaged in a  kind of "veiled” or "disguised” colonialism in Canal Zone 
territory, dividing the territorial integrity o f the country , penetrating the political and cultural 
life of the Panamanian people, and creating a threat to international peace and security.
One can dismiss the accusation the Canal Zone was actually a colonial enclave of the 
United States but not the inference. Ropp (1982) argues quite persuasively that there was at 
least an enclave relationship between the United States Federal Goverrunent and the political 
elite of the Republic of Panama. According to Ropp (1982), nationalist opposition movements 
were directed not only against the Canal Zone but also against the traditional Panamanian 
leadership class whose political and economic status was directly tied to Canal Zone markets. 
The elite often had to weather sharp criticism that they had sold out' the national patrimony for 
personal interest.
Ropp (1982) believes that an enclave understanding of Panamanian elite politics 
explains peculiarities such as the personalistic Actions and the lack of genuinely nationalist 
coalitions. The "bureaucratic/merchant” elite dominated Panamanian politics though the Liberal 
Party, controlled business in the Republic o f Panama through organizations like the National 
Council of Private Enterprise (CONEP), and rallied together an exclusive social network at the 
Union Club in Panama City. In return for a  mercantile monopoly on the supply of goods and 
services to the Canal Zone and political support against their domestic opposition, the
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Panamanian urban elite allowed the United States Federal Government to exercise jurisdiction 
in Canal Zone territory and other strategic places in Panama.
Particularly important in Ropp's enclave explanation of Panamanian politics are race 
and class. An enclave relationship was facilitated by the Panamanian elite's shared racial and 
cultural affinities with European and American immigrants, in sharp contrast with the urban 
lower classes o f Hispanicized and Antillean Blacks. The first major influx of foreign merchants 
and Antillean Blacks occurred simultaneously, during the construction of the Panama Railroad 
around 1850. What made the situation potentially threatening for the Panamanian elite was that 
the new wave of Antillean Black immigration, a result o f the construction of the Panama 
Railroad between 1851 and 1855, coincided with the period of constitutional reforms during the 
Liberal-dominated period {Confederaciôn Grenadina. 1853-1863; Estados Unidos de 
Colombia, 1863-1886). Liberal constitutional reforms in 1853 abolished certain property and 
literacy requirements for the right to vote, thereby giving the urban masses of Panama City and 
Colon political influence in presidential and legislative elections in Panama.^^ A Black Liberal 
Party was even formed, independent of the traditional Liberal and Conservative Party 
leadership. Worst of all for the urban upper echelon, the political strength of the arrabal or 
urban lower classes meant they might want a few of the important bureaucratic positions. Racial 
and class-based violence threatened the elite o f the maritime cities during civil disturbances in 
1856. 1885. and between 1900 and 1902 when the War of One Thousand Days nearly became a 
class conflict. The best option the enclave elite had for counterbalancing the political influence 
of the urban lower-class was outside enforcement. Ropp (1982, 10) argues;
 ̂ Bergquist (1978. 12) says: "[T|he Constitution of 1853 broadened the suffrage by abolishing property 
and literacy requirments. instituted direct secret elections, and provided for the election of many 
previously appointed government officials. Reaction to the Liberal reforms led to division within the 
Liberal party, political turmoil, and an attempt to reverse some of the Liberal measures under the 
moderate Conservative regimes of the late 1850’s. Liberals regained control of the government during the 
civil war of 1860-1862 and decreed a set of radical measures aimed at curtailing the political, social, and
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Separated from the Hispanicized blacks by race and class, and separated even further 
from the new wave of Antillean blacks, the Panamanian upper class looked to the 
canal-building powers as countervailing forces in the domestic arena. This tendency 
was natural in that it represented an extension of informal relations dating back to the 
colonial period. During the nineteenth century these cultural and social ties to the 
outside world had been further strengthened by the influx of foreign merchants who 
married into local families. Corrunercial relations, administrative ties through the transit 
companies, cortunon racial and class characteristics -  all supported the formation of a 
tacit internal-external "alliance.”
United States advisors participated directly in the day-to-day rurming of the 
Panamanian republic in the first few decades o f its existence. The trend accelerated after 1918 
when United States financial advisors were given broad authority to reform aspects of the 
country's fiscal operation.^ It was at this high water mark o f United States involvement in 
Panamanian national affairs that a middle-echelon. rural interior political opposition began to 
assert itself. Nationalist opposition coincided with the migration of middle-echelon rural job 
seekers to Panama City. Though a rural middle-class may have come to Panama City they were 
still tied to the culture o f the western interior and were employed in Panamanian bureaucracy 
rather than by Canal Zone-related businesses. Middle-class urban professionals resented United 
States involvement and the enclave-dependent urban elite leadership. By the early 1920s. Ropp 
(1982. 21) says:
[A| coalition of national forces had formed in opposition not only to the U.S. role on 
the Isthmus but also to the urban elite’s conception of the goals to be achieved in future 
negotiations with the United States.
economic power of the Catholic Church, which had allied itself with the Conservative opponents of the 
Liberal reforms.”
Ropp (1982) notes that by 1918. the superintendant of Santo Tomas Hospital in Panama City was a 
U.S. Army Major, the comptroller general and his assistant were U.S. citizens, and superintendent of the 
National Police was a U.S. citizen
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On 19 August 1923, a political opposition group called Acciôn Comunal (Community 
Action) was formed. Though not its founder, Amulfo Arias led Communia Action advocating a 
kind of cultural and racial nationalism called Panameftismo ( Panamanian-ism 1 On New 
Year's Eve. 1931, Amulfo Arias and other members of Community Action seized the 
Presidential Palace and removed Panamanian President Florencio Arosemena. an associate of 
former Liberal president Rodolfo Chiari.'*  ̂ Amulfo Arias' brother Harmodio was temporarily 
put in charge o f the goverrunent and the next year Harmodio Arias was elected president.
What made the January 1931 coup significant is that United States military forces chose 
not to interpose themselves. Ropp (1982, 25) says:
While the use of force in Panamanian politics has been common since the early days of 
the Republic, the coup of 1931 represented a watershed in this respect in terms of the 
military restraint of the United States. The resulting conclusion for Panamanian 
politicians was that the internal sources of military power were going to play an 
increasingly important role in politics.
From the very first years of the Republic o f Panama, Belisario Portas and the Liberal opposition 
had tried to use the appeal of military leaders like General Esteban Huertas to tum the electoral 
majority against the incumbent Conservatives.^ Neither a native Panamanian nor a member of 
the urban upper class. Esteban Huertas according to Ropp (1982) had the potential to attract a 
mass following. Conservative wariness about Huertas' pohtical agenda and a Urrited States 
recommendation that the Republic o f Panama limit itself to a police force led to the disbanding 
of the Panamanian Army on 18 November 1904. After 1931, the use o f  the armed forces in the 
political arena became more common, and ultimately, irrstitutionalized.
One common story is that Amulfo Arias was at a New Year’s Eve party in the Presidential Palace the 
night of the coup. Arias opened one of the bathroom windows from the inside during the party, and then 
later that night with members of Community Action re-entered through the bathroom window and seized 
the building and along with it the Panamanian state.
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Political parties organized informai squads o f armed civilians {pie de guerra) for 
electoral intimidation. Harmodio Arias appointed Jose Antonio Remôn Cantera. the only 
Panamanian with formal military training, to lead a new National Police.** After the 1940s, Juan 
Antonio Remôn used the National Police like a Praetorian arbiter of Panamanian politics. 
Remôn himself became president in 1952. Until his assassination at a horse track in Panama 
City on 2 January 1955. Juan Antonio Remôn was opposed by former Liberal Party supporters 
who made the remarkable accusation that he was politicizing the National Police. The real point 
of criticism may have been that Remôn failed to use the National Police in the ftutherance o f 
the Liberal Party agenda.
The escalating political independence of Panamanian paramilitary officers climaxed on 
11 October 1968, when the National Guard seized control of the state, ushering in three decades 
of military government. Soon afterwards, the United States was compelled to withdraw from 
direct involvement in the Canal Zone through the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties. In an interesting 
twist. Ropp (1982) believes that the post-1968 period of reformist military government put 
Panama back in step with other, more independent Latin American govenunents.
Since elite political opposition in Panama was unable to intimidate or otherwise 
challenge the military government from within they had to rely on the possible intervention o f a 
yet more powerful military force from outside. In December 1989, the United States military 
eliminated the Noriega regime by force and with it the institutions of military government. The 
II October 1968. coup having been reversed by American action in December 1989. the 
Panamanian bureaucratic/merchant elite returned to occupy coveted positions directly and 
indirectly related to the operation of the Panama Canal and the former Canal Zone (Interoceanic
*" Esteban Huertas was a former Colombian officer who switched sides during the Panamanian 
secessionist movement on 3 November 1903. Huertas was rewarded by being made the first commander- 
in-chief of the Panamanian army.
*' Remôn was a Mexican Military Academy graduate in 1931. His title was Chief of Central Police 
Headquarters.
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Region). Constitutional refbnns since December 1989 have outlawed the armed forces, similar 
to the Republic of Panama of 1904.
3.2 Maritime-Com m ercial an d  TERRrrcRiAL-AOMiNisTRATrvE Societies
There is much to consider in Ropp's (1982) enclave society explanation of Panamanian 
history. The essence of the argument is that an enclave relationship between the United States 
and the Panamanian elite began on the Isthmus of Panama during the middle of the nineteenth 
century and continued under the terms of the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treatv. The mutually 
beneficial enclave relationship delayed and warped the development of nationalist coalitions. 
Nationalist opposition against American involvement and the self-interest of the enclave- 
dependent elite climaxed with the October 1968 military coup and the 1977 Panama Canal 
Treaties. American military intervention in December 1989. for better or worse, reversed the 
nationalist trend.
The problem with the enclave-dependency explanation of Ropp (1982) and others is 
that throughout Panama's history the urban commercial elite has always been the politically 
dominant group. Ropp's (1982) enclave dependency interpretation represents one way of 
explaining the origins of a Panamanian leadership that staked its prosperity' on maritime activity 
but did not seem to be genuinely nationalist. Another way of explaining Panama's enclave- 
dependent. bureaucratic/merchant elite is to call them a ' maritime-commercial society," based 
on the hypothesis of Edward Fox in his geographic history The Other France: History in 
Geographic Perspective (1977).
Fox's geographic history of France leads one to consider that more than one society 
may inhabit the same state. Fox hypothesized that a “maritime-commercial” and a “territorial- 
administrative” society had co-evolved within France based on observations of French politics 
over the long term. According to his own account. Fox was merely trying to understand the
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1965-1966 French presidential elections. When he extended his analysis to span twenty regimes 
since the seventeenth century he noticed a curious yet consistent division between French 
political factions that could not be explained as the product o f class or regional differences.^' 
After exhausting the possibilities. Fox posed the hypothesis that the pattern represented the 
legacy of an ancient yet persistent socio-geographic split among the people living in what was 
now known as France.
The political division in France was the result of social developments along two 
different systems of communication and exchange conditioned by geographic paths of least 
resistance. Fox began exploring the contrast between the two societies by drawing hypothetical 
distinctions between the kinds of things that would be communicated or exchanged, how far. 
and for what piupose (travel versus transport, trade versus commerce), as well as the spatial 
orientation and morphology of settlement (areal versus linear). What makes Fox's distinctions 
compelling is that they revolve around the simplest and most everyday kinds o f social activities, 
unfolded around persistent geographic conditions over long periods of time.
In Fox's understanding, the territorial boundaries of contemporary France happened to 
hem in two societies with distinct socio-geographic underpiimings. Nationalist and authoritarian 
French political leaders, the legacy o f France's territorial-admiiustrative society, had always 
played a conspicuous part in the work of political historians and social scientists studying 
French politics. But Fox brought to light the existence of another group o f  political leaders from 
a different part o f France who were neither nationalist nor authoritarian and remained, to social
Fox’s inspiration for taking a historical perspective was in part the work of a French historian who 
noted that during the 1840s and 1850s, powerfiil bankers found their railroad investments susceptible to 
the whim of administrative authority and decided they might best be served by becoming the government 
themselves. Fox (1971) grouped the twenty regimes into three general categories including, parliamentary 
(constitutional monarchy or republic), administrative (monarch, emperor, president), and republic 
(unicameral govenunents to reform the constitution or for defense purposes). Fox asks whether the 
political divisions supporting the creation of these different regimes represent not three conventional 
divisions (Left, Center, Right) within six different political groups (Commimist or non-Corrununist Left 
clerical or anti-clerical Center, parliamentary or anti-parliamentary Right) but rather one geographical 
division common to Left Center and Right
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scientists transfixed by the unity of the state, a concealed phenomenon of French political 
history . Fox speculated that this other group of leaders was the legacy of France's maritime- 
commercial society. Fox (1971, 39) described France's maritime-commercial society as the 
"other France,'’ a society without territory or political administration, but no less real:
Today, for us to recognize the existence of a society without territory or political 
administration merely on the grounds that it maintains itself by an active exchange of 
goods and messages, as well as a highly developed sense of common purpose, requires 
a very special effort.
French maritime-conunercial society was cosmopolitan, oriented to the outside world, 
and lived a segregated urban existence on the coast and along rivers with two-way access to the 
sea in the interstices o f territorial-administrative powers. The modem territorial consolidation of 
the French State did not erase milleimia of segregated development. In fact, modem irmovations 
in transportation and infrastructure within France may have reproduced the ancient split. 
Though aware how the comparative application of his findings might raise the specter of 
geographic determinism. Fox (1971, 15) nonetheless stated that if his hypothesis works for 
France it might work elsewhere:
If the two societies had developed in France along two different systems of 
communication, presumably their structures would coincide with patterns of travel and 
transport, following lines of low geographical resistance. If this possibility appeared to 
offer an explanation of the social dichotomy in France, it also raised a specter -  the 
problem of geographical determinism -  in a new form. Fiutlier, if such a hypothesis 
proved useful in analyzing French development, it should also be applicable to other 
areas.”
One of the ramifications of Fox’s work for the stut^ of international relatiotis is that the behavior of 
decision-makers on the world scene may lie concealed behind a façade of sovereignty. The sovereign 
state represents the means of administrative power for dueling societies whose essentially ancient 
personalities may have reached adolescence well before the boundaries or even the institutions of the 
state existed.
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Unlike the situation in France, Panama's maritime-commercial society is not so much a 
concealed phenomenon of political history as it is a misdated one. A maritime-commercial elite 
evolved on the Isthmus o f Panama as early as the middle o f the sixteenth century. In Act, the 
maritime-commercial elite have remained the dominant political group on the Isthmus of 
Panama through periods of economic decline and political subordination under Spanish 
American and Colombian authority and after the formation o f an independent Republic of 
Panama until the October 1968 military coup.
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C h a p t e r  4 .  T h e  Po l it ic a l  d o m in a n c e  o f  Pa n a m a ’s  M a r it im e -C o m m e r c ia l
So c ie t y
This chapter draws heavily from the published and unpublished works, in Spanish, of 
Panamanian sociologists and historians who have written on the dual nature of pre­
independence Panamanian society. Citation was not possible in all cases. Two authors in 
particular. Jaén (1978, forthcoming) and Figueroa (1978), provided an empirical foundation 
given their extensive knowledge of Panamanian archival sources for the relevance of Edward 
Fox's ideas in understanding the social and geographic nature of the two Panamanian societies. 
Both Jaén (1978, forthcoming) and Figueroa (1978) describe the split disposition among the 
dominant class o f  Panama. Jaén (1978, forthcoming) called the bourgeois of Panama City {la 
burgiiesia de la chtdad de Panama) an urban commercial elite who exercised a dominant 
influence over the entire Isthmus of Panama from Panama City. The other elite group Jaén 
(1978. forthcoming) referred to as the lorded society or large ranchers of the interior. This 
inland dominant group dispersed themselves among the cities and villages of the western 
savannas and wielded power at the regional and local scale in rural areas {la sociedad sehorial. 
la de los grandes ganaderos del interior del pais, dispersas en las pequehos poblados de las 
sabanas).
Figueroa (1978) described a similar division between a politically dominant commercial 
oligarchy in the maritime cities and a  subordinate and scattered rural upper echelon in the 
interior. Figueroa (1978, 212) listed the common characteristics o f the dominant commercial 
urban oligarchy including: a less "colonial" frame of mind: an anticlerical and pro-Mason 
disposition: their xenofllia and free port advocacy: memberships in Sociedades de Amigos del 
Pais or groups devoted to the spread of Enlightenment ideals: and their endorsement of 
education in chemistry, agronomy, geology, and physics rather than theology and law. In 
contrast to the characteristics of the dominant urban maritime elite, Figueroa (1978. 230)
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described the rural upper echelon as more ' colonial," negative towards the influence of the 
outside world. Catholic, Hispanic, and more concerned with family solidarity and community 
stability.
What Fox's ideas add to the extensive and detailed work of Jaén (1978. forthcoming) 
and Figueroa (1978) is an explanation for what generated the dual pattern in early Panamanian 
society, and why it persisted through centuries of economic fluctuation and administrative 
transformation. What this chapter intends to add is an understanding of how the legacy of a dual 
society in Panama influenced foreign relations with the United States over the Panama Canal.
In terms o f the theoretical implications o f Fox's work on Panama, the biggest difference 
between Panama and France is that in France maritime-commercial and territorial- 
administrative societies traded power and influence. No one group completely dominated over 
the long term. In Panama, the maritime-commercial elite dominated Panamanian politics for 
four centuries with few exceptions. The Panamanian elite fit the maritime-commercial lifestyle 
Fox describes for France in its desire for mercantile wealth, its port city orientation along a two- 
way access to the sea and its cosmopolitan relationship with foreign merchants and 
businessmen. However, the Panamanian elite also exhibited characteristics typical of a 
territorial-administrative society in its control over territory and preference for bureaucratic 
jobs.
For maritime-commercial society in France and Panamanian maritime-commercial 
society the end was probably the same, commercial wealth. However, the means of obtaining 
wealth in Panama were different because of the nature o f the Panamanian transit economy and 
the relative lack of capital owned by the Panamanian elite relative to foreign merchants. In 
Fox's understanding, a maritime-commercial society stakes its prosperity on waterborne 
commerce by using its wealth and access to the sea for purchasing and shipping high bulk 
commodities over long distances. But what if  a society oriented to a maritime environment
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could count on bulk waterborne commerce coming to them? Given an interoceanic technology, 
waterborne commerce came to Panamanians. But what waterborne commerce came to 
Panamanians did not belong to them. It was only passing through. So Panamanians provided 
services to foreign waterborne commerce in transit. The Panamanian maritime-commercial elite 
staked its prosperity on interoceanic technologies providing access to the sea for others.
The maritime-commercial elite o f the port cities of France faced competition from each 
other. Panama's maritime-commercial society, on the other hand, did not compete with foreign 
capital. The Panamanian elite co-opted foreign capital by cultivating close ties with wealthy 
foreign immigrants and business agents and capturing their wealth by providing services such as 
mules and inns during the colonial period, and commissaries, housing and financial services in 
contemporary' times. The influence of outside merchants and shippers could threaten 
Panamanian markups and monopolies on transit-related services. However, the Panamanian 
maritime-commercial elite alliance with foreign capital in Panama was protected by the 
influence of the elite within local and regional political bureaucracy.
Maritime-commercial societies in France foced threats from adjacent territorial- 
administrative powers. Panama's maritime-commercial elite, on the other hand, did not reject 
subordination to outside territorial-administrative powers. Even Colombia (a.k.a.. Gran 
Colombia and New Granada) could be considered something o f an outside power since the 
capital at Bogota lay far from Panama City and communication between the two cities was 
difficult if not impossible overland. The Panamanian maritime-commercial elite either co-opted 
territorial-administrative power using their family influence in mid-level bureaucrac}' to 
negotiate special commercial privileges, or they rebelled against their territorial-administrative 
overlords using the influence of an outside power like Britain or the United States in return for 
canal-related concessions.
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4 .1 T he  Extension  of Iberian  Maritim e-Ccmm ercial Institutions to  Panama
Mediterranean maritime activities did not imprint their cultural and ecological features 
over vast portions of the Spanish American interior. Maritime-commercial societies exist in 
linear patterns o f cities and settlements lining coastlines and navigable rivers. Geographers 
focusing on the cultural landscape o f inland areas of Latin America may tend to view scattered 
settlements along the Latin American coast as peripheral entry points to the interior. 
Geographers may also tend to divide the study of adaptation in rural inland enviroiunents from 
the urban morphology of coastal cities as separate matters for cultural geography and urban 
historical geography.
Geographers like Butzer (1992) have shown that an Iberian agro-ecological livestock 
complex instituted in part through the encomienda labor system was grafted onto natural and 
cultural environments in New Spain (Mexico). The institution of encomienda was like a kind of 
military retirement plan for Spanish veterans of the conquest entailing certain rights and 
obligations for the use of indigenous labor to work their land. In Fox's terminology', the 
encomienda tradition would be a classic territorial-administrative institution of royal patronage 
to a soldier class. An Iberian agro-ecological livestock complex was not the only social and 
geographic phenomenon that Spaniards introduced to the Americas In Panama as in many other 
places in the Americas, an Ibero-Mediterranean maritime-commercial complex established 
itself.
The first European transit o f the Isthmus of Panama from Atlantic to Pacific was an 
overland march led by Vasco Nunez de Balboa in September 1513. Balboa's transit is usually 
portrayed as something epic but it was just a recotmaissance. The maiden transit that really 
meant something was probably led by an unnamed pack mule and occurred at least three 
decades later, sometime after 1545 when the silver mines of Potosi in the Viceroyalty of Peru 
went into production (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). The Isthmus o f Panama became an overland
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connection o f a  6r-flung trade route, firom the West Coast o f South America to Europe.^ At 
that moment and peihaps for the first time in human history the latent geographic potential of 
the Isthmus o f Panama as a global transit point was awakened, in the service of the Carrera de 
Indias or trans-Atlantic "Indies Route.”
The European port of origin and final destination for the Carrera until 1679 was 
Seville, a city along the Guadalqivir River on the Atlantic-oriented coast of Spain. The Carrera 
de Indias owes its origins to late medieval Mediterranean structural convoys (Ward, 1993). One 
could probably think of the Indies Route as the extension of medieval Mediterranean maritime 
institutions. The considado or guild o f Seville used its geographic monopoly to limit other 
maritime city's merchants fi-om involving themselves in the Carrera. Merchants from Seville 
could have owned the actual vessels or just an exclusive privilege to buy and sell merchandise 
to the carrying fleet.
When the vessels of the Carrera called at the ports of the Americas it was not as a 
single maritime flow but two separate flows On the trans-Atlantic leg of the journey between 
the Mediterranean and the Caribbeaiu the Carrera was a united grouping of vessels. Upon 
entering the waters of the Caribbean through the Lesser Antilles the vessels of the Carrera 
splintered into two distinct clusters each with their own particular geographic route and seasonal 
movements. One cluster of vessels, the armada y  flota de tierra firm e ("armada and fleet of the 
mainland”), appears to have been a mixed fleet of conunercial and military vessels. The other 
cluster, the armada de la guarda de la Carrera de Indias ("defense armada for the Indies 
Route”), was an escort of warships including the formidable galeones. A perhaps not entirely 
correct distinction has the fiota  leaving New Spain (Mexico) in April and the galeones leaving 
Portobelo (Panama) in August for their eventual rendezvous in Habana (Cuba), where the two 
groups rejoined to make the return voyage back to Spain.
In the information provided by Ward (1993). the year 1551 is the first date for an overland transiL
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There were two separate and coexisting early overland technologies across the Isthmus 
of Panama. One was El Camino Real (‘"The Royal Road”) or Calle de Santo Domingo. Another 
was the Calle de la Carrera, also known as Las Cruces or "Crossing” Trail, a roadway-river 
system involving the navigable stretch of the Chagres River (Figure 4.1). Until the deterioration 
of the stone roadway during the eighteenth century, the Camino Real was the official route of 
the trajin. the overland transit o f  silver between the Viceroyalty of Peru and Spain. The peak 
period of silver transport (measured as value in pesos ensayados) across the Isthmus of Panama 
was during the first half o f  the seventeenth century (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). which was fiallowed 
by a precipitous decline after 1650.*^
Of the two routes, the Las Cruces Trail was more adaptable for commercial logistics. 
The Las Cruces Trail was a water route making use of the Chagres River (Figure 4.1 ) and a 
coastwise run to Portobelo. The Las Cruces Trail was also a higher capacity route using barges 
and river craft that could carry more cargo and required less effort than the all-land Camino 
Real route. The Las Cruces Trail remained in active use until the middle of the nineteenth 
century and serviced the initial pulse of migration between New York and San Francisco 
between 1848 and 1852, by which time the partially-completed line of the Panama Railroad 
w ent into service.
Commercial fair activities at Portobelo on the Caribbean side of the Isthmus of Panama as measured by 
the tonnage of the carrying fleet is closely correlated with the value of royal treasure in transit (Figure 7). 
However, the value of the Portobelo fair as reported in Spanish archival records is not considered to be a 
reliable estimate by Ward (1993) because of considerable imderreporting. It is included for comparison in 
Figure 8.
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Figure 4.4. A Comparison of Royal Treasure Shipped Across (he Isthmus of Panama and Net Tonnage of Tierre Firme
Fleet at the Portobelo Fair
Source; Ward ( 1993)
Portobelo was one of only a select few maritime cities o f the Spanish America legally 
permitted to participate in international commerce. The others included Cartagena 
(Colombia),Veracruz (Mexico) and Habana (Cuba).^ In their heyday, the transit of silver and 
the commercial fairs at Portobelo were a cyclical if not irregular occupation. Only at the time of 
the silver transit during the Panamanian dry season, at the end of July or beginning of August, 
was Portobelo transformed into a  mercantile fair. During the rainy season the Chagres River 
route ("Las Cruces Trail'') actually became navigable further upstream but the overland Camino 
Real, the official route of the trqj'in. was fully passable only during the dry season (Haring 1964, 
181).
After 1679. the considado of Seville lost its monopoly position to the port city of Cadiz. 
The European point o f departure and arrival for the Carrera and all of its commercial privileges 
shifted 75 miles to the south. One can only guess at what fevors the merchants of Cadiz 
promised the regents of Spain for the privilege of becoming the new control point over the 
Carrera. Despite their new privileges after 1679, the merchants of Cadiz enjoyed little of the 
high level of commercial activity that had taken place on the Isthmus of Panama earlier in the 
century. The last quarter of the seventeenth century was in feet the end of the Carrera as far as 
the Isthmus of Panama was concerned.
By the time Cadiz had become the control point of the Carrera, the amount of silver in 
transit and commercial activity at the Portobelo fair measured in terms of vessel toimage and 
official value of the fair had declined precipitously. Alternate routes to the West Coast of South 
America had made significant inroads on Panamanian technologies. Among the Isthmus's 
competitors were French trading vessels coasting ofiT Peru, South Sea Company ships carrying 
slaves and other merchandise, and indirect trading up the rivers of southern South America
Prior to Portobelo. the main Atlantic port ci^ was Nombre de Dios but operations were moved to the 
site of Portobelo after 1579 because of disease. Ward (1993. 29) notes that between 1519 and 1588. forty - 
six tiiousand people died in Nombre de Dios alone.
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(Ward 1993, 187-191). The city itself was finished off by military destruction in 1740. But 
Portobelo s commercial decay had been unfolding since the 1650s. demonstrated by artificially 
encouraged droughts o f goods in order to create higher prices (see staggered %irs after 1650 in 
Figure 4.5). Ward (1993, 155) says:
After the last fair was celebrated in Portobelo. the role of the isthmus of Panama in the 
Spanish world changed. No longer was there any pretext of supplying Peru by means of 
organized fleets and commercial fairs. Direct commerce via the Pacific, or indirect 
trading through Rio de la Plata, supplanted Panama as the most efficient (i.e.. cheap) 
routes to the rich Southern viceroyalty; just as this was a period of depression in 
Panama, it was a boom era for those places that [benefitedi from the redirection of 
commerce.
Panama would not see the same high levels o f maritime opportimity and interaction with foreign 
merchant interests imtil the growth and expansion of the United States during the middle of the 
nineteenth century.
Would it be useful to pose the contemporary political evolution of transplanted 
Mediterranean maritime-commercial institutions like the consulado and the structural convoy in 
Spanish America, against the inland institutions and ways o f life o f the encomiendal A 
comparative analysis of maritime society in New Spain on the coastal and riverine margins of 
the Iberian agro-ecological complex may reveal a kind of “other Mexico, in the way of Fox's 
(1971) hypothesis. That a group of people engage in contrasting ecological endeavors and 
cultivate separate social networks may have relevance for contemporary national politics. For 
instance, the legacy of maritime-commercial influence in northern Mexico versus traditional 
territorial-administrative society in Mexico City may have played a role in precipitating the elite 
political crisis in 1910-11 that led to the Mexican Revolution.
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Figure 4.5. A Comparison of Royal Treasure Shipped Across the Isthmus of Panama and Value of Goods Exchanged at
Portobelo Fair
Source; Ward (1993)
In Central America, Adams (1989) posed a  hypothesis similar to Fox's (1977). Adams 
(1989) does not compare two contrasting societies to explain Central American political culture. 
But he does explain how the relative absence o f one type of society, with an encomienda 
tradition, may have influenced contemporary Central American politics. Adams' (1989) 
observed that Central American countries tend to treat their indigenous populations differently. 
Citing a few cases. Adams suggests that political leaders in Guatemala and El Salvador 
sponsored a policy of violent repression against indigenous insurgency whereas leaders in Costa 
Rica and Panama were more likely to negotiate with indigenous activists. Adams felt that the 
lack of a colonial encomienda tradition in the political culture of countries like Costa Rica and 
Panama helps explain the difference in policy.
What Adams (1989) did not pursue is the fact that the absence o f an encomienda 
political culture in Costa Rica and Panama may suggest the presence of another perhaps 
contrasting political culture. The conventional distinction from political science is that Central 
American leaders were either Liberal or Conservative, a matter of part) afhliation or ideological 
preference. Where a leader grew up, his lifestyle, family relations and business contacts 
probably explain why a Central American political leader may have found Liberal principles of 
government more appealing than Conservative ones.
4.2 THE Social and  G eographic Mobility  o f  the  Panamanian  Maritime-Com m ercial  
Elite
Long-term fluctuations in maritime-commercial opportunity compelled Panamanian 
elite families to shift between the western interior and the maritime cities. In times of crisis or 
times of opportunity, vertical mobility required geographic mobility. By moving inland in times 
of crisis, elite families could gain status if they had land or bureaucratic prestige. By moving to 
the maritime cities in times o f opportunity, elite families could accumulate wealth if they had
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the right connections to commercial activity and local political authority. Ancient relics of shifts 
back and forth between the maritime cities and the western interior may still exist in the modem 
state of Panama, Emilies distinguished by their old surnames. Descendents of the oldest elite 
families in Panama may have had to shift their geographic and social orientation between the 
maritime cities and the interior at least three times over the last four centuries (Figure 4.6).
Supporting Adam's (1989) reasoning, the lack o f encomienda development in the 
interior of the Isthmus of Panama was probably just as important to the political evolution of 
Panamanian society as the conspicuous growth of commercial activity in the maritime cities. 
The first citizens of the old city of Panama were four hundred Spaniards who originally came 
from Andalucia and Extremadura in southern Spain (Figure 4.7).^^ As in several other places in 
Latin America, the lowland tropical ecology of the maritime cities of the Isthmus of Panama 
was an entirely different kind of environment fi-om southern Spain where most settlers came 
from. Whatever adaptations or systems of production existed in the grasslands and forested 
uplands of Andalucia and Extremadura would be alien on the Isthmus of Panama, less so in the 
central interior savannas of the Azuero Peninsula, but alien nonetheless.’* And whatever 
demand for agricultural products existed in the maritime cities was probably more easily 
satisfied through waterborne imports than overland transport fi-om inland areas well beyond the 
immediate hinterland of Panama City and Portobelo. In addition, the decimating population 
declines that occurred throughout the Americas during the first century of European 
colonization due to disease and displacement were particularly severe in Central America. 
Without a supply of indigenous labor and without a strong market demand in the maritime 
cities, the economic opportunities for an encomendero on the Isthmus of Panama were limited if 
not non-existent.
Ward (1993. 32)
’* Not surprisingly. Jaén (1978. 492-3) notes that the rural descendants of the original Spanish 
encomenderos preferred to settle only in the open savannas.
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Between 1540 and 1600 a social and geographic transition began occurring in 
Panama. The struggling encomendero elite of the interior became an upper class of urban 
merchants with relatives acting as middle-level government functionaries. In the absence of a 
strong territorial-administrative society the non-encomendero political leadership o f the 
maritime cities cultivated their own territorial and administrative relationships with Spanish 
colonial authorities. Family members of the maritime-commercial elite became a surrogate 
territorial-administrative society protecting their femily's monopoly over transit services against 
competition from Spanish and Peruvian merchants and foreign threats like pirate attacks.
The shift to maritime-commercial activity was not uncommon in other parts of Latin 
America where indigenous population declines and natural environments closed off 
opportunities for interior settlement. But the degree to which the maritime-commercial shift 
occurred on the Isthmus of Panama may be unique in Latin America. By 1607, Ward (1993) 
says not a single encomendero remained on the Isthmus of Panama. Ward (1993, 33) says that 
second generation encomenderos felt that despite the stigma attached to commercial activity it 
was. "the only opportunity to regain their social and economic status within an ever more 
mercantile Panama.'’ Ward (1993, 33) explains:
To be sure encomiendas disappeared throughout Spanish America by the end of the 
colonial era, but because of Panama’s lack of resources and Indians and the commercial 
nature of the isthmian economy, it became the first area to move away from an 
economic system rooted in the Old World feudal past
The mid-eighteenth century maritime depression and devastating attacks on the port 
cities by European pirates like Henry Morgan in 1671 forced maritime-commercial high society 
to recoil to the western savannas of the interior. The 6scinating thing about the first generation 
of Panamanian landed society in the eighteenth century is that many of them probably had been
Ward (1993. 32-33).
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part of the urban maritime-commercial elite. Figueroa (1978, 128-129) describes how after a  
generation or two previously urban families adopted the ways of territorial-administrative 
society in the interior to the point where they fell out of touch with femily relations in the 
maritime cities:
[TJransplantcd one or two generations, previously urban, ruralized families lived a 
basically agricultural existence and did not identify themselves with their city brethren, 
who were devoted to mercantile matters, despite carrying similar surnames [Author’s 
translation].
Jaén (1993. 497) claimed that recent arrivals from the maritime cities socially fortified the 
savarma elite and adapted to the mentality and lifestyle of the western interior:
[Tjhese recent arrivals [after the 1671 destruction of old Panama City] demographically 
fortified a dominant group that otherwise was condertmed to mestization or extinction, 
and etuiched the possibility for more intense social relations. But at the same time they 
adopted with ease the mentality and lifestyle {"el compartamiento"\ of their exogenous 
nei^bors. and rapidly the economic structures of self-sufficiency [Author’s 
translation].
The classic inland enterprise of cattle raising, the staple o f upper echelon livelihood in the 
savannas, served as the principal instrument of commercial interchange between the rural elite 
and their more wealthy and politically influential urban counterparts.^ Jaén (1978, 493-4) notes 
that many o f the savanna ranching, landowning and bureaucratic upper class engaged in 
commercial relations perhaps hundreds o f kilometers away.
Panamanian maritime-commercial families that failed to withdraw to the interior at the 
end of the seventeenth century were probably those that after several generations had become 
too accustomed to the maritime-commercial lifestyle. They may have looked to maintain their
Figueroa (1978, 131) argues that the monopoly of power in Panama Cify and adjacent regions was in 
the hands of a small elite group, based partly upon the signatories of the acts of independence in 1821.
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social and economic status in other places and were shed away like some kind of Latin 
American maritime-commercial diaspora. Other families may have remained in the maritime 
cities of the Panama content to accept their dwindling social standing or lacking the capacity or 
the desire to become a part of the traditional world o f the territorial-administrative elite o f the 
interior.®'
Like the early shift to the maritime cities, the shift back to the interior was bom of 
necessity to maintain status in the wake o f failing economic opportunity. The eighteenth- 
century move to the interior may have reversed the effects of the earlier sixteenth-centur\" 
encomendero shift to maritime-commercial life in the transit cities. A true territorial- 
administrative society became invigorated in the interior of the Azuero Peninsula in Santiago 
and Los Santos, and would remain even after the period of maritime depression had passed. 
High levels o f maritime opportunity returned to the Isthmus of Panama after the construction of 
the Panama Railroad in 1855 and the Panama Canal in 1914 (Figures 4.8 and 4.9). But 
succeeding generations of maritime-commercial elite could not count on complete political 
dominance over the inland upper echelon, as had their sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
predecessors. Jaén (1977) notes that despite missing out on the new wealth of the maritime 
cities during the second half of the nineteenth century, many families simply chose to stay in 
rural areas (e.g.. De la Guardia, Arosemena, Mirô, and more recently, Fâbrega and Chiari). The 
formerly maritime but now inland elite had become accustomed to life in the interior of Panama 
or else they lacked the foresight to interact with new maritime-commercial immigrants. Many 
interior Emilies became politically and economically alienated from Panama City after the 
middle of the nineteenth centurv.
1830. 1831. and 1840. Figueroa (1978. 134) says European observers remarked that the urban oligarchy 
was more like a tribe ("tribu”) than a social class.
®' Ropp (1982. 72 n.20) cites Gandasegui (1986) who divides the Panamanian elite by race. In reality , the 
division is by history of occupation The three groups are: "Separatists” or the traditional rural families
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For the middle and lower echelon o f  Panamanian society the social and geographic 
division between the western interior and the maritime cities was even more profound. Jaén 
(1978, 490) says that for almost all of the pre-independence period, communication between 
middle and lower echelon groups in the western interior and the maritime cities was rare. 
According to Jaén (forthcoming), the majority of the population of the interior maintained a 
■'self-sufficient rhythm” (ritmo autônomo) in their everyday life, orchestrated by a  rural elite 
preoccupied by continuity and stability. What ties did exist between the western interior and the 
maritime cities were maintained only at an elite level. By the begitming of the twentieth century 
the situation for the rural interior had changed. Better access to the cities from the interior and 
expectations o f upward mobility and a better life created a major movement of people from the 
rural inland to Panama City. Migrants maintained an expatriate network of rural interior social 
relations in Panama City and because of this represented a political opposition to the maritime- 
commercial elite.
4.3 Pa n a m a ' s In su r g e n t  TERRuoRiAL-ADMiNisTRATrvE Society
On the eastern frontier of the Audiencia of Panama the impenetrable Darien lowland 
forest probably sufficed in itself as a natural barrier against potential overland attacks 
throughout the colonial period despite the best efforts of European pirates and settlers. The 
western flank was an entirely different matter. In fact, the western savarmas of the Azuero 
Peninsula are known as "the interior.” highlighting Panama's one-sided western orientation. 
Spanish administrators established a frontier network of roads and settlements extended along a 
westward axis from Panama City begirming with the founding of the city of Natâ in 1522. just
and urban merchants. Immigrants” after World War II fiom Western Europe and North America, and 
"Hebrews” representing the most isolated elite group.
81
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
three years after Balboa's transit/" The curious thing about the early territorial-administrative 
network across the Isthmus is that it was not a radial but a linear pattern of towns and villages, 
the opposite of what Fox (1971) suggests as the classic territorial-administrative settlement 
morphology. The explanation for this anomaly is that paths of least resistance for travel and 
trade across the western Isthmus lay within a relatively narrow linear corridor running along the 
southern edge of the continental divide.
The one exception to a linear territorial-administrative settlement morphology on the 
western Panamanian frontier lies in the center o f the Azuero Peninsula at the city o f Santiago. 
Santiago de Veraguas represents the spoke in one of the only truly radial patterns of towns and 
villages on the Isthmus of Panama (Figure 4.10).® It is easy to see that as one moves laterally 
along the narrow Isthmus, the Azuero Peninsula jutting out into the Pacific is the only possible 
space that an expanded radial pattern might have room to emerge. It is not surprising that 
Santiago along with nearby Los Santos represented the historical core of the Isthmus of 
Panama's inland territorial-administrative society. Confirming the core quality of the central 
Azuero Peninsula. Jaén (forthcoming) says that large ranches and rural estates were most 
concentrated in Santiago and Los Santos where there was significant administrative or mineral 
activity. In the poorer parts of the western interior such as Alanje, Santa Maria, Anton, and San 
Carlos estates were scattered. An intermediary pattern neither dispersed nor concentrated was to 
be found in the early estabUshed frontier zones close to Panama City like Natâ and Penonomé.
® Spanish administrators relied on informal institutions like the Catholic Church to establish territorial 
control in indigenous areas in the far western highlands and Caribbean coast (Jaén, forthcoming).
® The importance of a radial settlement pattern may still have resonance in Santiago through Catholic 
religious festivals, where each of the villages sends floats to the church at Santiago. If mapped, there 
might be a radial pattern around Santiago instead of a linear pattern as one might expect based on the fact 
that the Inter-American Highway runs east-west through the middle of the city.
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Figure 4.9. The home of the maritime-commercial elite, Panama City in 1908. The Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal 
lies just off to the right of the photograph (National Archives),
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Political and military leaders from the central Azuero Peninsula (area around Santiago 
and Los Santos in Figure 4.10) challenged the political ambitions of the urban maritime elite. 
Figueroa (1978. 116) claims that the dominant rural group of Veraguas opposed the interests of 
the commercial bourgeois o f Panama City when they could make political and social alliances 
with the small rural landowners {las fingueros) on the border regions thereby presenting a more 
unified interior political front. The rural leader from Santiago who could ally with not only 
middle echelon landowners but also marginal groups in Panama City presented a particularly 
formidable threat to the maritime elite.
The most successful political leader to come from the radial hub-city of Santiago, the 
son of a schoolteacher and someone who attracted strong support among the middle-class as 
well as the marginal groups of Panama Cit>\ was one of the National Guard officers who led the 
October 1968 military coup, Omar Torrijos Herrera (Figure 4.11). Ropp's (1982, 48) felt that 
the rural middle-class consciousness of the National Guard was a deliberate effort by Torrijos 
Herrera "to ensure the loyalty of the infantry through cultural or regional ties.’’ It is a fascinating 
insight into how Torrijos reconstituted the geographic and historical legacy of Panama's 
territorial-administrative society in the National Guard.
Maritime-commercial and territorial-administrative societies represent social divisions 
as much as geographic ones, divisions with their own unique internal subgroups. The maritime- 
commercial society in particular was internally divided. Because of its cosmopolitan nature, 
wealth and in particular race divided urban maritime-commercial society even at the elite level. 
The name for the lower echelon of the urban maritime cities, the arrabal, comes from the fact 
that they lived outside the walls of the city. Many of the arrabal were Antillean Blacks who 
immigrated to Panama City and Colon during the middle o f the nineteenth century looking for 
employment on the Panama Railroad and later the Panama Canal projects.
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Figure 4.11. Photo, date unknown. Celebration of Omar Torrijos' leadership in the 11 October 1968, military coup. Torrijos appears slightly 
shiOed to the left (National Archives).
Figueroa (1978, 117) says that the urban maritime-commercial oligarchy had essentially 
three enemies in the political arena. Two o f the urban elite’s political foes were territorial- 
administrative, the dominant rural groups of the interior particularly in Santiago de Veraguas. 
and the centralist Bogota government. The other political foe for the urban elite were groups 
within urban maritime-commercial society, the lower classes and marginal urban groups on the 
outskirts of Panama City {arrabal). Less than a  decade after independence from Spain in 1821. 
three separate military leaders each representing a major portion of Panamanian society were in 
open conflict with each other and against Colombian authority .
The period between 3 November 1903, and 11 October 1968, could be called the long 
insurgency of the Isthmus of Panama's territorial-administrative society, intent on seizing 
administrative and fiscal control of the state from the dominance of the maritime-commercial 
elite in Panama City. A territorial-administrative society of the interior accomplished the 
ultimate goal of state control on 11 October 1968. with the National Guard's military coup. The 
territorial-administrative upper echelon of military officers ruled until the United States was 
provoked into action against General Manuel Antonio Noriega on 20 December 1989. 
effectively reversing the legacy of the military coup and setting the stage for a  new inland 
opposition.
4.4 POLITICAL R e l a t i o n s  w i th  O u ts id e  TERRrroRiAL-ADMZNisTRAnvE a u t h o r i t i e s
Morse (1985) suggested a geographic basis for conflict in early Latin American society 
between interior landowners and Spanish American administrators. Interior landowners had 
rights to land and control over indigenous labor stemming from the original privileges their 
encomendero ancestors acquired from the Spanish monarchs after the military conquest. 
However, local and regional authorities o f the Spanish American bureaucracy subsequently 
tried to consolidate their own power over land and people:
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The centrifugal movement of settlers into farm, ranch, and mining lands, far removed 
Grom seaports and administrative centers (with these in turn distant Grom Spain by an 
arduous sea voyage), created the danger of sovereign satrapies, each enjoying absolute 
control of Indian workers who. in the Mexican and Andean highlands, and in Paraguay, 
could not combine for effective resistance to their new masters. As a result and “in the 
face of the excessive privileges granted by the monarchs themselves to the first 
discoverers and their descendents. the officials of the Court and the Audiencias reacted 
by retrieving all the grants of the Crown in the discovered lands, through long suits, 
tenaciously sustained.”
No comparable centrifugal movement o f settlers into farm, ranch and mining lands occurred on 
the Isthmus of Panama until the eighteenth century. Given in addition the strategic importance 
of ± e  Isthmus of Panama for the Carrera de Indias and the absence of any potential inland 
"sovereign satrapies” in the western savannas to challenge the Audiencia in Panama, one would 
think that regional Spanish officials would dominate all aspects of Panamanian life.
However, where in other parts of Latin America a landed elite of encomendero ancestry 
may have opposed Spanish-American administrative authority the non-encomendero maritime- 
commercial elite adapted to its presence. Many members of a maritime-commercial elite 
intermarried with rich Spanish and Peruvian merchant families. Others often close relatives 
filled the middle bureaucratic ranks of the local cabildo and the Spanish Audiencia in Panama 
City with their extended family. In an interesting observation. Ward (1993) says that the 
encomendero heritage of the Isthmus of Panama was "diluted” by the immigration of wealthy 
peninsular Spanish or Peruvian merchants;
The encomendero heritage of Panama’s aristocracy was further diluted by the continued 
irrunigration of Spanish merchants, who quickly married into the local aristocracy. No 
small number of these new arrivals were sent to Panama Grom Spain and Peru by large 
merchant concerns that wished to have permanent representatives in (and kinship 
relationships with) the Panamanian merchant corrummi^. The children of the 
aristocracy often followed their fathers into the merchant business, but a large number 
became government officials, occupying midlevel positions to the extent that the 
Panamanian goverrunent was always a potential ally in furthering positive policies for 
commerce.
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What Ward (1993) may not consider is that rather than a diluted encomendero class this 
commençai urban upper echelon could be a  different kind of elite altogether. It was perfectly 
natural that a non-encomendero maritime-commercial elite would develop close relations with 
wealthy foreign immigrant Emilies given the absence of opportunity in the interior while their 
relatives became mid-level administrative officials working for their family's commercial 
interests.
As already noted above, by 1607 not a single encomendero remained on the Isthmus of 
Panama. High-level Spanish officials would not have relished the idea o f a sparsely settled 
frontier flanking both sides of a vital overland silver route. Since Spanish encomenderos were 
absent, the Spanish-American administration had to work through other means to consolidate 
control over the strategic Panamanian flanks and prevent European pirates from invading the 
coast or seizing the silver in transit. One means of defense besides fortifying the maritime cities 
was giving the Isthmus of Panama a special administrative status. The Audiencia of Panama 
was established in 1538.^ In the Spanish system the Audiencia was second only to a 
Viceroyalty in jurisdictional status. The only reasonable explanation for why an area as 
diminutive as the Isthmus of Panama would be promoted to the level of an independent 
Audiencia in the Spanish territorial framework was because of its strategic importance. Ward 
( 1993. 48) claims that the President of the Audiencia of Panama held great prestige even though 
the position itself was relatively low paying. More than once the president was called on to lead 
troops against foreign armed forces such as in 1668 and 1672. Presidents were invariably 
militarv’ men whose principal job was maintenance of Panamanian defenses.
In 1543. the situation was modified and Panama was incoiporated as part the Audiencia of Guatemala 
Then two decades later, in 1564. an independent Audiencia was re-established on the Isthmus of Panama 
and remained until the end of the Spanish period.
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In addition to fortifications and administrative organization, another means for the 
Spanish-American administration to protect Spanish geographic imperatives in Panama may 
have been to look the other way when it came to Panamanian maritime-commercial monopolies 
over transit services. The Panamanian maritime-commercial elite did not directly threaten 
Spanish-American administrative control, like a powerful interior encomedero elite in other 
places, but did threaten their control indirectly. Ideally it was in everyone's best interests to 
cooperate against European privateers and other foreign threats. However, it is not 
inconceivable to think that the Panamanian elite felt a maritime-commercial monopoly was 6 ir 
compensation for willingness to cooperate with Spanish authority and security measures on the 
Isthmus of Panama. If pressed the Panamanian elite might not cooperate with Spanish efforts 
against foreign privateers. There was also the threat that an extended family member of the 
maritime-commercial elite who worked within the regional administration could leak vital 
information to foreign adventurers about the silver transit if Spanish authorities ever 
contemplated a crackdown on Panamanian business interests.
For the maritime-commercial elite it was the mule industry that represented a major 
source of derived wealth firom the transit trade.** The Panama route was not the only great mule 
route in the Americas. Ward (1993, 60) notes at least five others including the Potosi to Lima 
route employing more than 50.000 mules over a distance o f408 leagues, the Mendoza-Santiago 
route, the Acapulco-Veracruz route, the Huancavelica-Potosi route, and the Caribbean coast to 
Colombian inland cities routes to Quito. However, merchants on the Isthmus of Panama 
charged exorbitant prices relative to other roads within Spanish America because they 
maintained a tight monopoly on transit services (Ward 1993, 230-1). Markups on mule services 
allowed merchants to become wealthy and to diversify their portfolios by purchasing land.
** In the very first years of the transit until 1549, slaves carried cargo but afterwards only mules were 
used. It may have been that the roads were too rough and ffequenUy washed out for wheeled carts. A
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Ward (1993, 62-65) lists some fascinating statistics on the mule industry. Nearly 
everything about the mule industry was imported. The mule-service industry between the 
maritime cities was a true maritime-commercial endeavor in terms of the overland route mules 
took across the Isthmus of Panama and the trade in the mules themselves. All o f  the mules used 
on the Isthmus of Panama were imported, as well as all o f their food. Purchases of mules often 
exceeded yearly defense costs.
Sustaining a markup on mule-services in the face of Spanish and Peruvian merchant 
pressure seems to have been the key social relationship binding maritime-commercial society to 
local political authority. Local bureaucratic and family relations designed to sanction the 
interests of the mule monopoly may have even marked the genesis of Panamanian' identity :
Since the mule industry was one of the principal means of livelihood of the isthmus, 
officials in Panama were generally supportive of exorbitant rates, despite complaints 
from the captive merchants of both Spain and Peru. Indeed despite the close ties 
between authorities in Panama and Spain officials on the isthmus seemed quickly to 
have developed a creole mind-set so that their first loyalties were to other 
Panamanians, at the expense of Spaniards and Peruleros. This was the genesis o f a 
Panamanian sense o f identity [emphasis added].**
Besides the mule industry, an important source of municipal revenue for the local 
cabildo of the city o f Panama was the tax on travelers to maintain the roadways, iims and other 
infrastructiue for the transit. The inns were actually owned by the city of Panama but it is not 
clear whether that meant the price of staying at an itm was subsidized, or more probably, 
marked up with administrative consent. In 1593, the tax on travelers became formalized as an 
averia del camino or road tax of 0.5% on all silver, which was later extended to apply to not just
mule could carry approximately 2001bs. more than a slave but less than a shallow draft barge on the 
Chagres River which might carry 25 tons or more.
** Ward (1993, 69, 77-80). Jaén (1978, 506) argues that unlike other parts of Latin America, it was not 
until the end of the eighteenth century that a firm urban group coalesced as a commercial bourgeois that 
seemed typically "PanamaniatL” Figueroa Navarro (1978, 8) says that the commercial luban boiugeois 
were the leading group of Panamanian national sentiment, and noting a German sociologist, says that the
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silver but all merchandise. Throughout the seventeenth century, merchandise was taxed at a 
bulk rate. Each arroba (281bs of merchandise, based largely on a cubic measurement) destined 
for Portobelo was charged a flat toll rate. In 1698, well past the high point of the transit trade, 
the toll system was modified in a complicated system designed to itemize charges based on 
what commodity was being transported. In 1707, the toll policy was changed back to the 
original system because the itemized method was simply too cumbersome.^^
The early peninsular Spanish merchants o f Seville protected their own commercial 
interests on the Isthmus o f Panama through intermarriage with the Panamanian upper echelon. 
The mercantile interests of Cadiz, who took over the silver transit after 1679. may have 
preferred to use their political influence in Spain and protect their commercial privileges in 
Panama from the top down. Perez-Venero (1982) notes that for several years before 
independence Spanish authorities had allowed free commercial activity in Panama. But after the 
merchants of Cadiz successfully lobbied for exclusive fianchises on the Isthmus of Panama 
whatever local loyalist support existed was probably finished off. precipitating Panamanian 
revolt from Spanish authority on 28 November 1821.
Panamanian rebellion from Spanish authority served only to transfer Panama's political 
dependency to Gran Colombia. Subsequent dissatisfaction with Colombian authority produced a 
number of revolts and rebellions between 1821 until 1903. The revolt o f the State o f the Isthmus 
in 1840 helps illustrate how Panamanian rebellions sought goals that were less ambitious than 
sovereign self-rule. There is a difference between being an independent Isthmus of Panama and 
an Isthmus of Panama at liberty to barter its dependency upon more than one state.
lack of roads connecting Bogota and Panama City contributed to the development of a separate 
Panamanian national identity.
An analogous situation to the brief change in the system of toll collection between 1698 and 1707 
would be if the Panama Canal Commission began to charge vessels different tolls based on the different 
composition of commodities being carried, or even the geographic route, versus an across the board net 
tonnage charge for ladeiu ballast or government vessels.
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In a  letter on 5 December 1840, Chief of the State o f the Isthmus Tomas Herrera 
announced to President Martin Van Buren that the State of the Isthmus wished to be recognized 
as a sovereign nation. But in a strange twist Herrera said that the State of the Isthmus would 
remain independent only until such time as a new federal government could be arranged with 
Colombia. Article Q of the 18 March 1841, Convention of the State of the Isthmus signed in 
Panama Citv read:
[f the organization given to New Granada be federal and suitable to the interests of the 
people of the Isthmus, the latter shall form a State of the federation.... In no case shall 
the Isthmus be incorporated into the Republic of New Granada under the central 
system.^
In other words. Panamanian independence was a maneuver to adjust, not necessarily sever the 
existing political incorporation o f the Isthmus of Panama with Colombia.^
In a  letter on 3 1 December 1841, designated Special Agent of the State of the Isthmus 
to the United States in Washington William Radcliff presented the Panamanian case for 
recognition as an independent sovereign state to Secretary o f State Daniel Webster.™ Radcliff 
explained the history of the joining and subsequent separation o f the Isthmus of Panama to 
Colombia, emphasizing the fact that the former colonial provinces o f the Isthmus of Panama
^ The convention remained in session for five months, entrusting power to Col. Tomas Herrera. The 
General Secretary was José Augustin Arango, whose son of the same name would be a member of the 
Council of Provisional Government of the new Republic of Panama in 1903.
In a letter from Foote to Clayton dated 12 April 1850. Foote commented on the regularity of political 
strife in Central American politics: ‘Thq^ look upon strangers with distrust, and will when necessary, 
make common cause against them; but they have little cohesive power among themselves. The motives 
that in our coimtry cause combinations of political parties, or factions of such parties, here cause 
revolutions: and revolutions or organic political changes have succeeded each other, since the 
achievement of independence with such fi^uency, that the people have not been able to cultivate the 
policy of nationality that is so powerful in the United States.”
° The oddity of designated Special Agent of the State of the Isthmus William RadclifiTs letter is that a 
treaty had been signed between representatives of the State of the Isthmus and Colombia reincorporating 
the Isthmus of Panama on the very same day that Radcliff writing from Washington, D C., addressed 
Webster for recognition of the independent State of the Isthmus. Apparently. Radcliff was totally 
unaware of the negotiations then being concluded on the Isthmus of Panama.
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(Veraguas and Panama) had chosen to join Simon Bolivar's Gran Colombia. This, according to 
Radcliff, meant that they were 6ee to change their minds later.
The catch to Radcliffs explanation is that unlike Venezuela and Ecuador, the former 
colonial provinces of the Isthmus o f Panama had joined Gran Colombia in a subordinate form 
as a 'department.'^' Because of this, upon the separation of Gran Colombia into the independent 
states of Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia, the Isthmus of Panama simply remained a 
department o f  Colombia.^ Radcliff argtied that Panamanians were compelled to acquiesce but;
[R|eserv’ed the privilege of separating therefrom ... hoping that the time would soon 
arrive when the interests of other nations would become identified with their own in 
requiring for them an independent existence and cooperating for its establishment.
Radcliff hedged his argiunent for why Panamanians kept the privilege of asserting their 
independence whenever they felt like it by qualifying:
AJtho [sic| the right of separation at pleasure was perhaps not expressly reserved and 
admitted, it was nevertheless understood at the time by all concerned to be a just and 
necessary consequence of preceding and passing events and circumstances.
' The colonial territory was part of the Captaincy-General of Venezuela and Viceroyalty of New 
Granada. At one time, the area from Gracias a Dios to Chagres River was part of Captainc\ -General of 
Guatemala.
* In a letter from dated 13 September 1833, McAfee claimed that Venezuela was a more liberal and 
cosmopolitan state than Colombia. Referring to a policy of religious toleration and liberal openness. 
McAfee said. " ... this course of policy will at once ... give Venezuela a rank and character among the 
nations of the world as well as the enjoyment of advantages and priveleges [sic] which she could not hope 
for in connection with a goverrunent so insulated as this, whose views & fbelings are hampered and 
controirled [sic] by a power which as yet overshadows her best prospects. In fact New Granada either 
does not yet know her true interests, advantages and powerful means of being a great people, or she is 
afraid to call them into action, many of the leading men here have their heads full of a continental system 
... which is proved by ... their Jealousy of foreigners and foreign commerce which they are taught to 
believe (by men who are ignorant of the world & live secluded in high and gloomy walls) takes away 
tlieir money and introduces new and extravagant opinions & modes of living. I do not believe that all of 
tlie enlightened men at the head of the goverrunent believe in these things, yet such opinions as I have 
stated prevail and have so far influenced the Goverrunent -  Venezuela sees this and has deterrrrined not 
to risk a cormection with a state who thus far does not see her own interest and whose power could 
controul [sic] her.”
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Radcliff said that even if  Panamanians did not, in fact, have the privilege of separating from 
Colombia, the secession of Panama was justified by civil war in Colombia and the isolated 
geographical position o f the Istiunus of Panama from the rest of the country
In a letter a  few montiis later on 19 February 1842, Radcliff said that the local political 
leadership of the Isthmus o f Panama had always desired a federal system rather than a 
consolidated system. Radcliff s statement was somewhat at odds with his earlier argument that 
the Isthmus of Panama desired sovereign independence. Strangest o f all is how Radcliff 
concluded his February 1842 letter. He said that in his own personal view as an American 
citizen, only a treaty with an independent Panamanian state would neutralize the political 
fickleness rampant in Colombia as well as in Panama.^ Radcliff insisted that supporting the 
sovereignty of Colombia would only encourage political discord. Radcliff claimed that a treaty 
must be signed to insulate American use of a Panamanian route from the caprice and cupidity of 
the sovereign of Panama itself:
[The use of the Isthmus of Panama] upon any terms will depend on the future will and 
pleasure, or caprice, or cupidity of one of them, unless otherwise regulated by some 
treaty stipulations they may be induced to enter into. It is therefore an object of great 
importance to acquire through negotiation the right or privilege desired, and secure by 
treaty as permanently as possible that which is now dispensed as a favor, revocable at 
pleasure. The right or privilege wanted is that of entering and using the ports of the 
Isthmus with our vessels and cargoes for the purposes of trade there or kyond with 
other countries; and of using the Isthmus as a highway or passage from one ocean to the 
other for the purposes of intercourse personal and commercial with other countries on 
each side the Continent: free and clear from all restrictions and impositions whatever 
except the necessary charges of transportation together with the permission of 
improving at our own expense the passage or mode of crossing the Isthmus to some 
extent or other whenever convenient.... [therefore the United States must] treat with all 
concerned in the results, for the guaranty of the Independence of the Isthmus as a 
separate State, and of its permanent neutrality, in case the work be accomplished 
[emphasis added).
 ̂Consider that what Radcliff characterized as Panamanian fickleness was what he was earlier calling a 
noble independence movement
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Radcliff s ended his letter with an offer to limit the exercise o f Panama's sovereignty if  outside 
powers would construct a  transportation technology and guarantee the neutrality o f the State of 
the Isthmus;
The Government of the Isthmus, having the sole control of that route, is naturally 
desirous of improving it’s advantages for the benefit of it’s citizens as far as reason and 
equity would allow: but is willing to limit the exercise of its control within proper 
bounds by treaty stipulations, if other nations would imdertake the contemplated 
improvements for the use and benefit of the World. It desires also to make treat} 
arrangements with other Governments, wherdry the State of the Isthmus shall be 
considered as always a neutral territory: exempt from compromittal in the wars of other 
Countries, and as a place of peace and security for all the inhabitants of the Globe who 
shall wish to pass over it. or send across it their properw.
Early Panamanian political secessions were clearly not independence movements they 
were dependence movements. The political leadership o f the Isthmus of Panama seceded in 
1840 not to break away but to renegotiate their political status with Colombia in light o f new 
commercial and fiscal opportimities up for grabs fi*om a Panamanian canal or railway. The 
maritime-commercial elite was intent on gaining leverage in the relationship with territorial- 
administrative authority in Bogota, particularly after the Conservative's centralizing constitution 
in 1886 dissolved federal rights. The possibility that foreign interests might construct an 
interoceanic canal offered Panamanians the chance to opt for a  protectorate by one or more of 
the maritime powers.”  In the minds of Panamanian leaders, if Colombia was unwilling to grant 
them more self-rule within a federal arrangement so that they could pursue their maritime 
interests, they might just switch their political dependence to someone else. The potential that
■' RadclifTs suggestion in essence became American policy when in November 1903 President Theodore 
Roosevelt decided that rather than continuing to support the sovereignty of the Republic of Colombia on 
the Isthmus of Panama, he would support an independent Republic of Panama.
^ In a letter from Blackford to Webster on 20 October 1842, Blackford conunented on the British 
proposal for a multilateral protectorship: ^In a conversation with Mr. Steuart, Her Brittanic Majesty's 
Cliargc. respecting Panama, he frankly stated, that he had addressed a communication to his Government, 
in which he proposed that the Province of Panama should be declared an independent state, and placed 
under the protection of England -  France and the United States, with trea^ stipulations, calculated to
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United States intervention might be turned against Colombian autboritv inspired maritime- 
commercial rebellions, and eventually Panamanian independence on 3 November 1903.
Arrangements among the maritime powers to defend the neutrality of an Isthmian or 
Central American canal such as Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty and the 
1850 Clayton-Bulvver Treaty were inspired in part to create a safe habitat for private capital. 
Private interests considering whether to invest in an interoceanic technology were guaranteed 
that their investments were safe from occasional hostilities among the maritime powers. 
However, it was not until the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty that a neutrality agreement 
advantageous to the strategic interests of the United States was signed.
The one aspect of the interoceanic transportation technology equation that seemed to 
defy resolution was not so much the question of capital investment, where the lowest 
topographic relief lay, or even what sort of engineering plan was best. It was the question of 
who would be sovereign of the Isthmus of Panama. Literally everyone seemed to have a plan 
for territorial or extraterritorial control over an interoceanic canal.
Just a week before the final draft of the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was inked between 
representatives of the United States and Britain in Washington, D C , political leaders in Central 
America v/ere sketching their own territorial designs. In a letter on 12 April 1850, United States 
Chargé d 'Affaires at Bogota Thomas M. Foote informed Secretary of State John M. Clayton 
that a new Central American state was being considered which would include Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, and the Isthmus of Panama with its capital at Panama City:
I heard rumors of a meditated dismemberment of this Republic (Colombia), with a view 
to the formation of a new, independent State. I gave little heed to these rumors at first 
thinking them, like the talk of revolution, the ebullition of heated partnership, that 
would cool down after a while. But information I have recently received, from reliable 
sources, compels me to believe that the project of forming a new State is seriously 
entertained, that the incipient steps toward its accomplished [sic] have alreacfy been 
taken. The project, as nearly as I can leam, is this; To form a new Republic that sliall
avoid all jealousies. To this measure he does not anticipate any objections on the part of New Granada, as 
the province is now a burden. He has not yet received an answer ftom his Govenunent”
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embrace the State of Nicaragua and Costa Rica in Central America, the Province of the 
Isthmus, and all that portion of New Granada lying west of the Magdalena river as high 
up as Nare, and thence south west to the mouth of the San Juan in the Pacific, with the 
seat of the govemt at Panama.
This was not merely a plan for a new state. This was an alliance for a  specific aim, a kind of 
nineteenth-century Central American equivalent of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries). This potential new state would enclose within a  single sovereignty all of 
the best interoceanic routes across Central America. The formation o f  such a state by Central 
Americans could have no other purpose than to consolidate a  territorial monopoly over a 
geographic position valuable to the maritime powers so as to, like OPEC, try to control its price. 
Divided, the states o f Central America with potential Isthmian canal routes might find 
themselves trying to outdo each other to offer the more concessionaire privilege in order to 
attract private capitalists or the protection of the maritime powers. But united, these states were 
in a position to raise the asking price for the rights to construct an interoceanic canal and insure 
their sovereignty over its direct and derived benefits. It made sense for political leaders in 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica to donate their sovereign control over the Rio San Juan route in 
return for a portion o f the direct and derived benefits of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama 
should one be constructed there, and vice versa.
In the same letter to Clayton on 12 April 1850, Foote said:
The Northwestern portion of the Republic, especially the Province of Panama, has 
received a new impulse in consequence of the unprecedented emigration to California 
and the attention that has been given to the Isthmus as a great route of commerce. 
Vague, but magnificent ideas of fiitiue prosperity and grandeur float in the minds of the 
people of that quarter, and they imagine that, if they could constitute themselves the 
independent State, all these ideas would be promptly realised. The measures of the 
government here have tended to encourage rather than repress these motives.
As a result o f  its brief non-dependence movement in 1840, the province of Panama was given 
the power to raise its own revenues and was released fi-om paying general Colombian expenses.
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but not much more. The Isthmus of Panama did not acquire the level of sovereign self-rule as in 
a federal state to pursue its own special maritime interests until the Liberal constitutional 
reforms of the 1850s.
There could have been instances when a Panamanian dependence movement really was 
an independence movement i.e., a  desire to be an independent sovereign state free of any 
political dependence whatsoever. But in the minds of leading nineteenth-centur\ Panamanian 
statesmen like Mariano Arosemena, the poUtical options for the Isthmus of Panama were either 
to become a federal state within a Colombian. Ecuadoran, Peruvian or Central American 
confederation, or else a "Hanseatic Republic” protected by the maritime powers.̂ *̂  The Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 was in some ways an apt marriage. The treaty combined the 
expanding federal powers of the United States Government in strategic foreign territory and a 
maritime-commercial elite with a political tradition desiring commercial liberties and federal 
rights but without the burdens of sustaining an independent nation.
It was only during the middle o f  the twentieth century that nationalist opposition groups 
led by Amulfo Arias and Omar Torrijos began to speak forcefully about removing all forms of 
political dependence upon the United States. At the same time one must consider that nationalist 
and 'non-dependence' rhetoric within the Republic of Panama was in many ways a domestic 
political phenomenon, an opposition movement meant to buy political support not overhaul 
international relationships. Even the most nationalist Panamanian administrations like the 
Torrijos regime (1968-1981) contemplated replacing the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with a 
multilateral protectorate under the Organization of American States or the United Nations. 
Eventually Torrijos signed a neutrality agreement which in his own words essentially put the 
operation o f the Panama Canal under the protective umbrella of the Department of Defense.
^ I was unable to find a reference to works of a nineteenth-century Panamanian secessionist leader who 
insisted on completely independent statehood, free from a protectorate by the maritime powers.
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The official turnover of the former Canal Zone and Panama Canal on 31 December 
1999. might be celebrated as Panama's third independence day by nationalistic Panamanians.^ 
But in practical terms the legacy of the Torrijos administration was to arrange a timetable for 
the recoil, not a foil withdrawal, of American involvement and only in the day-to-day aspects of 
Canal Zone and Panama Canal operation. A neutrality agreement subject to unilateral 
invocation by the United States under threatening circumstances remains in force. The 
Neutralit} Treaty is in a broad sense no different than the entangling situation established by the 
1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty and folly compatible with longstanding political traditions of 
Panama's maritime-commercial elite.
As it is. the people of the Republic of Panama always celebrate two independence days in the same 
month; independence &om Spain on 21 November ÛS2I) and independence from Colombia on 3 
November ( 1903). Given that the official turnover of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone will occur on 31 
December (1999). by default Panamanians will always be celebrating a third independence day. as New 
Year’s Eve. A summary of Panamanian comments during the March 1973 United Nations Security 
Council Meetings noted: ’’Speaking in support of the draft resolution. Panama said that it was putting 
before the Council a basic problem which affected international peace and security. Panama’s 
independence would be completed only when the Canal Zone was incorporated politically, economically 
and culturally in the rest of the Republic. Panama was convinced that the draft resolution would help to 
achieve the objectives it had put before the Council” [emphasis added] (U.S. Congress 1977b. 1453).
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Pa r t  U : A m e r ic a n  G e o g r a p h ic  Im p e r a t iv e s
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C h a p te r  S. T h e  G e o g r a p h ic  Im p e r a tiv e s  o f  a n  E x p a n d in g  U n ite d  S t a t e s  
When a newly independent United States that bad scarcely extended beyond the 
Appalachian Mountains expanded to become a powerful transcontinental country during the 
nineteenth century, it became an American geographic imperative to control the Isthmus of 
Panama. On a global scale, the expansion of European powers into the Pacific Ocean coincided 
to some degree with American expansion across North America, throwing the global 
geographic imperatives of European maritime powers against the hemispheric imperatives of 
the United States. But as American Presidents like Rutherford B. Hayes in 1880 were keen to 
point out. echoing the principle articulated by President James Monroe in 1823. the imperatives 
of the United States were of a fundamentally higher order than the fer flung interests of Europe. 
Protecting the neutrality of an interoceanic route became the basis for an entangling alliance 
with Panama that still exists.^
The 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty with Colombia (New Granada) was one of if not 
the first entangling alliance for an early United States.^ Article XXXV of the Treaty of Peace.
In his celebrated farewell address to the nation on 17 September 1796. President George Washington 
said; "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own. to stand upon foreign 
ground? Why. by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle oiu- peace and 
prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, hiunor. or caprice? 'Tis our policy to steer 
clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. .. Taking care always to keep 
ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to 
temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." Little might President George Washington have 
imagined that only half a century later it would not be with Europe but with of all places the Isthmus of 
Panama that the United States would entangle itself in a permanent alliance guaranteeing another nation's 
sovereignty.
® In a letter from Clayton to Foote on 19 July 1849, Clayton believed that Article XXXV of the 1846 
treaty was: "[T]he first instance in which such a guaranty has been bestowed by this government. May the 
privileges for which it was exchanged always be equivalent to the responsibilities which it imposes!” 
(U.S. Congress 1977b. 362) Malloy (1910, 147) said of the treaty: “and above all, the guaranty provisions 
of Article 35 regarding the Isthmus of Panama embodied a wholly new principle in the policy of the 
United States and one which proved to be of momentous and permanent importance.” In a letter on 28 
February 1850. Foote said he had talked to the British Charge d'Affaires in Colombia that "in view of 
tlie desirableness of a railway across the Isthmus, and the great benefits likely to result from its 
constructiotL the United States had departed from their uniform policy of avoiding close alliances with 
any nations, and had given the guaranty referred to.” However, see Miller ( 1931, 157) about an American 
alliance with France to guarantee its possessions in the Americas as a holdover of the revolutionary war.
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Amity . Navigation and Commerce, signed in Bogota on 12 December 1846, and ratified by the 
United States Senate on 3 June 1848, stated:
And. in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these 
advantages, and as an especial compensation for the said advantages and for the favours 
they have acquired by the 4th. 5th and 6th articles of this treaty, the United States 
guarantee positively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present stipulatioiL the 
perfect neutrality of the before mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free transit 
from the one to the other sea, may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time 
while this treaty exists: and in consequence, the United States also guarantee, in the 
same maimer, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and 
possesses over the said territory.*”
Transcontinental expansion undermined the high principles o f foreign policy that 
President George Washington could afford to assert in his day when the United States was a 
one-ocean nation. President Washington may not have conceived of a future United States 
compelled by territorial and commercial expansion to involve itself on the Isthmus of Panama 
and abroad. Regardless, he would probably not have understood how an American president 
could knowingly justify an entangling alliance with a foreign territory as a matter of national 
self-preservation, as both James K Polk and Rutherford B. Hayes would later.
5.1 Ea r l y  Am e r ic a n  Prin ciples  Ab o u t  In v o l v e m e n t  O verseas
Washington's belief about avoiding entangling alliances was a common element in the 
rhetoric of American foreign policy.** Subsequent presidents often stated their belief that the 
United States should remain free of entangling alliances. In his inaugural address on 4 March 
1801, President Thomas Jefferson stated:
*“ U.S. Congress (1977b. 8-9).
*' Compare Washington’s statement, for instance, with the words of Thomas Paine in Common Sense, 
published twenty years earlier in January 1776, “...we ought to form no partial cormections with any part 
of [Europe]. It is the true interests of ... [Americans] to steer clear of European contentions” (cited in 
LaFeber 1989. 19-20).
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About to enter, fellow-citizens. on the exercise of duties which comprehend every thing 
dear and valuable to you, it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential 
principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its 
administration. I will compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear, 
stating the general principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice to all 
men, of whatever state or persuasioit religious or political: peace, commerce, and 
honest friendship, with all nations, entangling alliances with none.^
In a speech delivered on 4 July 1821, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams foretold 
that if the United States involved itself in foreign interests, including the independence 
movements underway in former Spanish America, it might eventually drag Americans to a 
moral low ground in their foreign affairs. It seemed that for Adams even supporting an 
independence movement like the one that had created the United States itself contradicted the 
principle o f national self-determination free o f foreign interference:
[The United States) knows well that by once enlisting under other banners than her 
own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself 
beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual 
avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of 
freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty 
to force.... She might become the dictratess of the world. She would no longer be the 
ruler of her own spirit”
There existed another side to the rhetoric o f early American foreign policy. Most 
renowned was the assertion made by President James Monroe in his annual message to 
Congress on 2 December 1823, that the United States would consider the interference o f Europe 
in the Western Hemisphere as an act of hostility against the United States. Monroe's message 
was prompted by a  border dispute between the United States, Russia and Great Britain over the 
Pacific Northwest coast. In his statement. President Monroe was careful to point out that it was 
not the existence but the extension of European territorial influence in the Western Hemisphere 
that he considered a  threat to American national security. Monroe made this assertion without
Cited in Gantenbein (1971,6).
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emphasizing that such would particularly be the case if an extension of European influence were 
pondered on or near a border with the United States; that would go without saying. It seems 
President Monroe was attempting to preempt any extension of Europe to the detriment of the 
United States and just to be safe made it a blanket claim for the entire Western Hemisphere. 
Monroe said:
In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by 
which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which the}' may 
terminate, the occassion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the 
rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by 
the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are 
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European 
powers. .. We owe it. therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing 
between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any 
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as 
dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any 
European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the 
governments who have declared their independence and maintained it. and whose 
independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we 
could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in 
any other maimer their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the 
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.^
One of the earliest official statements of policy about the Isthmus of Panama in 
particular were written instructions dated 8 May 1826, from Secretary of State Henry Clay to 
United States representatives to the Panama Congress. Simon Bolivar, the leader of the state of 
Gran Colombia (now Panama, Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador), called the Congress to 
discuss the construction of an interoceanic route across the Isthmus of Panama. In his written 
instructions to the two American representatives, neither of whom were actually able to attend.
83 Cited in LaFeber (1989, 80).
^  Cited in Gantenbein (1971. 323-324). At about the same time that President Monroe spoke to Congress 
in 1823. former President Thomas Jefferson wrote that possession of Cuba and Florida would give to tlie 
United States control over the Gulf of Mexico and "would fill the measure of our well-being.” In his 
foreword to the book by McCain (1965. ix-x). J. Fred Rippy says Jefferson insisted that Gulf bordering 
areas like Louisiana and Florida either be retained by a weak Spain or annexed by the United States but 
that he would not consent to a stronger power controlling them: "Control of the Isthmian routes of 
interoceanic communication then became a corollary of our policy of dominating the Gulf and Caribbean
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Secretary of State Clay was careful to emphasize it was the opinion of the United States that no 
one nation should possess an exclusive privilege over an Isthmian route;
What is to redound to the advantage of ail America should be effected by common 
means and exertions, and should not be left to the separate and unassisted efforts of any 
one power .... If the work should ever be executed so as to admit of the passage of sea 
vessels from ocean to oceaiu the benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated 
to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the payment of 
a just compensation or reasonable tolls.̂ ^
Clay's position was that no one nation should have an exclusive privilege. But that was not the 
same thing as advocating all maritime nations of the world be granted equal control over an 
interoceanic canal.
United States Chargé d’Affaires at Bogota Robert B. McAfee's note to the Minister of 
Foreign Affeirs of Colombia Lino de Pombo of 31 May 1834. could be considered a corollary 
of the policy explained by Clay in his instructions of 1826. McAfee wrote that a road across the 
Isthmus of Panama would be a project worthy of the imited "exertions and influence'’ of all the 
governments of the continent, but he questioned whether a private company was capable of the 
task:
[I]t may be a question of some doubt how far an incorporated company ought to have 
the controul of so important a point or whether such a united company alone would be 
able to accomplish it upon a scale corrunensurate with the hopes and expectations of the 
commercial world?
For representatives of the United States, private sponsorship had its drawbacks. A private firm 
may not be able to construct an intercxzeanic technology of sufficient capaciw and sophistication 
to be useful for American maritime shipping. A private interest could be manipulated by
region in order to prevent its domination by Europe. For the Pacific Coast and the Southwest had to be 
defendecL and speedy transit across the Isthmus was vital in this defense strategy."
U.S. Congress (1977b. 3).
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European capital interests or governments. And it would not be easy to see how a private 
enterprise would be able to protect itself from attack by a foreign maritime power, or even from 
excessive taxes or tolls imposed by the sovereign of the territory itself, without the support of a 
sovereign government.
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century the policy of the United States was to 
prevent any European entity public or private from appropriating an exclusive privilege on the 
Isthmus of Panama. By the end of the nineteenth century , the principle that no one nation ought 
to have an exclusive privilege on the Isthmus was something that American representatives did 
not feel applied to them because of American geographic imperatives. The goal of American 
policy never changed. It remained one o f preventing a European nation from appropriating an 
exclusive privilege on the Isthmus of Panama. The difference was that during the course of the 
nineteenth century acquiring an exclusive privilege for the United States became the preferred 
means to that end.
One need only compare Secretary o f State Clay's instructions in May 1826 with 
President Rutherford B. Hayes' message to Congress in March 1880. President Hayes' message 
to Congress on 8 March 1880, was a point blank statement asserting American interests on the 
Isthmus of Panama.^ The policy of the United States was a canal under American control as a 
matter of American geographic imperative. Since the United States' commercial and ultimately 
national security interests over a canal across any part of Central America were paramount to 
those of other nations, the United States would demand a monopoly sliare of supervisory 
privileges and obligations. Hayes said:
No doubt Hayes speech was a reaction to the recently concluded canal agreement between the United 
States of Colombia {Estados Unidos de Colombia) and Lucien N.B. Wyse, a representative of the 
International Interoceanic Canal Association of France. The original Wyse Concession was concluded 
between the Republic of Colombia and the representative of the International Interoceanic Canal
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The policy of this counhy is a canal under American control. The United States cannot 
consent to the surrender of this control to any European power, or to any combination 
of European powers .... An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will 
essentially change the geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of 
the United States and the rest of the world. It will be the great ocean thoroughfare 
between our Atlantic and our Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the 
United States. Our merely commercial interest in it is greater than that of all other 
countries, while its relations to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of 
defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of paramount concern to the people of 
the United States. No other great power would, under sim ilar circumstances, fail to 
assert a rightfiil control over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interest and 
welfare.... [T]t is the right and the du^ of the United States to assert and maintain such 
supervision and aut!;ority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus that connects 
North and South America as will protect our national interests. This I am quite sure will 
be found not only compatible with butjpromotive of. the widest and most permanent 
advantage to commerce and civilization.
In a related statement. Secretary of State James A. Blaine drafted a circular letter dated 
24 June 1881. explaining President Hayes' position as one of pure geographic imperative. 
Blaine stated that the United States could no more allow a hostile warship to pass through a 
Panama Canal than it would allow the armed forces of a hostile nation to transit the 
transcontinental railroads:
It is as regards the political control of such a canal, as distinguished from its merely 
administrative or commercial regulation, that the President feels called upon to speak 
with directness and emphasis. During any war to which the United States ... might be a 
party, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile nation through the canal at Panama 
would be no more admissible than would the passage of the armed forces of a hostile 
nation over the railway lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United 
States.
A conspicuous feature of Secretary of State Blaine's Jime 1881 letter is that its tone and 
affirmation seem to parallel the statements o f  President James Motuoe in December 1823.
Association of France. Lucien N.B. Wyse. in May 1876. On 18 May 1878. an enlarged Wyse Concession 
entered into force.
* Shortly afterwards on 19 April 1880. American minister Evaits wrote to the Colombian minister “This 
govenunent cannot consider itself excluded, by any arrangement between other powers or individual [sic| 
to which it is not a party, from a direct interest and if necessary a positive supervision and interposition 
in the execution of any project which, by completing an interoceanic cormection through the Isthmus, 
would materially affect its commercial interests, change the territorial relations of its own sovereignty.
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Compare the last part o f Monroe's message to Congress with the last part of Blaine's letter
below:
[Ajn agreement between the European stales to jointly guarantee the neutrality, and. in 
effect, control the political character of a highway of commerce, remote from them and 
near to us. forming substantially a part of our coastline, and promising to become the 
chief means of transportation between our Atlantic and Pacific States, would be viewed 
by this government with the gravest concern .... Any attempt to supersede that 
guarantee by an agreement between European powers, which maintain vast armies and 
patrol the sea with immense fleets, and whose interest in the canal and its operation can 
never be so vital and supreme as ours, would partake of the nature of an alliance against 
the United States.**
Regardless of President Hayes' message to Congress and the rhetoric o f American 
geographic imperative at the end of the nineteenth century, avoiding entangling alliances with 
foreign nations never ceased to be one of the highest principle of American foreign relations. 
On 8 December 1885. Democratic President Grover Cleveland decided to withdraw from 
Seriate consideration the Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty concerning the Nicaraguan canal, an 
agreement signed in December 1884 during the Republican Chester A. Arthur administration. 
Cleveland said it was contrary to the precedent set by President George Washington in 1787:
Maintaining, as 1 do. the tenets of a line of precedents from Washington's day which 
prescribe entangling alliances with foreign states. 1 do not favour a policy of acquisition 
of new and distant territory or the incorporation of remote interests with our own .... 
Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier dividing the two greatest 
maritime areas of the world must be for the world’s benefit, a trust for mankind, to be 
removed from the chance of domination by a single power, nor become a point of 
invitation for hostilities or a prize for warlike ambition. An engagement combining the 
constructiorL ownership, and operation of such a work by this government with an 
offensive and defensive alliance for its protectioit with the foreign state whose 
responsibilities and rights we should share, is. in my judgment inconsistent with such 
dedication to universal and neutral use.*̂
and impose upon it the necessity of a foreign policy, which, whether in its feature of warlike preparation 
or entangling alliance, has been hitherto sedulously avoided” U.S. Congress (1977b. 51).
** Cited in Arias (1911 [1970|. 43-44).
Cited in Arias (1911 [1970], 50)
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5.2 In t e r n a l  G e o g r a p h ic  Im p e r a t iv e s  fo r  A m e r ic a n  in v o l v e m e n t  in  Pa n a m a
When it comes to understanding what was at stake geographically for the United States 
in its early involvement on the Isthmus of Panama, the rhetoric of American Presidents and 
Secretaries o f State is misleading. Asserting high principles o f American foreign policy or 
America's special commercial or strategic interests in diplomatic correspondence or a message 
to Congress was something American representatives fieely indulged in. And the policymakers 
and interest groups that debated American foreign policy may not have been rational least of all 
well informed about what was at stake abroad.
Whatever advantage came by American involvement in Panama, it was politically 
sensible for the opposition to reacdvely challenge the incumbent party's policy in Panama as 
either too weak or too aggressive, regardless. It could be argued that American involvement 
abroad would drag the United States into foreign intrigue and ambitions. Expectations o f wealth 
and power overseas would inevitably corrupt the national interest and its leadership. And what 
might be gained in terms of mercantile wealth or military power would have to be paid for in 
moral currency and American lives. But on the other hand, it could be argued that national 
interests were at stake if the United States 6iled to assert itself in Panama and allowed 
ambitious and powerful states to establish themselves ever closer to American borders. Unless 
some preemptive overseas diplomacy was instituted now the United States might inevitably 
have no choice in the matter as foreign intrigue and ambitions would come to American shores.
Speaking about the second half of the nineteenth centur} , Nichols (1961, 529) says:
The one constant common to these eras, is the frequent practice of sacrificing 
diplomacy to domestic politics. On this point warring theorists on imperialism would, 
perhaps, agree.
Nichols (1961) believes the fight between “Union” President Johnson and the “Radical’
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Republicans in Congress was the real reason for the failure of Secretary of State William H 
Seward's ambitious territorial plans. Seward believed the United States should consider 
annexing islands and border areas including Haiti, Santo Domingo, the Danish West Indies. 
Canada, Cuba. Greenland, Hawaii, Iceland and Puerto Rico. The same principle would apply for 
President Ulysses S. Grant's failure to secure a protectorate over Haiti and annex Santo 
Domingo. If a President particularly a Republican President never enjoyed anything close to a 
treaty majority in the Senate until the end of the nineteenth century it would have been difficult 
to muster the congressional consensus to support a new policy o f American expansionism.
Yet few American Presidents at any time in history held both a treaty majority in the 
Senate and a majority in the House at the same time. The first President after Ulysses S. Grant 
to enjoy both a treaty majority (two-thirds) in the Senate and a majority in the House was 
Franklin D Roosevelt (Figure 5.1). Four elected American presidents since James Monroe have 
controlled a treaty majority o f the Senate and a majority o f the House (Abraham Lincoln, 
Ulysses S. Grant, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Lyndon B. Johnson). However. Theodore 
Roosevelt and Jimmy Carter held a majority in the House and nearly a treaty majority in the 
Senate.^
While it may be true that ratification of a treaty is easier if the same party that controls 
the Presidency also controls a treaty majority in the Senate, it is not clear why it should 
necessarily follow that without such a treaty majority foreign policy is difficult or impossible. 
Foreign policy can be handled using a  range of options not all o f  which require a treaty or the 
participation of Congress. Even if a  treaty were required, the feet that a President does not enjoy 
a treaty majority in the Senate or a  majority in the House to pass implementing legislation does 
not mean that a President is prevented from soliciting crossover votes. Though no one political 
party controlled the Presidency or a  treaty majority in the Senate throughout most of the second
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half of the nineteenth century it seems to have been irrelevant for the issue of American 
involvement on the Isthmus of Panama. Domestic political opposition did not in any way knot 
the ratification of a profoundly entangling role for the United States Federal Government on the 
Isthmus o f Panama via Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty The 1846 Bidlack- 
Mallarino Treaty was negotiated and ratified not by a Republican administration but by a 
Democratic President (James K Polk) and a Democratically controlled Senate with bipartisan 
support. The four major interoceanic canal treaties up to and including the Hay-Bunau-Varilia 
Treaty introduced into Congress by the President in 1850. 1901. 1902 and 1903 were all ratified 
with bipartisan support.®'
5.3 G lobal Geographic Imperatives fo r  American In v o lv em en t  in Panama
In an article called ‘The Panama Canal and sea power in the Pacific.'' Captain Alfred 
Thayer Mahan claimed that advocates of the Panama Canal probably did not separate its 
commercial and military advantages to the United States;
The primary object of the canal may have been commercial, or it may have been 
military. I doubt whether many of those conspicuous in its advocacy and inception 
analyzed to themselves which of these two obvious features was chief in their 
individual estimatiorL®̂
®*’ Tire percentage of the Senate controlled by the majority party of the House of Representatives is 
included as Figirre 42 for reference.
®' Tliere has only been one instance where an interoceanic canal treaty supported by the President was 
nearly rejected kcause of partisan opposition in Congress. At the end of the second-longest continuous 
treaty debate in history of the United States Senate (38 days) on 18 April 1978, Democratic President 
Jimmy Carter gained a two-thirds m a jo riQ r in the Senate for advice and consent to ratification of the 
Panama Canal treaties against Republican opposition by the tally of 68 to 32. i.e.. with only one vote to 
spare.
®̂ Mahan (1977. 16).
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Figure 5.1. Representation of the President’s Political Party in the Senate and House. Source; Martis (1989)
Mahan was probably correct. In fact, it need not be an either-or question, i.e., whether the 
Panama Canal was a military or a  commercial asset to the United States. The best answer is that 
the Panama Canal was both a military and a commercial asset; however, it was a military asset 
first. Early American involvement in Panama was driven by the hemispheric and global 
expansion of the United States to protect its maritime frontiers against the encroachment of 
European powers.
It was practically inevitable that the United States would eventually assert itself in 
Panama, the linchpin o f maritime communication in the Western Hemisphere and a global 
choke point coveted by other maritime powers. The Isthmus of Panama is in fact one of only 
three global maritime choke points. A global maritime choke point is a narrow maritime pass 
connecting two major oceans and bisecting a major continental landmass. Global maritime 
choke points are evident on an ordinary map of the world upside down, forcing one to see a 
basic symmetry in the configuration of the world's continents and oceans rather than the 
familiar world map. Three dominant global ' peninsulas. ' the Australasian archipelago, Africa 
and South America, stand up from two landmass bases. Eurasia and North America (Figure
5.2). Each global peninsula is bisected by a central maritime choke point and flanked by other 
maritime choke points creating a global maritime choke point complex of islands, sea-lanes and 
straits (Figure 5.3).
The morphology o f  a global maritime choke point complex can be described by how 
open or closed the flanking choke points are and how distant the alternative or cape complex 
lies around the end of the global peninsula. In the case o f the Panama and Suez choke point 
complexes, there exists one central choke point and a single distant alternative cape complex, 
the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn, respectively. The Suez complex is a very closed system 
relative to Panama and Suez, while the Strait o f Malacca choke point complex is the most open 
system of the three. The Strait o f Malacca is the first choke point along the frontier between the
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Pacific and the Indian Oceans. However, there are several other choke points separating the 
Pacific and the Indian Oceans, lined up from the Southeast Asian archipelago to the cape 
complex at Cape Leeuwin between Australia and Tasmania.
Sketching the global symmetry of continents and oceans and dividing it into three 
choke point complexes presumes that maritime communication is oriented in a basically 
latitudinal fashion. What about maritime communication in a longitudinal direction, cutting 
across latitudinal bands of wind and weather patterns? If one looked at the world turned 
sideways instead of upside down there would exist only two global maritime choke points, a 
porous North Atlantic-North Sea system and the narrow Bering Strait system, bisecting two 
world islands and linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with a  central Arctic Ocean. Because 
the watery waste at the northernmost latitudes is not liquid at the surface it obviously constrains 
maritime movement to submarines. The two longitudinal choke points have an almost entirely 
military significance until such time as submersible tankers or bulk cargo vessels begin to 
engage in maritime commerce on a  regular basis.
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C h a p t e r  6. a n  A m e r ic a n  C a n a l  f o r  a  Co m m e r c ia l l y  P r o a c t iv e  Un it e d  St a t e s
F e d e r a l  G o v e r n m e n t  O v e r s e a s
A plausible explanation for United States Federal Government involvement in Panama 
was that an interoceanic canal served American business opportunity abroad. The United States 
Federal Government was more than willing to interpose itself to protect the Panama Railroad 
Company. A private enterprise, the Panama Railroad Company relied heavily on the United 
States Federal Government both diplomatically and even militarily during the riots o f April 
1856 and the uprisings of March and April 1885. In at letter dated 31 December 1856. U.S. 
Secretary of State William Marcv said:
Every nation which is charged with the duty of protecting the interests of its citizens 
engaged in foreign commerce, has not only the right to complain of this coiuse on the 
part of New Granada, but is imder obligations to its citizens to resist the wrong. In this 
\iew. which is entirely irrespective of the direct interests or exclusive rights of the 
company, this Government is called on by the obligations of duty to intervene in this 
question of the Totmage tax.
In a letter from Bowlin to Marcy dated I August 1856. just after the 15 April riots against 
American citizens in Panama City. Bowlin states that the only way to protect American use o f 
the Isthmus of Panama is through The strong arm of our own power’:
With regard to the futtue of this Isthmus, it is diCQcult to speculate upon it: but one 
thing to my mind is certain that if our people and our properw are to be protected on it. 
it must be by the strong arm of our own power .... This idea is the more to be regretted 
as it presupposes, a change in our Foreign policy; but this being our highway to 
different portions of the Republic, and in the nature of things must continue so for many 
years -  we catmot abandon it. and must yield to the obligations its entire protection 
imposes. -  Besides we never could with honor abandon that private Company, who 
have vested their money, in the most magnificent enterprise of the age -  under the 
implied security at least that their own Government would protect them in the right
Bowlin seems to be suggesting that the United States aimex the Isthmus, saying it was a 
regrettable circumstance as it would change American foreign policy but that it was the only
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way to protect American interests and the investment of the Panama Railroad Company. The 
United States Federal Government was not just protecting American private enterprise. It was 
interceding on behalf of a private enterprise whose purpose was to operate an interoceanic 
technology to serve intercoastal communication and commercial enterprise abroad. Protecting 
the operations of the Panama Railroad Company simply returns the question; does the pursuit of 
commercial enterprise abroad explain why the United States Federal Government signed an 
entangling alliance on the Isthmus of Panama?
Political geographers like Agnew (1987) have explored what they call 'structural 
imperatives' behind American foreign trade policy and the issue of expansionism. Agnew 
(1987) contrasts how the interests of different regional economies within the United Stales 
influenced political representation in Congress. Despite a common political framework. 
American regional economies were based on fundamentally different resource bases and 
systems o f production that tended to make them articulate with the wider world economy in 
different ways. Issues like trade policy electrified the contrasts among American regional 
geographies and set the stage for political conflict. Political representatives from the industrial 
core of the Northeast and the agricultural West favored trade relations with undeveloped 
markets in East Asia, requiring food and manuActured products, whereas the cotton-growing 
South and the mountain West fevored a  policy of free trade and free access to alternative 
industrial markets.
The Panama Canal issue did not electrify the contrasts among American regional 
geographies. The almost unanimous consensus o f support for the Panama Canal across party 
lines in Congress and across contrasting regional economies might be considered a kind of 
geographic finding in itself.^  ̂The Panama Canal ideally could have served any of America's
Daellenbach’s (1982) basic finding in his statistical analysis of foreign policy roll calls for the decade 
of the 1880s was that party affiliation -  more than geographic location, economic constituency, or
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regional economies in some way. The Panama Canal coastwise route even provided a check on 
transcontinental freight rates thereby indirectly benefiting areas in the interior o f the county that 
would not even use the Panama Canal. The absence of a regional economic disposition against 
the Panama Canal and tians-regional appreciation for its role in the defense of the United States 
as a whole probably explains why an interoceanic canal never found itself a victim of regional 
American politics, and only rarely of partisan politics.
LaFeber (1963), Williams. Shoenberger. and Agnew (1987) suggest that the solution of 
overseas expansion' o f which the Panama Canal formed an important logistical component, was 
a remedy against periods of economic depression. LaFeber (1963) claims that the depression of 
the 1890s was a watershed period in American history. The politically influential industrial 
Northeast lobbied for expansionism in order to gain access to new Asian or Latin American 
markets for their surplus manufactures. Strong American presidents supported economic 
expansion to solve the United States' internal economic and social problems. As Americans 
pursued commercial opportunities abroad. LaFeber (1993) says, at home they centralized power 
in the president to protect their far-flung interests. LaFeber (1963) says that the pursuit of 
economic opportunitN' in East Asia and Latin America was never really questioned in the United 
States at the turn o f the century. The imperialist versus anti-imperialist debate w'as just a matter 
of w hat commitments the United States should take on when it came to creating stepping stones 
across the Pacific Ocean in foreign territories (LaFeber 1963. 416):
Few Americans believed that the Latin American and Asian markets were of little 
importance to the expansive American industrial complex. On the other hand, few 
agreed ... that the United States should claim and occupy every piece of available land 
in the Pacific. The mass opinion fell between these two views, and within that 
consensus the debate was waged.
anything else -  explains Senate voting behavior on expansionist issues. Daellenbach (1982) also argues 
that the Republican Party was generally the more expansionist.
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LaFeber (1993, 156) believes that President William McKinley after the Spanish-American War 
in 1898 was simply willing to endure the down side of controlling foreign territory:
[McKinley’s] objective was not a colonial empire but the minimum territory needed to 
obtain his conquest of world markets, along with the taking of strategic points 
necessary to protect that conquest. To achieve such a conquest, however, McKinl^ 
was willing to endure disorder and bear upheavals, even hill scale insurrection in the 
Philippines, or the threat of becoming involved in war on the Asia mainland.
The Panama Canal was justified as a long-term public investment that would pay for 
itself in terms of its social savings to American shippers. However, the Panama Canal was not 
indispensable for any immediate American commercial interests during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. A surprisingly modest share of American exports and private foreign 
investments was even in the position to require a Panama Canal. A smaller subset of this share 
might have actually used it. Until 1905, the entire East Asian trade with the United States 
represented less than five percent of all American exports including whatever portion departed 
from the West Coast of the United States that would never have used a Panama Canal (Figure
6.1). Between 1905 and 1915, exports fi’om the United States to East Asia and Oceania 
increased but still represented less than ten percent of all American exports combined.
The same can be said about American foreign trade with South America. Exports to 
South America represented less than five percent of all exports, including whatever portion 
would have never used a Panama Canal such as routes between the West Coast of the United 
States and the West Coast o f South America and a substantial portion between the East Coast of 
the United States and the Atlantic and Caribbean Coast of South America (Figures 6.1 and
6.2).^ American exports to Europe and the rest of North America (including Canada, Mexico,
Imports into tlie United States from Asia, South America and Oceania as a proportion of all American 
imports between 1850 and 1915 represented a significantly larger portion of all American imports, where 
Asia and South America combined may have accounted for nearly 20% of all imports (Figure 37). But 
the “solution of overseas expansion” depended on exports, not imports.
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the Caribbean and Central America), little of which would have been affected by a Panama 
Canal, represented the major destinations for American products and consistently accounted for 
about ninety percent of all exports between 1850 and 1915 (Figure 6.1).
As for foreign investments, it was Mexico. Canada, Europe, the Caribbean, and the 
Caribbean coast of South America that accounted for nearly ninety percent of all United States 
foreign direct and portfolio investments abroad between 1897 and 1935 (Figure 6.3). Asia does 
not appear to have accounted for more than seven to ten percent o f  American foreign 
investment and did not experience any increase between 1897 and 1935. Lebergott (1980) 
calculated that overseas investment accounted for only about one percent of all American 
private investment between 1869 and 1897. For the period 1900 to 1929. foreign investment 
represented six percent of American private investments, less than investments within the state 
of California alone. Figure 6.3 does not include an assessment of what the relative returns to 
American foreign investment were, i.e., if an American citizen had a dollar to invest whether it 
became more profitable to invest it abroad than at home. Lebergott (1980, 231 n.8) claims that 
returns on American foreign investment were about seven percent, a  figure that nonetheless did 
little to change the overall rate of return on total American private investment.
The modest contribution of Asian, Pacific and South American foreign trade and 
investments to the American economy^ calls into question how indispensable the Panama Canal 
was. had it been built during the second half of the nineteenth century. The limited contribution 
the Panama Canal could make to American foreign commerce also calls into question its role as 
a solution of overseas expansion, unless built in anticipation of economic expansion or to 
preempt other powers from potentially excluding the United States fi’om expanding commercial 
interests as yet undeveloped. It is not self-evident that a policy of overseas economic expansion 
into Asian or South American markets utilizing the Panama Canal would absorb American 
overproduction if those markets would never account for more than ten percent of all American
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exports combined and probably much less. The burden is on LaFeber (1963. 1993) and others to 
demonstrate how trade or foreign investments utilizing the Panama Canal would have made a 
difference during an economic depression. If not, the burden becomes one o f explaining how 
American business interests in Asia or South America gained disproportionate influence among 
representatives of the United States to support their canal-dependent overseas pursuits.
6 .1 T he Potential  of Relative Location  and  the  Performance of Am erican  
Interoceanic  T echnology
One o f  the ironies of the Panama Canal is that its indispensability was exaggerated in 
the past while its dispensability is exaggerated in contemporary times. OfiBcial reports about the 
potential utility o f the Panama Canal to maritime commerce like Johnson's (1912; 1913) 
understandably did not emphasize the Panama Canal could only be expected to serve American 
foreign commerce later, as opposed to right away. But it is not clear how useful a Panama Canal 
would have been to the United States had one been constructed before 1914. Even the Panama 
Railroad, for all its innovation and despite a  very successful initial period o f operation between 
1855 and 1869, was just an American quick fix for the transcontinental railroad and a 
compromise solution given the difficulty of building an interoceanic canal. The Panama Canal 
would have been a subordinate coastwise option for the United States and would have inspired 
limited use for foreign waterborne trade.^  ̂ The majority of American foreign commerce and 
investment was simply not in a position to benefit from a Panama Canal. In fact it was not until 
1950, almost forty years after its construction, that use of the Panama Canal by American 
foreign commerce began to exhibit a take o ff  phase (Figure 6.4). Since 1950, the performance 
of the Panama Canal has continued to improve.
Johnson (1912) presents statistics on coastwise shipping costs via an all-rail route and via a Panama 
Canal route, but there is little indication about how a slight cost advantage actually translated into use 
because of difGculty in tracking transcontinental freight by rail.
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Figure 6.4. Long Tons of Commercial Cargo through the Panama Canal by Month between August 1914 to September
1996
The relative location of the Isthmus of Panama is what makes the Panama Canal or any 
interoceanic technology an asset to the United States. The technology, the locks, the concrete 
and the gears that make canal gates open and close are secondary. Contrast the permanence of 
relative location with the performance of various types o f interoceanic technology. To illustrate 
a point about relative location, imagine if in 1904 exactly the same American engineers using 
exactly the same equipment employing exactly the same West Indian, Asian or European 
laborers had constructed the Panama Canal across a  narrow portion o f the island of Cuba. The 
Cuban Canal would be a  marvel o f early twentieth century technology, the ninth (or perhaps the 
tenth) wonder of the world, and testament to an unfailing human determination to conquer 
nature. It also would have been one of the most foolish enterprises ever undertaken. Cuban 
Canal technology might be able to save a little bit o f  distance around the island of Cuba but the 
value of that distance saved would be unusable to maritime shippers. One does not credit an oil 
drill for striking oil. Construct the same magnificent lock technology in some other location and 
it would be absolutely useless.
The Isthmus of Panama's geographic potential to convey commercial merchandise and 
passengers was realized by only the simplest kinds of technologies even for historical times 
until the completion of the Panama Railroad in 1855.^ Barring new archaeological evidence 
about the role of the Isthmus in pre-Columbian maritime communication, the first regular 
interoceanic use of the Isthmus of Panama began during the middle of the sixteenth centurv .̂ ^
^  There are several possible reasons why representatives of Spain chose not to construct a more 
ambitious interoceanic technology across the Isthmus of Panama. One reason might have been that the 
task of constructing a ship canal exceeded the capabilities of sixteenth-century engineering. Another 
possibility has to do with the belief that to construct a 'substantial’ improvement on the Isthmus of 
Panama represented a sin against nature, made perfect by the hand of God. A third possibili^ is that an 
interoceanic canal would have been a liability more than an asset for the Spanish, and would only entice 
privateers and hostile maritime powers to attack the Isthmus.
' Ward (1993) offers sometbhig of a possibility in reference to a pre-Colombian Panamanian stick 
throwing game called krun. A krun was an opportimity for economic interaction and a means of 
advertising one’s wealth and stature. The krun may have created local demand for items brought from 
abroad and moved in transit at least partially across the Isthmus of Panama. Ward (1993. 40) says. The 
forging of long-distance trade coruiections may have been the most important result of a krun. as the
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The expansion of European settlement and economic activity on the Pacific Coast of the 
Western Hemisphere, beginning with Spanish silver mining in the Viceroyalty of Peru, was 
what first exposed the latent value of the narrow Isthmus o f Panama's relative location. 
However, the sixteenth-century overland roadways did not provide much capacity and were 
severely hampered by natural constraints.
The most ambitious and awaited progeny of the Las Cruces roadway was an 
interoceanic canal, one o f adequate dimensions to be useful for commercial vessels and the 
largest warships of the day An interoceanic canal failed to materialize for three centuries 
despite there being no lack o f interest in the possibility.^ By the second half of the nineteenth 
century the needs of maritime communication between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts o f the 
Americas had more than exceeded any capability that the Panama Railroad could offer. 
Moreover, the availability o f alternate overland technologies like the transcontinental railroad 
after 1869 practically eliminated need for anything other than an interoceanic canal.
Americans were not the pioneers of an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus of Panama. 
The bulk of early American private efforts to break ground on an interoceanic canal were on the 
Rio San Juan route across Nicaragua, generally believed to be the better route.^ On 18 May 
1878. a contract entered into force awarding exclusive rights o f canal construction across the 
Isthmus of Panama to the French International Interoceanic Canal Association. The May 1878 
French contract was at least the ninth time in forty years the Government of Colombia had 
granted a foreign interest exclusive privileges to build an interoceanic technology, canal or 
railroad (see Appendix for treaties and other agreements concerning an interoceanic route). The 
French private effort might be summed up in the following way. Not driven by its own
possession of such rare conunodities as gold, pearls, and elaborate textiles made by skilled masters was 
one of the important objectives of Panamanian chiefs.”
^  Von Humboldt’s (1811) assessment of the best places for an interoceanic canal was influential in 
^reading interest within Europe and the United States.
^  Selfridge (1874). U.S. Congress (1872. 1883).
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geographic imperatives the French company nonetheless sought to take advantage of the 
geographic imperatives of others namely the United States by providing the service.
The privately funded effort o f La Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique to 
construct a  sea-level canal went bankrupt in 1888. It is not entirely clear whether it was the 
overly ambitious idea of excavating a sea-level canal or financial mismanagement that 
ultimately subverted the French endeavor The French company was reorganized as La 
Compagnie Nouvelle and the contract extended by the Republic of Colombia, twice. 
Realistically, the best option for the French Panama Canal project was to be nationalized by the 
United States Federal Government. The U.S. Federal Government's active role in canal 
construction began when the Spooner Act of 1902 was activated by the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty, ratified in 1904, and has continued ever since. The steamer Ancon made the maiden 
transit of the new interoceanic canal technology across the Isthmus o f Panama on 15 August 
1914. Since 1914, the Panama Canal has been substantially improved through a continual 
process of widening, deepening and straightening its interior channels.
6.2 THE M isconception  of Pan am a ' s Indispensability in the  Past
Between 1851 and 1855, an American private enterprise constructed the first major 
innovation in Isthmian technology to replace Camino Real and Las Cruces Trail roadway-river 
systems, the Panama Railroad (Figures 6.5 and 6.6). The Panama Railroad Company's original 
contract with Colombia was signed on 28 December 1848. The Panama Railroad Co. opted for 
a more manageable yet no less innovative project than an interoceanic canal. The New York 
based company recorded its first earnings in 1852, three years before the entire line was 
completed, and paid the initial capital investment of $8,000,000 in 1858 after only six years of 
operation. The movement of passengers between New York and San Francisco from 1848 to 
1869 was one of the important functions of the early Panama Railroad (Figure 6.7). A
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somewhat surprising element o f Figure 6.7 is that the celebrated year 1849 was in 6 c t one of 
the lowest years in terms of number of passengers in transit. Much higher numbers of 
passengers used the Panama Railroad en route between New York and San Francisco during 
peaks in 1852 when the partial line of the road opened for business, in 1859. and in 1868. The 
ver\' best year for the Panama Railroad in terms of the movement of passengers between 1848 
and 1869 was 1868, only a year before the Union-Pacific railway was completed.
In functional terms, the Panama Railroad was the first American transcontinental 
railroad. It is no wonder that after the fomed linking of the Union-Pacific railway on 10 May 
1869. at Promontory. Utah the gross earnings of the Panama Railroad fell abruptly. Figure 6.8 
illustrates the rapid rise in gross earnings and net surplus earnings after expenditures o f the 
Panama Railroad Company between 1852 and 1868 and its precipitous fall in 1869. Information 
between 1868 and 1873 was not consistent in the Annual Reports of the Panama Railroad 
Company. Only the year 1871 was reliable. However, the downward trend after the construction 
of the Union-Pacific Railway in May 1869, marked by the red dotted line in the graph, is easy to 
see.
Figure 6.9 is a comparison of the value of foreign and domestic merchandise shipped 
from New York to San Francisco across the Panama Railroad and its principal competitors, the 
Rio San Juan river across Nicaragua and the Tehuantepec railway across Mexico. Figure 6.9 
illustrates the precipitous decline in the use of all Central American technologies after the year 
1869. The Nicaraguan route appears to have been an even more temporary option than the 
Panama Railroad. Whereas the Panama Railroad line served as a quick fix between 1855 and 
1869 while the Union-Pacific railway line was being completed, the Rio San Juan route served 
as a quick fix between 1852 and 1856 while the Panama Railroad line was being completed.
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Figure 6.6. A 1912 photo of the Panama Railroad. In 1855 it was the first major 
advance in interoceanic technology across Panama in three hundred years 
(National Archives).
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Figure 6.10. Net Tonnage of Vessels Cleared and Entered Between Atlantic and Pacific^ Ports of the United States via
Cape Horn
Use o f  Cape Horn as measured by the net tonnage of vessels entered and cleared 
between Atlantic and Pacific ports o f the United States between 1853 and 1915. did not 
experience a precipitous decline after the linking of the Union-Pacific railway in May 1869 
(Figure 6.10). Though the use of Cape Horn declined steadily after 1869 it may have been the 
construction o f  the Panama Railroad in 1855 that made the biggest impact on the use of Cape 
Horn for American coastwise communication. In other words, whatever influence the 
construction o f the transcontinental railroads had on Cape Horn traffic impacted a route that had 
already experienced its major decline.
Figure 6.8 is interesting because it illustrates how the Panama Railroad Company 
experienced a second peak in the earnings between 1883 and 1888, during the high point o f the 
activities of the French La Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique. The gross earnings 
of the Panama Railroad Company appear to have increased to a level exceeded only by the 
company's very best year in 1868. Yet during the same period net surplus earnings after 
expenditures were at an all time low. In 1885, net surplus earnings fell to practically nothing. 
The year 1885 seems to have been a very unlucky year for the Panama Railroad Company. Not 
only did the rail infrastructure require major improvements after more than three decades of 
heav>- use but the company also decided to reduce its freight rates with its two major customers, 
the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and La Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique. 
Lowering its freight rates does not. in retrospect, seem to have been a particularly wise move. 
The lower freight rates increased the monthly flow of traffic after 1885 but not enough to 
compensate for the reduction in fireight rates, and gross revenues fell substantially. Instead of 
earning $868.000, which would have been the gross earnings o f 1886 traffic based on 1885 
freight rates, the company earned only $119,000.
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If its financial problems were not enough, the company's wharves and freight sheds at 
Colon (Aspinwall) were totally destroyed by a fire on 31 March 1885, caused by civil unrest in 
the transit c i t i e s . A  more detailed breakdown of the company's expenditures between the 
problem years between 1881 and 1894 (Figure 6. L I) illustrates where the company had to spend 
nearly all o f its surplus revenues, e.g., to maintain the line of the road and repair the damage 
caused by the fires. According to the 1885 Annual Report of the Panama Railroad Company, 
the price tag on the damage caused by the 1885 riots came to a grand total of $844,000 in 
historical dollars.
Not surprisingly, the breakdown of total rail tonnage by through and local traffic 
suggests that by the end of the nineteenth century the Panama Railroad went fi'om a coastwise 
interoceanic carrier to a short-haul line handling local traffic for the construction of its 
replacement, the Panama Canal (Figure 6.12). Plainly the most important contributor to the 
Panama Railroad's total traffic after 1904 was local traffic generated by the Isthmian Canal 
Commission during the beginning o f American work on the Panama Canal. The dramatic 
decline in gross earnings after 1869 and the dominance of local traffic in railroad operations 
suggest that the Panama Railroad was an American quick-fix' for communication with the 
West Coast enjoying its role as the surrogate transcontinental railroad for only the two decades 
between 1849 and 1869.
By the time the United States Federal Government was deciding where it should invest 
in an interoceanic canal the transcontinental railroads had long since replaced the Panama 
Railroad. The transcontinental railroads were the most economical and most used means of 
communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts for nearly every major city in the 
United States. The Isthmus of Panama was not the lifeline between the Atlantic and Pacific
There was another major fire on 23 September 1890 in Colon which because of prevailing winds was 
kept from doing serious damage. Afterwards, the policy of the company was not to rebuild but to 
reestablish itself in areas further from town to create a buffer zone between itself and the city.
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Coasts of the United States although such may have temporarily been the case before 10 May 
1869. when Union Pacific and Central Pacific construction crews met at Promontory. Utah 
Territory, linking the first United States transcontinental railroad.
6.3 THE M isconception  o f  The  Panama Ca n a l ' s  Obsolescence T oday
A misconception about lock-canal technology in Panama is that it represents an 
outmoded system o f  tum-of-the-century lock chambers and gates that over time has lost much 
of its usefulness for United States shipping. For one thing, the Panama Canal is less a system o f 
locks connecting channels than a system of channels that happen to be connected by locks. The 
purpose of the locks was to make up for the fact that interior channel sections could not be made 
deep enough to connect flush with outside channel sections and the ocean. Unless one were to 
suggest that the massive lock chambers being of concrete ought to be replaced with a newer 
material like carbon fiber, the 90-year-old lock system is not outmoded. The throughput 
capacity of the Panama Canal lock chamber system is at present adequate for the needs of 
shipping. There does exist an important constraint to total throughput capacity of the Panama 
Canal but it is not the lock system, with a capacity estimated at between 44 and 46 vessels per 
day. Unsafe hydrodynamic forces that occur when large vessels pass in close proximity are 
what constrain the Panama Canal. The daily throughput in the narrowest interior channel at the 
Gaillard Cut is currently estimated at 38 vessels per day, which in effect bottlenecks the entire 
Panama Canal channel system.
There are. admittedly, two senses to the word capacity. First, capacity can mean 
throughput in terms of the number of vessels that can transit per day. Second, capacity can also 
mean the maximum draft, width or length of vessel that can safely navigate the entire Panama 
system of channels and locks. In this respect, outside observers are correct when they claim that
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Panama Canal technology is outmoded, since increases in the average size and draft o f the 
vessels of the world fleet have rapidly outgrown the size o f the lock chambers. The average size 
of vessel in the world merchant fleet has increased dramatically over the period 1921 to 1988, in 
fact more than seven-fold. It is generally understood that at least for crude petroleum if  not most 
other bulk waterborne commodities, the cost of shipping on a per ton basis decreases as the size 
of the vessel increases. A large vessel too large to transit the Panama Canal may still be able to 
ship the same ton of commodity for less than a small vessel that utilizes the Panama Canal, 
despite the fact that the large ship has to take a route thousands of nautical miles longer. The 
increasing size of vessels has decreased the proportion o f the world carrying fleet that can 
transit the Panama Canal at summer draft (Figure 6.13). The summer draft o f a vessel 
(depending on which area of the world it travels) is the maximum draft or waterline that a ship 
is allowed to bear. In 1965, only about ten percent of the oil tanker fleet and one percent of the 
ore and bulk carrier fleet was too deep to fit through the Panama Canal's lock chambers. A 
decade later, by the time of the reopening of the Suez Canal, nearly forty percent of the oil 
tanker fleet and twenty percent of the ore and bulk carrier fleet was too deep to transit the 
Panama Canal.
Adding to the notion that the Panama Canal is obsolete is the fact that the Panama 
Canal's share of global waterborne commercial tonnage has decreased between 1967 and 1994 
from about five percent to a little less than four percent. The decrease had a notable blip during 
the early 1980s when Alaskan oil was shipped in large quantities to the Atlantic and Gulf coast 
of the United States (Figure 6.14).“̂  It would appear that the Panama Canal is becoming a  less 
utilized technology in terms of the declining proportion of the world merchant fleet capable of 
using it as well as its dwindling share of global waterborne commerce. This judgement seemed
This and the estimate for the Gaillard Cut is from information presented at the 1" Universal Congress 
of the Panama Canal in Panama City, Republic of Panama 7-10 September 1997.
The Suez Canal .Authority (1996. 8) estimated that 5.9% of world trade passed through the Suez Canal.
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to be the consensus during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings in 1977 and 1978. 
Based on this kind o f statistical finding, the argument was posed that since the Panama Canal is 
a becoming an obsolete technology the United States is not really losing anything by agreeing to 
a full transfer of operational control to the Republic of Panama.
The trend in use of the Panama Canal as a percentage of global waterborne commerce 
between 1967 and 1994 is decline. However, the trend in use of the Panama Canal as a 
percentage of American waterborne commerce between 1950 and 1995 (Figure 6.15) is not only 
not decreasing it is increasing. The trend in United States foreign trade passing through the 
Panama Canal as a percentage o f all United States waterborne foreign trade betw een 1950 and 
1995 demonstrates a slight increase from just over ten percent to nearly fourteen percent. In 
other words, the proportion o f American waterborne foreign trade passing through the Panama 
Canal is increasing.
Figure 6.16 compares American versus all other waterborne conunerce through the 
Panama Canal between 1934 and 1996. The trend between 1934 and 1996 is that the United 
States share has remained dominant, slightly increasing from sixty-five to over seventy' percent. 
In other words, two out o f every three long tons of commercial cargo that transits the Panama 
Canal is departed from or bound for United States ports and that trend is also increasing. The 
trends in Figures 6.15 and 6.16 contradict the findings of Figure 6.14.
The Panama Canal is becoming more valuable to United States shipping as a proportion 
of American waterborne trade. The most notable trend about the increase of American foreign 
commerce using the Panama Canal is the striking growth o f the Atlantic-Gulf Coast of the 
United States to Asia route after World War H, most of which represents grains shipped by bulk 
carriers. Since the late 1960s, the Atlantic-Gulf Coast o f the United States to Asia route, 
probably originating from farms in the Mississippi River watershed, has become the most 
important trade route using the Panama Canal (see Figures 6.17 and 6.18). By itself, the
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Atlantic-Gulf Coast to Asia route accounts for more long tons o f  commercial cargo than all 
other foreign waterborne commerce through the Panama Canal combined.
How can one assess the viability o f Panama Canal technology if it is becoming less 
used by the world as a whole but more used by the United States? Everything depends on the 
baseline that uses in assessing the Panama Canal. Using global waterborne commerce or global 
vessel size as a baseline will naturally tend to underestimate the competitive viability of the 
Panama Canal because of the sheer number of trade routes that would never geographically be 
in a position to require the Panama Canal. On the other hand, using American waterborne 
commerce as a baseline will naturally tend to overestimate the competitive viability of the 
Panama Canal to the world because of the unique geographic position o f the United States. The 
American Gulf and Atlantic grain trade to Asia is a captive market. One might also note that 
using long tons of commercial cargo rather than the value in dollars of commodities being 
shipped tends to overestimate the competitiveness of the Panama Canal since most cargo 
shipped through the Canal represents low value, high bulk commodities.
The Panama Canal is not in a position to capture all global waterborne commerce. 
Therefore, one could not reasonably expect that an increase in global waterborne commerce 
would increase commercial cargo passing through the Panama Canal. For instance, it would not 
be correct to conclude that since none of the increase in waterborne trade between Japan and 
Southeast Asia passes through the Panama Canal that, therefore, the Panama Canal is becoming 
obsolete. The trick is to isolate a subset of global waterborne commerce based on what the 
Panama Canal is in a position to capture, and then see what proportion of that subset of world 
trade has used the Panama Canal over time.
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Figure 6.15. United States Foreign Trade Passing Through the Panama Canal as a Percentage of Total U.S. Waterborne
Foreign Trade, FY 1950-1995
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Figure 6.17. U.S. Atlantic to Pacific Ocean Commerce Through the Panama Canal as a Percentage of the Total Atlantic
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Figure 6.18. U.S. Pacific to Atlantic Ocean Commerce Through the Panama Canal as a Proportion of Total Pacific to
Atlantic Ocean Commerce Using the Panama Canal
Much of the empirical information presented during the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Hearings in 1977 and 1978 was inconsistent in its use o f a baseline and in at least in 
one case appeared to be faulty in form ation .T he best way to measure the commercial 
competitiveness of Panama Canal technology starts with calculating a meaningful subset of 
world foreign waterborne commerce adjusted to fiscal years in order to compare it with Panama 
Canal Annual Report data. A global subset could be taken based on only those routes 
realistically in a position to use the Panama Canal based on a positive distance saved versus 
other options like the Suez Canal, the Strait o f Malacca, the Cape of Good Hope. etc. This 
would represent the most appropriate baseline for an exploratory assessment of the performance 
of the Panama Canal based on the most reasonable denominator
6.4 The financial Burd en s of Constructing and O perating  the Panama Canal
Financially speaking, it is a real question why anyone other than the United States 
Federal Government would want to invest in an interoceanic canal. Since its opening in 1914. 
the Panama Canal under varying regimes (Panama Canal, Panama Canal Company and Panama 
Canal Commission) has operated under conditions where total revenues just cover total 
expenses and net income is basically zero after payments on the interest-bearing capital 
investment (Figure 6.19). A more detailed breakdown of the financial situation of the Panama 
Canal between 1914 and 1951 illustrates how unprofitable even business operations like the 
commissaries were. The Panama Canal was barely able to pay the interest on its capital 
investment, let alone any part of the principal (Figure 6.20). The saving grace for the Panama 
Canal in terms of being able to pay off the initial $400,000,000 capital investment to construct 
the base technology between 1904 and 1914, plus additional investments over the last 80 years
The figures in Padelford and Gibbs (I97S) were not adjusted for fiscal and calendar year differences. 
Other information on the dollar value of Panama Canal waterborne commerce must have been an estimate 
because the Panama Canal Annual Reports do not list commercial cargo by value, only by weight
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to improve it, were two reorganizations in 1951 and 1979. Much of the interest-bearing capital 
investment was depreciated (notice the precipitous drops in direct interest-bearing capital 
investment in Figure 6.21).
There will be a need to spend large amounts of money to make improvements on 
Panama Canal technology in the near future. It is not clear w hy the Republic of Panama would 
be anxious to inherit full operational control of a canal that seems to have been a financial 
burden even for the United States Federal Government. Nor is it eas\' to see why a  private 
interest would be anxious to invest in an interoceanic canal given that the percent return on the 
capital investment after interest payments since the canal's opening in 1914 has struggled to 
break five percent. The average annual return on capital investment is a startling zero percent, 
not including the year 1996. The financial impossibility of operating a Panama Canal with an 
average net income of zero dollars and an average return on capital investment of zero percent 
emphasizes one thing. Probably only the United States Federal Government could have justified 
the expenditure, based on the social savings the Panama Canal generated for American 
shipping.
Panama Canal technology was designed to make distance saved available to maritime 
shipping. The value of Panama Canal distance saved to the shipper can be estimated as a social 
savings, i.e., savings earned by shipping a particular item via the Panama Canal versus shipping 
that item between the same two points of origin and destination using an alternate route. 
Innovations in the size and efficiency of maritime vessels, intermodal technologies and the 
geography of commercial trade continue to impact the value of distance saved to a shipper. 
Unlike ordinary commodities' whose purchase price naturally fluctuates on the world market in 
response to supply and what shippers are willing to pay, the purchase price of Panama Canal 
distance saved is purposely kept down and does not reflect its true value to the shipper. Ver\ 
much unlike the situation of the colonial roadways and the Panama Railroad in which transit
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fees and other charges were deliberately inflated, Panama Canal tolls have been closely 
subsidized by the United States Federal Government.
Any private enterprise expecting reasonably rapid returns might be ill advised to stake a 
large investment on an interoceanic canal unless a  zero net income sounds tantalizing. Even if 
the French company had managed to finish the Panama Canal and move into an operational 
phase at the end o f the nineteenth century, one wonders how the French company would have 
not gone bankrupt anyway? Of course, this argument is predicated on some federal mandate to 
set tolls at a  minimum level. In the absence o f social savings, a private firm might consider 
setting tolls at the maximum level shippers could bear. A private interoceanic canal company 
has a geographically captive Mississippi River grains market which would undoubtedly have to 
bear the burden o f paying for higher tolls until such time as extra large bulk carriers can 
profitably ply the Gulf-Atlantic Coast to Asia route rounding Cape Horn
6.5 A Po s t  Lo ck -Canal Technology
The Panama Canal's capacity could be increased to a greater number of ships by 
widening, deepening and straightening channel reaches but it is an expensive process. Adding to 
the Panama Canal's capacity to take larger ships by constructing a third set of locks in order to 
handle deeper draft vessels represents a  major construction project likely much more expensive 
than increasing the channel dimensions. The ultimate technology would eliminate the need for 
lock chambers altogether.
Nearly 175 million years ago. a  series of natural straits existed across the Isthmus o f 
Central America. The legacy of these extremely ancient natural straits persist as paths of least 
resistance, routes of low topographic relief across the Isthmus of Central America that have 
provided human enterprise places to start and, in effect, re-impose a  sea-level passage. Take 
Panama Canal technology as it exists today. If the interior chaimel reaches between the locks
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were liberated o f their present handicaps and made deep enough to lie at sea level then lock 
chambers could be bypassed entirely. The Panama Canal would become a system of channels 
connected by a few tidal gates, as close to the elusive Strait of Central America as is probably 
technologically feasible.
Proposals for a sea-level canal often suggest excavating an entirely new set of channels, 
rather than modifying the existing Panama Canal. Other locations include routes on the Isthmus 
of Panama slightly to the west of the Panama Canal, in Colombia, or along the Rio San Juan on 
the border between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The rationale behind excavating another set o f 
chaimels from scratch may have to do with the advantage of having two rather than just one 
option for transiting the Isthmus of Central America, a benefit in terms o f  total capacity or 
logistical redundancy. During his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1977. 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated;
I. myself, have raised the question whether it is wise to place two canals in the same 
country -  we have enough problems with one of them there -  and whether it might not 
be better to have a sea-level canal, if we build it. in some other country.'®̂
However, having two canals merely for the sake of having two canals seems a luxury that 
would undoubtedly have to be assessed if billions o f federal dollars are going to used for 
another major construction effort in a foreign country.
The diplomatic dilemma behind construction of any post lock-canal technology is 
exactly the same as the one that confronted representatives of the United States and the 
Republic of Panama in late 1903. Constitutional provisions for the use of United States federal 
funds in foreign territory to build a sea-level canal may demand a provision like Article HI of 
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. The Constitution clearly states that Congress has the authority to
U.S. Congress (1977-78. 3:560)
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use United States federal funds to regulate commerce, encompassing the power to build an 
interoceanic canal only within a territory or possession of the United States.
Though stopping short of a full explanation, 1 believe the United States Federal 
Government has an interesting option in the use of federal funds in foreign territory for a sea- 
level canal. In a sea-level canal, the waters within the chatmels might through mutual agreement 
with the territorial sovereign be designated territorial waters of the United States. As the 
engineers and workers excavated the canal they would actually be creating the physical basis for 
the territorial Jurisdiction of the United States, perhaps depending on a ruling o f the Supreme 
Court acknowledging that the provisions o f Article 1 Section Eight and Article IV Section Three 
of the Constitution are begin satisfied. United States Coast Guard or other maritime regulatory 
authorities would naturally have jurisdiction within the waters of the canal, but otherwise little 
of the adjacent territory would be required making the job of compensating the local sovereign 
for the use of its territory potentially less complicated.
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Figure 6.21. Returns on Interest-Bearing U.S. Capital Investment in the Panama Canal (1903-1951), Panama Canal 
Company (1952-1979), and Panama Canal Commission (1980-1999)
C h a p t e r  7. a  C a n a l  c in d e r  A m e r ic a n  C o n t r o l  f o r  a  G e o p o u t i c a l l y  R e a c t i v e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  F e d e r a l  G o v e r n m e n t  O v e r s e a s
The Panama Canal was not indispensable for American foreign commerce at the turn of 
the century. However, it may have been indispensable for national security. During his message 
to Congress on 8 March 1880, President Hayes made it clear that it was not ' merely" the United 
States' commercial interests that justified a canal under American control. When President 
Hayes insisted that he would consider European involvement on the Isthmus of Panama as 
virtually on the coastline of the United States, he was not mentally annexing Panama. Hayes 
was thinking about Europe. The United States probably backed its way into the Panama Canal 
project in order to deflect the influence of foreign powers.
7 .1 VIRTUALLY A PART OF THE COASTLINE OF THE UNITED STATES
Isolation of nautical distance could not protect the United States from the great powers 
at the dawn of the long-range battleship navy. The American plan for defense of the Atlantic 
and Pacific Coasts o f the United States was a systematic policy of preventing or preempting 
European and Asian maritime powers from establishing bases in strategic Pacific or Caribbean 
harbors and islands from which they might strike at the American coast.
The attitude of President James Monroe in December 1823 was that the extension of 
European influence was to be prevented in the entire Western Hemisphere. American reaction 
to European designs in the Pacific, Caribbean and Central America belies the geographic bias 
behind application of a 'Monroe Doctrine' during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. In 1900, Captain Alfred T. Mahan argued for a more geographical usage o f  Monroe's 
principle in relation to the Panama Canal (see Mahan's Momoe Doctrine in Figure 7 .1);
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[D|oes there ... remain sound reason of national interest for pressing the Monroe 
Doctrine to the extent of guaranteeing our support to American states which love us 
not, and whose geographical position, south of the valley of the Amazon, lies outside of 
effective influence upon the American isthmus?'”̂
An October 1902 memorandum from the Navy General Board to Secretary of State John Hay 
warned that the complex situation around the entrance to the Suez Canal might also develop 
around the Panama Canal. The maritime powers were establishing territorial footholds in the 
eastern Mediterranean to protect their own national interests passing through the Suez Canal. 
The Navy General Board letter declared that the Republic o f Colombia should cooperate with 
the United States in preventing any European power from controlling territory near the flanks of 
the Panama Canal:
As tending to show that aggression on the part of individual or allied nations may be 
expected in connection with acquiring territory in the region about the termini of the 
canal, especially after their interests shall have been extended through the operation of 
the canal, it is desired by the Board to invite attention to the fact that nations whose 
interests are largely benefited by transit through the Suez Canal, have, since the 
opening of that canal, acquired not only territory to command the canal in greater or 
less degree, but they have also enormously strengthened their original strongholds in 
the Mediterranean, Germany had attempted to secure from the Porte the island of 
Farsen, in the Red Sea, and has imdoubted aspirations in Syria, where she has gradually 
acquired great influence, especially at Haifa; at the opportime moment she will act 
aggressively, and it may be expected that Syria will ultimately be portioned among 
various interested nations. England has acquired Cyprus and has also virtually acqitired 
Eg>pt and the canal itself, so far as war operations against herself are concerned. With a 
view toward preventing like aggressive action against Colombia and the United States, 
it is important that Colombia should support the United States as requested.'”̂
Secretary of State Elihu Root wrote a memorandum to President Theodore Roosevelt on 2 June 
1908. suggesting that the construction of the Panama Canal gave special importance to 
Roosevelt’s corollary to the Momoe Doctrine:
Cited in Adams (1974. 136 n. 52). 
Cited in Adams (1974.220-1).
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The building of the Panama Canal makes it more important that there shall be no hostile 
control of the route between our great Atlantic and Pacific ports and the Isthmus. For 
that reason it is of special importance that the people inhabiting the islands and shores 
of the Caribbean shall maintain independent, peaceful and prosperous govenunents.
The policy of the United States to aid them in maintaining such governments has been 
prosecuted with special success during the last four years/ ^
Mahan (1903, 26) even suggested enforcing a three thousand-mile buffer zone, within which 
European powers would be excluded from establishing coaling stations:
[I]t should be an inviolable resolution of our national policy, that no foreign state 
should [henceforth] acquire a coaling station within three thousand miles of San 
Francnsco -  a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands and the 
coast of Central America.
7.2 THE STIUVTEGIC GEOGRAPHY OF COALING STATIONS
In the era of the coal-driven battleship, a German or British battleship en route through 
the Panama Canal had sufficient range to make the voyage to American waters. However, it 
would need to refuel before continuing. An American monopoly over strategic naval refueling 
bases would cripple the strategic logistical reach of foreign maritime powers looking to protect 
their commercial lifelines in American waters as well as undercut their ability to sustain naval 
operations elsewhere in the Pacific and the Caribbean. Preventing Germany, Britain. Russia. 
Japan and other powers from establishing secure and defended coaling stations or naval bases in 
the Caribbean or Pacific, in support of their use of the Panama Canal, insulated the United 
States coast from naval attack. In a 12 November 1901, memo written by Admiral Dewey. 
Dewey said (see map Dewey may have been referring to in Figure 7.2):
Cited in Adams (1974. 175).
Maurer (1981. 67) notes that the German warship Moltke had a range of 3000 miles traveling at 15 
knots, a figure which would undoubtedly decline if the average speed increased.
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Careful investigation into the radius of coal endurance of foreign men-of-war ... shows 
that virtually the utter most reach of German men-of-war firom their own ports, on a 
single supply of coal, in the direction of the proposed isthmian canal, is in the 
neighborhood of Haiti or St Thomas. Therefore, we find Germany deeply interested in 
Haiti, and undoubtedly she would be equally interested in the acquisition of St. Thomas 
if the opportunity were ripe.‘°®
On 24 Jime 1910, a  bill emerged firom the Ecuadorian Senate to lease the Galapagos Islands to a 
German-French syndicate, allegedly for three million dollars and a guarantee of Ecuadorian 
sovereignty'. On 1 July 1910, as part of the American reaction to continuing developments. 
Assistant Secretary of State Beekman Winthrop wrote to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox;
[A|ll possible steps be taken to prevent any foreign powers, either directly through their 
governments or indirectly through their citizens, from obtaining coaling stations and 
possibly military bases at either of these places or at any other place on the flanks of the 
trade routes to the Panama Canal."°
A few days later on 16 July 1910, Assistant Secretary of State Wilson wrote to the American 
Ambassador in Berlin with instructions to state forcefully American opposition to German 
interests on the Galapagos Islands:
You will not lost sight of the fact that this Goverrunent has long held that it would be a 
menace to this coimtry if any European power were to obtain a base at the Galapagos 
Islands or at any other point affording special strategic advantages as regards the 
Panama Canal.' ' '
However, diplomatic blustering would not be enough. First, American representatives 
had to acquire exclusive rights to establish secure bases and coaling stations in the best strategic 
harbors like Pago Pago (Samoa), Pearl Harbor (Hawaiian Islands), Manila (Phillipine Islands).
Cited in Adams (1974. 155-6). 
^ Cited in Adams (1974. 199).
Cited in Adams (1974. 200-1). A new American attention to German naval designs in the Caribbean 
can be gauged by the fact that in the siuiuner of 1901 and for first time in the history of the Naval War
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and Unaiaska (Aleutian Islands). Second, they had to develop a long-range fleet able to fight the 
best battleships of the world in the open sea. By the turn o f the century, the United States had 
extended a maritime network of naval bases and coaling stations that virtually monopolized the 
ability to support naval operations in the Pacific Ocean and much of the Caribbean Sea (Figure 
7.3). American naval bases provided advance positions for the defense of the West Coast and 
protected the flow of American vessels against hostilities en route to commercial markets in 
East Asia. Australia or the West Coast of South America. Most important of all. denying the 
same base locations to others turned the vast Pacific Ocean into a watery desert for foreign 
navies, unable to sustain themselves without coal and supplies (Figure 7.4).
In his message to Congress on 4 January 1904, transmitting the 1903 Hay-Bunau- 
Varilla Treaty. President Theodore Roosevelt emphasized the important role the Panama Canal 
would play for American warship mobility since the Spanish-American War of 1898. The 
geographic imperatives of a transcontinental and now a transpacific United States had replaced 
reasons of convenience with reasons of vital necessity, as Roosevelt stated;
Long acknowledged to be essential to our commercial development it bad become, as 
the result of the recent extension of our territorial dominioit more than ever essential to 
our national self-defense. In transmitting to the Senate the treaty of 1846. President 
Polk pointed out as the principal reason for its ratification that the passage of the 
Isthmus, which it was designed to secure, "would relieve us form a long and dangerous 
navigation of more than 9.000 miles aroimd Cape Horn, and render our conunimication 
with our own possessions on the northwest coast of American comparatively easy and 
speedy.’' The events of the past five years have given to this consideration an 
importance inuneasurably greater than it possessed in 1846. In the light of our present 
situation, the establishment of easy and speedy communication by sea between the 
Atlantic and Pacific presents itself not simply as something to be desired, but as an 
object to be positively and promptly attained. Reasons of convertience have been 
superseded by reasons of vital necessi^. which do not admit of indefinite delays.'
College, the Imperial German Navy not the British Navy played the opposition in the war games (Adams 
1974. 152-3).
U.S. Congress (1977b 315-316).
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The Panama Canal potentially provided the two-ocean American fleet distance saved on the 
order of thousands o f  nautical miles, improving response time by weeks. However, it depended 
on the route.
The Panama Canal would have served little or no purpose in terms of distance saved to 
the Philippines. An American warship in 1900 steaming via the Panama Canal versus using the 
Suez Canal for the same trip would save a grand total of one percent over using the Suez Canal. 
The value of the Panama Canal for American warships was that it would allow them to make 
the voyage never having to stop at a foreign coaling station. A famous case, the U.S.S. Oregon 
departed from San Francisco on 19 March 1898, and arrived at Key West on 26 May 1898, 
having traveled 14,064 knots around the Straits of Magellan. Along the way, the Oregon had to 
make no less than six foreign port calls in at least four different countries at Callao (Peru), Port 
Tomar, Punta Arenas (Chile), Rio Janeiro (Brazil), Bahia (Brazil), and Barbados."^ More than a 
mere savings in nautical distance, being able to rely on a secure logistical lifeline all the way 
from the western end o f the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean was the hidden geographic 
benefit of the Panama Canal for the United States.
There were two technological solutions to the problem of projecting naval force over 
long distances. One was to physically shorten the nautical distance a naval vessel had to travel 
by constructing a distance-saving technolog} like the Panama or Suez Canal. The other 
technological strategy was to erase the constraints o f nautical distance and the limitations of 
effective range by designing better vessels with faster and more fuel efficient propulsion 
systems (Figure 7.5). As far as technological solutions go, distance-saving technologies and far- 
flung coaling stations were probably not the preferred solution.
The strategic significance of the Panama Canal was at a premium during the turn o f the 
century because the predominant means o f projecting force abroad were coal-driven battleships.
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The Panama Canal would provide a stand-in technology for a long-range warship propulsion 
system. However, the canal strategy required not only constructing the Panama Canal but also 
establishing a secure line o f coaling stations and naval bases. Maurer (1981, 61) cites a  1912 
study of the United States Navy estimating that the mobilization and concentration of the 
American fleet in the Caribbean would require a total of 300,000 tons of coal initially and 
another 150.000 tons per month afterwards. If setting up a  logistical network to supply coal for 
the American fleet in the Caribbean was difficult, imagine setting up and supplying a network 
of coaling stations across the entire Pacific Ocean. Not only was supplying a network of coaling 
stations to extend the range o f battleships difficult but merely re-coaling a single naval vessel, 
accomplished mostly by band, was a task in-itself. Around 1904, coaling at sea was still not 
practical and fleets remained circumscribed in a radial pattern around secure coaling bases 
(Maurer 1981, 61-62). The heralded Voyage of the Great White Fleet was a testament less to 
American naval strength than to the global reach of the British logistical network upon which 
the American fleet depended in order to make its circumnavigation.
The United States Navy experimented with oil fuel vessels as early as 1897 and by 
1911 the Navy had developed its first fuel oil warships, the Nevada-class."^ A 29 May 1920. 
letter from Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels to Senator Carroll S. Page of the Senate 
Naval Affairs Committee marks 1913 as the date for an important shift in American naval 
thinking away fl’om a coal-driven battle fleet;
On March 7. 1913. the Navy Department addressed a letter to the Secretary of the 
Interior asking whether the Navy Department was justified in adopting an oil-burning 
policy for the Nav) .... [U|pon these assurances of an adequate supply of fiiel oil, the 
Navy Department cognizant of the very marked superiority of oil over coal as a fuel for 
men-of-war. became committed in 1913 to a policy of adopting oil as a fuel for all the
The total cost of this single voyage, approximately half of which was for the coal consumed, amoimted 
to $98,253 in 1898 dollars (U.S. Congress 1900).
'"Maurer (1981,70).
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combatant units of the fleet There is no question that this policy is a correct one. and an 
essential one for the highest naval efficiency."^
With the development of more efficient propulsion systems using liquid fiiel the geography of 
projecting naval force and the need for a two-ocean capable navy fundamentally changed 
(Figure 7.6). The relative advantage of a distance-saving technology like the Panama Canal 
decreased:
Because oil fuel was cheaper than coal in the Pacific, and the proximity of the oil 
reserves to the coast ensured supply in a crisis, the earlier financial and transportation 
problems that kept the battleships concentrated in the Atlantic no longer mattered in 
deciding where to concentrate the fleet"*
Oil fuel had twice the thermal capacity of coal, meaning that for any given weight an oil-driven 
warship could travel twice as far as a coal-driven warship (Maurer, 1981). Most important of 
all. a warship using oil fuel could refuel at sea even in rough conditions and in less time using 
pumps not only to move oil between ships but also to move fuel around on board. Oil fuel 
propulsion systems erased many o f the constraints of nautical distance and released the 
logistical tether that tied a battleship to a circumscribed area around the nearest secure coaling 
station.
Major (1980) claims that by World War II the Panama Canal was no longer a real 
military asset for the United States."^ Considering that the final decision to switch from a coal 
to an oil fuel Navy occurred in 1913, the Panama Canal was effectively no longer a supreme 
military asset for the United States before it even opened. The greatest geographic irony about
U.S. Congress (1920). 
"* Maurer (1981, 70).II" Major (1980) believed that the declining military significance of the Panama Canal, a structure built to 
fulfill sea power, was due to the subordinate role Canal Zone air bases played for the protection of the 
continental United States. Rather than being supplanted by air power during World War IL as Major 
(1980) claims, the argiunent here is that advances in the technology of naval power using oil-fuel had 
already begun to diminish the Panama Canal's military usefulness before it even opened in August 1914.
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Panama Canal technology as a military asset was that at the beginning o f American construction 
of the canal in 1904 the canal represented the state-of-the-art in logistical stand-in naval 
technology. But because of significant improvements in propulsion and oil fueling systems in 
the interim, by the time the Panama Canal technology was actually completed in 1914 its 
relative importance to the Navy had already declined.
Maritime use of the Panama Canal by the U.S. Navy has fidlen a logistical order of 
magnitude from the major choke point for the premier fighting vessels o f the day in 1904, to a 
transit point for military support vessels and supply ships at present. The platform of choice for 
projecting naval force has evolved from coal-driven battleships to nuclear powered aircraft 
carriers and submarines either too large to make a canal transit or unable to transit in stealth 
(Figure 7.7). Advances in naval propulsion and design, not to mention the development of air 
power and intercontinental ballistic missiles, continue to make Panama Canal lock-canal 
technology militarily outmoded unless the preferred means of projecting military force in the 
future become more conventional or subject to geographic constraints o f nautical distance.
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C h a p t e r s . A m e r ic a n  G e o g r a p h ic  Im p e r a t iv e s  in  Pa n a m a  a n d  t h e  P o w e r s  o f  t h e
Un it e d  St a t e s  F e d e r a l  G o v e r n m e n t
What sets the Panama Canal Zone apart from other strategic buffer zones is that it was a 
constitutional requirement. The United States had to exercise sovereign rights, power and 
authority within Panama for Congress to use its constitutional authority to use federal funds for 
the Panama Canal, considered an instrument o f commerce not of war. Article I, Section Eight of 
the Constitution o f 1787 gives Congress power to regulate commerce, meaning it can use 
federal funds to construct an interoceanic canal. But according to Article IV. Section Three 
Congress can only exercise its powers in a United States territory or possession. The only way 
that United States sovereignty in the Canal Zone could have been avoided was if the 
Constitution of the United States itself was modified, or the Panama Canal declared an 
instrument o f war.
Article 111 of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty states that in the Canal Zone, the United 
States exercises all the rights, power and authority of sovereignty to the entire exclusion of any 
such exercise by the Republic of Panama."* The ever-quoted Article III o f the Hay-Bunau- 
Varilla Treatv reads:
Haniahan argued. "Insofar as the recent accommodations can be adequately tailored to suit the 
traditional arguments of both countries the structure of the accord is basically weak; the question of who 
has sovereigntj' is still unsettled” (cited in U.S. Congress 1977-78. 3:670). Assistant Attorney General 
John M. Harmon wrote to Sen. Ernest F. HoUings on 16 September 1977 (U.S. Congress 1977-78, 2:94- 
96) that. ~[ln reference to Article 111] This formulation indicates that the Republic of Panama was willing 
to permit the United States to exercise all the rights and powers of sovereignty and ownership in the 
Canal Zone, but not to relinquish sovereignty and title themselves, while the United States was content 
with the practical result that it could utilize in the Canal Zone all the powers it wanted and needed." (U.S. 
Congress 1977-78. 2:250) A letter from Attorney General Bonaparte on 7 September 1907. stated: “The 
omission to use words expressly passing sovereignty was dictated by reasons of public policy. 1 assume: 
but whatever the reason the [Hay-Bunau-Varillaj treaty gives the substance of sovereignty, and instead of 
containing a mere declaration transferring the sovereignty, descends to the particulars all the rights, 
power and authority' that belong to sovereignty, and negatives any such sovereign rights, power, or 
authority’ in the former sovereign” A more radical interpretation of United States rights in the Canal 
Zone was by Rep. Flood (U.S. Congress 1977-78. 2:369). "The term titular sovereignty’ means nothing 
more than a reversionary interest on the part of Panama in the sole event the United States should 
abandon the Panama Canal as in the case of the execution of a reversionary deed of property in Anglo-
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The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authori^ 
within the zone mentioned and described in Article H of this agreement and within the 
limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in said Article II which 
the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory 
within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by 
the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority'.
Was the United States Federal Goverrunent therefore sovereign of the Canal Zone? The answer 
is that it was not: but neither was the Republic of Panama. A decision of the 5̂ '’ Circuit Court in 
1940 stated:
The Isthmian Canal Convention [1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty) ... is comprehensive 
in that it gives to the United States, in perpetuity, the greatest possible jurisdiction in 
the Panama Canal Zone, without actually ceding the area to this coimtry .... If it is 
possible for one nation to retain "sovereignty’ and yet grant in perpetuity the exercise of 
‘sovereignty,’ then this is the existing situation.
The explanation for this peculiar answer lies in the nature of sovereignty itself. Classical 
understanding is that sovereignty is an indivisible and inalienable bundle of rights. Thus the 
dilemma is how can a concept insisting on an indivisible and inalienable bundle of rights be 
reconciled with the terms of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty where the United States exercised 
sovereignty but the Republic of Panama was sovereign?
The classics of political philosophy do not shed much light on how sovereignty might 
be divided, transferred or otherwise exercised in foreign territory. Nearly all. with the 
interesting exception of the authors of the Federalist papers, considered that a division or 
alienation of sovereignty was illogical and contrary to all political principles. None appear to 
have contemplated the possibility of a situation like the Canal Zone. Despite a consensus that
Saxon countries. Hence, there can never be any reversion of the Canal Zone to Panama imless our country 
abandons the canal enterprise, which includes the Zone.”
' Case of Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco, 111 F.2d 263,265-266 (5* Cir. 1940), cited in U.S. Congress 
(1977-78, 1:622).
The brief search included Hobbes, Montesquieu. Rousseau. Kant, Hegel, and the Federalist Papers.
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sovereignty is indivisible and inalienable, classic political philosopher s viewpoints were not 
useful. Most referred to a division of powers between the interests of the people and the 
government but not between two foreign governments in the same territory. Only the Federalist 
papers provided any usable insights into how two governments might exercise sovereignty in 
the same space at the same time.
8.1 A Federalist  Interpretation of the  Canal Zone
Federalist No. 42 comments on the irony o f federal jurisdiction over matters relating to 
trade with the Indian tribes. Indian tribes resided within the legislative jurisdiction of the States 
but were under the jurisdiction o f the federal government. This situation gave cause to ponder 
how it was possible to reconcile the exercise o f two sovereigns in the same space at the same 
time, to reconcile a  partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the States: 
to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain.'
Federalist No. 23 claimed that not only is a division of sovereign power in the same 
space at the same time possible, so is concurrent exercise of the same power in the same space 
at the same time. A State and a federal government can exercise exactly the same rights 
concurrently, for instance, taxation. Regardless of whether or not the exercise of a sovereign 
right has been conferred upon the federal government by the State, if the State is not prohibited 
from exercising the same right it may do so.‘“
Federalist No. 42 stated: "What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State is not yet 
settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexi^ and contention in the federal councils. And how 
the trade with Indians, though not members of a  State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can 
be regulated by an external authority, without so far intmding on the internal rights of legislation, is 
absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case in which the articles o f Confederation have 
inconsiderately endeavoured to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the 
Union, with complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, 
and letting the whole remain" (emphasis added] (Adler 1952, 138).
Federalist No. 23 said: ‘‘[TJhe power of imposing taxes on all articles other than exports and imports 
.... is manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States and in the individual states. 
There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that power [exclusive] in the Union .... 
The necessity o f  a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division o f  the sovereign
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Federalist No. 39 made two interesting statements that would just as easily be applied 
to the relationship between the United States Federal Government and Republic o f Panama in 
the Canal Zone. First its states;
[L local or muiudpal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the 
supremacy, no more subject within their respective spheres, to the general authority 
than the general authority is subject to them within its own sphere [emphasis added].
In other words, the States and the federal government dip from the same reservoir of 
sovereignty' but are mutually exclusive in their use o f  it, neither being subject to the other. The 
formulation "distinct and independent” and "no more subject” at least hints at independent 
sovereignties. Understandably, this was not the intent.
Second, Federalist No. 39 says that the jurisdiction of the federal government is 
circumscribed and leaves to the States "residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other 
objects.'' The idea that the States retain residuary and inviolable sovereignty is similar to a 
litany of terms, "territorial sovereignty,” "titular sovereignty,” "barren scepter.” "residual 
sovereignty,” "ultimate sovereignty.” "reversionary sovereignty,” "scintilla o f sovereignty,” 
etc.. describing circumstances like the Republic o f Panama's dominion in Canal Zone 
territorv.
power; and the rule that all authorities, o f which the States are not explicitly divested in favour o f the 
Union, remain with them in full vigour, is not a theoretical consequence of that di\ision. but is clearly 
admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution. 
We there find that notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most 
pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the 
States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States” [emphasis added] (Adler 
1952. 106-7).
Federalist No. 39 states. "Among communities luiited for particular purposes, it [i.e.. supremacy] is 
vested partly in the general and partly in the mimicipal legislatures. In the former case, all local 
authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasiue. 
In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions o f the supremacy, 
no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is 
subject to them within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a 
[national] one; since its Jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several 
states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects" [emphasis added] (Adler 1952. 127).
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The snag in applying the Federalist papers' conception of sovereignty to the Canal 
Zone is that the United States and the Republic of Panama are two separate and independent 
sovereignties. A federalist explanation does adequately separate into autonomous governments 
the two sovereigns that are supposed to occupy the same space. Classical thinking about a 
division of sovereignty between a people and the functions of government or between a  state 
government and a federal government do not go 6 r enough in separating political authority. 
Classical thinking about a division o f sovereignty among two or more states in an alliance, 
league or confederation goes too far to separate governments into independent and wholly 
autonomous states to be relevant to the Canal Zone. Governments that agree to a voluntary and 
dissoluble alliance do not acquire any right to exercise sovereignty in each other's territory . It 
seems the subject matter of classical political philosophy seems to go from federalism to 
'political alliances.' passing over a curious gray area where two or more foreign governments, 
via mutual agreement, exercise their sovereignty' in the same space.
How exactly is one to categorize this extraterritorial option whereby the United States 
Federal Government can exercise its sovereignty in a territory already occupied by another 
government, through a mutual agreement that is significantly less binding than a federalist 
arrangement but much more binding than a political alliance?
8.2 A Contemporary But  Still  Federalist  Interpretation  o f  the Canal Zone
A contemporary interpretation of United States and Panamanian jurisdictional overlap 
in the Canal Zone is Hanrahan's "Legal Aspects of the Panama Canal Zone -  In Perspective" 
published in 1965 in the Boston University Law Review.^'* Hanrahan (1965) chose to ignore the 
classical understanding that sovereignty is indivisible.'^ This allows him to sidestep the
Cited in U.S. Congress (1977-78. 1:655-679).
Hanrahan briefly discusses the origins of the classical understanding of sovereignty as indivisible: 
"The absolute quality of sovereign^ in its early stages of development reflected, primarily, the nature of
181
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
political philosopher’s dilemma in explaining what cannot be: that two sovereigns exist in the 
same space at the same time. In Hanrahan’s formulation, the United States and Panama hold 
two different, non-mutually exclusive aspects of the same sovereignty (U.S. Congress 1977-78, 
1:673):
The relationship between Panama and the United States requires that a distinction be 
drawn between a grant of sovereign powers and a grant of sovereignty. A further 
distinction may be drawn between territorial sovereign^,’ a property r i^ t  similar to 
that which exists in the private law. and sovereignty in the jurisdictionaL i.e.. power 
sense. In other words, ignoringfor the moment the classical mandate that sovereignty is 
indivisible. Panama's grant to the United States might be explained in terms of a 
transfer of jurisdictional powers within a designated zone while Panama retained its 
territorial’ or property right as owner of the land. This reasoning, it is suggested, 
removes the fear of loss of total sovereignty’ from the Panama Canal question and 
provides a workable solution conceivably acceptable to both parties .... The political 
fact which exists in the Panama Canal Zone today is that two independent nations each 
share attributes of sovereignty .... An appropriate solution would give to the word 
sovereignty, insofar as it is granted to the United States, a jurisdictional coimotatioiL In 
view of the social, political and economic ties between the two coimtries it seems 
hardly relevant to the successful conduct of a canal operation to argue the question of 
sovereignty [emphasis added].
Hanrahan insists that the Republic of Panama retained its original, territorial 
sovereignty while at the same time transferring’ to the United States the privilege to exercise 
the jurisdictional aspects of its sovereignty. Panama's territorial sovereignty in the Canal Zone 
is an original property right that came with the territory after independence from the Republic of 
Colombia on 3 November 1903. The fact that Panama transferred jurisdictional powers to the
the highly centralized powers which appeared in the sixteenth century as the sole law making and law 
enforcing body within a territory. Thus sovereignty was the expression in legal terms of what actually 
existed as a political fact Inasmuch as the law making power acted without any e.\temal legal control and 
was reasoned as being necessary for an ordered society, it was only natural for sovereignly to be defined 
as an indivisible power. Hobbes asserted that '[S[omeone must have the last decision and whoever has it 
and can make it good has sovereign power.’ Accordingly, divisible sovereign^ has been declared 
illogical and contrary to political reality. In the words of Hamilton. "Two sovereignties carmot co-exist 
within the same limits.” The classical concept of indivisible sovereignty gave vitality to the developing 
nation-states which fed their national egos upon absolute and unlimited legal power .... By the end of the 
18* century. Europe inherited a legal theory representing unlimited legal power in its own territory and 
complete freedom of action in international relations with only those restrictions imposed by its own will; 
- a view inconsistent with any workable system of international law and one which has been succinctly 
described as creating an "anarchy of sovereignties’” (U.S. Congress 1977-78. 1:671).
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United States does not eliminate the fact that the transfer as well as the right to exercise 
jurisdictional powers is conditional upon a mutual agreement. Conceivably if  that mutual 
agreement lapsed or was abrogated, jurisdictional powers would automatically recoil back to the 
territorial sovereign, the Republic of Panama.
Hanrahan claims that his conception o f sovereignty would provide a workable solution 
to United States-Panamanian relations by removing the fear of loss of total sovereignty on the 
part of the Republic of Panama. Nevertheless, a distinction between Panamanian sovereignty' as 
a property right that came with the territory, and sovereignty in the jurisdictional or power sense 
as exercised by the United States, fails to address the real point of contention between the two 
nations. The real point o f contention was to what extent the United States would exercise its 
jurisdictional rights to Panama's detriment. It would probably not be comforting for 
representatives o f the Republic of Panama to be assured that they did not actually lose their 
"territorial sovereignty" in the Canal Zone they just lost any ability to exercise it.
The idea that Panama holds territorial sovereignty but carmot exercise sovereign 
jurisdictional powers is the same argument that Secretary of State John Hay made in his 
diplomatic exchange with Panamanian Ambassador De Obaldia in 1904.'^ Hay's letter to De 
Obaldia on 24 October 1904, was the first substantial defense of American rights, power and 
authority in the Canal Zone. Hay's letter established a paradigm for American interpretation of
A decision of the 5* Circuit Court in 1940 was that: "The Isthmian Canal Convention [1903] ... is 
comprehensive in that it gives to the United States, in perpetiriw. the greatest possible jirrisdiction in the 
Panama Canal Zone, without actually ceding the area to this country .... If it is possible for one nation to 
retain sovereignty' and yet grant in perpetirity the exercise of 'sovereignty,' then this is the existing 
situation .... In the determination of the Zone’s statirs by our own Government, there exists corrfusion. 
The executive department maintains the position that the United States exercises full sovereign rights, and 
in a most recent statement is careful to exclude ttiis area from those over which we are sovereign” 
[Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco, 111 F.2d 263, 265-266 (5* Cir. 1940)] (Cited in U.S. Congres 1977- 
78. 1:622). Letter from Assistant Attorney General John M. Harmon to SetL Ernest F. Hollings. 16 
September 1977 (U.S. Congress 1977-78, 2:94-96). (U.S. Congress 1977-78, 2:94) “[In reference to 
Article III] This formulation indicates that the Republic of Panama was willing to permit the United 
States to exercise all the rights and powers of sovereignty and ownership in the Canal Zone, but not to 
relinquish sovereignty and title themselves, while the United States was content with the practical result 
that it could utilize in the Canal Zone all the powers it wanted and needed.”
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rights granted in the Canal Zone. In his letter. Secretary of State Hay conceded that the Republic 
of Panama held '‘titular sovereignty” but he coined it in a well-known phrase a "barren scepter” 
(U.S. Congress 1977b, 442):
If it were conceded that that abstract nominal, "rights, powers and authority of 
sovereignty in and over the zone” are vested in the Republic of Panama, there would 
still remain the fact that by said Article III [Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty] the United 
States is authorized to exercise the rights, power and authority of sovereignty "to the 
entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign 
rights, power or authority.” If it could or should be admitted that the titular sovereign of 
the canal zone is the Republic of Panama, such sovereign is mediatized by its own acts, 
solemnly declared and publicly proclaimed by treaty stipulations, induced by a desire to 
make possible the completion of a great work which will confer inestimable benefit 
upon the people of the Isthmus and the nations of the world. It is difBcult to believe that 
a member of the family of nations seriously contemplates abandoning so high and 
honorable a position, in order to engage in an endeavor to secure what at best is a 
"barren scepter.”
Needless to say. Hay's note to De Obaldia in 24 October 1904. probably did not go far in 
soothing De Obaldia's concerns and obviously did not provide the workable solution to the 
dilemma over sovereign rights in the Canal Zone that Hanrahan seemed to have expected.
8.3 A Sta te 's Rig h ts Dispute  Betw een  the Repu bu c  of  Panam a  and the United  
States in 1904
The summer of 1904 marked an important first: the first misunderstanding between the 
United States and the new Republic of Panama over sovereignty in the Canal Zone. The 
diplomatic exchange helps clarify early U.S. and Panamanian understanding about the Canal 
Zone. The argumentation, on both sides, is interesting in itself.
Panamanian representatives claimed that the United States should not exercise its 
jurisdiction in the Canal Zone to the detriment of the Republic of Panama's ability to support 
itself fiscally and commercially. Panamanians made specific in their disputes with the United
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States exactly what action or what privilege the United States was illegally exercising in the 
Canal Zone. Panamanians tried to explain how American jurisdiction was detrimental to their 
ability to raise revenues or take advantage of what they considered their geographic natural 
resource. Panamanian representatives also claimed that American authority could not apply in 
the Canal Zone if it was not strictly for the protection, construction, operation and maintenance 
of the Panama Canal. Representatives of the Republic of Panama made their best arguments 
when they did not focus on the abstract question over who was the true territorial sovereign of 
Canal Zone territory. Whenever they did choose to focus on their rights as the sovereign of 
Canal Zone territory they always managed to undermine their own arguments.
The issues raised in the diplomatic exchange of the summer of 1904 were hardly new to 
United States relations with the sovereign of the Isthmus. The same arguments can be found in 
discussions between representatives of the United States and Colombia during the 1850s over 
whether the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty exempted American ships, mails and passengers 
using the Panama Railroad from Colombian duties and taxes. The 1904 disagreement focused 
on which sovereign rights the Republic of Panama had expressly transferred to the United States 
Federal Government through the various articles of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, and which it 
had reserved for itself. The peculiar facet is that Panamanian claims and American counter­
claims resembled a "State's Rights’' dispute. Both sides seemed to see their relationship in terms 
of a federalist division and transfer of sovereignty in the Canal Zone.
Panamanian protests about the exercise of sovereignty in the Canal Zone by the United 
States were lodged in two letters. One was by Panamanian Secretary of Government and 
Foreign Affairs Tomas Arias to Envoy John Barrett on 27 July 1904. Another letter was from 
Panamanian Ambassador to the United States Jose de Obaldia to Secretary of State John Hay on
In Secretary of War Taft’s statement before the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals on 18 April 
1906. Taft said that Governor Allen of Ohio once called titular sovereignty a "barren ideality” -  perhaps a 
predecessor to Hay’s statement that Panama’s titular sovereignty was the "barren scepter.”
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11 August 1904. The American reply to the Panamanian correspondence is Secretary of State 
Hay’s lengthy letter of 24 October 1904, to Ambassador De Obaldia, the letter that fiamed the 
conventional American interpretation of rights acquired in Canal Zone territory via the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903.
The diplomatic exchange began after the formal establishment of the Canal Zone. On 9 
May 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt, through Secretary of War William H. Taft and in 
accordance with the Spooner Act of 28 June 1902, and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty , issued 
detailed instructions for a Canal Zone govenunent. On 24 June 1904, Secretary of War Taft by 
direction o f the president issued instructions for the Chairman of the Isthmian Canal 
Commission to establish ports, tariSs, custom houses, and post offices in the Canal Zone (U.S. 
Congress 1977b, 411-415). About three weeks later, on 15 July 1904. a local Panamanian 
chamber o f conunerce issued a letter to the President of Panama, Manuel Amador Guerrero. 
The letter complained that the grant o f sovereignty in the Canal Zone to the United States as 
stipulated in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty did not mean the United States could establish ports, 
custom houses and tariffs.''^ It may be noted that the local chamber of commerce made this 
initial protest, not officials of the Republic of Panama. The first official incident between the 
United States and the Republic of Panama occurred on 26 July 1904, when Panamanian 
officials attempted to enforce toimage duties on the Chilean steamer Li mari. The Li man was 
unloading at the port of La Boca. La Boca lies on the east side of the entrance to the Panama 
Canal on the Pacific Ocean, a port that the Governor of the Canal Zone declared was within
The chamber of commerce letter stated: “That although according to article 3 of the canal treaty it 
seems that the United States may exercise sovereignty over the said zone, it is clearly imderstood that it 
shall do so only as far as may be necessary for the constructioiu maintenance, etc., of the canal within 
said zone .... If custom-houses be established in the zone, all merchandise and produce save those of the 
United States would be shut out from the very place where the people of Panama woitld expect to have a 
ready sale and receive some benefit thereby. Corrunerce, agricultirre, and the cattle business would be 
strangled, and the Government of Panama, which should derive its revenues from these sources, would 
suffer the same fate. Disaster would be general and all would be forced to emigrate. By article 1 of the 
treaty, the independence of the Republic of Panama is guaranteed by the United States. By the proposed
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Canal Zone territory and therefore under United States jurisdiction and free from any 
Panamanian tonnage or port duties.'^
In a letter dated 27 July 1904, Arias reminded Barrett of the 6 ct that the Republic of 
Panama had ratified the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treat} without modification. Arias believed that 
when representatives of the Panamanian government did so they observed that the United States 
was acquiring a limited exercise of rights, power and authority for the canal enterprise. The 
United States could not expect to exercise sovereign rights, power and authority to the detriment 
of the Republic o f Panama’s "̂ fiscal and economical sovereignty.” Arias also claimed that the 
Republic of Panama reserved what it did not expressly transfer. To support this claim. Arias 
says that nowhere in the treaty was the Republic o f Panama specifically excluded from the right 
to charge postage, maritime taxes, and other aspects of its economic and fiscal sovereignty in 
Canal Zone territory. He concluded by reiterating, “The fact stands, therefore, that Panama, 
being the original owner of the canal zone, clearly reserved what it did not expressly surrender”:
[Pjanama, being the original owner of the canal zone, clearly reserved what it did not 
expressly surrender. The sovereign right of levying taxes within the zone does not 
appear by any of the stipulations of the treaty to have been expressly surrendered to the 
United States ... In other words, national taxes and contributions take effect in the canal 
zone in so far as not expressly excepted by said Articles X and XIII. This being the 
case, the fact of excluding from the canal zone, by order of the authorities there, the 
postal tariff and postage stamps of the Republic of Panama is. to say the least 
improper, inasmuch as such proceeding affects, in marked manner, a source of revenue 
from which it expects brilliant results in the near future. Finally, and as logical 
understanding of the meaning of the treaty whereby the fiscal and economical
establishments the Republic of Panama would be reduced to the worst kind of dependence and servitude 
that exists, that of starvation” (U.S. Congress 1977b. 423).
In a letter from Barrett to Hay on 26 July 1904. Barrett said: “Despite Panama’s objections vessels are 
arriving and departing from La Boca, Port Ancon. The Panama Govenunent contends that the United 
States is acting in contravention of the treaty and denies the right of canal authorities to enter and clear 
ships. Despite Panama’s objections vessels are arriving and departing from La Boca, but the tension is 
growing stronger each day and something must be done to end the trouble or break the deadlock. The 
Chilian steamer Limari is now discharging cargo, but the Panama authorities threaten to arrest and fine 
both captain and agent unless she leaves port or complies with Panama’s regulations. The agent has 
appealed to General Davis and he has repliW that he will not permit any interference by other authorities 
.... Up to this writing nine merchant vessels have been received at La Boca. Until the arrival of the 
Limari the Panama Govenunent only protested through the captain of the port; since her arrival the 
Panama authorities have tried in every way to compel her captain to respect their orders.”
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sovereignty is assured to the Republic, it considers that the rights which it so clearly 
and expressly reserved to itself have not been taken into proper consideration .... the 
Republic claims the acknowledgement to the full extent of its economical and fiscal 
sovereignty within the canal zone, not only because it considers having right according 
to the trea^, but that its very existence and future depend on it. The fact stands, 
therefore, that Panama, being the original owner of the canal zone, clearly reserved 
what it did not expressly surrender [emphasis added).
There may be weaknesses in Arias line of argumentation. As Hay pointed out later, the 
argument is correct in principle if  in fact, the Republic of Panama had not expressly 
surrendered the exercise o f sovereign rights, power and authority in the Canal Zone. In Article 
III. the Republic of Panama not only granted all powers, rights and authority to the United 
States but also prevented itself from exercising any such powers, right or authority. Recall 
Arias' point that Panama reserved what it did not expressly surrender. Federalist No. 23 stated 
that via the terms of the Constitution, "‘the State governments would clearly retain all the rights 
of sovereignty which they before had. and which were not. by that act, exclusively delegated to 
the United States.” Federalist No. 23 lists three exceptions whereby a State confers sovereignty 
upon the federal government and is unable to exercise that right itself;
This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would only 
exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive 
authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and 
in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted 
an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the states would be absolutely 
and totally contradictory and repugnant. I use these terms to distinguish this last case 
from anodier which m i^ t appear to resemble it. but which would, in fact be essentially 
different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of 
occasional interferences in the policy of any branch of administration, but would not 
imply any direct contradiction of repugnancy in point of constimtional authority.
Article III of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty fits Federalist No. 23's second exception by 
granting the exercise of sovereign rights, power and authority to the United States and entirely
(Adler 1952. 105-106).
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excluding the Republic o f Panama from the exercise o f any such sovereign rights, power, and 
authority.'^'
Soon after Arias sent his letter to Barrett, Ambassador De Obaldia dispatched a letter to 
Secretary of State John Hay In this letter, dated 11 August 1904, De Obaldia makes the curious 
claim that though the Republic o f Panama may have signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, by 
doing so it was actually signing the Hay-Herrân Treaty. De Obaldia reasons that the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty carried with it the Hay-Herran promise that the United States had no need 
for an absolute renunciation o f sovereignty on the part of the sovereign of the Isthmus of 
Panama. De Obaldia says that it was "a promise which has not been destroyed by the fact that 
the Hay-Herran Treaty no longer exists, for the declaration in which it is embodied expresses 
the purpose of following a frank and honest policy, accepted and confirmed afterwards by the 
Senate o f the United States." De Obaldia, again like Arias reminding American representatives 
that the Republic of Panama ratified the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty without modification, adds: 
"[AJnd it had a decisive influence on the Government of my country in causing it to approve 
unreservedly and without modification the Varilla-Hay convention."
In a marked deviation from Arias' federalist logic. De Obaldia says that the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty is merely a contractual obligation between a lessor and a lessee. He 
informs Secretary of State Hay that the proper relationship with the Republic of Panama must 
be as lessee, but as "the fact that the lessee is another republic, there may be confusion 
respecting the character and the essence of the contractual relations created by the agreement." 
The important thing to note is how De Obaldia's tries to frame the relationship in terms of 
property law. De Obaldia demands that Hay recognize the special circumstances in the fact that 
the lessee, the Republic of Panama, is not a private entity but an independent sovereign. At this
It is only the logic of the Federalist papers that is being used here to illuminate potential U.S. 
understanding of the treaty. The Federalist papers do not. of course, actually apply to If S -Panamanian 
relations.
189
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
point. De Obaldia might have argued that any federalist logic about a transfer of sovereign 
rights is incorrect. However, De Obaldia s argument undermines itself because he seems to 
forget that the United States is also a sovereign state. By the same way of thinking, the United 
States is no more “lessor” as if it were a  private interest than the Republic of Panama is just a 
"lessee.”*̂* Special consideration would have to run both ways. What is more. De Obaldia is 
unable to cite any article of the treaty where the word 'lease” is used.
De Obaldia then maintains that the phrase, "The Republic o f Panama grants to the 
United States all the rights, power and authority ... which the United States would possess and 
exercise if  it were the sovereign,” in Article III of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty clearly implies 
that the United States is not sovereign. Furthermore, De Obaldia says, the next part of Article 
III. "to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic o f Panama of any such sovereign 
rights, power or authority” is in obvious contradiction to other articles o f the treaty implying the 
Republic of Panama retains some kind of sovereign rights, power and authority. Whether De 
Obaldia is suggesting that the Republic of Panama is sovereign and that Article III must be. 
therefore, void or powerless is not clear. De Obaldia s could have used this line o f reasoning 
more wisely as it was precisely this same type of argument that Hay worked to great effect in 
his reply to De Obaldia. Hay's reasoning was to hold up De Obaldia's argument as a claim that 
the Republic of Panama was "the sovereign” of the Canal Zone, then proceed to falsify it with 
any number of examples illustrating that Panama did not exercise full sovereign rights, power 
and authority. Hay's argumentation was like propping up a straw man. The fact was that neither 
side could reasonably claim that their nation was "the sovereign” in Canal Zone territory if the 
only set of criteria was which nation exercised Jidl sovereign rights, power and authority.
Hay said in his October 1904 letter that: "It is manifest that at the time this agreement was signed, both 
the secretary of state and the attomey-general of the Republic of Panama considered that the rights of the 
United States in the canal zone were something more than those of a pri\'ate concessionaire or lessee.”
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8.4 THE Defense  of Am erican  So v ereig n ty  in the Canal Zo n e  by  Secretary  o f  Sta t e  
John  H ay  nsr 1904
In Secretary of State Hay's reply to De Obaldia, dated. 24 October 1904. Hay uses the 
controversy over whether the United States had exceeded its authority for a general defense of 
United States exercise of sovereignty in Canal Zone territory. Whereas the ambiguities in the 
term sovereign completely backfired on Panamanian representatives. Hay exploited these same 
ambiguities to great effect in his rebuttal. Hay did not rebut De Obaldia's claims by foolishly 
trving to prove that the United States was sovereign in the Canal Zone, a claim that no nation 
could make if sovereign was defined as sovereign of the territory and government exercising 
sovereignty. Hay took a subtle approach and merely proved that the Republic of Panama did not 
exercise its full sovereignty in Canal Zone territory. Hay never claimed sole sovereignty for the 
United States as that would put him in the same fix as Panamanians, i.e., making a claim no 
nation could make. Hay argued that the United States was as close to sovereign as it gets 
without actually being sovereign. Exactly what he would call this state of being sovereign 
without actually being sovereign. Hay does not say.
The Hay letter claims at least five principal grounds for United States exercise of 
sovereignty. First, Hay does not accept De Obaldia's conflating the Hay-Herran Treaty and the 
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. Hay says, "Whatever could or would have been the effect o f the 
stipulations of the proposed treaty with Colombia, known as the Hay-Herran Treaty, is rendered 
unimportant by the fact that said treaty was not concluded but was rejected by Colombia." In 
reference to sovereignty pledges given to the Republic o f Colombia in Article IV of the Hay- 
Herrân Treaty, Hay says that it has been the long-estabUshed policy of the United States to 
defend the sovereignty of the independent nations of the Western Hemisphere. However, Hay 
said that it "does not include the denial o f  the right of transfer o f  territory and sovereignty from 
one republic to another of the western hemisphere upon terms amicably arranged and mutually
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satisfactory, when such transfer promotes the peace of nations and the welfare of the world” 
[emphasis added]. Hay is not correct in his use of the term "‘transfer o f territory.” The Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla transferred sovereign rights in a territory it did not transfer territory. Hay 
concluded that not only did no such provision as Article IV of Hay-Herran appear in the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty, but on the contrary Article HI means that If the powers of sovereignty 
are to be exercised in that territory the right to exercise them belongs to the United States.”'̂ ^
Second, Hay rebutted the argument that the phrase “for the construction, maintenance, 
and operation ...” in Article III constitutes a limitation on the grant o f  sovereign rights, power 
and authority to the United States. Hay says that the phrase is merely ‘ a declaration of the 
inducement prompting the Republic of Panama to make the grant.” Hay explains that a transfer 
of property usually sets forth a description of the property, inducement leading to the grant, and 
the compensation or words of conveyance. But what Hay seems to overlook is that Article III is 
not a transfer of property but of sovereign power, rights and authority. Thus here is a case where 
Hay. instead of appealing to a federalist explanation, appeals to a  much more basic but not 
entirely appropriate precedent in property law. Hay further explains;
It would be offensive to the Republic of Panama to be placed before the world as 
having been induced to consent “to the entire exclusion . . .” in the territory of the canal 
zone, by the payment of money or because of a want of ability to maintain its 
independence. It would, however, be highly honorable and entirely justifiable to 
consent to such exclusion of sovereign right when the moving cause or inducement is 
"the construction, sanitation, maintenance, operation, and protection” of a work of such 
stupendous magnitude and world wide importance as the Isthmian Canal.
Hay said: "In support of the contention advanced by the Goverrunent of the Republic of Panama, you 
quote Article IV of the proposed treaty with Colombia The first stipulation of that article is as follows; 
The rights and privileges granted by the terms of this convention shall not affect the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Colombia over the territory within whose boundaries such rights and privileges are to be 
exercised.' No such provision as the foregoing appears in the convention between the United States and 
tlie Republic of Panama; on the contrary. Article m of the convention with Panama provides that; ‘The 
Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, powers, and authority within the zone ... 
which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign ... to the entire exclusion of 
the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power, or authoriQr.’ This 
stipulation is plain and its purpose manifest. If the powers of sovereignty are to be exercised in that 
territory the right to exercise them belongs to the United States.”
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Hay does not make a  convincing point. Whether or not it would appear more honorable 
to the rest o f the world to consent to a transfer of sovereign power, rights and authority just 
because it serves a work of stupendous magnitude is irrelevanL Such is merely a matter of 
appearance. The actual justification for making a transfer o f sovereignty ultimately has to be 
based on something legal, some principle of international or constitutional law, not a subjective 
assessment of how stupendous are the uses to which the transferred sovereignty will be applied. 
Hay does, however, later claim a Constitutional justification for a transfer of sovereignty as his 
fourth ground of support.
Third, Hay tests" the treaty to prove the point that the United States acquired the right 
to exercise sovereign privileges, including establishing custom houses and post offices, etc., in 
Canal Zone territory. If the United States were the sovereign of the territory. Hay asks 
rhetorically, would it be able to establish custom houses, regulate commerce, establish post- 
offices, etc.? Yes, Hay says, it would. Hay then applies a similar rhetorical query to the 
Republic of Panama and says. If it were conceded that the abstract, nominal, rights, powers 
and authority o f sovereignty in and over the zone" are vested in the Republic of Panama, there 
would still remain the Act that by said Article HI the United States is authorized to exercise the 
rights, power and authority of sovereignty to the entire exclusion o f the exercise by the 
Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority ."" He follows with the 
formulation that though the Republic of Panama did not confer absolute sovereignty to the 
United States, it retained only a titular sovereignty amounting to little more than a "barren 
scepter."’
Fourth, Hay says that the wording seems to make a distinction between the Canal Zone 
territory and the rest of the Republic of Panama. The implication is that Panamanian 
representatives distinguished between Panama’s rights the Canal Zone and in the rest of the
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Republic of Panama. Hay feels that such would not be necessary if  the Panamanian claim were 
true that their exercise of sovereignty covered the entire Isthmus. Hay includes parts of 
Panama's Constitution stating that the territory of the Republic remains subject to the 
jurisdictional limitations stipulated or which may be stipulated in public treaties concluded with 
the United States of North America for the construction, maintenance, or sanitation of any 
means of interoceanic transit.”'^  In addition. Hay mentions articles o f Panama’s Constitution 
directing the executive to establish duties where a clear difference is made between those by the 
Republic o f Panama and those by the United States in Canal Zone territory . Finally. Hay notes 
several Panamanian court cases clearly implying that criminal jurisdiction was transferred to the 
United States because the Panamanian courts felt that they lacked jurisdiction. Hay calls 
attention to every instance he can muster where the Republic o f Panama either does not assert 
fiill sovereignty, or recognizes some kind of United States jurisdiction. Therefore, having 
proven’ that Panama does not exercise full sovereignty in the Canal Zone, as De Obaldia was 
supposed to have been arguing. Hay concludes that the Republic o f Panama must only have 
some kind o f partial sovereignty which Hay sees to be no more than a  "barren scepter.”
The question is, does De Obaldia really assert that the Republic of Panama is "the 
sovereign” o f the Canal Zone? Is that the claim that Hay has to rebut? De Obaldia asserts that 
what Panama does not expressly give up in the treaty it keeps. Thus at least to some extent. De 
Obaldia seemed to acknowledge a sovereign empowerment o f the United States in the Canal 
Zone. In one instance. De Obaldia says point blank that he is concerned only about Panama's 
"fiscal and economic sovereignty.” However, for the most part De Obaldia for some reason 
feels he must overstate his case, denying that the United States is now sovereign in Canal Zone 
territory. Obaldia’s claim was his undoing. By denying that the United States is sovereign, and 
justifying it on the fact that the phrase "if it were sovereign” clearly means that the United
U.S. Congress (1977b. 451).
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States is not the sovereign. De Obaldia practically stands declaring that the Republic of Panama 
is still the only sovereign in the Canal Zone. The catch is that no nation could claim to be the 
only sovereign in Canal Zone territory. De Obaldia seemed to have felt that in order to save a 
piece a Panamanian sovereignty, i.e., the all-important piece concerning fiscal and commercial 
matters, he had to claim the whole thing. By doing so he lost it all. Besides, arguing that the 
United States is not the sovereign misses the mark. Hay himself said, in a  very curious turn, that 
the United States never claimed to be sovereign. Rather Hay claimed the United States merely 
claimed the right to exercise all sovereign rights, power and authority to the entire exclusion of 
any such exercise by the Republic of Panama.
Fifth and lastly. Hay explains that the devotion of federal fimds to projects like an 
interoceanic canal are predicated on the Act that the territory is subject to United States 
sovereignty. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty does not explain why the United States has to 
exercise sovereignty in the Canal Zone so that federal fimds can be used. To pursue whether 
Hay's claim makes sense one has to look beyond the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.
8.5 Am e r ic a n  So v e r e ig n t y  in the  Ca n a l  Z o n e  a n d  T h e  Spo o n er  Ac t  o f  1902
The Spooner Act of 1902 authorized the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty But it does not 
clarify- a connection between the use of federal fimds and sovereign rights, power and authority. 
The Spooner Act merely states;
[T|he President is hereby authorized to acquire from the Republic of Colombia [then 
sovereign of the Isthmus], for and on behalf of the United States, upon such terms as he 
may deem reasonable, perpetual control o f  a strip o f land, the territory o f the Republic 
o f Colombia, not less than six miles in width ... and the right to use and dispose of the 
waters thereon, and to excavate, construct and to perpetually maintain, operate, and 
protect thereon a canal ....[emphasis added].'^®
In U.S. Congress (1977b, 178) a document dated 18 January 1902 called the Supplementary report of 
the Isthmian Canal Commission, perhaps paraphrasing the Spooner Act, stated: "The existing 
concessions thus purchased would be valuable only because their ownership by the United States would
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Perhaps it is implicit that the president’s authorization to excavate^ construct, maintain, operate 
and protect a canal is conditional upon acquiring perpetual control. The act then appears to 
make a second and somewhat separate authorization;
[A|nd also jurisdiction over said strip and the ports at the ends thereof to make such 
police and sanitary rules and regulations as shall be necessary to preserve order and 
preserve the public health thereon, and to establish such judicial tribunals as may be 
agreed upon thereon as may be necessary to enforce such rules and regulations 
[emphasis ackiedl.
The second authorization in the Spooner Act only calls for "jurisdiction” to preserve 
order and public health and enforce rules and regulations. In other words, in order to "excavate, 
construct and to perpetually maintain, operate, and protect thereon a canal” the president is 
authorized to acquire perpetual control', whereas in order to "make such police and sanitary 
rules and regulations as shall be necessary to preserve order and preserve the public health 
thereon, and to establish such judicial tribunals as may be agreed upon thereon as may be 
necessary to enforce such rules and regulations” the president is authorized to acquire 
jurisdiction.
If perpetual control is a requirement it seems redundant for the Spooner Act to authorize 
jurisdiction relating to civil order and public health. Perpetual control should have covered 
everything. Why would the Spooner Act make two distinct authorizations? It seems odd that the 
rationale for a transfer of perpetual control is not clarified, while the rationale for transfer of 
joint jurisdiction over civil order and public health is clarified. This is particularly difficult to
remove the obstacles in the way of negotiations between the two Governments for the occupation of 
Colombian territory by the United States for canal purposes; but these concessions are unsatisfactory and 
insufhcient. and a new arrangement must be made if an isthmian canal is to be constmcted by our 
govenunent across the Isthmus of Panama. The grant must be not for a term of years, but in perpetuity, 
and a strip of territory from ocean to ocean of sufGcient width must be placed under the control o f the
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understand since the authorization for jurisdiction could not have been justified by a 
constitutional requirement to expend public funds.
8.6 American  Sovereignty  in  the  Canal  Zo n e  a n d  T he United States Con stitution
The next level o f  authorization for the treaty beyond the Spooner Act leads straight to 
Article IV, Section Eight of the U.S. Constitution. This is, in feet, what Hay would allude to. 
Hay's remarks deserves full quotation because they unfold probably an unrecognized aspect of 
the Canal Zone:
For many years after the adoption of our Constitution the belief prevailed that the fends 
of the National Government could not be expended in the construction of public 
improvements, excepting those required for the use of the National Government such 
as the Capitol, executive department buildings, arsenals, forts, custom-houses, post- 
ofBces, etc. The construction of highways, railroads, etc.. the improvement of rivers 
and harbors, etc., the protection and improvement of water powers, construction of 
canals, and similar undertakings for the use and convenience of the general public and 
private enterprises, was considered to be outside the competency of the National 
Government, although said works were to be constructed in territory subject to the 
national sovereignty. Finally, it was established that the National Government had the 
authority to enter upon the construction of public works of the character referred to, and 
to devote the public funds of the nation thereto; and the reasons inducing such 
determination are all predicated on the fa c t that such public works are to be situated in 
territory subject to the national sovereignty. It is quite probable that this phase of the 
situation is not considered by the Panamanian authorities, and that they do not 
distinguish the difference between the Govenunent of the United States and the French 
Canal Company. The French Company was a private enterprise and derived its fimds 
from individuals who voluntarily devoted their private means to promoting the 
endeavor; such fends could be expended anywhere and for any purpose sanctioned by 
the contributors. But the Government of the United States in building the canal does not 
expend private fimds, but public moneys derived by public taxation for public purposes. 
Moneys so realized may be used for national purposes outside the territory subject to 
the national sovereignty, such, for instance, as the promotion of a war in foreign 
territory, for in time of war the war powers of the nations are called into activity, and 
those powers are coextensive with the nation’s necessities, and the conduct of the war is 
especially enjoined upon the National Government by our Constitution; so also these 
funds may be expended for the purchase of ground for the erection of embassies, 
coaling stations, etc., for those are instrumentalities of the National Government; but 
the Isthmian Canal is an instrumentality of conunerce, a measure for the promotion of 
the purposes of peace. Conunerce is the life of the nation, but it is conducted by 
individual citizens in a private capacity and not as a governmental institution [emphasis 
added].
United States. In this strip the United States must have the right to enforce police regulations, preserve 
order, protect property rights, and exercise such other powers as are appropriate and necessary.''
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Hay says that the U.S. Constitution stipulates federal funds can only be expended in 
territory under U.S. sovereignty. For Congress to even consider dispersing one penny to start 
the Panama Canal, there had to be a Canal Zone. Herein lies the much sought answer for why 
the Spooner Act, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, or any Isthmian canal treaty would be 
inadequate and unconstitutional if  they called for anything less than perpetual control o f  Canal 
Zone territory almost as if it were a territory or possession o f the United Stales. Hay notes that it 
is 'quite probable that this phase of the situation is not considered by the Panamanian 
authorities .. .^ It might be also noted that such may be well and good for the United States and 
its Constitution, but why should the Republic of Panama bear the negative consequences of 
what is a purely internal procedure o f the United States Government?
8.7 THE Su pr em e  Co u r t ’s  Ru lin g  o n  Am e r ic a n  So v e r e ig n t y  in  the  Ca n a l  Z o n e  in  1907
A source confirming Hay's opinion is a ruling o f the United States Supreme Court a 
few years later in the case o f  Wilson v. Shaw, Secretary o f the Treasury on 7 January 1907. In 
the case of Wilson v. Shaw, the plaintiff was a private citizen who sought to stop payment o f the 
$40 million to the French company and $10 million to the Republic of Panama as well as any 
money to build the Panama Canal, on the grounds that it was an unlawful disbursement of 
public funds or issue of public obligations .... [for] an unauthorized business venture” (U.S. 
Congress 1977b, 1634-5).
The plaintiff in the case based his argument on the very thing that Hay argued, that the 
Constitution authorized federal funds be used only in a United States territory or possession. 
The plaintiff said that the Canal Zone was not acquired as a  territory or possession in the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty. As to this technicality, the plaintiff was not entirely wrong. Nonetheless, 
the Court affirmed the judgement of the Court of Appeals and ruled that the plaintiff was not
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entitled to bring such a suit unless he showed direct and special injur>' to himself ahove injury 
suffered by others, i.e., the mere fact he is a taxpayer is not enough.’̂  In the opinion of the 
Court, the petition to stop the construction o f the canal W3S a startling request The Supreme 
Court explained:
[Tjhe courts to interfere and at the instance of a citizen, who does not disclose the 
amount of his interest stay the work of cotistruction by stopping the payment of money 
Brom the Treasuiy of the United States therefor, would be an exercise of judicial power 
which, to sav the least is novel and extraordinarv.'^
Though the decision was against the plaintiff on the basis of no grounds for complaint the 
Supreme Court examined each one o f the plaintiff s argiunents against the constitutionality o f 
the Panama Canal project.
The plaintiff argued that the Spooner Act required a treaty with the Republic o f 
Colombia, not the Republic of Panama, that it is 'not a compliance with the terms used, that 
these rights and privileges shall have been obtained by force from the Republic of Colombia, or 
by treaty or otherwise from anyone else; nor does this act in terms authorize under any 
conditions the payment of any money to the Republic of Panama (U.S. Congress 1977b, 1636). 
Therefore, the plaintiff contended, "whatever title the Government has was not acquired as 
provided in the act of 28 June 1902, by treaty with the Republic o f Colombia” (U.S. Congress 
1977b. 1641). The Court replied that the territory of Panama had passed by an act of secession 
to the Republic of Panama and a treaty ''ceding the Canal Zone [to the United States], was duly
The Supreme Court said: 'That, generally speaking, a citizen may be protected against wrongful acts 
of the Government affecting him or his property may be conceded. That his remedy is by injunction does 
not follow. A suit for an injunction is an equitable proceeding, and the interests of the defendant are to be 
considered as well as those of the plaint^. Ordinarily it will not be granted when there is adequate 
protection at law. In the case at bar it is clear not only that plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction, but 
also that he presents no ground for any relief” (U.S. Congress 1977b, 1640).
U.S. Congress (1977b, 1640).
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ratified” (U.S. Congress 1977b, 1641) [emphasis added]. The Court’s understanding of the 
treaty as "ceding” territory is not accurate.
Secondly, the plaintiff claimed that Congress under the Constitution has no authority to 
employ public funds in making, buying or operating commercial enterprises including railroads 
or canals in foreign countries. What was required by the Constitution, a  cession o f territory, had 
not been acquired since the boundaries o f the Canal Zone were not defined in the treaty and 
because the Canal Zone was not declared a  territory or possession o f the United States. The 
Court answered:
It is hypercritical to contend that the title of the United States is imperfect and that the 
territory described does not belong to this Nation, because of the omission of some of 
the technical terms used in ordinary conveyances of real estate ... disputes not 
infrequently attend conveyances of real estate or cessions of territory. Alaska was ceded 
to us forty years ago. but the boundary between it and the English possessions east was 
not settled until within the last two or three years (U.S. Congress 1977b. 1633) .... The 
title of the United States to the Canal Zone in Panarrta is not imperfect either because 
the treaty with Panama does not contain technical terms used in ordinary conveyances 
of real estate or because the boimdaries are not sufficient for identification, the ceded 
territory having been practically identified by the concrrrrent action of the two 
interested nations.
Note the incorrect use of the terms "belong to this Nation” and "ceded territoryA rticle III of 
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty granted sovereign power, rights and authority in Canal Zone 
territory. It did not cede territory.
R. R. Baxter, a professor of international law, stated during his testimony to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, that such opinions essentially did not mean what they say:
Pronoimcements that the 2kne is a territory or possession of the United States' or that 
it is 'foreign territory' are therefore nothing more than judicial determinatiorts of 
Congressional intent concerning the applicability of particular United States statutes to 
the Canal Zone .... The Court’s assertion in Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907) that "It 
is hypercritical to contend that... the (Canal Zone] does not belong to this Nation” ... 
amoimts only to a holding that for purposes of the Panama Canal Act of 1962 (sic;
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1902j, the United States possessed a sufBcient interest in the Canal Zone to authorize 
the Government’s expenditure of tax revenues for the building of the canal.'^
If it was merely the intent of the Court to assert sufGcient interest in the Canal Zone to authorize 
the use of federal fimds in calling the Canal Zone territory a U.S. possession or "ceded 
territory/’ as Baxter imderstands, it would have been better if the Court had said so. The 
Supreme Court’s opinion against the plaintiff was practically a claim of aimexation o f the Canal 
Zone to the United States. As it was. such legal turns of phrase may seem harmless and proper 
to upholding the law and the actions of Congress but they can create serious international 
misunderstandings.
Lastly, the plaintiff contended that the power given to Congress in Article 1. Section 
Eight of the Constitution was the power to regulate, not to carry on. commerce. Navigation and 
transportation is carrying on commerce. Therefore, an interoceanic canal project in any territory 
foreign or domestic falls outside the provenance o f the United State Federal Government. To 
answer this third objection, the Court cited several cases demonstrating that the federal 
government does have the power to construct interstate highways:
In California v. Pacific Railroad Company, 127 U.S. 1. 39. it was said: 'It cannot at the 
present day be doubted that Congress, under the power to regulate commerce among
Baxter notes similar cases (U.S. Congress 1977-78. 4:77): “In Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. United 
States, 280 U.S. 173 (1929). for example, the Supreme Court expressly avoided the international law 
question of titular sovereign^ ’ and made clear that its determination that the Canal Zone ports were 
'foreign’ was only for purposes of constniing the statute governing the Postmaster General’s rate setting 
for mail carriage. Id. At 177-178. Other frequently cited cases are similarly circumscribed .... By the 
same token, the statement of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Husband R. (Roach), 453 F. 2d 1054 
(1971). cert denied. 406 U.S. 935 (1972). that “The Canal 2kne is an unincorporated territory of the 
United States.” 453 F. 2d at 1057, occius in the context of a decision defining die domestic legislative 
authority of Congress with respect to the Canal Zone; it does not purport to address the question of 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone in an international sense.” Hearings in the House Subcommittee (cited in 
U.S. Congress 1977-78. 1:625-628). Thus. U.S. domestic legislation and corut decisions would not 
appear to provide a basis for any definitive conclusions with respect to the intematiooal status of the 
Canal Zone, nor are they intended to. Rather, such definitions are made for the sole purpose of extending 
the effect or of exempting the Zone from its application ... the Supreme Court did equate the Canal Zone 
with territory belonging to the United States, but in the context of establishing the authority of the Federal 
Government to expend funds and to engage in construction work in the Zone. ”
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the several States, as well as to provide for postal accommodations and military 
exigencies, had authority to pass these laws. The power to construct or to authorize 
individuals or corporations to construct national highways and bridges from State to 
State, is essential to the complete control and regulation of interstate commerce. 
Without authority in Congress to establish and maintain such highways and bridges, it 
would be without authori^ to regulate one of the most important adjuncts of commerce. 
This power in form er times was exerted to a very limited extent, the Cumberland or 
National road being the most notable instance. Its exertion was but little called for, as 
commerce was then mostly conducted by water, and many o f our statesmen entertained 
doubts as to the existence ofthe power to establish ways o f  communication by land But 
since, in consequence o fthe expansion o f the country, the rrmltiplication o f its products, 
and the invention o f railroads and locomotion by steam, land transportation has so 
vastly increased, a sounder consideration o f the subject has prevailed and led to the 
conclusion that Congress has plenary power over the whole subject. Of course the 
authority of Congress over the Territories of the United States, and its power to grant 
franchisé therein, are. and ever have been, undoubted. But the wider power was very 
freely exercised, and much to the general satisfaction, in the creation of the vast system 
of railroads connecting the East with the Pacific, traversing States as well as Territories, 
and employing the agency of state as well as Federal corporations’ .... [After citing 
several other cases) These authorities recognize the power of Congress to construct 
interstate highways. A fortiori, Congress would have like power within the Territories 
and outside o f state lines, fo r  there the legislative power o f Congress is limited only by 
the provisions o f the Constitution, and cannot conjlict with the reserved power o f the 
States. PlaintiÆ recognizing the force of these decisions, seeks to obviate it by saying 
that the e.\pressions were obiter dicta, but plainly there were noL They announce 
distinctly the opinion of this court on the questions presented, and would have to be 
overruled if a different doctrine were now announced (U.S. Congress 1977b. 1642-4) 
[some emphasis added).
In the case of California v. Pacific Railroad Company, the Court said that the powers of 
the federal government to regulate commerce did exist in Article I, Section Eight of the 
Constitution. The federal government did not exercise its powers to any extent imtil required by 
the commercial expansion of the country and the growth o f land transportation particularly 
railroads. Without the authority of the federal government, no one authority would be able to 
regulate the consistent use, operation and maintenance of the vast road system in its entirety.
In Wilson v. Shaw, the Supreme Court supposed if the Federal Government had the power to 
construct interstate highways within the States, it should certainly have the power to do so 
"within the Territories and outside of state lines” where it would not conflict with the reserved
Another contributing factor may have been that during the early phases of railroad constnictioiu 
railroads passed through Indian lands. i.e.. territories occupied by Indian tribes not subject to the
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power of the States.''" What the Court did not suppose was that it may conflict with the reserved 
power of foreign governments, if  the territory is not truly a United States territory or possession.
8.8 T he Expansion  of the Pow ers  of th e  United States Federal  Government in 
Foreign  T erritory
The decision of the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Shaw (1907) would be invoked during 
the Panama Canal treaties debate by conservative Republicans especially in the House of 
Representatives asserting that the Canal Zone was a territory or possession of the United States. 
Constitutional procedure stated that the president did not have the power to cede territories, in 
this case meaning the Canal Zone via the Panama Canal treaties, without House approval. 
Republican Caliform'a Governor Ronald Reagan said that he had spent time reading and 
studying legal cases and opinions about the status of the U.S. in the Canal Zone, undoubtedly 
relying on Wilson v. Shaw in equating the Canal Zone with the Louisiana Purchase and Alaska 
(U.S. Congress 1977-78, 2:97). Reagan, manipulating the classical dilemma before the 
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said (U.S. Congress 
1977-78. 3:632-633):
But. the important thing to remember is that only one nation can exert sovereign rights 
over a given piece of land at one time, and the 1903 treaty made it clear that we would 
do so in the Canal Zone and that the Republic of Panama would not
The Supreme Court's decision in Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc. et al v. Connell et al. (1948) 
clarified that despite the fact the United States exercised sovereignty in Canal Zone territory, it 
was not a United States territory or possession. The Canal Zone was only considered a United
legislative jurisdiction of the States. Only the federal government could make treaties with Indian tribes 
and garrison federal troops to safeguard and clear the way for railroad construction.
This statement is taken to mean within the territoriesyer outside of state lines, not as a designation of 
two separate situations.
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States territory for the purpose o f applying domestic legislation.'^' The Fifth Circuit Court in 
1940 stated;
In the determination of the Zone’s status by our own Government, there exists 
confusion. The executive department maintains the position that the United States 
exercises full sovereign rights, and in a most recent statement is careful to exclude this 
area from those over which we are sovereign.''*'
Baxter said that Supreme Court determinations calling the Canal Zone a United States 
territory or possession are merely Judicial determinations as a  means for other purposes. In other 
words, they do not mean what they literally say. The explanation is sensible but it seems 
incomplete. If the Supreme Court is attempting to rectify its understanding of sovereignty with 
the reality of sovereignty on the ground, then what is the Court’s understanding of sovereignty? 
Implicit in the Court’s mistaken pronouncements is the idea that there can be one sovereignty 
for one territory, that sovereignty and territory are permanently and indivisibly attached to each 
other. Thus the only way to receive a grant to exercise sovereign power, rights and authority is 
by receiving the territory itself. Cede the territory, then and only then can sovereignty be 
acquired.
Baxter stated (cited in U.S. Congress 1977-78, 4:77) “The Supreme Court did. however, refer to the 
Canal Zone’s international legal status in Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc. v. Connell. 335 U.S. 377 (1948). The 
Court held the Fair Labor Standards Act to be applicable to United States employees on bases leased from 
tlie United Kingdom in Bermuda, notwitlistanding statutory language making the Act applicable only to 
'territories’ or possessions’ of the United States. The Court cited precedents for application of the Act in 
territories over which the United States was not sovereign, noting tfiat the Act had been applied to the 
Canal Zone, admittedly territory over which we do not have sovereignty.’ 335 U.S. at 381. The reference 
to the Canal Zone is clearly dictum, but it is deserving of notice as a rare Supreme Court statement over 
the Canal Zone in an international sense. The United States thus never acquired ’sovereignty’ over the 
Panama Canal Zone but only rights within the terms of the various treaty arrangements between the 
United States and Panama, beginning with the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903. The area at all times 
remained subject to the titular sovereignty of Panama. The relinquishment by the United States of rights 
under the existing treaties, pinsuant to Article 1, paragraph 1, of the new Panama Canal treaty, will thus 
not be a surrender of sovereignty by the United States but a retrocession of certain rights to the Republic 
of Panama. The continuing sovereignty of Panama over the Zone is recognized in the Preamble of the 
new treaty, wherein the United States ’Acknowledg[es| the Republic of Panama’s sovereignty over its 
territorv.”
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Barring a federalist transfer o f  sovereignty the only peaceful way that a foreign 
sovereign can acquire the right to exercise sovereignty in a space already occupied is if  by 
mutual agreement the original sovereign o f the territory agrees to untether and retract its 
sovereignty, creating a kind of sovereign vacuum. An alternative to a  federalist explanation for 
how the United States was empowered to exercise sovereignty in Canal Zone territory is that the 
Government o f the Republic of Panama bound itself to a non-exercise of its sovereigntv so that 
the United States Federal Government then could exercise its own sovereignty . In other words, 
a country can agree not to exercise its sovereignty in its own territory to make room for another 
country's extraterritorial sovereignty.
The idea that Panama would agree to a  non-exercise of sovereignty in the Canal Zone in 
something that appears throughout the history of American involvement in Panama. In a letter 
from Radcliff to Webster dated 31 December 1841, RadclifTwrote:
The Government of the Isthmus, having the sole control of that route, is natiuaily 
desirous of improving it’s [sic| ad\ antages for the beneGt of it’s [sic] citizens as far as 
reason and equity would allow; but is willing to limit the exercise o f its control within 
proper bounds by treaty stipulations, if other nations would undertake the contemplated 
improvements for the use and benefit of the World. It desires also to make treaty 
arrangements with other Governments, whereby the State of the Isthmus shall be 
considered as always a neutral territory; exempt from compromittal [sic] in the wars of 
other Countries, and as a place of peace and security for all the inhabitants of the Globe 
who shall wish to pass over it. or send across it their property [emphasis added].
Half a century later. Secretary of War William H. Taft arranged the non-exercise of United 
States control after a conference with Panamanian representatives in Panama City on 28 
November 1904. The meeting in Panama City was arranged to settle differences between the 
two countries as a result of the Hay-Bimau-Varilla Treaty. The ''Taft Agreement” was not a
Case of Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco. I l l  F.2d 263, 265-266 (5* Cir. 1940). Cited in U.S. 
Congress (1977-78, 1:622).
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treaty but a series o f executive o rd e rs .T h e  first of these executive orders entered into force on 
12 December 1904.
Taft summarized the basic conclusions o f Secretary of State Hay’s letter to Ambassador 
De Obaldia o f 24 October 1904, suggesting that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty did not confer 
total sovereignty on the United States but rather left to the Republic of Panama at least a titular 
sovereignty.'^ Taft argued a peculiar formulation, agreeing to a temporary "nonexercise” of 
United States sovereign rights as a solution to stem the controversy (U.S. Congress 1977b. 516):
Now. as I have said already, it is not for me to enter into a discussion, because I have 
not the power to vary the position taken by Secretary Hay with reference to the extent 
of the powers which the United States might lawfully exercise in the Zone. But my 
attitude must be this: Assuming the power to the extent declared in Secretary' Hay’s 
note, how far can I go in waiving the exercise o f these powers and withholding the 
exercise o f powers already exercised, so as to assure the Government of Panama that 
we wish to exercise no powers that we do not deem necessary in the constnrctioru 
maintenance, and protection of the canal? Now. I am not in a position to waive 
absolutely -  I mean to give up the right to exercise -  those powers, but I am given 
authority by the President to establish now, subject to action by Congress, a 
nonexercise o f those powers, such as I hope will be satisfactory to the Goverrunent of 
the Republic, and will continue indefinitely until the construction of the canal shall so 
affect the relations and conditions existing as to require a new adjustment of the 
relations between the two Governments [emphasis added].
Secretary of War Taft’s statement before the Senate Corrunittee on Interoceanic Canals. 18 April 1906. 
Taft stated (cited in U.S. Congress 1977b. 512): "I was there not to construe the treaty, not to assert the 
full powers of the United States, but to make a modus vivendi which should bind neither part to any 
permanent construction of the treaty. I did not intend to give up any right which the Government had. and 
might in the future wish to exercise, but it was quite willing to make any concessions not affecting those 
rights and not interfering with the power and convenience of the Govenunent in constructing the canal, 
which would soothe the amour propre of the Panamanian people or of the Govenunent and which should 
convince them that we were not in the midst of their country for the purpose of excluding them from a 
prosperous business. ”
■* Tlie statement preceding Taft’s was made by Panama’s Secretary of Government and Foreign Affairs 
Santiago de la Guardia. De la Gaurdia’s words underscore the specifically fiscal and conunercial nature 
of early Panamanian representatives’ claims about United States exercise of sovereignty: "We place our 
entire trust in the United States Government, and, as Mr. Roosevelt said, the question for us was that the 
canal should be constructed, and that we present no obstacles whatever. But the idea of sovereignty was 
restricted by a servitude in favor of the United States for the construction, maintenance, and protection of 
the canal. But we never imagined that such an idea could lead to a commercial business of the canaL or to 
any measures except such as were necessary for its construction, maintenance and protection, because 
such conunercial advantages as the Govenunent of the United States might derive from the Zone by 
interpreting the treaty in the form later seen are very insignificant for a country so great, for a govenunent 
so rich and so generous as that of the United States, while for us ... have the importance of life and death. 
Whether we are to be a nation or not depends upon whether we receive these advantages” (U.S. Congress 
1977b. 515).
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Taking Taft’s notion a step further, if by way of the ^ a f t  Agreement” the United States 
Federal Government agreed to a non-exercise of the sovereign rights it had been permitted to 
exercise in Canal Zone territory via treaty from the Republic of Panama, then why is it not also 
the case that by way o f the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty Panama agreed to a non-exercise o f the 
sovereign rights it was justified to exercise in its territory via declaring independence from 
Colombia?The Government of the Republic of Panama bound itself to a conditional non- 
exercise of sovereignty in the Canal Zone by the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty By the Taft 
Agreement, the United States Federal Government in turn agreed to a temporary non-exercise of 
American sovereignty. The Government of the Republic of Panama could re-impose the 
exercise of certain aspects of its sovereignty in the Canal Zone.
Through mutual agreements like the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, and subsequent 
adjustments even if temporary like the 'Taft Agreement,” certain privileges, obligations and 
procedures of two different sovereignties seemed to be able to co-exist in the same space at the 
same time, like oil and water. The result may have been messy and complicated in practice, but 
at least it was negotiated. Half a century later, the demands of sovereignty in the Canal Zone by 
Panamanian representatives seemed to have become less fiscal and commercial and more 
territorial in nature. Consolidating territorial and administrative control over Canal Zone 
territory became an end in-itself. Hanrahan (U.S. Congress 1977-78, 1:679) noted the irony in 
that, 'increased anti-American activity in Panama is inconsistent with the progress achieved in 
resolving traditional Canal Zone differences.” The explanation for this anomaly is that 
nationalist demands in the Canal Zone probably had little to do with the United States.
The Republic of Colombia recognized the Republic of Panama after certain concessions and 
considerations were granted by the United States in the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty signed 6 April 1914 and 
entered into force I March 1922.
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Nationalist demands against the United States were a product o f  domestic politics within the 
Republic of Panama itself
8.9 PHANTOM AMERICAN FEDERALISM IN THE CARIBBEAN AND THE PaCMC
Suppose that there can exist more than one sovereign in one territory at a time. In other 
words, any given territory can be controlled by more than one sovereign. Secondly, suppose that 
sovereign jurisdiction need not be transferred from the original sovereign. The capacity to 
exercise sovereignty should already exist in the foreign sovereign by the very virtue o f its being 
a sovereign. A transfer is unnecessary. The original sovereign need only clear out of the way 
and leave the territory bare. In the Canal Zone, the Republic o f Panama bound itself to a non­
exercise o f its sovereignty so that the United States could exercise its own sovereignty. The 
Republic of Panama was therefore the conditional non-sovereign and the United States was the 
conditional sovereign, where the conditions as mutually agreed upon would determine the 
extent to which the Republic of Panama would not exercise its sovereignty.
A transfer of sovereignty, rather than a non-exercise, suggests some kind of phantom 
American federalism in foreign territory. Classical political thinking on the divisibility' of 
sovereignty cannot rectify the existence of two independent sovereigns in the same space. Of 
the group of classical political thinkers selected above, only the authors of the Federalist papers 
contemplated a division of sovereignty. The fact that these were the contributions o f early 
American political thinkers is important to note because using federalism was how 
representatives of the United States tried to compute the irregularity of United States 
sovereignty in the Canal Zone. Confused about how to exercise sovereignty in foreign territory 
and certainly without having any well-developed off-the-shelf classical understanding of how to 
go about arranging it, Americans had to improvise a concept. It seems perfectly reasonable to 
think that federalist principles about the division of sovereignty would be the very first place
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that Americans, crafters o f the world’s most famous example o f federalism, would go to try to 
improvise a  solution. Commenting on an 1857 proposal. Secretary of State Marcy said that the 
American plan to create a protectorate in Panama was no different than the arrangement that 
had created the States of the Union:
The arrangement does not propose a full cession of the sovereign rights of New 
Granada over the territory included in the two municipalities, though it is to a 
considerable extent a restriction upon those rights. This arrangement is not believed of 
unusual character. In organizing the General Govenunent of tlie United States, thean
several States
c u u u uu uiuac i ui i m n ii cuicui uui ucuc cu ui 
l  
reserved to themselves a large portion of their original Sovereign rights.
Panama retained a State o f the Union-like status after its independence in 1903. 
Panamanians protested in a State's Rights way when the United States Federal Goverrunent s 
jurisdiction clashed with Panama's fiscal and commercial interests in the Canal Zone. It was the 
United States Federal Goverrunent that made major infrastructure improvements outside of the 
Canal Zone like the Pan-American Highway and other paved roads in the terminal cities, the 
Bridge o f the Americas and the Panama City and Colon sewer and water systems. A striking 
example o f State-like privilege is that the Republic of Panama does not have its own currency. 
Legal tender in Panama is the U.S. dollar.
Secretary of State Hay's 24 October 1904, letter to Ambassador De Obaldia established 
a paradigm for American interpretation of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. The implication of 
Hay's argument, supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Shaw, is that there 
can only be one sovereign in one territory, but jurisdictional aspects o f sovereignty can be 
transferred through mutual agreement and exercised at the hand o f  a foreign government. Hay's 
contention that the Republic o f Panama transferred sovereignty to the United States Federal 
Goverrunent in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty carries with it a peculiar ramification. A 
conveyance of sovereignty is what creates federal governments not just empowers them.
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If sovereign jurisdiction in Canal Zone territory was transferred and given multiple 
transfers of sovereignty similar to the Canal Zone from different parts of the world, then 
conceivably the United States Federal Government has been double-dipping in two 
confederations, one at home and one abroad. The first confederation is among the States and 
other United States territories and possessions by means of the Constitution of 17 September 
1787. The second confederation was among foreign territories or territories not designated a 
United States territory or possession by means of a phantom Constitution, whose articles were 
the ad hoc and piecemeal provisions o f various treaties and executive agreements.
Instead of agreeing to transfer sovereignty to the United States Federal Govenunent by 
way of the Constitution of 1787 like a  State, the Republic of Panama agreed to give rights to the 
United States Federal Govenunent in the Canal Zone with the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty like a 
phantom State. In a letter from Douglas J. Bennet Jr.. Assistant Secretary for Congressional 
Relations, to John Sparkman. Chairman. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate. I 
November 1977. Beimet attempted to compare the Canal Zone with other places around the 
world where states granted sovereign Jurisdiction to an outside power, or.
[TJhe right to exercise exclusive sovereign powers within portions of its territory 
without affecting a cession of its own sovereignty over that territory. '^
Bennet cites Chinese leases for naval bases to France. Germany, and Russia where the lessees 
retained the right to exercise their own sovereign powers in Chinese territory. Bermet includes 
examples like Article 111 of U.S.-Cuba agreement of 16 February 1903, relating to Guantanamo 
Naval Station and Article HI of the Treaty of Peace with Japan authorizing the United States to 
“exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and
U.S. Congress (1977-78 1:250-254).
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inhabitants of (the Ryukyu and Daito islands)” where Japan retained ‘"residual sovereignty.” All 
three cases^ like the Canal Zone, represent s tia t^ ic  points for naval operations.
Phantom American federalism was as close to an American empire as the United States 
ever got. Dominance in the hemisphere and separation from Europe and Asia by two major 
oceans blessed the United States with not having to fight for control over vast flanking 
territories. Taking control over a hodgepodge of potential naval bases or coaling stations in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific as well as the interoceanic canal shut down the ability of any foreign 
threat to operate a large naval force on distant American shores. At one time the phantom 
United States encompassed Alaska, American Samoa, Baker Island, the Panama Canal Zone. 
Guam. Guantanamo, the Hawaiian Islands, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, 
Kingman Reef, Midway Islands, Navassa Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the 
Ryukyu Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wake Island and probably others. The geographic 
focus of United States sovereignty exercised in foreign territories has shifted in the age of air 
power (Figure 8.1). No longer beholden to the geography of projecting a coal-fired fleet over 
long distances, the former naval bases of the phantom United States evolved into a series of air 
bases in foreign territory including several in Panama (Major 1980).
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Figure 8.1. Radius of action for rigid airships and seaplanes. Office of Naval Intelligence 
(National Archives).
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C h a p t e r  9 . R e l a t iv e  L o c a t io n  a n d  So v e r e ig n t y
The geographic paradox about the Isthmus of Panama is whether to consider it in terms 
of its relative location or its territory and sovereign jurisdiction. Diplomatic problems almost 
always occurred when people intentionally or unintentionally misunderstood the meaning of 
“relative location,” arguing that the Isthmus of Panama was either a territory that functioned for 
maritime communication or a  relative location with a sovereign jurisdiction over it.
Correct Geographic Understanding Incorrect Geographic Understanding
The relative location of the Isthmus of Panama is 
a global asset and serves a vital function for 
maritime communication.
(American version) The territory of the Isthmus of 
Panama is a global asset and serv'es a vital function 
for maritime corrununicatiorL
The territory of Panama has a sovereign 
jurisdiction over it
(Panamanian version) The relative location of 
Panama has a sovereign jurisdiction over it
Since the middle o f  the nineteenth century, the major point o f contention in diplomatic 
negotiations between the United States and the sovereign of the Isthmus of Panama has been the 
question of fair compensation for allowing the United States to control the use of a geographic 
resource. The sovereign o f the Isthmus of Panama claimed that it had the right to put its national 
interests first with respect to everything within or passing through its own territory. The United 
States claimed that being sovereign of the Isthmus of Panama carried with it a special obligation 
to respect the needs o f foreign maritime communication and honor mutual agreements to that 
effect. In a letter to Secretary of State John M. Clayton on 29 March 1850, Chargé d Affaires at 
Bogota Thomas M. Foote said:
While the United States, England, and the other great powers, are looking to the 
Isthmus as the route made by nature for the commerce of the world, and devising plans 
to secure its neutrality, so that all can enjoy the facilities it proffers. New Granada, too 
weak or inert to avail herself, by industry and enterprise, of the great commercial
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advantages of her position, is considering how much she can make by conceding the 
privilege of transit to others. It is true that there are many here who look forward to a 
better state of things, in the hope that immigration, and the proof given by foreigners of 
what may be accomplished by well-directed enterprise, may work a  change in their own 
people. In the meantime, however, all parties seem desirous of making the best bargains 
possible.
Clearly Panama should be compensated for what subtracts from things in its territorial 
jurisdiction if not rewarded for its willingness to cooperate with the needs of global maritime 
shipping and relax its sovereign jurisdiction over foreign flows in transit. The inirastructine to 
make the Panama Canal work requires United States sovereignty over everything from 
freshwater resources to civil authority and puts demands on the sovereign jurisdiction of the 
Republic o f Panama. One might hasten to note that the Panama Canal also adds great value to 
things within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama, an indirect form of 
compensation. Nonetheless, because the RepubUc of Panama agreed to restrain its exercise of 
sovereignty in the Canal Zone it can expect some kind of direct reparation for it.
A hard line Panamanian argument has been that the sovereign o f the Isthmus of Panama 
deserves a share of the social savings o f the Panama Canal, defined as the sum of all savings in 
dollars that shippers earn by not having to take a more costly alternate route. Before the 
secession of an independent Republic of Panama on 3 November 1903, the Republic of 
Colombia (New Granada) was sovereign of the Isthmus of Panama. Colombian Minister to the 
United States Pedro Alcantara Hertan said to Secretary of State William L. Marcy on 8 
December 1856:
The total value for the direct and indirect benefits to the Republic of Panama from the Panama Canal 
has been the subject of much calculation and debate. While the precise dollar amount is not clear, what is 
generally understood is that the Panama Canal accounts for perhaps one-third of the Panamanian 
economy (Nicolas Ardito Barietta, personal commimication).
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Mew Granada may be said to have derived no equivalent for the valuable privileges 
which she has granted; for the revenues, which she has gratuitously foregone and for 
the trouble, dangers and responsibilities, which she has assumed, in consequence of the 
opening of the interoceanic corrunimication .... The most painfol of these circumstances 
is that the govenunent, which has derived most benefit from the liberal co-operation of 
New Granada, should not rate it at its proper value.
Herrin reiterated the argument to Secretary of State Lewis Cass on 10 August 1857, that 
Colombia was entitled to some consideration given the social savings that Americans earned by 
using the Isthmus of Panama:
Calculate the saving of both money and time which this firee and commodious way has 
secured to the United States and. then, let any man say and impartially say whether 
New Granada be not entitled to some consideration for die leading part, which she has 
taken, without profit to herself, in smoothing the ground for the work.
If interoceanic technologies like the Panama Canal tap distance saved from the territory 
of the Isthmus o f  Panama then naturally the Republic of Panama should be compensated for at 
least a part o f the social savings earned. LaFeber (1989, 99) quoted an unnamed Panamanian
official as saying:
You in the United States inherited vast mineral wealth ... Africa was given gold and 
diamonds. The Middle East is rich in oil. God gave Panama nothing but a waterway. 
We must make a living from our resources, as others have firom theirs.
The urmamed Panamanian official is either equating the United States Federal Government with 
divine intervention or he is mistaken in thinking that the Republic o f Panama was given a 
natural waterway by providence. The point the Panamanian official was probably trying to 
make is that the relative location of the Isthmus of Panama was Panama’s natural geographic 
resource. The principles agreed to in the Kissinger-Tack Agreement seemed to concede the fact 
that the relative location of the Isthmus of Panama was a natural resource o f Panama:
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It is recognized that the geographic position of its territoiy constitutes the principal 
resource of the Republic of Panama.
This principle o f the Kissinger-Tack Agreement is, geographically speaking, illogical. The 
Republic of Panama cannot be sovereign over the relative location of the Isthmus of Panama, 
nor due a portion of the social savings of the Panama Canal to the world.
9 .1 Ca n  a  Sta te  Be Sovereign  Over  rrs  Rela tive  Location?
Distance saved is not a natural resource tapped from the territory of the Republic of 
Panama. When a vessel comes to port at the entrance to the Panama Canal the captain does not 
have to fill out a  requisition for one hundred jugs of distance saved to be extracted from the 
Isthmus of Panama and loaded onto his ship, crying out, “Careful with that Panama distance 
saved, boys, that’s gotta last us all the way to Hong Kong!” Distance saved is not a  thing but a 
relationship that has a certain value which shippers are willing to pay for. Saving nautical 
distance has value regardless of whether or not a  Panama Canal ever existed. However, distance 
saved would not be available in the same quantity to maritime shippers if the Panama Canal or 
other interoceanic technologies like the Suez Canal did not exist. The Panama Canal can 
provide a substantial amount of distance saved to maritime shippers, on the order o f thousands 
of nautical miles. Depending upon how much o f a part it happens to play in their ship operations 
and accounting, shippers may choose to purchase distance saved. If they do, the route they must 
take involves a transit across the territory o f the Republic of Panama.
Imagine if  two ships of exactly the same make and model carrying exactly the same 
commodities both purchased Panama Canal distance saved, i.e., paid the same Panama Canal 
tolls based on their identical net tonnage. Would the two ships be getting the same value from 
what they had just paid for? They would not. Wliat explains why when two identical ships pay
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the same price for the same geographic resource the amount they receive is different? If the 
territory of the Isthmus of Panama is providing a  natural resource then one of the two ships did 
not receive its proper share. Both ships paid the same price. Yet one of them ended up with four 
thousand nautical miles o f distance saved from the Panama Canal while the other one received 
less than a thousand nautical miles o f distance saved. A formal and very stem complaint to the 
Republic of Panama would be in order.
Obviously, the distance saved by the two ships would depend on where they had come 
from and where they were going. The geographic resource that the Isthmus of Panama allegedly 
provides in 6 c t depends entirely on geographic relationships extrinsic to the territory o f the 
Isthmus of Panama. There is nothing on the Isthmus of Panama that produces any amount of 
distance saved. There is only value in the relative location of the Isthmus of Panama. A 
sovereign government can claim to exercise exclusive sovereign jurisdiction over its own 
territory, a location defined by set limits and boundaries, including everything within or passing 
through that territory. But the idea of exercising sovereignty over relative location is 
incomprehensible. No sovereign government can lay claim to exercise sovereignty over a 
geographic relationship between its territory and the territory of other sovereign governments 
any more than the others could, unless that relationship lay entirely within its own territory .
Representatives o f the United States have consistently claimed that the relative location 
of the Isthmus of Panama obligates the sovereign of the Isthmus of Panama to restrain its 
sovereign jurisdiction over foreign economic flows in transit across the Isthmus. Two classic 
statements on the matter are by Secretary of State Lewis Cass in July 1858 and President 
Theodore Roosevelt in December 1903. Referring to a  unified Central America, Secretary of 
State Cass wrote to Mr. Lamar, Minister to Central America, on 25 July 1858:
Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, and none of these local governments, 
even if administered with more regard to the just demands of other nations than they 
have been, would be permitted, in a spirit of Eastem isolation, to close these gates of
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intercourse on the great highways of the world and justify the act by the pretension that 
these avenues of trade and travel belong to them, and that they choose to shut them, or. 
what is equivalent, to encumber them with such unjust regulations as would prevent 
their general use.*"®
Secretary of State Cass declared that being sovereign over territory on the Isthmus of 
Central America carried with it a  special duty to respect the needs of global maritime 
communication. According to Cass, to close off overland routes of maritime communication, or 
its equivalent, to encumber maritime flows with unjust taxes or tolls could not be excused by 
pretensions of sovereignty. The interests of the many superseded the interests of the few. And 
the United States represented the interests of the many.
During his Message to Congress on 7 December 1903. President Theodore Roosevelt 
said that the obligation of the sovereign of the Isthmus with respect to maritime communication 
was not just a duty but a  “solemn contract”;
But as long as the Isthmus endures, the mere geographical &ct of its existence and the 
peculiar interest therein which is required by our position, perpetuate the solemn 
contract which binds the holders of the territory to respect our right to freedom of 
transit across it, and binds us in return to safeguard for the Isthmus and the world the 
exercise of that inestimable privilege.''*^
Roosevelt claimed that this “solemn contract” bound Panama to respect the freedom of 
transit by the United States and the world. Yet Roosevelt does not clarify what contract he is 
talking about imless it is a reference to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treat) which was going to be 
considered by the Senate the following Spring. As compensation for the sovereign of the 
Isthmus" adherence to this solemn contract the United States was bound only to protect the 
neutrality of the Isthmus. The relative location of the Isthmus of Panama seemed to so transcend 
the matter of sovereignty that, according to Roosevelt, the Spooner Act of 1902 authorized him
U.S. Congress (1977b. 6). 
U.S. Congress (1977b, 291).
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to secure a treaty not with a sovereign government but with the relative location of the Isthmus 
of Panama itself. Roosevelt referred to an Isthmian route irrespective o f the name which for the 
moment the territory bore on the map”:
When the Congress directed that we should take the Panama route under treaw with 
Colombia, the essence of the condition, of course, referred not to the Govenunent 
which controlled that route, but to the route itself; to the territory across which the route 
lay. not to the name which for the moment the territory bore on the map.'^
9.2 T he Q uestion  o f  Fair Com pensation  t o  the  Sovereign o f  t h e  Isthm us of Panama
The reason there is a Panama Canal rather than a Nicaragua Canal or a  Honduras Canal 
is because the Isthmus of Panama provides paths of least resistance. Among the geographic 
resources that Panama Canal technology makes use of lying solely within the territory of the 
Republic of Panama are low topographic relief, a  short span between two oceans and other 
physical resources like water from the Chagres River watershed. Low topographic relief and a 
short span across, not geographic position, constitute the principal geographic resources of the 
Republic o f Panama with respect to the Panama Canal or any interoceanic technology.
The Republic of Panama carmot exercise sovereignty over geographic relationships 
between foreign maritime interests abroad. But it can exercise sovereignty over natural 
resources used for the construction and operation o f the Panama Canal as well as the maritime 
flows of foreign nations when they enter Panamanian territory in transit. The Government of 
Panama owns an exclusive right to exercise sovereignty over everything within or passing 
through its territory on the Isthmus o f Panama by means of its 3 November 1903, secession 
from the Republic of Colombia. However, the Republic of Panama agreed to a non-exercise of 
its exclusive rights of sovereignty in the Canal Zone through a  mutual agreement, the 1903 Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty. What the Republic of Panama was entitled to is compensation for
U.S. Congress (1977b, 291).
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agreeing to a non-exercise of sovereignty. Particularly, it was a non-exercise of sovereignty 
over things belonging to or passing through its Canal Zone territory including the land's low 
topographic reUef and short span, the United States Federal Government's Panama Canal 
infrastructure and workforce, and all foreign maritime flows in transit. The RepubUc of Panama 
never obligated itself to cede territory nor relinquish any of its exclusive sovereign rights in its 
own territory.'^' It just agreed not to exercise them.
The immortal question is “what price sovereignty"? It does not take a  certified public 
accountant to explain to us that paying for sovereignty, or paying the Republic of Panama for a 
non-exercise o f  its sovereignty in the Canal Zone, is not exactly a matter of dollars and cents. 
Thoughts o f national even personal welfare and pride are aroused by the very notion that 
Panama must concede to a non-exercise o f sovereign power in its own territory because the 
interests of foreigners are paramount to those of resident Panamanians. And in fact, this is 
precisely what ambitious Panamanian politicians hope to capitalize on.
In a  speech to the Panamanian National Assembly in 1951, First Vice President 
Alcibiades Arosemena expressed a common Panamanian misgiving that the needs of global 
maritime commerce were superseding the needs of the residents of the Isthmus:
Geography has deceived us, making us believe that our destiny was rooted in total 
surrender to our function as a land of transit, without allowing us to consider that this 
function responds above all to the needs of international commerce, nor that its 
undisturbed predominance put our nationality in fief to exclusive foreim interests and 
left our economy unarmed against the blows of changes in world traffic.
On I October 1968, President Amulfo Arias appealed in his inaugural address to the residents 
of the interior o f the Isthmus of Panama:
When the articles of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Trea^ are abrogated through mutual agreement with the 
United States, the Republic of Panama is be released from its obligations to the United States and is free 
to re-exercise its sovereignty in the Canal Zone.
Cited in Biesanz (1964, 121).
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The forgotten wealth of Panama’s interior, something which few take into account, is 
many times greater than the so-called canal economy; still, the real foundation of our 
prosperity and our stature as a Nation lies in the development of the land, through the 
(lignification of those who live from it'^^
Panamanian politicians like Arosemena and Arias claimed that the needs o f the residents of the 
Isthmus of Panama came before those of fbreigh interests. It is no wonder that the Panamanian 
nationalist agenda was focused on mobilizing that part of Panamanian society whose interests 
lay apart, in both social and geographic terms, from foreign commercial interests involved in the 
use o f the Isthmus for maritime commerce.
Yet American representatives were always at a loss to explain why Colombian and 
Panamanian representatives were intent to posture themselves at cross-purposes with the efforts 
of the United States or to harass American commerce in transit with taxes and duties. Most 
thought it was a matter of reckless greed and nationalism. Few American diplomats were aware 
of how the simple privilege of transit could become entangled in Panamanian domestic politics.
United States Minister Resident in Colombia James B. Bowlin's inapt explanation to 
Secretary of State William L. Marcy on 3 October 1856, about Colombian political motivations 
was that they simply hated the United States. Bowlin said;
Besides they have no claim upon the clarity or forbearance of our Government -  as I 
believe they hate it, with an intensity of hatred, from the mere spirit of petty envy -  if 
they dare openly show it -  Hense all their laws to hanass the transit of the Isthmus, are 
as plainly noted at us, as if we were spetrifically, and exclusively named in them.
If not hatred. United States representatives were convinced that Panamanian 
representatives were just greedy. There exist coimtless examples from as early as the 1830s of 
incredulous American diplomats railing about extortionate Colombians and Panamanians, 
concluding that since all diplomatic efforts to insulate American flows in transit from
U.S. Congress (1977-78.3:241)
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unreasonable taxes and duties had been exhausted no other option remained than the use o f  
military force. United States Minister Resident in Colombia James B Bowlin threatened the use 
of military force by analogy to the Colombian Minister o f  Foreign Af&irs Lino de Pombo on 10 
November 1856:
But the Undersigned again reiterates, that the mere naked privilege of crossing the 
Isthmus, is no rightjul or legitimate subject of taxation, and any attempt to impose it 
beyond the Contract if there were no guarantees in the way. could only be regarded, as 
an act of gross injustice and hostility .... The Feudal Barons along the Rhine, who were 
so notorious during the dark ages for plundering the commerce of that riven called it 
taxing for passing through their domains. But the Censorious World applied to it a very 
different title, and as commerce increased, and the nations who fostered it gained 
strength, they rattled their proud Castles about their heads, and taught them practically, 
the distinction between taxation and extorted tribute.
When United States representatives used their imaginations they suspected some kind 
of foreign or Communist conspiracy must be inspiring anti-Americanism. For example, during 
the 1840s American representatives believed that behind Colombia's lack o f cooperation to 
reciprocally eliminate discriminatory import duties w as a  British conspiracy to cripple the 
American carrying trade across the Isthmus o f  Panama. Similarly, the 1964 Canal Zone riots 
were allegedly sparked by a  handful o f Communist Cuban agitators manipulating ill-will 
between the United States and the Republic o f  Panam a in a  wider plot to destabilize the 
Caribbean and Central America.
Most every explanation has been offered a t one time or another for American 
difficulties on the Isthmus. But with few exceptions, the thought that it could be a maneuver o f  
domestic politics or an effort at triangular diplomacy is seldom entertained. In one o f  the choice 
exceptions to the rule that American diplomats were unaw are o f  Colombian and Panamanian 
maneuvers. United States Minister Resident in Bogota Jam es B. Bowlin wrote to Secretary o f  
State William L. Marcy on 29 January 1857:
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The Government of the United States, have been so generous and liberal in the terms of 
settling our difBculties with this Republic, that it is difficult to concieve that this 
Government will be stupid enough not to accept them; yet they are so elated with the 
silly idea, that the civilized world are to come to their aid. in any difficulty about the 
I s t^ u s  from mere national Jeolasy: and are so studious in cultivating a bad temper 
towards our Government; [that] it is impossible to anticipate what folly may rule them. 
Castlereigh & Tallyrand at the head of the mightiest Empires, were never half as much 
elated with the working of this grand political scheme of playing off nation against 
natioiu like puppets in the show; as these people are. about that Isthmus.
Bowlin's observations are characteristically cynical but they represent a  rare commentary on the 
geopolitical consciousness o f  Panamanians charmed by the possibility o f  playing triangular 
diplomacy between the maritime powers.
For a  representative o f  the Republic o f  Panama who recognized the burden to 
compromise with the United States over the use o f Canal Zone territory, what was critical to 
routine dom estic political survival was to be perceived as an extremely shrewd bargainer during 
treaty negotiations. During times o f  administrative insecurity, domestic political survival might 
absolutely depend on posturing oneself as unwilling to concede a  shred o f  Panama's sovereign 
interests to the United States at any price. Strange as it may sound, sometimes the best way for a  
Panamanian president to drum up support for a  treaty with the United States in the National 
Assembly or among a majority o f  Panamanians was to scorch the United States and the treaty 
negotiation process up and down as totally unAir and an assault on the dignity and sovereignty 
o f the people o f  the Republic o f  Panama. By doing so, it created the impression that the 
president was the determined patron o f  the Panamanian people and would win the best possible 
arrangement in the interests o f  all. including the lower classes and the residents o f  the 
interior.'^  W hat had to be disclaimed a t all costs by an incumbent Panamanian leader was the
For example, it is probable the uncompromising attitude that Special Representative of the United 
States for Interoceanic Canal Negotiations David H. Ward described of representatives of the Republic o f 
Panama in his testimony before the House Committee on Merchant Màrine and Fisheries on 13 April 
1973 reflected the Torrijos regime’s ongoing domestic political campaign targeted to a middle and lower- 
class as well as rural interior base of support.
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suggestion that supporting his negotiations w ith the United States would surrender a  portion o f 
the nation's assets for special interest, a  claim  that would almost certainly be made by the 
political opposition.
A sim ilar domestic predicament existed for American policymakers. Just like their 
Panamanian collegaues, American representatives negotiated agreements under conditions o f 
intense domestic pressure. United States involvement on the Isthmus o f  Panam a has never been 
considered merely a  matter o f  overseas ambition. The Isthmus o f  Panama has often been 
viewed, in the w ords o f  President Rutherford B Hayes in March 1880, as virtually a  part o f  the 
coastline o f  the United States. Herein lies the irresistible geographic dilemm a for Americans: 
Panama is a  foreign territory whose relative location functions like part o f  the United States. 
Whenever Americans ponder the Panama Canal issue, a  geographic mistake is invariably made. 
Panama is considered a  territory, instead o f  a  relative location, that serves American maritime 
communication.
Over the course o f American involvement on the Isthmus o f  Panama, American 
domestic politics seized upon the interoceanic canal issue in three major instances. One was as a 
side issue in 1901 for the United States Senate over whether federal funds should be used in 
Nicaragua or Panama. Another was an election-year issue in 1904 debating whether the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty was signed justly given American military support for Panamanian 
secession. Lastly, the Panama Canal became a  public issue in 1977 and 1978 over the decision 
to transfer full operational control to the Republic o f  Panama by the end o f  1999.
The debate between the Nicaragua o r Panama route in the United States Senate in 1901 
was not at an issue in the House and seems to have been a personal matter with the influential 
Democratic Senator and former Confederate Army officer John Tyler Morgan o f  Alabama 
against Republican Senator Mark Hanna o f  Ohio and Republican President Theodore Roosevelt. 
In 1904, the Democratic Party tried som ew hat unsuccessfully to focus public criticism against
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President Theodore Roosevelt’s actions calling for American intervention in the Panama 
secession during an election year The public controversy over ratification o f  the 1977 Panama 
Canal treaties and the long debate in the United States Senate in 1978 was about a  somewhat 
separate but sensitive issue in the post-Vietnam era: how a  withdrawal fi~om the Panama Canal 
and Canal Zone would reflect on United States power and prestige around the world.
Something that many Panamanians may not have understood is that when Calfomia 
Governor Ronald Reagan referred to General Om ar Torrijos and said that "someone ought to 
teach that tin-hom dictator what’s what, he had not the slightest interest in Torrijos. Governor 
Reagan was not criticizing Omar Torrijos fo r whom he cared little. Reagan was criticizing 
President Jimmy Carter using the timely issue o f  the Panama Canal treaties to label Carter's 
foreign policy as another embarrassing demonstration o f  a  lack o f American resolve.
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C h a p t e r  lO. T h e  En t a n g l in g  a l l ia n c e  w t th  Pa n a m a
A canal across Nicaragua would have performed precisely the same geographic role as 
a  canal across the Isthmus o f  Panama and should have been treated no less jealously as i f  it were 
a  virtual frontier o f  the United States. A Nicaraguan canal would have been vital to national 
security and essential to the pursuit o f  American business opportunity abroad. In feet, until the 
Isthmian Canal Commission report in 1901, the Rio San Juan route in N icaragua was 
considered to be a  better option (Table 10.1). But only on the Isthmus did the United States 
cross the line separating mere assertive words from actions by signing the 1846 Bidlack- 
Mallarino Treaty.'** Why was there not a  similar kind o f  agreement ratified with Nicaragua?
The United States came quite close to an entangling alliance with Nicaragua no 
different than the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty in the form o f  the Hise Treaty signed 21 June 
1849.'** Article IV o f  the Hise Treaty gave the United States the right to erect fortifications and 
station troops along the line o f  the canal for protection and defense. Article V o f the Hise Treaty 
provided United States fortifications to be used to preserve the peace and neutrality o f  the 
territories o f  Nicaragua. And potentially most entangling. Article XII obligated the United 
States to use its armed forces to protect and defend all territories rightfully within N icaragua or 
to recover territories wTongfiilly wrested from Nicaragua. Article XII o f the Hise Treaty stated 
that United States obligations did not apply to wars o f  aggression or territories not rightfully 
within Nicaragua. Presumably since there was no specific mention o f  the Mosquito Kingdom in 
Article XII, it was not considered a  territory rightfully outside o f  Nicaragua.
' ** It might be interesting to ask why there was so much activity under President Polk’s administration. A 
possible answer has to do with the strategic use of the Panama Railroad for troop transit to Oregon 
territory, the site of a critical border dispute with Britain. Until 1869. the Panama Railroad was the 
surrogate transcontinental railroad. The fear might have been that Britain would interfere with transits 
across Panama to undercut the U.S. ability to support its territorial claims in the Pacific Northwest 
'** See Mack (1944. 184) for a 27 August 1849 pact with Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt 
incorporating a territorial protection clause against Britairt
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Table 10.1. Conclusions of the Isthmian Canal Commission, 1899-1901, 16 November 1901.
Item Nicaragua Panama
Feasible for a sea- 
level canal
No Yes: but would take twice as long as a lock- 
canal
Feasible for a 
lock canal
Yes Yes
Summit Double that of Nicaragua
Course River for more than half its length River for more than half its length
Water supply Lake Nicaragua; inexhaustible Artificially form lake Bohio to yield a water 
supply to support a traffic of 10,000,000 
tons, supplemented when needed for more 
than four times the traffic by Alhajuela 
reservoir: may be considered unlimited for 
all practical purposes
Dam construction Conchuda Dam: practicable Bohio Dam: practicable, though the cost is 




Lake Nicaragua: practicable with 





along route at 
present
Silico Lake Railroad, 6 miles in length, 
and limited navigation of San Juan River 
and Lake Nicaragua. Nicaraguan 
government building a  railroad with port 
facility from Greytown to Monkey Point, 
45 miles north.
Panama Railroad a well-equipped railroad 
already in place, and existing conditions 
afford immediate accomodation for large 
labor force.
Terminal harbors No natural harbors at either end: 
satisfactory harbors can be created at low 
unit prices
Excellent roadsted protected by islands 
already exists at Panama: at Colon 
considerable work must be done to create 






Two years One year
Distribution of 
excavation work, 




Well distributed, with heaviest work near 
Conchuda, Tamborcito, and divide west 
of Lake Nicaragua
Largely concentrated in the Culebra and 
Emperador cuts, nearly one in the same.
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Organizing the sizable and largely 
foreign labor force, including 
transportation, housing, and 
organization; the cut through the west 
side of Lake Nicaragua eliminating c. 
18.000,000 cu yards of earth and rock, 
representing 10% of all classes of
Less labor than Nicaragua, thus less time to 
organize labor; excavating the Culebra cut c. 
43,000,000 cu yards of rock and earth, 
representing 45% of all classes of material to 
be removed.




Six years Eight years
Est. cost of 
maintenance and 
operation
$ 1,300,000 greater than Panama





73.78 miles 36.41 miles
Length of sailing 
line
Lake Nicaragua, 7031 miles Lake Bohio, 12.68 miles
Curvature of 
route
1368 degress less and 26.44 miles less 
curvature
Est. time for 
vessel transit
33 hours 12 hours
Characteristics of 
transit zone
Sparsely populated, not in the path of 
much trade or movement of people, and 
little sickness
Considerable population (relative to 
Nicaragua) along Panama route with 
concurrent risks of epidemic disease
Cost of
construction, not 
including in the 
case of Panama 







obtain use of the 
territory
No prior agreements in existence by 
either Nicaragua or Costa Rica
Rights granted to French New Panama Canal 
Company by Colombia still in existence; 
United States would have to deal with New 
Panama Canal Company the value of whose 
property was appraised at $40,000,000 by 
the United States. However, the company 
offered to sell its rights for $ 109,141300.
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(table 10.1 continued)
Total time for 
construction








Recommend In viewof the terms of the New Panama 
Canal Company, Nicaragua is the most 
practicable and feasible for an isthmian 
canal under control, management, and 
ownership of the United States.
Though there are physical advantages, 
shorter line, more complete knowledge, and 
lower cost of maintenance and operation, the 
price fixed by the New Panama Canal 
Company is so unreasonable that it cannot 
be accepted.
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An especially controversial article o f  the H ise Treaty in terms o f  British interests was 
Article VI, stating that vessels o f  countries a t w ar with, or carrying contraband to  countries at 
w ar with, the United States or Nicaragua shall no t be allowed to pass through. In theory, if 
Nicaragua claimed it was at war with Britain over the Mosquito territory then British vessels 
would be excluded from using a  Nicaraguan canal. The United States would be obligated to 
enforce the treaty with its own armed forces until such time as Nicaragua did not consider itself 
a t war with Britain. The only way that might happen was if  Britain relinquished its protectorate 
or any association with the Mosquito Kingdom.
President Zachary Taylor never subm itted the Hise Treaty to the Senate. And for his 
indiscretion in even signing such a  treaty Hise was recalled. The most likely explanation for the 
Nicaraguan treaty 's abject failure is geopolitics. O n 30 June 1847, two years before the Hise 
Treaty was signed, Britain formally claimed the contested territory on the Caribbean coast o f 
Nicaragua in the name o f  the independent Mosquito Kingdom. British representatives claimed 
that they had diplomatic obligations with the M osquito people going back to the eighteenth 
century. But it carmot be coincidence that the territory o f  the new British protectorate just 
happened to completely enclose the Atlantic entrance to any Nicaraguan canal.
I f  the recall o f  Hise and disavowal o f  the treaty he had signed with Nicaragua are any 
indication, the situation in Nicaragua was perceived as much too entangling for the United 
States. The Hise Treaty set the stage for nothing short o f  a  proxy war between the United States 
supporting the Nicaraguan claim, and G reat Britain supporting the claim o f  the Mosquito 
Kingdom. One might imagine how either Britain o r  the United States might be tem pted to turn a 
proxy w ar into a  direct conflict.
It is likely that representatives o f  N icaragua suggested the 1849 Hise Treaty as a  direct 
response to Britain’s formal claim o f  protectorate over the Mosquito Kingdom tw o years earlier 
in 1847. Representatives o f  Nicaragua were no doubt attempting to use the United States'
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interests in an interoceanic canal to counter Britain’s  actions. After all, what military options did 
representatives o f  Nicaragua really have to solidify their control over the M osquito Coast 
against Britain? In addition, Nicaraguan representatives may have felt that there w as a  limited 
window o f  opportunity for signing a  bilateral treaty with the United States guaranteeing their 
sovereignty over their Caribbean territory before the United States and Britain cam e to their 
own separate arrangement. The Hise Treaty was signed on 21 June 1849, in G uatem ala City, 
Guatemala. Coincidentally, only a few months later in London on 14 December 1849, United 
States Minister to Great Britain Abbot Lawrence sent a  letter to British Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Lord Palmerston. Lawrence inquired about negotiations for a  new bilateral agreement 
over a Central American canal to settle American and British differences, leading to the 
ratification o f  the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.
If  the interoceanic canal was so important to  the United States there is no reason why a 
similar agreement to Article XXXV o f  the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty should not have been 
approved with Nicaragua, considered the better American interoceanic option until the 19 0 1 
Isthmian Canal Comm ission’s recommendation. The United States Federal Governm ent neither 
forced its way nor even backed its way into an entangling alliance on the Isthmus o f  Panama. 
The United States was triangulated into an entangling alliance by Colombian and Panamanian 
diplomacy, a  feat that Nicaraguans were unable to match because o f  the specter o f  w ar with 
Great Britain over the Mosquito Coast.
10.1 Colom bian  T riangular  Diplomacy and t h e  Entangling  Alliance
As early as the 1830s, American representatives had serious concerns about British 
encroachments on the Isthmus o f  Panama. In a  letter dated 7 December 1835, Special Agent o f  
the United States to Colombia Charles Biddle warned:
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It is tolerably well understood that overtures have already been privately made by 
influential men to place the Isthmus under the protection of the British government'^'
In a  letter on 9 December 1836, United States Chargé d Affaires Robert B McAfee wrote to 
Secretary o f State John Forsyth about his concern that the British may find in their Vice- 
Consul’s imprisomnent a  pretext to seize the Isthmus o f  Panama;
If the British should take this place on account of this dispute, their future course. 1 am 
inclined to think would be governed by circumstances which cannot now be 
anticipated.
The interesting part o f  M cAfee's letter is that he noticed how Colombians saw in the American 
need for an Isthmian route the mechanism to interpose outside help power against Britain:
The consequence of all this, has been to give an increased impulse to the current of 
public opinion, which has for some time past been in motion in favor of a more intimate 
political & commercial intercourse with the U. States -  they suspect that the British, 
wish to seize Panama, and they look to us as the shield which is to interpose as our 
Citizens are interested in opening a more speedy communication across the Isthmus.
In a  letter on 25 February 1837, Colombian Chargé d'Afi&ires at Washington Domingo 
Acosta apprised Secretary o f  State Forsyth o f  the fact that the British would certainly attempt to 
seize the Isthmus imder the pretext o f  indemnification. The United States had to rise up and 
assert its rightful geographic stake on the Isthmus o f  Panama, just as Britain had done over the 
Bosporus in the Mediterranean Sea. Acosta’s remarkable suggestions to Forsyth in 1837 might 
be mistaken for a  page out o f  a  top secret American foreign policy memo if  not for the fact that 
Acosta was a  representative o f  Colombia:
Nonetheless, Biddle believed that: ‘"such a course has been declined by the English from an 
apprehension of giving offence to the United States of North America.”
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Constantinople, the United States might also establish as a principle of theirs that they 
would not consent that England should take possession of the isthmus. The basis of this 
policy would be the same as that of England; that is to say -  to prevent the 
preponderance which a nation already strong would acquire by the possession of 
countries which, by their geographical position offer incalculable advantages in respect 
both to mercantile relations as well as maritime power.
Acosta concluded piously:
The undersigned ought however, to mention that he has no other motive in making this 
conununication than zeal for the welfare of his nation and that of all America: and that 
be does not make it in pursuance of orders which be may have received ffom his 
govenunent
A costa's claim  that his communication was not in pursuance o f  orders he may have received 
from the govenunent o f Colombia contradicts an earlier letter.
Tw o years earlier, in diplomatic correspondence dated 1 May 1835. Secretary o f  State 
John Forsyth related a story o f  continuing United States efforts to draft a  reciprocal agreement 
elim inating Colombian import duties. Forsyth said that representatives o f  Colombia were asking 
for a  treaty  o f  alliance from the United States as a condition for a  treaty o f  commerce and 
navigation. Forsyth's position was that the United States was merely desirous o f  the same 
privileges that had been agreed to between Colombia and a  unified Central America. The reply 
from the M inister o f Foreign Afrairs o f  Colombia in 1833 w-as that the conunercial advantages 
granted by  Colombia to Central America were not secured as mutual equivalents but because o f  
a treaty o f  alliance. Forsyth refuted the m inister's claim, arguing that it did not make sense for 
Colombia to say it was getting a  defensive alliance from Central America ‘in return for' a 
reciprocal lowering o f duties.
In this same May 1835 letter. Secretary o f  State Forsyth claimed that Colom bia's 
apparent attem pt to entangle the United States into a  defensive alliance was “peculiarly 
u n f r i e n d l y g iv e n  the established policy o f  the United States. Forsyth also called it an
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unreasonable demand since the United States had already supported Colom bia's independence 
from Spain, the only country Forsyth saw  as threatening Colombia;
The President is therefore constrained to deem the repeal of the decree of the 21*̂  
November. 183 L, and the refusal of the Granadian Government to accede to a 
permanent abolition of the Five per cent except upon the condition o f our entering into 
a treaty o f alliance with New Granada, as peculiarly unfiiendly. especially as that 
Government must be well aware that our acceding to such a measure would be 
inconsistent with and repugnant to our luiiform and cherished policy. If. too, our 
sympathy with the Granadian people in their revolutionary struggle, our prompt 
acknowledgement of their independence, our unequivocal declaration o f a purpose not 
to permit other European powers to combine with Spain in attempting to suMue her 
alienated Colonies: our steacfy. persevering and. there is now reason to hope, successftil 
efforts to induce the parent country to recognize those colonies as sovereign states -  if 
all of these be appreciated, the President cannot but believe that the urueasonableness of 
the demand of New Granada will be manifest to herself. He persuades himself that 
upon further consideration she w ill deem the condition o f a treaty o f alliance with her 
on our part as neither necessary nor Just, for if. as if highly probable, she should seciue 
a permanent peace with Spain from whom alone she has ever had cause to dread 
invasion, there will be no need o f her entering into entangling alliances with any 
foreign power or o f requiring such a league as an equivalent fo r  an equality o f 
commercial advantages [emphasis added].
One can only wonder if  the oversight Forsyth makes at the end o f  his statement, i.e.. the fact 
that Colombia actually did have cause to dread British designs on the Isthmus because o f  
Colombian debt, was intentional so as to deny Colombia's claim for American protection.'^* 
Notwithstanding Forsyth's letter to M cAfee in 1835, a  decade later President James K. Polk and 
the United States Senate agreed to exactly what Colombians had wanted.
Between Secretary o f  State Forsyth's letter in 1835 and the 1846 Bidlack-Maliarino 
Treaty, an important event had occurred to radically change the Panamanian situation. A 
secessionist movement on the Isthmus o f Panama in 1840 created, for a  brief time, an 
independent sovereign state called the State o f  the Isthmus. The A ct that the Isthmus had
' The threat of British or Spatush intervention may have taken indirect form in the expedition of General 
Flores. In a letter from Bidlack to Buchanan on 10 December 1846, Bidlack noted that General Flores 
with the assistance of both the British and Spanish was threatening Ecuador, Pern and perhaps Colombia. 
He concluded: "The fact is that the eyes o f the government and the people of New Granada seem to be 
turned towards the United States for protection in this threatened emergency, and I have thought it to be 
my dut)' to inform you o f the fact.”
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declared itse lf independent in 1840 was not unexpected. In Biddle to Forsyth, 7 December 
1835. Special Agent o f  the United States to Colombia Charles Biddle stated:
I believe that the Republic of New Granada will be dismembered before two years & 
probably in less than nine months.
Biddle listed four reasons for Panamanian secession. All o f  his reasons had to do with Panam a's 
natural geographic and political isolation from Bogota as well as overtures already made to 
Britain and other nations by Panamanians, who said they preferred to be under the jurisdiction 
of any other country than C o l o m b i a . A  few months before C hief o f  the State o f the Isthmus 
Tomas H errera's announcement that the State o f  the Isthmus was an independent sovereign 
state, in a  letter from Semple to Forsyth on 2 October 1840. United States Chargé d 'Affaires 
James Semple reported to Secretary o f  State Forsyth:
One of the charges made against the present administration is that it is intended to sell 
the country, or at least part o f it (the Isthmus) to the British Goverat There appears 
indeed to be something misterious in the negotiations in relation to the Colombian debt 
but as yet the matter is not sufQciently developed to form an opinion.
The period immediately prior to the 1846 treaty was a  time o f particular anxiety for American 
representatives concerned about British designs in Panama in the wake o f  its brief political 
independence and the debt problems o f  Colombia. In a  letter on 1 December 1843. United 
States Chargé d'Af& ires William M. Blackford warned Secretary o f  State Abel P. Upshur about 
a British protectorate over Panama:
I have learned, lately, from an undoubted source, that a movement was made here in the 
early part of last year, of the nature of which it may be as well to apprize you. Some of 
the high ofiBcers of the Government and some of the respectable private citizens, signed
Gran Colombia broke into the states of Venezuela, Ecuador, Fern and Colombia in 1831. Panama 
remained a part of Colombia imtil 1903.
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a paper, addressed to Mr. Adams, at the time H.B,M.'s Chargé d'Affaires, requesting 
him to use his influence with his Government to induce it to assume a kind of 
Protectorship of this country — in order to suppress faction, ensure domestic tranquility 
and protect the Republic from foreign aggression -  in consideration o f all which 
valuable commercial privileges were promised. The application was made, not as from 
the authorities but from individuals. The connexion, however, of some of the signers 
with the Government leaves no room to doubt that the movement had an ofBciai 
sanction. Mr. Adams entered warmly into the views of the par^, and. on his return to 
England, urged them upon the Cabinet, which, however, rejected the application, and 
Mr. Adams’ successor was instructed to conunum'cate its determination in the most 
gracious maimer possible, which he accordingly did about a year since. It is highly 
probable, should the present distiubances produce a similar crisis, the application may 
be renewed. I have taken precautions to keep myself informed upon the subject The 
importance o f the Panama question to us would make such an ascendency o f British 
influence here, in all respects, to be deprecated and. by all means, to be prevented. 
[some emphasis added]
Colombia’s opportimity for United States involvement came in the form o f  attaching a 
guarantee o f  sovereignty over the Isthmus o f  Panama as a  condition to a  treaty o f  commerce and 
navigation. In a  letter on 20 May 1842, Acting Secretary o f State Fletcher Webster instructed 
William M. Blackford, the recently appointed United States Chargé d'Affeires at Bogota, to 
secure a  treaty o f  commerce that would either prevent an exclusive privilege on the Isthmus 
being given to a  foreign government, or at least provide a  basis for complaint if  the same 
privilege were not also given to the United States:
The projects for facilitating the communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans 
by means of a canal or railroad across the Isthmus of Panama, are connected with this 
topic [negotiation of a treaty of commerce] .... A freaty of commerce with this 
Republic, placing our citizens on a footing of equally with other foreigners within its 
confines, might serve to prevent a grant by the Mew Granadian Government to any 
other foreign government, company or individuals o f a special privilege in regard to
In a letter to Secretary of State Upshur on S March 1844, Blackford reported on what he suspected 
were British designs to expand its influence in Central America: "I am endeavoring to obtain some 
information with respect to the efforts which the Govenunent of Great Britain is silently, but successfully, 
making to obtain a present influence, and ultimate footing, upon the long reach of coast extending from 
the north-western extremity of this Republic to Cape Gracias a Dios. Whether the contemplated 
improvement of the Isthmus be made between Panama and Chagres, or by the Lake Nicaragua, the vast 
advantage which the power, holding the Mosquito Shore, must have over all other nations, is equally 
apparent. It is beyond all doubt, that the British Government -  with its usual far-sighted policy -  has an 
eye upon this important position. In fact the whole coast is now virtually under its influence -  as the 
nomiiial sovereign -  the King of the Mosquito Shore, as he is called -  is an Indian educated in Jamaica, 
devoted to the interests, and in the pay, of the British GoverrunenL”
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the communication above referred to or, if such privilege should be accorded, might 
give us a right to claim the same, or indemnification it is should be refused. It is of great 
importance to the United States that the railroad or canal referred to should be 
constructed, and that we should have the fiee use of it upon the same terms as the 
citizens or subjects o f other commercial nations [emphasis added).
In a  repeat o f  the “peculiarly unfriendly” gesture noted by Forsyth in his letter o f  1 May 
1835. on 21 April 1843, Blackford reported to Secretary o f  State Daniel W ebster that in order 
for him to conclude the treaty o f  commerce he w as asked to offer “some equivalent” by 
Colombia. Blackford seem ed to have played dumb, explaining to the Colombian representatives 
that he did not have the  authority to admit their products into the United States at duties less 
than the tariff called for, and was at a  loss to see w hat other compensation he could possibly 
offer. Blackford says tha t key leaders in Colombia had told him they, o f course, supported the 
treaty but feared that unless there was some special compensation’ they could hold up. the 
treaty would never pass the Colombian legislature. Blackford reiterated that he had "nothing to 
offer” :
It will be observed, that the Instmctions of his Government to Mr. Pombo. the original 
of which he submitted to me, and a translation o f which is sent herewith. - authorize 
him to concede the suppression of the differential duties, upon the condition, only, o f 
some equivalent being granted: and that as I had, heretofore, expressly declared. 1 had 
no authority to stipulate for the admission of New Granadian products into the ports of 
the United States, at a rate of duties, different from those imposed by the general Tariff. 
the expectation is  held out, I  might be able to offer compensation in some other shape. I  
have nothing to offer -  and i f  the treaty depend upon my proposing any thing in the 
shape o f compensation, the negotiation may be considered at an end. The object of the 
Cabinet at an end. The object of the Cabinet here is delay. The President a majority of 
the Ministry, and Plenipotentiary himself are decidedly in favor of making a treaty upon 
the basis 1 have contended for -  but they fear its rejection by the Chambers, unless there 
be some stipulations, which may be paraded as equivalents for the imaginary sacrifice, 
incurred by the abolition of the duties in question [emphasis added).
Was Blackford really so dull that he had no conception o f  what the Colombian representatives 
were after? Or was he sm artly giving no hint that he w ould agree to what he well knew was on 
the minds o f  Colombians, i.e., a  guarantee o f  Colom bia’s sovereignty on the Isthmus o f
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Panama, something that Colombians had only been pushing on his predecessors for the last ten
years?
Secretary o f  State Abel P. Upshur s letter to Blackford on 9 November 1843. suggests 
that American representatives really were that dull. Upshur thought that Colombia's reluctance 
to sign a  treaty revealed the existence o f  a  European conspiracy to block the American carrying 
trade:
There is reason to apprehend that the reluctance o f  that govenunent to abolish 
discriminating duties, may in part at least be imputed to the counsels, the insinuations 
or suggestions o f other govenunents. Several of the governments of Europe, have a 
strong interest in preventing the vessels of the United States from carrying to New 
Granada European. Asiatic or African productions, unbuithened by a discriminating 
duty. Without such a duty, it is believed that the merchants of the United States would 
obtain by far the largest share of the trade to New Granada, and might engross the 
whole of i t  The opportunities which the great marts o f  this country afford for shipping 
assorted cargoes, and our greater proximity to that country, would be elements of the 
ability to do this.
What neither Upshur nor Blackford grasped was that Colombians were reluctant to sign a  treaty 
o f commerce because American representatives could not take a  hint. Blackford's replacement. 
Benjamin A. Bidlack. took the hint and agreed to the condition o f  a  United States guarantee o f  
Colombia's sovereignty on the Isthmus o f  Panama. As a  result, the 1846 Bidlack-Maliarino 
Treaty was approved practically on the spot despite the alleged European conspiracy against it.
W hat explains why Bidlack would agree to something none o f  his predecessors had. not 
to mention something contrary to the principles o f  American foreign policy? Benjamin A. 
Bidlack was appointed Chargé d'Affaires o f  the United States on 18 May 1845, without frill 
powers from the United States and without instructions. O n 2 January 1847, three weeks after 
the treaty was signed. Bidlack finally received his formal instructions. Prior to the signing o f  the 
treaty. Bidlack's only guidelines were from a  letter on 23 June 1845, in which Secretary o f  State 
James Buchanan said:
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As it is important to us that no other nation should obtain either an exclusive privilege 
or an advantage in regard to such a conununication between the two oceans, you will 
lose no time in transmitting to the department any information upon the subject which 
you may be able to collect You will also use your influence, should this become 
necessary, with the government o f New Granada, to prevent it from granting privileges 
to any other nation which might prove injiuious to the United States.' '
Bidlack was acting without full powers but felt that he had to produce an agreement 
immediately. On 27 November 1846. Bidlack justified his actions;
I think it proper allso to observe that from various causes which I will not now stop to 
mention I consider it important that a treaty should imediately be made with New 
Granada securing to the Government of the United States the right o f way across the 
Isthmus o f Panama. I think 1 have prepared the way for such a treaty, but I have 
candidly advised the Secretary o f Foreign Relations, that 1 have not as yet any special 
powers or instructions to act on either of the above points. He has nevertheless sigiifled 
his willingness to open negotiations with me in reference to both in order that if we 
should be fortunate enough to agree upon anything satisfactory to the President of the 
United States it may be presented to the Senate of the United States at its approaching 
session. Under all the circumstances 1 have concluded to receive and act as far as 1 can 
upon any propositions which he may make to me. letting it appear upon the face of the 
correspondence that I do not profess to have power or instructions from my 
Govenunent. and thus leaving the President of the U. States at full liber^ to confirm & 
perfect or treat as a nullity, whatever may be thus agreed upon between us.'^~
Bidlack felt tentative about agreeing to the treaty without having formal instructions. On the 
other hand he reasoned that acting without formal instructions allowed him to be open to 
anything Colombian representatives might offer.
I f  President James K. Polk did not agree to what Bidlack had signed. Polk was perfectly 
free to ignore the whole thing. Bidlack. unlike his predecessors, did not himself rule on the 
appropriateness o f  attaching a  guarantee o f  Colombia’s sovereignty to the treaty. Bidlack just 
agreed to whatever was proposed and left the Secretary o f State and the president to rule on 
what had been signed. Bidlack may have thought that since he was not working under formal 
instructions, he could not be recalled for failing to follow directions. Clearly he saw an
Manning (1935. 357 passim). 
‘“ M iUer(l93l. 148).
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opportunity to do  what none o f  his predecessors had done, sign a  treaty o f  commerce and 
navigation giving the United States a  foothold with which to prevent any exclusive privileges 
being granted to a  European country.'® The logic o f Bidlack's initiative, opportunity and 
expedience, is reminiscent o f  President Theodore Roosevelt’s defense o f  his actions supporting 
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty o f  1903. Bidlack, in a paraphrase o f  Roosevelt’s controversial ad 
lib, essentially took  the Isthmus and left Congress to debate.
Miller (1931, 149) says that the guarantee in Article XXXV was included only four 
days before the treaty was signed. Bidlack wrote on 9 December 1846:
I had intended, to endeavour to agree upon the terms of a Separate treaty in relation to 
the Isthmus of Panama -  But in our conversation yesterday Mr. Mallarino intimated 
that it would be advisable to include both questions or subjects in the one treaty. Stating 
among other reasons that he did not wish as long as it could be avoided to call the 
attention o f  the Briush. Legation or Govenunent to the movement and that if the 
Granadian Government abolished the diffiential duties and ceeded to the United States 
the right o f  way across the Isthmus he presumed, the United States would Gurantee to 
New Granad the Isthmus or at least as much of it as was required for the construction of 
a canal or Rail Road upon the most favorable Route, and moreover that it was important 
that this Gurantee, should appear in the treaty as a condition for the right of way and 
the abolition of the discriminating or differential duties, otherwise New Granada, would 
be obliged to grant the same privilegs unconditionally to England, with which 
Government they had a trea^ to that effect [treaty of IS April 1825). 1 replied that, the 
Gurantee might be considered very little short of a trea^' of alliance, and that such 
treaties were inconsistent with the established and cherished policy o f the United States.
He remarked that he did not expect a treaty of general alliance but ortly a Grrrantee 
limited to the Isthmus, such as would not be at all inconsistent with the early declared 
policy of the Urtited States in relation to the South American Republics as reiterated by 
President Polk to the Congress of 1845.6.
According to Bidlack, Colombian M inister o f  Foreign Aflairs Manuel M aria Mallarino advised 
him to agree to a  guarantee o f  sovereignty as a  condition for the treaty. Otherwise, Colombians 
would be obliged to grant the same commercial privileges to the British unconditionally 
because o f  earlier agreements. Bidlack responded with the standard retort that a  guarantee 
"might be considered very little short o f  a  treaty o f alliance, and that such treaties were
Bidlack said that the former 1844 treaty would probably be rejected by the Senate because it did not 
abolish the differential duties, and as to the question of the Isthmus’ he considered it dangerous to let
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inconsistent w ith the established and cherished policy o f  the United States.” However. Bidlack 
accepted M allarino s argument that since the guarantee was limited to the Isthmus o f  Panama 
and not the Republic o f  Colombia as a  whole, it was not inconsistent with American foreign 
policy to steer clear o f  entangling alliances with foreign nations.
Mallarino insisted that the guarantee o f  Colombia's sovereignty must be called a  
condition for the grant o f  commercial privileges on the Isthmus o f  Panama. Otherwise. Britain 
would automatically get the same commercial privileges based on its earlier agreements. 
Mallarino was offering Bidlack a  means o f  preventing an exclusive privilege being given to 
Europeans.'^ But even more, what Mallarino offered was a  preemptive strike on the privileges 
o f interoceanic communication. Mallarino generous enough to hand the United States 
representative the argument to use against Britain. Mallarino suggested that the United States 
should defend the treaty against British complaints by simply stating that it was a  privilege 
granted for a  special obligation incurred. This would, o f  course, compel Britain and France to 
agree to a  sim ilar obligation with Colombia i f  they wanted the same commercial privileges on 
the Isthmus, w hich was exactlv what Colombians wanted.
the golden moment pass’ (Miller 1931. 154).
In a letter from h^larino  to Bidlack dated 10 December 1846, Mallarino set out a detailed apolog) for 
Article XXXV focusing squarely on its utility for preventing any exclusive commercial privileges bang 
acquired by Britain. Firstly, Mallarino maintained that Britain has been very aggressive in promoting its 
mercantile interests in Argentina, along the Orinoco River in Venezuela, on the Mosquito Coast of 
Nicaragua and in Mexico under the pretense of mineral interests, as part of a master plan to exclude 
United States corrunercial competitioa Mallarino proclaimed that this British grand design must be 
prevented and the line must be drawn at the Isthmus of Panama. Secondly. Mallarino said that the United 
States ought to interpose itself in order to maintain the fieedom of trade and mercantalism for all 
maritime nations. Of course, so that international jealousies are not provoked, Mallarino suggested. 
Article XXXV should be incidentally introduced into a commerce and navigation treaty. Mallarino 
claimed that by guaranteeing the permanent neutrality of the isthmus. a.ka. Colombia’s sovereignty. 
Britain would be forced to invite Colombia to make the same terms. Mallarino claimed that this could 
become the United States’ own master plan to thwart Britain by means of similar treaties elsewhere in the 
Western Hemisphere. Finally. Mallarino avowed that by ratifying Article XXXV the United States would 
be vindicated o f the brand as oppressor and future conqueror of the Spanish Republics, appearing rather 
as the zealous protector of their territorial integrity. Mallarino said that Article XXXV not only serv ed the 
world’s mercantile interests but was entirely exempt firom ary cost or risk
In the statements o f several American representatives including President Polk it was understood that 
Britain and France would soon sign similar neutrality agreements with Colombia.
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Mallarino was upping the ante in Colombia’s bid to solidify its territorial control over 
the Isthmus o f  Panama."^ I f  Colombia could make United States representatives agree to 
Article XXXV o f  the treaty as a  condition for interoceanic commercial privileges it forced 
Britain and France to do the  same thing. A multilateral guarantee o f  sovereignty insulated 
Colombia's control over the Isthmus from European indemnification and it would check 
Panamanian secession supported or manipulated by foreign maritime powers. Best o f  all. it 
could be used to pose the great maritime powers against each other in case one o f  them were to 
threaten Colombia -  all to enforce Colombia's own sovereign right to tax their maritime 
f l o w s . A n d  all o f  this was to  be gotten by Colombia in exchange for nothing more than a 
reciprocal lowering o f  duties.
Mallarino's suggestion that the guarantee had to  be hidden within the treaty as Article 
XXXV so as not to call British attention to it for as long as possible is ludicrous. Mallarino was 
playing upon American fears like those o f Secretary o f  State Uphsur in his letter o f  9 November 
1843. that a European conspiracy was out to foil any American attempts to come to an 
agreement with Colombia. The only purpose for suggesting that the guarantee o f  sovereignty be 
placed within the treaty was so as to incorporate it as a  condition o f the commercial privilege.
Perhaps telling of Mallarino's thinking is a letter to Buchanan on 15 March 1847. in which Mallarino 
threw around some ideas for the upcoming American Congress in Lima between Colombia. Peru. Bolivia. 
Ecuador. Chile and any others that wish to join. Mallarino cited several provisions to be agreed upon in 
order to prevent future wars between American states. The fourth provision, in particular, had 
implications for Colombia's hold over the Isthmus of Panama; '̂ 4 -  that no state is to authorize by its 
recognition, the acts of any portion of the States of the league, which may pretend to erect itself by force, 
into an independent nation, or unite itself to another, whatsoever may the pretexL under which those acts 
are executed."
The seriousness of Colombia’s debt problem can be gauged from Foote’s note to Clayton on 25 April 
1850 in which Foote said: ‘‘This Govenunent considers the Isthmus of Panama as the most valuable part 
o f its possessions. In a secret session of Congress, a few days ago, a proposition was introduced 
authorizing the Executive to sell the Isthmus to any power that would assume to pay the foreign and 
domestic debt o f New Granada, that amounts in round numbers to aboutfifty millions o f dollars. After an 
animated discussion the proposition was voted down. Although some, without doubf voted against it 
from a feeling of repugnance to alienate any portion of the national territory, and an unwillingness to 
make, by the offer to sell, a virtual proclamation that the country could not pay its debts, yet the 
controlling motive of the majority was that, in some vague maimer. New Granada was to derive immense
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Besides, i f  Britain and France were going to sign a  similar treaty with Colombia anyway, there 
should have been no reason to hide anything. And what is more, it would be very odd to think 
that anyone least o f  all the British would read the treaty in such a  cursory way that Article 
XXXV. with its bold statement that the United States would guarantee Colombia's sovereignty, 
would somehow escape their notice.
The formal protocol to the treaty dated 9 December 1846, stated;
[T]he obligation to guarantee the integral possession o f those portions of territory 
between the Continents that ^ e  universal mercantile interest require to be &ee and 
open to all nations” might quoad hoc be considered at least a quasi alliance; and. to 
some extent, contrary to the policy of the United States, for agreeing to which the 
abolition of all differential duties might not be considered a sufBcient equivalent Mr.
Bidlack stated moreover that the abolition of the ‘"differential duties” was reciprocal, 
and therefore could not fairly give to either of the high contracting parties a claim for 
other equivalents; but he fiankly admitted, that the Government of the United States 
was desirous of the abolition of these differential duties, and might be willing to receive 
it as a partial consideration for the proposed guarantee. He however contended, that this 
guarantee of territory and the guarantee of the “right o f way” over said territory, or 
what had been termed “the right of transit” over the “interoceanic passage”, should also 
be reciprocal and included in the same treaty.
Bidlack used the sam e type o f  argument that Forsyth did in 1835. claiming that the 
abolition o f  differential duties was reciprocal and did not demand other equivalents being given. 
However. Bidlack hedged that he was willing to consider the American guarantee o f  
Colombia's sovereignty over the Isthmus as partial consideration o f  Colombia's effort to lower 
its differential duties allowing the free and open use o f  the Isthmus by American ships and 
cargo. The last statement by Bidlack is interesting. He says that an American guarantee o f  
Colombia's sovereignty must be reciprocated by a  Colombian guarantee o f  the United States 
right o f transit. In other words, Bidlack asks that in exchange for guaranteeing Colom bia's 
sovereignty on the Isthmus, Colombia binds itself to guarantee the United States' right to use
advantages from the Isthmus. In obedience to this very general feeling the Government finds itself 
compelled to be very careful how it makes any concession affecting that territory” [emphasis added].
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the Isthmus for transit."^ American representatives would point to this condition in the 1846 
treaty a  decade later to dispute attempts by the Colombian and Panamanian legislatures to 
impose tonnage and passenger taxes on American flows, and even justify  a  war.
10.2 Am er ic a n  JUSTIFICATION for  an  Entan glin g  Alliance
W hen the Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty was introduced into the United States Senate by 
President James K. Polk for advice and consent to ratification a  question immediately arose 
whether Article XXXV violated the established American policy o f  avoiding entangling 
a l l i a n c e s . P o l k  provided four reasons why the Senate should give its consent to ratification, 
looking fo r a  loophole through which an entangling alliance might p a ss .'^  Polk's arguments are 
not entirely convincing.
First, Polk argues that not only does Article XXXV benefit the United States, it 
benefited the United States even more than Colombia. But if  that is so. one might ask, why was 
it that a  Colombian representative, not a  United States representative, demanded the inclusion o f  
Article XXXV? Even more, why would the United States representative practically have to
'** There was another right that the United States asserted as a result of agreeing to Article XXXV. To 
prevent the possibility of Colombians triangulating the United States into war with Britain over 
Colombia’s debt given the obligations incurred by the United States in Article XXXV. Clayton told Foote 
in a letter dated 19 July 1849. that the United States now claimed the right to offer unsolicited advice to 
Colombians concerning their foreign relations. Clayton said; ’The intimate connexion between the two 
governments occasioned by the treaty, renders it desirable that the Department should be fully, promptly 
and accurately informed in regard to matters touching the foreign relations or domestic policy of New 
Granada. That Republic is largely indebted to subjects of Great Britain and if the British Government 
should deem it expedient (Lord Palmerston has recently asserted its right to pursue this course) to enforce 
the payment of the interest on this debt and of such of the principal as may be due. it might elect to seize 
tire Isthmus of Panama for the purpose of inderrtrtifying its subjects. This should at once present to us a 
casus foederis, perhaps involving an inevitable war. Hence the obligatiorts which we have incurred give 
us a right to offer, unasked, such advice to the New Grartadian Government in regard to its relations with 
other powers, as might tend to avert from that Republic a rupture with any nation which might covet the 
Isthmus of Panama.”
According to Miller (1931. 158). it was Secretary of State James Buchanan who actually wrote tire 
presidential message that Polk presented to the Senate. Buchanan said on 25 March 1847 that it was 
likely that the Senate would want a protracted debate on Article XXXV (Maturing 1935, 360 passim).
' ° Williams (1965 [1916|, 53) argued that the 1846 Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty was by design part of 
President Polk’s expansionist agenda. Approval o f the treaty may have been part of Polk’s expansionist
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have his arm twisted to  include Article XXXV in the treaty i f  it was supposed to be more in the 
interests o f the United States than Colombia?
Secondly, Polk insisted that because Article X XX V  applied only to the Isthmus of 
Panama and not all o f  Colombia it does not violate the policy o f  avoiding entangling alliances 
with foreign nations. A fter all. President Washington never said anything about entangling 
alliances with parts o f  foreign nations. Polk's hairsplitting am ounts to the peculiar argument that 
the United States is obliged to guarantee the sovereignty o f  only that part o f  Colombia most 
likely to be threatened by foreign powers and does not apply to  die rest o f  Colom bia which a  
foreign power would probably not be much interested in anyway.
Thirdly. Polk declared that Article XXXV is not an alliance for a political object but for 
a  purely commercial purpose, the pursuance o f  which all maritime nations have an interest. The 
fourth and final o f  Polk 's rationales is an extension o f  the third. Polk said that the United States 
took on an obligation in Article XXXV not for itself alone but for the entire maritime world 
Polk says that in the interests o f  civilization and fo r the benefit o f world commerce the 
neutrality o f the Isthmus must be defended. The alternative is a  world where the freedom to use 
an Isthmian canal is subject to the whim o f hostilities between the great maritime powers. Polk 
finds in a  guarantee o f  Colom bia's sovereignty the only 6 i r  means to prevent one nation from 
securing an exclusive privilege on the Isthmus o f  Panama, as Colombia would not consent to 
give the territory up to become a  neutral state. Even if  it would, Polk says, the Isthmus of 
Panama "is not sufficiently populous or wealthy to establish and maintain an independent 
sovereignty.” Polk concludes by saying that if  the agreem ent is not ratified by the Senate, it 
would rob the United States o f  the distinction o f  being first to  guarantee the neutrality o f  the 
Isthmus through a guarantee o f  Colombia's sovereignty. Polk expected Britain and France 
would do likewise.
agenda, but the treaty itself and especially Article XXXV was the product of Colombian representatives'
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In a  letter dated 20 January 1847, Bidlack had informed Secretary o f  State Buchanan 
that Colom bia did not intend to sign a  similar agreement with Britain. It is not clear what action 
was taken by United States representatives in Bogota to inquire w hether British and Colombian 
representatives were going to sign a  neutrality treaty until, in a  letter dated 15 December 1849. 
Secretary o f  State Clayton instructed Foote to press Colombia to sign a  neutrality treaty with 
Britain. Between 1847 and 1849, something had happened to make Britain s  signing a  neutrality 
agreem ent with Colombia an American imperative. On 28 December 1848. the Panama 
Railroad Company signed an agreement for an exclusive privilege to  construct a  railroad across 
the Isthmus o f  Panama. In his letter, Clayton noted that Thomas W. Ludlow, President o f  the 
Panama Railroad Company, had sent a  letter to the Department o f  State requesting that the 
American minister at London cooperate with the Colombian m inister to draft a  neutrality 
agreement with Britain similar to the 1846 Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty. Clayton said;
The Department is ignorant, however, whether or not the New Granadian govenunent 
has itself sought for that guaranty or has even empowered and instructed its diplomatic 
agent in London to negotiate for i t  If upon inquiry you should ascertain that no 
measures of the character adverted to have been taken by New Granada, you will urge 
their immediate option by that government The guaranty o f Great Britain is necessary 
fo r  the security o f the capital to be invested in the railroad, and is o fgreat and obvious 
importance to the United States [emphasis added].
In a  letter dated 13 December 1849, Clayton suggested to Abbot Lawrence. United States 
M inister to Great Britain, that it would be preferable if  Colombia and Britain themselves came 
to an agreement.*^' However, given the disharmony between the tw o nations at the time over
agenda.
' ' In a letter on 8 February 1850, Foote reported on his efforts to effect a neutrality agreement between 
Colombia and Britain so as to expedite the Panama Railroad deal: ‘‘In my interview with the [Colombian] 
Secretary of Foreign Relations, yesterday. I broached the subject of obtaining from England and France a 
guaranty [of] the neutrality of the Is ttous of Panama, similar to [the 1846 treaty] ... 1 urged the 
importance of such a guaian^ on the ground that the Panama Railway, though undertaken and prosecuted 
by American enterprise and capital was a work in whose success the whole commercial and civilized 
world was interestôl.... From the tenor of the Secretary's remarks. I think it probable that Mr Rivas will 
be instructed to procure from the French and English Ministers in Washington guaranties of the neutrality 
of the Isthmus by their respective Governments.”
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Colombia's debt, Clayton instructed Lawrence to inquire to Lord Palmerston, the British 
Secretary o f  State for Foreign Af&irs, about the possibility o f  concluding a  neutrality agreement 
between the United States and Britain covering the Isthmus o f  Panama:
It is obviously of the utmost importance, especially in consideration o f the opinions 
expressed by Lord Palmerston with reference to the Spanish American States who are 
diUnquent debtors of British subjects, that the British Government should guaranty the 
neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama as amply as this has been done by the United 
States. For this purpose, it would be preferable that Great Britain and New Granada 
should themselves enter into trea^ stipulations. It is scarcely probable, however, in the 
existing state of the relations between those two coimtries, that this could be 
accomplished. You wilL nevertheless, avail yourself of a suitable opportuni^ to suggest 
it to Lord Palmerston ...I f, however, you shall ascertain that the British Government 
would not enter into such a treaty with New Granada, you may then sound Lord 
Palmerston as to the disposition o f his Government to conclude one with the United 
States for the same purpose [emphasis added).
The only obstacles to an agreement between the United States and Britain over a Central 
American canal, Lawrence stated in a  note to Palmerston on 14 Decem ber 1849. were the 
boundary question with Nicaragua on the Mosquito Coast and control o v er Greytown. the port 
commanding the Caribbean entrance to a  Nicaraguan canal r o u t e . L a w r e n c e ' s  suggestion to 
Lord Palmerston led to the drafting o f  the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty o f 1850. Probably more than 
anything o f  its time until its replacement by the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, the Clayton- 
Bulwer Treaty transformed the principle pledged by President James M onroe into a tangible 
instrument o f  American foreign policy preventing an extension o f  European territoriality in a 
key area o f  the Western Hemisphere.
' ■ In a letter from Lawrence to Lord Palmerston. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 14 
December 1849. Lawrence said: "‘No other nations in the world have so important interests to be affected 
by it -  no others have the requisite capital at command -  no others have shown a willingness to guaranty 
the neutrality essential to its safety -  and capital, always timid, would shrink from  it without such 
guaranty -  much more were it the cause of disagreement between these two nations. Though Great 
Britain or the United States may each be in a position to do this work single handed, yet neither would 
probably desire to do so. It may therefore be assumed that the two Countries desire to go on with the
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10.3 THE WINDFALLS OF ENTANGLING THE UNITED STATES
Both the leaders o f Colombia in Bogota and local leaders on the Isthmus o f  Panama 
could expect a  windfall from American interposition. For the leadership in Bogota, an American 
guarantee o f  sovereignty over the Isthmus o f  Panama was essential in order to interpose the 
United States against Britain and other m ajor European powers and to ensure Colombia's 
domestic control over a  fractious, weakly incorporated yet fiscally valuable part o f  its territory. 
For the leadership on the Isthmus o f  Panama, the goal was to monopolize the fiscal and 
commercial benefits o f  an interoceanic technology, and that required adm inistrative privileges 
and some degree o f  freedom from the Bogota central government. American interests could be 
interposed against Colombia either temporarily so as to mitigate Panam a's political 
subordination, or permanently so as to create an independent Panamanian state under the 
protection o f  the United States.
The question was which one o f  the two, Colombians or Panamanians, would be the 
beneficiaries o f  United States' commitment to an entangling alliance. A provisional answer was 
written on 3 June 1848, when President Jam es K. Polk and the United States Senate approved 
the 1846 Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty guaranteeing the sovereignty o f  Colombia over the Isthmus 
of Panama. Panamanian dissent followed. Panamanian rebellions in the wake o f  the 1846 
Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty were a  reaction against American interposition on Colom bia's behalf. 
They actually seem to have been a  stimulus fo r  it.
If  the United States Federal G overnm ent found itself forced to intervene on the Isthmus 
of Panama in order to maintain civil order in the transit cities, it would discredit Colombia as 
unwilling and unable to control its own territory or create a  safe environment for American 
passengers and cargo. A politically unstable Panama was an unacceptable situation for the 
United States that transcended any cares about who, between Colombians and Panamanians, felt
work, through their respective capitalists, together and harmoniously, and that in the absence of any
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they deserved to be  sovereign o f Panama. An obvious alternative course for the United States 
was to see its overarching obligation to protect the neutrality o f  the Isthmus o f  Panam a through 
a  different means than the 1846 Bidlack-Maliarino Treaty, i.e., a  protectorate over an 
independent Panamanian state. That alternative becam e reality on 3 November 1903, when the 
Republic o f  Panama seceded from the Republic o f  Colom bia with American military support.
obstacles, it would be soon completed and in operation” [emphasis added].
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C h a p t e r  i l .  A m e r ic a n  In t e r v e n t io n  T h r o u g h  t h e  1846 B id l a c k -M a l l a r in o
Tr e a t y
Americans and Panamanians have differed over issues o f  sovereignty and the direct and 
derived benefits o f  an interoceanic technology since a t least a  half-century before the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty entered into force. Prevailing understanding sees United States officials 
asserting unAir power and authority. Rare outbursts o f  all-out social conflict like the April 1856 
riots in Panama City, a.k.a. the "Watermelon W ar,” or the January 1964 Canal Zone riots were 
thought to be the product o f  the racial and cultural prejudices held by Americans traveling or 
living in Panama.
A pattern exists in American intervention on the Isthmus o f  Panama since the 1850s 
suggesting that outbreaks against the United States were not the spontaneous phenomena they 
are generally thought to be. Conventional explanations focus on the period after 1903, seeing 
conflict between the United States and the Republic o f  Panama as the building up o f  nationalist 
frustration against an anachronistic American enclave established by the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty. But in three o f  the more important instances, the 1856 Panama City riots, the 1964 
Canal Zone riots, and the 1973 United Nations Security Council meetings, confi'ontations with 
the United States with the intention o f  soliciting intervention were intentionally encouraged. 
What is most interesting about conflict with the United States being encouraged is that it is 
probably just a legacy o f  how Panamanian society has always dealt w ith the outside world.
11.1 The Problems o f  an  Entan glin g  Alliance
The 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty entered into force on 12 June 1848. Virtually from 
the s ta rt Article XXXV o f the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty was severely tested as to whether the 
Government o f Colombia (New Granada) was allowed to exercise its full sovereignty over the 
flow o f  American troops, passengers and cargo in transit across its territory. Problems began in 
July 1852. In response to the transit o f  several hundred United States troops on the partially
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completed Panama Railroad, representatives o f  Colombia protested that they had never 
consented to an unrestricted transit o f  United States troops across their territory. The troop 
transit problem paled in comparison w ith the events that would soon follow.
Declaring that it was not obligated to surrender the exercise o f  sovereignty over things 
within or passing through its territory, Colombian officials o f  the federal State o f  Panama 
passed legislation to collect passenger taxes, mail postage, and vessel tonnage duties from 
American fiows in transit on the Panam a Railroad. Representatives o f  the Government o f 
Colombia stated the meaning o f  th e  treaty was clear. The treaty gave citizens o f  the United 
States the same privileges as Colombian citizens with respect to transit across the Isthmus o f  
Panama. Colombian authorities claimed that the new charges and duties were applied in a 
completely non-discriminatory way to both citizens o f  the United States and Colombia. 
American representatives claimed tha t the charges and duties were obviously intended to tax 
American flows. The overwhelming majority o f  passengers, cargo and vessels involved in the 
transit across the Isthmus o f  Panama were American, and that Article XXXV o f the Bidlack- 
Mallarino Treaty exempted American flows in transit from any such discriminatory charges.
On 15 April 1856 a  riot against American citizens broke out in Panama City. American 
investigators alleged that not only did representatives o f  the Government o f  Colombia 6 il  to 
exercise their responsibilities to protect the lives and property o f  American passengers in transiL 
they claimed that their negligence went so far as complicity in the attacks. In the eyes o f  
extremely fhistrated American representatives, the sovereign pretensions o f Colombia's 
representatives on the Isthmus o f  Panama were appallingly hypocritical. Bold assertions o f  the 
privilege to tax American economic flows in transit across Colombian territory contrasted 
sharply with bold denials o f  negligence in its responsibility to protect American citizens and 
property in transit across the same Colombian territory. A virtual ultimatum was given on 13 
February 1857, from Special Commissioners o f  the United States I.E. Morse and James B.
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Bowlin, to Colombian Special Commissioners Lino de Pombo and Florentino Gonzalez;
In conclusion -  we beg leave most respectfully to remind the Cottunissioners of New 
Granada that if they persist, in the position which they have taken, the entire 
responsibility will fall on their Country and themselves - They have closed the door 
against any future negotiations; thqr have brought the two Governments to a direct 
issue: and in their absolute refusal to treat, have forced upon the United States, the 
alternative, either to stand disgraced before the world, and their own Citizens, as unable 
or unwilling to protect [their] lives & property; or to take into their own hands the 
adjustment of the indenmi^ -  the means and measure of the redress, and to provide for 
the safety of their citizens, on the transit of the Isthmus.
Pending the failure of a diplomatic settlement, war between the United States and Colombia 
over the Isthmus of Panama was likely.
11.2 THE TROOP T ransit  Problem
In July 1852 about six himdred United States troops crossed the Isthmus. In a letter 
dated 6 June 1853, almost a year later. Colombian Chargé d Af&ires at Washington Victonano 
de Diego Paredes protested to Secretary o f State William L. Marcy that American troops had 
crossed the Isthmus without advising Colombian officials of the province of Panama 
beforehand. Secretary of State Marcy s reply was that taking on the obligation to guarantee 
Colombia's sovereignty over the Isthmus o f Panama was more than a 6 i r  exchange for allowing 
the fiee transit of American citizens and property across the Isthmus, including United States 
troops. Marcy’s ironic reasoning was that agreeing to a partial non-exercise of sovereignty with 
the United States through mutual agreement now prevented a total loss o f all sovereignty 
through war with a foreign maritime power later. Marcy says:
When, however, independent States enter into treaties with foreign powers, they expect 
to relinquish their sovereignty in part with the expectation of receiving fiom the power 
with which they treaty, lull equivalents therefor. The Undersigned considers that by the
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treaty above referred to. New Granada has received from the United States an ample 
equivalent for any sacrifices she may have made in entering into it'^^
Marcy added that the obligation to guarantee the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus 
obviously demanded that U.S. troops be allowed to transit the Isthmus in case they had to be 
used against Colombia's attackers. Realistically, it is doubtful that even Marcy believed the 
transit of United States troops to the West Coast o f North America was some sort of drill for the 
defense of Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus.
hi his letter dated 19 July 1853. Colombian Chargé d'Afiàires Paredes replied that 
while it was true Colombia had agreed to a  partial "surrender,” i.e., non-exercise, of its 
sovereignty, it had done so in such a way that clearly explained the limits o f that non-exercise. 
Paredes argued that the Government of Colombia had agreed to yield its sovereignty only to the 
extent that it would treat the citizens and the Government of the United States no differently 
than Colombian citizens. What Colombian Chargé d’Affaires Paredes meant was that whatever 
rules apply to private citizens of Colombia applied to the Government o f the United States. In a 
letter dated 8 April 1854, Colombian Chargé d’Afiàires Paredes would argue that since citizens 
of Colombia are not allowed to transit in armed force across the Isthmus of Panama, the 
Government o f the United States cannot either. Paredes believed that the 1846 Bidlack- 
Mallarino Treaty could not possibly have been meant to force upon the Government of 
Colombia "the surrender o f her sovereignty and the sacrifice of her most precious rights,” which 
he claims would be the result if United States troops were fieely allowed to use the Panama
' ̂  A letter dated 20 Jime 1853. from Marcy to Paredes said: “The Undersigned appreciates the concern 
which Mr. Paredes expresses for the sovereignty of New Granada. When, however, independent States 
enter into treaties with foreign powers, they expect to relinquish their sovereignty in part with the 
expectation of receiving from the power with which they treaty, full equivalents Uierefor. The 
Undersigned considers that by the treaty above referred to. New Granada has received from the United 
States an ample equivalent for any sacrifices she may have made in entering into it  Indeed, the 
Undersigned is at a loss to tmderstand how the serious obligation which that instrument imposes on the 
United States could be efficiently discharged, if discharged at all, were the construction for which Mr. 
Paredes contends to prevail.”
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Railroad. In response to Secretary of State Marcy’s statement above, Colombian Chargé 
d'Affaires Paredes says:
[I]t is no less certain, on the other side, that nations, in surrendering a portion of their 
sovereignty, do so in an explicit and conclusive marmer, and by clearly explaining the 
limits or restrictions of the concessions which they stipulate, as it was done in the case 
of the trea^ of 1846, in which the privileges and prerogatives granted to citizens and to 
the govenunent of the United States, are limited to the same extent as those granted to 
New Granadian citizens .... this article had no other object then that of 
counterbalancing, by means of a guaranty of the Isthmus, those privileges and 
prerogatives granted to the United States, especially in what concerns the exemption 
&om the payment of duties called differential, which exemption had been then eagerly 
sought for. but in vairu by all the Ministers of the United States accredited near the New 
Granadian govenunent. and in fact this could not have been understood otherwise; for. 
if it be true, that the treaty through[ou|t is essentially liberal to both parties, this 
liberality could not have been carried to such an extreme, on the part o f iVe»v Granada, 
as to involve the surrender of her sovereignty and the sacrifice o f her most precious 
rights ... such as to allow, under all circtunstances. the transit of troops by the aforesaid 
Isthmus [emphasis added].
Secretary of State Marcy’s reply to Colombian Chargé d’Affaires Paredes on 12 
October 1853, was that the recent expansion of the United States in Oregon territory and as a 
result of the Treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo made it imperative for the United States Army to use 
the Panama R ailroad.O verland federal military convoys were probably quite common but 
one should recall that the first transcontinental railroad across the United States was not 
completed until 10 May 1869. At the time, the only railroad to the West was across the Isthmus 
of Panama. Marcy asserted that since the Colombian Congress had not objected to the transit of 
United States troops during the negotiation of Article XXXV, it was unfoir to proclaim 
afterwards that Colombia had specifically forbidden the United States to send its troops across 
the Panama Railroad. But if it was critical to United States national security that federal troops 
be allowed to transit the Isthmus of Panama, the burden was on representatives o f the United
' Letter from Paredes to Marcy dated 19 July 1853 (Maiming 1935).
' Kemble (1972. 202-3) believed that the Panama Railroad was especially useful for transporting troops 
in connection with Indian wars in Oregon and Puget Sound.
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States to clarify that the privileges being granted in Article XXXV of the Bidlack-Mallarino 
Treaty included the right o f  transit o f United States troops.
The interesting part o f  Secretary of State Marcy s reply in his 12 October 1853 letter 
focused on the compensation for Colombia's yielding o f  sovereignty over American flows in 
transit. Marcy challenged Colombian Chargé d Af&ires Paredes to consider whether agreeing to 
a reciprocal lowering of duties and granting the United States Government and its citizens the 
same rights o f transit as Colombian citizens was equal to what the United States obligated itself 
to do. namely, secure and protect the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama 
against ail foreign encroachments;
Is it possible that the New-Granadian government could for a moment suppose that tliis 
government ever did or ever could consider any prospective development of the 
Commerce between the two countries by the equalization of the duties on their 
respective vessels and their cargoes, and on the freedom of the passage of their 
respective vessels and their cargoes, and on the freedom of the passage of their 
respective citizens across the Isthmus of Panama, as an equivalent for the obligation 
referred to?‘̂ ^
In Colombian Chargé d'Afi&ires Paredes reply to Secretary of State Marcy on 8 April
1854. Paredes claims that between Colombia and the United States, it was the United States that 
was reaping tremendous benefits from the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty which more than paid
' ̂  In a letter from Marcy to Paredes dated 12 October 1853. Marcy said: "... Mr. Paredes does not allege 
that during the negotiation of the treaty or when it was discussed by the New Granadian Congress, that 
the article referred to was objected to as granting the United States the specific privilege for which the 
undersigned contends. If such an objection had been made and it had been answered that no such grant 
was in contemplation, the construction now contended for by New Granada might have been entitled to 
more weight. Under existing circumstances, however, it may safely be concluded that the article was well 
understood to embrace the privilege referred to. The Undersigned .... does not... believe that the treaty 
would ever have been ratified by this government, had it not been well understood to include that 
privilege. The govenunent of the Territory of Oregon had then recently been organized. That territory, 
even in the immediate neighborhood of the sparse settlements on the coast of the Pacific was and still is. 
filled with savages, against whom the inhabitants would e.\pect to be protected by military force. Troops 
could be conveyed thither with greater facility and despatch by the way of the Isthmus of Panama than 
across the continenL At the time of the ratification of the treaty with New Granada, the treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo was also on the point of being ratified. By that treaty , a large addition was made to
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for having to guarantee the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama. Paredes 
argues that the social savings o f the Panama Railroad to the United States figured as part of 
what the Government of Colombia was providing to the United States. What the United States 
gained through its social savings dwarfed what Colombia would possibly acquire by exercising 
its sovereign right to raise revenues from American flows passing through Colombian territory :
[T]he political, commercial and financial consequences which are resulting and 
accruing from this transaction to the benefit of the United States, without its being 
productive of any thing, for the iHcsent. to New Granada, except the disadvantage of 
finding herself deprived of her custom house revenues in that portion of her territory: 
for. although, on the other side, there is held out to her the hope of some future 
advantage, this is uncertain and not easily appreciated.
There is noticeable shift o f thinking between Colombian Charge d'Affaires Paredes 
statement in 8 April 1854, and his earlier correspondence. Rather than protesting how the transit 
of United States troops involved the sacrifice of Colombia's "most precious rights" o f 
sovereignty. Paredes essentially argued that the principle of a non-exercise of Colombia's 
sovereignty over United States troops could be a precedent to deprive Colombia its right to raise 
revenues. Colombia's ability to impose its jurisdiction over American flows in transit across 
Colombian territory was at stake. If Colombia could successfully claim the sovereign right to 
impose restrictions on the flow of United States troops, it would pave the way for collecting 
revenues from American commercial and passenger flows in transit.
The troop issue reappeared two years later in a letter from Colombian Minister to the 
United Stales General Pedro Alcantara Herràn to Secretary of State William L. Marcy on 
January 24, 1856. General Herran stated that the Government of Colombia had no particular 
cause for objecting to the transit of American troops other than as a matter of principle.
the possessions of the United States on the Pacific, which, it must have been foreseen, would also require
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Before all. the undersigned will state that, on the part of New Granada, there is no 
particular cause for objecting to the transit of American troops, through that portion of 
her territory, and that, so far fiom wishing to impose unnecessary restrictions, relative 
to the use of that interoceanic way, that govenunent is disposed to tender to the United 
States those good offices which may serve to give new proofs to this republic of the 
confidence which New Granada places in iL The question is simply one of principles, 
the solution of which is of great importance to both coimtries.
General Herrin claimed that neither the Colombian Executive nor Congress has the power to 
grant the transit of foreign troops, unless the United States asked permission first. Herrin's 
claim leaves one merely to ask if neither the Executive nor the Congress of Colombia have the 
constitutional power to grant the transit of troops then who does'] And furthermore, why would 
merely asking permission first change the Colombian constitution?
The reappearance of the troop transit dilemma after two years coupled with Herrin's 
somewhat acconunodating tone are given partial explanation by a letter from Colombian 
Minister Herrin to Secretary of State Marcy only four days later on 28 January 1856. In this 
letter. General Herrin petitioned the United States to come to Colombia’s aid, per its obligations 
in Article XXXV of the 1846 treaty, in a boundary dispute with the Mosquito kingdom on the 
western frontier of Panama. A bit of diplomatic conciliation on Colombia's part was useful if 
United States troops would be needed to preserve Colombia’s borders.
11.3 THE Passenger Tax  Problem
The early dispute regarding to what extent Colombia could exercise sovereign 
jurisdiction over American flows in transit, and to what extent Article XXXV of the Bidlack- 
Mallarino exempted American flows from Colombian jurisdiction, shifted from sovereign 
principles to important fiscal matters. On 15 April 1854, United States Chargé d’Af&ires James 
S. Green protested to Colombian Minister of Foreign Afifeirs C. Pinzon that a dollar per 
passenger tax decreed by the province of Panama was a discriminatory charge against American
to be protected by troops.”
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citizens. American Chargé d AAàires Green claimed that Article 34 of the Panama Railroad 
Company’s contract exempted rail passengers from any national, provincial, municipal or other 
taxes and imposts. Green also said that tonnage duties and other charges do not apply to the 
movement of articles in transit, and if American citizens continued to be harassed in this way 
they would find other means of communication. In the meantime the United States Government 
would hold officials o f Colombia responsible. Green said:
Surely it caimot be pretended that for those long and perilous voyages thousands of 
miles from the jurisdiction and protection of New Granada, that one tenth of the whole 
profits, should be paid to Panama, merely because the vessels come into port for a few 
hours, and for which they also pay the usual and customary charges! !
Chargé d’Affaires Green 6iled to mention that the Panama Railroad was no less 
discriminating to American citizens. Between 1852 until the completion of the entire rail line in 
1855, passenger and cargo rates for partial transit along the forty mile long Panama Railroad 
were set at excessive levels. Panama Railroad Company charges were the following: 1“ Class 
passenger ticket ($25.00), 1^ Class freight ($0.50 cu ft). 2”'* Class freight ($1.05 lOOlbs), and 
mails ($0.22 11b).A ccording to Lindsay (1938), prices for transit on the Panama Railroad 
were made excessively high in order to keep traffic down to a  minimum during the construction 
period. Nonetheless, the same overpriced rates remained in place for twenty years. It was only 
as a result of competition from the Union-Pacific railroad after 1869 that the Panama Railroad 
had to lower its passenger and freight rates.
It is ironic that when officials o f the Panama Railroad Company charged twenty-five 
dollars for a passenger to transit the Isthmus of Panama they were doing an inestimable service 
to the people of the United States. Yet when the provincial authorities of Panama attempted to 
add a tax of one dollar to the already excessive rates being charged by the Panama Railroad
Lindsay (1938).
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Company it became a matter of breach of contract and an extoitive assault on American 
citizens. It is very difficult to believe provincial authorities in Panama did not know exactly 
what they were proposing, that their passenger tax allegedly on both Colombian and American 
citizens traveling across the Isthmus was really just a discriminatory charge on American 
citizens. But in terms of dollars and cents, what was the difference between a  discriminatory 
provincial tax and an inflated company rate?
Shortly after Chargé d Af&ires Green's letter to Minister Pinzon the matter was 
seemingly settled.'^ United StatK Minister R odent in Colombia James B. Bowlin wrote to 
Secretary of State William L. Marcy on 17 May 1855, that the provincial decree of Panama had 
been declared void and unconstitutional by the Government of Colombia in Bogota. The 
Colombian Constitution reserved to the nation as a whole, not individual provinces, the sole 
pow er of regulating commerce.
The situation became complicated again when the Colombian Constitution was 
reformed and Panama was promoted from a province to a federal state. In a letter date 10 May 
1855. Minister Resident in Colombia Bowlin reported to Secretary of State Marcy that, after a 
struggle, the last Colombian Congress had consolidated the four provinces of the Isthmus o f 
Panama (Azuero, Chiriqui, Veraguas and Panama) into a  federal state modeled “in her rights 
and relative position to the Chief Government after our own states.” Recall that in Article 2 o f 
the IS March 1841. convention, leaders from the provinces o f Veraguas and Panama declared 
themselves an independent sovereign State of the Isthmus pending a new federal arrangement, 
in which case thev would consent to be a state within a federal Colombian union:
If the organization given to New Granada be federal and suitable to the interests of the 
people of the Isthmus, the latter shall form a State of the federation.... In no case sliall
' In a letter from Marcy to Bowlin on 3 Febmar) 1855, he refers to a letter of 4 April 1854, in which the 
Foreign Secretary of Colombia had assured Green that the passenger tax levied by the provincial 
government of Panama would not continue to be enforced.
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the Isthmus be incorporated into the Republic of New Granada under the central
system.
Minister Bowlin’s 10 May 1855, letter to Secretary of State Marcy confirmed that the 
provinces of the Isthmus of Panama had finally become organized as a federal state, the 
objective o f the 1840-1841 separation o f  the State of the Isthmus. Colombian Minister to the 
United States General Pedro Alcantara Henan wrote to Secretary of State Marcy on 18 August
1855. that the new constitutional arrangement was a peaceful transition by constitutional 
procedure. The new agreement reserved foreign relations as well as the right o f property over 
any existing or future interoceanic route to the government at Bogota. Despite its peaceful 
origins, the new federal arrangement between the State of the Isthmus and the central 
government at Bogota started a series of events that led to the worst breakdown in a century and 
a half of American involvement on the Isthmus of Panama.
11.4 THE T onnage  Duty  Problem
Officials of the State of Panama did not waste time in wielding their new sovereign 
privileges. In a letter dated 10 October 1855. United States Minister Resident in Colombia 
James B. Bowlin made an official protest to Colombian Minister o f Foreign Afikirs Lino de 
Pombo concerning a law passed on 27 August 1855, by the legislature o f the federal State of 
Panama. The law imposed a tonnage tax on all vessels arriving at ports on the Isthmus of 
Panama, with the exception of vessels of the Royal Mail Company. Bowlin concluded with the 
by now routine American claim that Article XXXV of the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty guaranteed 
complete freedom of transit to American citizens and cargo, paid for by an American guarantee 
of Colombia’s sovereignty over the Isthmus o f Panama.
What Minister Bowlin seemed unaware of was that by demanding the Colombian 
central government honor treaty obligations and enforce its authority over the State of Panama,
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he was asking the central government to agitate Panamanian state's rights. Bowlin probably 
considered Colombian reluctance a matter o f diplomatic negligence, ill-will or complicity in 
Panamanian extortion. But Colombian authorities in Bogota were probably reluctant to overrule 
the decrees of the State of Panama simply because they knew the domestic troubles it would
179inspire.
Colombian Minister of Foreign Af&irs Lino de Pombo s reply to Minister Bowlin dated 
12 October 1855. was that the executive office of Colombia did not consider the State of 
Panama's tonnage dues applicable to ships arriving at the terminal cities o f the Panama 
Railroad. Panama City and C o lo n .P o m b o  reminds Bowlin that since the time of the 
constitutional reforms, the new Legislative Assembly of the State of Panama was entrusted with 
more extensive powers to legislate on matters o f foreign commerce.
United States Minister James Bowlin wrote to Secretary of State Marcy on 18 October 
1855 that according to his own reading of the Colombian Constitution, he did not feel the State 
of Panama had acquired the right to legislate on matters of foreign commerce. Bowlin reiterated 
his concerns about the Colombian Supreme Court ruling in his letter to Secretary of State Marcy 
on 25 October 1855. Regardless of the 6 c t that the Court had ruled the State of Panama's 
tonnage law did not apply in the terminal cities of Panama City and Colon. Bowlin felt that the 
real issue was whether such as ' reckless community” as the State of Panama had the legitimate 
right to legislate on foreign commerce at all:
Whilst the decision is clear and emphatic, as to the freedom of the Ports of Aspinwall 
and Panama; I regret, that they seem to cling to the idea, that the Slate of Panama has 
power to levy tonage duties in the other ports of the State. The decission not being 
against the validity of the law. but merely that it can have no force or effect, in the 
privileged ports of Aspinwall and Panama. In this I differ with them upon their own 
law. And the claiming of such a power for such a reckless community as the State of 
Panama; is but nurturing an apple of discord, that will bring them into difBculties with
' It may also have been that the new Liberal administration in Bogota sponsoring the constitutional 
reforms was conceding to a Liberal leadership in Panama as a matter of partisan loyalty.
The tonnage duties were apparently repealed by Colombia on 11 October 1855.
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all the commercial powers. In the bill creating the State of Panama ... is the list of the 
powers reserved to the nation at large, and with which Panama cannot interfere, and the 
first of that list, as I translate it, is — “All things relative to Foreign affairs”. Now if 
taxing expressly Foreign commerce, is not a “thing relative to Foreign affairs” 1 
certainly cannot understand the force of language.
Colombian Minister to the United States Pedro Alcantara Herran stated in his 26 October 1855 
letter to Secretary of State William L. Marcy that the relative powers of the National Congress 
in Bogota and the Legislature of the State of Panama to establish tonnage duties was a domestic 
question. Herran's letter to Marcy on 14 November 1855, later confirmed that tonnage duties 
established by the Legislature of the State of Panama did not apply to vessels entering the 
terminal ports of the Panama Railroad, Panama City and Colon.
Minister Bowlin reported to Secretary o f  State Marcy on 3 January 1856, that the 
Governor of the State of Panama intended to appeal the decision so that the tonnage duties 
applied to all ports on the Isthmus of Panama, including Panama City and Colon. Bowlin 
believed that there was little likelihood the Governor’s request would be successful;
The Governor of Panama is out in publication, against the decision of the Executive 
Government here, on the subject of the tonage tax, and deciars the intention of 
appealing to the Congress to overthrow the decision, & sustain the tax -  but 1 flatter 
myself Congress will have a little too much Good sense, to engage in that plundering 
crusade against the Commercial World.
In a few short months Bowlin would be proved wrong. Not only would the repealed totmage 
duties be reinstated on 25 June 1856, but another tax in the form of “postage” for American 
mail in transit would be proclaimed by the Legislature o f the State of Panama.
11.5 THE POSTAGE PROBLEM AND THE RETURN OF THE TONNAGE DUTY PROBLEM
On 14 May 1856, United States Minister Resident in Bogota James B. Bowlin wrote to 
Secretary of State William L. Marcy that as of just ten days after the 15 April 1856 riots.
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Panamanian authorities had apparently intended to add insult to injury by charging a  postage of 
$3.20 per lb. on all American mail in transit on the Panama Railroad, more than ten times the 
$0.22 per lb. charged by the Panama Railroad C om pany .G iven  the armual flow of American 
mail in transit via the Panama Railroad, Bowlin estimated that the yearly revenue would be no 
less than half a million dollars. In other words, earnings from postage alone would amount to 
double the total import duties o f Colombia, giving the whole measure in Bowlin's opinion "an 
air of reckless plunder and magnificent stupidity."’ In a 3 July 1856. letter to Bowlin, Secretary 
of State Marcy had said that the Post Office Department's estimate put the cost of transporting 
the mails across the Panama Railroad at nearly $2 million per year if the State o f Panama wns 
allowed to collect postage.
In a letter dated 2 October 1856, Colombian Minister of Foreign Afrairs Lino de Pombo 
replied to Bowlin’s protest. Pombo presented a brief introduction of the State of Panama's 
decree followed by a very odd argument in its defense. The dispute, Pombo noted, was whether 
the second Article of the Law of 25 April of the State o f Panama applied to mails in transit or 
whether it was contrary to Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty and the contract 
of the Panama Railroad Company. Pombo explained that postage only applied to letters, not 
periodicals, which enjoy freedom from any charge. He argued that this privilege was the same 
as that granted to letters of Great Britain through a postal convention with Colombia on 24 May 
1847.
Pombo continued by saying that all correspondence passing between the post offices of 
the Isthmus of Panama, with the exception of national and foreign periodicals, always pay 
postage in accordance with the Colombian postal tariff of 29 April 1846. Pombo stated that 
since the 29 April 1846 postal tariff was established prior to both the 1846 treaty and the 
Panama Railroad contract, it takes precedence. But would not a later agreement naturally reform
Bowlin said the Panamanian postage was $3.20 per English pound.
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an earlier one? The bizarre opinion o f Pombo's letter was that Colombia only allowed the 
Panama Railroad Company the privilege of transporting correspondence across the Isthmus of 
Panama^ it never removed its right to charge postage:
By that concession, simply of the transport or carriage, the national tariff of transit 
postages was neither repealed nor even reformed, and from the right of territorial 
dominion it arrises, constituting a branch of the revenue of the Republic, neither was it 
affected by the exemption from all kinds of impositions conceded in the Art 34 of the 
contract to the objects and effects o f all sorts which may be transported from one sea to 
the other by the railroad, because among such effects ... the correspondence is not 
comprehended, since this is treated of in special articles.
One is at a loss to understand what postal service Pombo felt was being provided by Colombian 
officials if correspondence was transported and handled entirely by the Panama Railroad 
Company. In addition, since letters in transit were probably addressed from New York to San 
Francisco, not New York to Colon to Panama City to San Francisco, bags of mail were just 
general cargo and should not be considered correspondence for any other purpose than company 
freight charges.
Pombo claimed that the Colombian Confederation was due postage on top of a share of 
the profits from the Panama Railroad it was already getting through its contract with the 
company. It would make more sense to believe that the Panama Railroad Co. had contracted the 
right to charge for transporting all cargo free of import duties, including things like 'postage," 
and that Colombia had consented to a  portion of all company profits as its compensation. Yet 
Pombo said that what portion the Colombian Confederation was receiving from its contract with 
the Panama Railroad Co. was less than it ought to have if it did not charge postage:
[T]he percentage payable by the Company out of the net profits made by transporting 
the mails is notoriously a sum very inferior to the legitinute compensation which New 
Granada ought to exacL renouncing the transit postage.
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The only reasonable answer to Pombo is that his complaint about a lack of compensation is a  
matter that should have discussed when the Government of Colombia was negotiating its 
contract with the Panama Railroad Company. In a response to Minister Pombo on 10 November 
1856, Bowlin says:
Your Excellency claims, that the percentage now recieved by N. Granada is 
notoriously inferior to the legitimate compensation, which N. Granada ought to exact 
renouncing the transit postage.' To that is might properly be answered, that whether 
inferior or not it is Qx«i by the solomn contract of the nation, in which her honor and 
public faith are pledged, and she carmot renounce its obligations, at her pleasure ....
In a letter to Secretary of State Marcy on 3 October 1856, Minister Bowlin reported that he had 
spoken to Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lino de Pombo who assured him that postage 
would not be etiforced until the Congress met again. Bowlin also noted that the totmage tax 
would probably not be executed, and secondly and perhaps not coincidentally, he reported a 
rumor that the British Minister had broken o ff relations with the Colombian Confederation. 
Bowlin said it was likely there would be a British blockading squadron on the coast as a result 
of an unpaid Colombian debt in excess of $30 million. Thus there may have been a decision for 
forbearance on aggravating the United States, whose military assistance Colombians soon might 
have to rely on.
11.6 THE APRIL 1856 PANAMA CUY RJOTS
In a letter to Secretary of State Marcy dated October 1856, Colombian Minister to the 
United States Pedro Alcantara Herran enclosed an exchange between the United States 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific squadron. Commodore William Mervine, and the Governor 
of Panama, Francisco de Fàbrega, the man who was implicated in the 1856 riots in Panama 
City.
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Given the nature of communications in the nineteenth century, naval commanders 
abroad were probably entrusted with certain powers to act on the spot in time of emergency 
without having to consult superiors in the United States. It is not clear whether Mervine was 
acting entirely on his own, or whether he had instructions to use force to prevent the collection 
of tonnage taxes. A letter from Secretary of State William L. Marcy to United States Minister 
James B. Bowlin on 31 December 1856, written only three months after the Mervine-Fabrega 
exchange, suggests that Mervine's threat of force may have been policy;
Should they take forcible steps to collect it [tonnage tax), the procediue would be 
resisted by om naval forces in the harbors of Aspinwall and Panam a. The grounds of 
resistance to that tax have been folly presented in your communications to the 
Government of New Granada, and in mine to its diplomatic representative here. The 
imposition of that tax is contrary to the spirit and policy of the treaty of 1846. between 
the two countries. 1 do not propose to repeat again the argument which has been 
presented on this point The tonnage law is, beyond all questiort a violation of the 
contract with the Rail Road Company.
In the correspondence below. Commodore Mervine threatened military force against 
any attempt by Panamanian officials to impose tonnage duties on American vessels. Mervine 
claimed that in an earlier conversation with Fàbrega he had been personally assured that neither 
postage nor tonnage dues would be collected. Fàbrega for his part does not mention whether or 
not he had told Mervine that no totmage dues would be collected. Fàbrega only says he was 
simply upholding Colombian law and posed himself as the casualty of American might makes 
right:
Francisco de Fàbrega. Governor of Panamà. to Commodore William Mervine. 
Commander-in Chief of the United States squadron in the Pacific. Panamà City. 
September 8. 1856:
.... You have stated to me that you would hold an insistance, on my part to exact the 
dues, as a casus belli and that you would, consequently, operate with all the forces at 
your command- I shall not stop to inquire in the regularity of such a declaration; much 
less to vindicate the right of New Granada in establishing the dues in question. It is
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enough for me to know that such a declaration has been made; that you have the means 
to carry it into effect; and that, for my part I have no other power to oppose to it. than 
that of reason, which. I think, stands on the side of my country, on this occasion ....
Commodore William Mervine. Commander-in-Chief of the United States squadron in 
the Pacific, to Francisco de Fàbrega. Governor of Panama. U.S. ^ g  Ship 
Independence. Bay of Panama, September 10. 1856:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yoiur commimication of the 8* instant in 
relation to the collection of "totmage duties.” In my interview with you on the 1" instant 
on this subject, you assured me that there should k  no difiSculty in this matter on your 
part as the Agent of the General Government -  that you would suspend the execution 
of the decrees until our respective Governments came to some definite arrangement 
this assurance referred both to the meal matter and the tonnage tax. Almost immediately 
after this, by your order, the Rail Road Co.'s Steamer was measured and a demand 
made for the tax. thus Sir. falsifying the assurance made to me: but probably, better 
faith could not be expected fiom an ofBcial. who could so far outrage humanity as to 
order the massacre of defenceless women and children.
The correspondence is telling of the rapidly decaying state of relations between the United 
States and Colombia as a result o f the fiscal and. in April 1856. violent harassment of American 
citizens and property in transit.
On 3 May 1856, Secretary of State William L. Marcy wrote United States Minister 
Resident in Bogota James B Bowlin that he had been informed of an attack on American 
passengers on the Panama Railroad in which the civil authorities of the State o f Panama were 
implicated. Because o f the importance of the Panama Railroad route to the United States and the 
need to make it secure, Marcy instructed Bowlin to remind Colombian authorities of their 
sovereign responsibilities to deal swiftly and effectively with the matter and to inflict an 
"exemplary” punishment on those responsible. Marcy said:
This government has just received information of the massacre of several of the 
passengers across the Isthmus, and of resident Americans at Panama, on the night of the 
15*. ultimo, by the natives or resident population at that place .... The evidence here 
received directly and deeply implicates not only the people, but the civil authorities of 
Panama in the barbarous cruelties committed upon the railroad passengers and
268
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
American citizens and in the plunder and destruction of property .... You will take the 
earliest opportunity to make known these expectations of the President, and to express 
to that Govenunent the pain it would give him to learn thar there had been any 
remissness on its part, either in punishing the guilty, and that it will be reacfy, at once to 
indettmify the persons who have suffered in their persons and property. It is important 
not only to the United States but to New Granada, that the passage across the Isthmus 
should be secure from danger of interruptioiL For this purpose, as well as for the ends 
of justice exemplary punishment should be promptly inflicted upon the transgressors, 
and the responsibility of New Granada for the misconduct of its people should be 
recognized. In this case the complaint against the local authorities goes beyond the 
neglect of their duty, they are charged with active participation in the wanton 
destruction of human life.
Marcy's feelings as to what Bowlin was to do about both the attack as well as the postage 
decree then still in effect were no doubt clear. Bowlin was to demand swift punishment for the 
15 April attack including an indemnity, and object that the 25 April decree o f the State of 
Panama was clearly in conflict with Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty as 
well as the contract with the Panama Railroad Company.
In his official protest o f  the federal State of Panama's handling of the 15 April riot to 
Colombian Minister of Foreign Affiars Lino de Pombo on 23 June 1856. United States Minister 
Resident at Bogota James B. Bowlin cited the testimony of forty witnesses to the events. The 
witnesses' testimony suggested civil authorities and police of the State o f Panama had 
premeditated the attack. Tales to the contrary. Bowlin said, were "mere fictions devised to give 
the appearance of a sudden outbreak."
Minister Lino de Pombo s reply to Bowlin on 28 June 1856, was a tactful letter assuring 
Bowlin that the Colombian Senate was considering measures to extend the jurisdiction and 
sovereign powers o f the central govenunent over the State of Panama, particularly with regard 
to judicial matters:
As early as the 27'*' of May, the Senate was applied to for legal provisions, calculated to 
invigorate the administration of affairs, of a national character, on the Isthmus and, in 
serious cases, to strengthen the hands of the judicial power [emphasis added).
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Pombo promised that if any authorities o f the State of Panama were culpable for the attacks, 
they would be punished. Pombo said he doubted officials o f the State o f Panama had anything 
to do with the riots and said that the events of 15 April were nothing more than a spontaneous 
outburst. Allegations that the riots were somehow planned represented an exaggeration by 
American witnesses biased by their emotions. Pombo asks that a reasonable assessment of the 
evidence be made.
Nonetheless, Pombo s offers his own explanation. Pombo calls the events of 15 April a 
unpremeditated act for which American citizens were indirectly responsible because o f their 
violent temperament and their visible contempt of the local population. In addition, few of the 
many material benefits which American citizens enjoyed fi-om the use of the Isthmus were 
being shared with the resident population save the smoke of the locomotives and the noise o f 
the trains.'^ In later diplomatic correspondence, particular reference would be made to the 
frustrations of Caribbean Black lower-class residents of Panama City, possibly former 
employees o f the Panama Railroad Company during the construction phase, who had recently 
lost their jobs as the many informal boatmen ferrying passengers and cargo between the vessels 
anchored offshore and the railroad station house. The Panama Railroad Company had replaced 
most of them with a company docking and ferrying system. In a turning of the tables, Pombo 
colorfully describes American passengers on the Panama Railroad as practically the most 
violent people in the Western Hemisphere and paints the urban population of Panama City as 
the innocent victims of American brutality and greed:
'*■ Pombo said (Miller 1935): "From the time, when the legislation of New Granada, in a spirit of utmost 
liberality, had removed all the obstacles, which could trammel or baffle interoceanic communicatiotL 
through the Isthmus, travellers thronged on that liighway; especially so, when the gold of California had 
made its flattering appeals to emigration and to the spirit of enterprise and avarice, did multitudes of 
adventurers, from every region of the earth, constantly traverse our soil, through that highway, materially 
benefitting iL in the first instance, by the necessities of travel, which called for the employment and 
remuneration of the sons or inhabitants of the country. When, however, the railroad was built to the 
construction of which not only the nation, but individuals, also, gratuitously contributed the appliances of 
lands, the comparatively slight advantages went on decreasing until, for these, were substituted the smoke
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[Ajmong those adventurers, there have firequently appeared, and continue to be found, 
ignorant and immoral, quarrelsome and intemperate men. without any other God than 
gold, nor other law than brutal force -  men. who have committed so many felonies and 
murders in the gold placers of the North, in the wilds of Oregon, in the counties of 
Amador and Mariposa, and in filibustering expeditions, which disgrace the living age; 
men. who. claiming to be civilized, have not. however, yet shaken off the most hostile 
prejudices; men. who look with contempt on the native population and even that of the 
Spanish origin; men. in whose eyes, with Afiican blood, are imworthy of any 
consideration and whose every thought, on a foreign shore, is a thought of 
'annexionism. ’ Of these passengers some, by initiation into their crapulent vices, have 
tainted the most humane and hospitable people in the universe: a people, once and 
habitually peaceable and submissive to the law. who have, for some time past, leaned 
through such influences, to insubordination and turbulence. Others have provoked 
fiequent quarrels, whidi have reulted in death and wounds and in a spirit of violent 
antipathy, so that th ^  have now generally become objects of complaint and mistrust in 
the eyes of a simple-minded people.
In a patriotic portrayal of the lower-class residents of Panama City, calling them the sons o f the 
land." Pombo absolves the attack as an act o f self-defense. He regretted only that they had 
allowed themselves on certain occasions to be taken over by their emotions when confi'onted by 
violent American antagonists:
A natural consequence of antecedents so fatal as these, is the facility, with which the 
passions of the multitude may. in a single moment, be enkindled in resistence of the 
insolence and attacks of some of the immigrants, as well as the gathering, in such cases, 
of the sons of the land in a spontaneous and unpremeditated offensive and defensive 
league, for the protection and help of their companions. Especially sad is the 
consequence that, finding the mass of their antagonists infuriated and implacable, they 
should have allowed themselves, in certain occasions, to be driven into every kind of 
excess.
Colombian Minister of Foreign ASairs Lino de Pombo concluded his letter by addressing the 
allegation that the attack was the result of administrative incompetence. Pombo said that any 
defect in the ability o f the new State o f  Panama to enforce law and order in its territory was due 
to a deficiency of revenue;
of the locomotive, the noise of the trains, the yells of the passengers and the mere exhibition of animation 
and wealth at the extremes of the line.”
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[Gjrowing out of the very franchises and immunities, granted to commerce and its 
transit; out of the stubborn resistence [sic| of foreigners, resident in the country , 
opposed to the enactment and collection of taxes, affecting their interests.
Minister Pombo may have a point, in that Colombian Panama might have been better able to 
provide police or other security forces to protect foreigners in transit if it were able to collect the 
revenues to pay for them. But Pombo does not provide any details on what part of the current 
budget was devoted to police enforcement nor what the State of Panama's fiscal needs were to 
garrison an adequate police force, if it was in fact the federal State of Panama alone and not the 
central government that was responsible for paying the police budget. Pombo only makes the 
rhetorical claim that foreigners “resident in the country,” by which he may or may not mean 
simply passing through in transit, are opposed to any such measure. Thus, according to Pombo. 
Americans reap what they sow.
United States Minister Resident in Bogota James B Bowlin's response to Colombian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lino de Pombo on 30 June 1856, disputed most o f Pombo s claims. 
Bowlin said that, firstly, the testimonies he cites to describe the attacks were not entirely those 
of Americans nor can they be dismissed offhand. Secondly, he said that few of the American 
passengers attacked or killed were in fact armed. And thirdly, Bowlin said those American 
passengers en route to or fî om California and Oregon were not the classes of evil people 
caricatured by Pombo.
A letter fi'om Secretary of State Marcy to Special Commissioners of the United States to 
the Colombian Confederation I. E. Morse and James B. Bowlin dated 3 December 1856, 
includes a synopsis o f the papers filed at the Department of State on the riots of 15 April 1856. 
Manning (1935. 388 n.2) says that the original report filed by A B Corwine dated 18 July 1856, 
fills 108 handwritten pages while the documents appended to it as evidence cover about three
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times as many pages. Also part of the original Corwine report were supposed to have been 
letters written by Corwine himself while on the investigating mission which amounted to 
another 100 pages. Included at the end of the letter was a translation of part of the Colombian 
report presented by the Governor of Panama to the national government at Bogota dated 22 
April 1856, just a week after the riots, printed in the Gaceta Oficial of Bogota on 28 May 1856.
Corwine compared two principal sources o f  evidence for his report. One source was 
eye- witness testimony he had gathered himself. Another was testimony taken from the official 
account presented by Panamanian Governor Francisco de Fàbrega. In comparing the two 
sources of evidence, Corwine says that there were several discrepancies in the testimonies used 
for the Colombian report that could not be rectified with testimonies he had collected, as well as 
important focts from the official Colombian report that implicated officials of the State of 
Panama. In his letter of 18 July 1856, Corwine stated that he was to inquire into four things 
about the 15 April 1856 riots (Table 11.1).
The 15 April 1856 riots in Panama City have a  nickname, "The Watermelon War The 
origin of the phrase comes from the foct the initial incident, one in a series o f events on 15 
April, occurred when a drunken American passenger ate a piece of watermelon from a street 
vendor, refused to pay for it, and then pulled a gun. A common explanation given and one stated 
in the official Colombian report in 1856 is that economic resentfulness and racial tension 
between the Black urban residents of Panama City and American passengers in transit simply 
exploded over this trivial dispute because of its symbolic implications. But how exactly does 
shoplifting lead to a citywide riot involving several deaths? And what kind of extraordinary 
racial or economic tension would have had to exist in Panama City for an argument over a 
watermelon to cause something like the 15 April riots?
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Table 11.l. A summary of findings for the Corwine report on the April 1856 riots in 
Panama City (Manning 1935).
“First, As to how th e  a ffa ir commenced and who hcgan it? and to detail as minutely as 
possible, the successive steps in the riot.”
“In regard to the first interrogatory propounded, the manner in which the affair commenced 
seems to be clearly established, and the concurrent testimony goes to show pretty conclusively
that the first shot was fired by Halrahan, a native That the police and mob took possession of
the railroad station house simultaneously with each other, and had the same object in view.... 
That the authorities of the country could not restrain the mob— The documents relative to the 
part borne by the Governor, the Chief of Police and his posse and the massacre at the Railroad 
station are very full and conclusive & go to establish the complicity of those functionaries and 
the persons under their command ”
“Second, W as the assau lt upon the Rail road station and  citizens o f the United States, and 
the robbery and  destruction o f the property, unprem editated? o r was it made in pursuance 
of a previous arrangem ent?”
“As to the second question From the slight provocation given and the quickness with which
the armed mob assembled & commenced the attack upon the hotels in the Cienega, without 
cause, [one witness] thinks the affair was the result of preconcerted action... [others] altho’ they 
think it was not premeditated agree in saying that the natives availed themselves of the 
opportunity to plunder & commit other outrages...."
“Thirds Was there an y  hostile feeling, on the p a r t  o f the  natives o r residents o f Panama 
against citizens of the  United States? and if so how did  it originate? Was it occasioned by 
any im proper conduct o f  persons passing through Panam a to and from the Steamers on 
any occasion an te rio r to  th a t o f the 15*̂  April?”
In reply to the 3** question— [In the words of a witness whose testimony is representative of 
others] there has in his opinion existed an ill feeling for some time past on the part of the 
Boatmen and former muleteers, against the R.R. & Steamship Cos. which feeling doubtless 
arose, partly from the fact that their services were no longer required by passengers, the Steamer 
“Taboga" rendering the services of boats formerly used unnecessary; and the rail road doing 
away with transportation across the Isthmus by mules. He has seen passengers drunk and 
behaving improperly, but he has never observed any thing occur to justify or give rise to such a 
massacre as that of the 15 April last.
“Fourth. Did the au thorities o f Panama fail in th e ir  du ty  to  suppress the riot? and if so, was 
this occasioned by the confusion o f the scene, o r  was it intentional on their part?”
“Fourth Interrogatory ‘Every witness’ says Mr. Corwine ‘ to whom I have propounded this
question, without a single exception, has answered most directly and positively in the affirmative 
to the first clause, all stating that the authorities did fail to suppress the riot;’ and the reason given 
for such failure is not attributable to the confusion of the scene, but it is generally conceded to 
have been intentional. ”
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Corwine's treatment o f the initial dispute over the slice o f watermelon is preparatory to 
a step by step accounting of everything that preceded the critical event, the attack on the station 
house by the crowd and the police.'^ What supposedly did or did not happen between the street 
vendor and a  drunken passenger is actually several steps removed from what precipitated the 
attack on several passengers who had fled to the station house where most of the American loss 
of life occurred:
All the witnesses who have deposed in my ... presence unite in saying that there were 
two attacks. The first by the mob on the American houses in the cienega Sc. the 
passengers who were in and about the same & the second, after the lapse of 
considerable time was made on the station houses by the police & mob united.
The second attack was precipitated after Col. Garrido. the Chief o f Police, was ordered to 
occupy the station house. It has never been clear whether the order was for the police to occupy 
the house or to attack it. It is strange that the Governor would direct the Chief of Police to 
occupy the station house rather than interpose the police between the two combatants. If a mass 
of people were surrounding the station house it would have made more sense to disperse them 
first, as they would have been the ones the police would have first encountered. What precisely 
Governor Francisco de Fàbrega ordered the Chief o f  Police to do remains a subject of 
controversy. Many Americans at the time believed it was simply an order to attack the 
passengers who had fled to the station house. It was de Fàbrega s orders on 15 April 1856 to 
occupy the station house that inspired Commodore William Mervine's exchange in September
According to Corwine’s report, the drunken American passenger. Jack Oliver, ate a piece of 
watermelon from a street vendor and refused to pay for it. Oliver was accompanied by another man. 
When the vendor who was carrying a machete demanded payment. Oliver pulled out a pistol. At this 
point others became involved. According to Corwine’s report, the man accompanying Oliver paid the 
street vendor for the watermelon and attempted to end the dispute. Among the people surroun^g the 
street vendor, Oliver, and the man accompanying Oliver was another man by the name of Miguel 
Halrahan or Hebrahan (the name is spelled differently). Corwine reconstmcts from testimonies he 
collected that it was Halrahan who grappled with Oliver, took the gun away, and fired the first shots.
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1856 in which he called Fàbrega, an official, who could so far outrage humanity as to order the 
massacre o f defenceless women and children.”
In Governor de Fàbrega's own testimony, published in the Gaceta Nacional on 28 May 
1856 (based on testimony given 22 April 1856), he stated that he had only ordered the police to 
"march to occupy” the house but with the implication that they were to return fire if fired upon. 
Fabrega said:
And it is said that it was 1 who gave the order to fire on the Company s house: but this 
is not strictly correct. When urged by the Secretary of the American Consul I went 
towards the house, where I was given to understand said Consul was and myself and 
those who accompanied me were fired upon and two of my party woimded. 1 fell back 
as was natural and, meeting at a few steps the Commander of the Gendarmery with his 
force. I gave him the order that he should march to occupy that house, l~de que 
marchase à ocupar aquella cüscl"\ (These were my words.) The Commander of the 
Gendarmery inquired of me: “And if they fire on me?” Let yourself determine what was 
also my reply.
De Fàbrega concluded his testimony by stating how horrified he was over the entire af%ir. by 
which he meant not the actual 15 April 1856, riots and the subsequent loss of life but by how 
unjust people can be in accusing him o f having had the power to prevent the riots:
I am horrified, Mr. Secretary, in contemplating how far the injustice of men will go. 
when I find any one who can suppose me to have had the power, that is to say. the 
means, of preventing such fiightfiil crimes, and yet deny to me a willingness to have 
employed them. After that. I should not occupy myself in refuting such absiud 
imputations
The feature o f de Fàbrega's testimony was how he reiterated several times that he had neither 
the power nor the means to control the situation. Governor de Fàbrega made an effort to point 
out how few were the police under his command:
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One thing is certain, that the gendanneiy is composed of only twenty-five men, with 
whom it would have been humanly impossible for the authorities to attend to 
everything. There has happened, therefore, what happens in all countries where the 
condition of affairs which is sought to be controlled is superior to the means which are 
at hand for the purpose.
Under ordinary circumstances, claiming that one was completely imprepared to deal with a 
contingency only serves to implicate oneself as incompetent. This may have been exactly what 
de Fabrega was trying to accomplish. De Fàbrega's testimony implicated the entire Colombian 
administration of which he was only the local part as utterly unprepared to maintain order in 
Panama having at the ready a mere twenty five police.
The critical moment during the 15 April 1856. riots occurred after the Governor, at the 
behest of the Secretary of the American Consul, went himself to try to maintain the peace and 
allegedly had his hat either shot out from his hand or from the top of his head. De Fàbrega 
testified that people from inside the station house had fired on him and he therefore judged them 
to be the ones prolonging the dispute. It was at this moment that Governor de Fàbrega ordered 
the Chief of Police. Col. Garrido, to occupy the station house. De Fàbrega claimed that the 
armed passengers continued to use their weapons until the police, only numbering twent\' five, 
subdued them after which unfortunately a mass of angry people rushed the station house and 
attacked and killed many of those inside.
Corwine s report refuted the claim that Americans could have fired bullets allegedly 
wounding or being shot through the hat of the Governor or his escorts. Corwine's report also 
refuted the claim that Americans in the station house even had weapons or were firing on the 
mob of people that was gathered around. Corwine's assessment seems rather more likely given 
that not a single Colombian among the crowd surrounding the station house had been reported 
killed or injured. In addition, it is difficult to see how a mere twenty five policemen, though
Fabrega was answering the accusations of Panama Railroad Company Superintendent G. M. Totten, 
who accused Fabrega of a premeditated act
277
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
unable to control a crowd supposedly kept at bay by the people firing madly fi'om the station 
house, could in a matter of moments capture the station house without receiving a  single injury. 
According to a letter fi'om Morse and Bowlin to de Pombo and Gonzalez on 13 February 1856, 
the riots caused the deaths o f eighteen Americans and wounded forty or fifty others. There were 
two reported Colombian deaths, neither directly related to actions at the Panama Railroad 
station house. Both were allegedly killed by gunshots fired fi'om an American who they were in 
fact chasing.
What seems clear from the detailed synopsis, particularly fi'om the series o f events 
leading to the attack on the station house, is that there is reason to believe that officials o f the 
State of Panama encouraged the April 1856 riots. The question is, why would they encourage 
such a thing? In a letter written by Minister Bowlin to Secretary of State Marcy dated 5 
November 1856, Bowlin makes an extraordinary suggestion which though perhaps offered 
partly in exasperation may actually explain a great deal. Bowlin said that the true aim behind 
the extortionate laws (one could also add complicity in the 15 April riots) of representatives of 
the State of Panama, whose interests he differentiates fi'om the government at Bogota, was to 
"drive the U.S. fiom necessity to take possession o f the Isthmus:"’
As soon as this publication made its appearance, two of the leading papers here, edited 
by the two Representatives fiom the State of Panama, assailed my letter with violent 
abuse .... From the spirit of these articles, it is manifest, that their authors, mean to try 
to maintain these obnoxious laws and enforce their extortionate exactions: or drive the 
U.S. fiom necessity to take possession of the Isthmus, which I solemnly believe is their 
true, ultimate and sole aim -  and that fiom no nobler motive, than a vile speculation 
growing out of their knowledge of the effect, that the planting of the flag, has 
uniformally had upon the value of real estate. The Government of New Granada, has no 
interest in these laws .... Her true interest would therefore be to maintain her plighted 
faith in preserving her oft repeated guarantees of Free ports & Free transit and thereby 
secure the claim to our treaty guarantee of protection.
The leaders of the State of Panama were ‘State’s Rights’ activists. They represented the 
same interests as the secessionists of the 1840s and the 1900s. To a Panamanian state’s rights
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activist in 1856, the central Bogota government was a distant ruler that either thought more of 
the 6r-flung commercial exploits o f outsiders than the everyday weU&re of the residents o f the 
Isthmus of Panama, or thought nothing o f their liberal economic am bitions.U nlike authorities 
off in Bogota, the Panamanian state s rights activist would proclaim, their sole objective was to 
insure the economic welfare o f the residents of the Isthmus o f Panama. Had the police turned 
against the crowd it might have looked as if authorities of the State of Panama were more 
concerned for the Americans in the station house than the interests of the recently-unemployed 
urban residents of Panama City.
OfGcials of the State o f Panama like Governor Francisco de Fabrega imposed the 
federal State of Panama's fiscal and economical sovereignty over American flows in transit in 
the face of American warships. Then Pombo postured himself as a public servant dissuaded 
from his duty only by an American threat of force. It is difficult to believe that Fàbrega was 
unaware of the situation he was provoking by trying to collect tonnage duties fi'om American 
vessels with American warships in full sight and having just spoken to Commodore Mervine. 
Panamanian activists like Pedro O. y Perez, mentioned in Corwine's report as accompanying 
Fàbrega. appear to have exploited the desperation of the dissident lower-class in the maritime 
cities by encouraging them to plunder Americans in transit. Corwine's report stated;
This Pedro O. y Perez, it appears by the testimony of Mr. Ran Runnels sworn to before 
the U.S. Consul was ... one of the leading spirits, who incited the mob to the deeds 
committed by them, for he states most positively that Perez addressed inflammatory 
appeals to the natives & furnished them with a Keg of Powder. Mr. Rumrels further 
states that he was present in the Cienega when P. Obarrio y Perez made a speech, 
shortly after the Governor arrived on the ground, in which he urged upon that 
functionary, to open the Park & let the natives arm themselves.
In a letter from Bowlin to Marty on 5 December 1856, Bowlin said: "Indeed 1 have entertained but 
little doubt, that this matter [mail transit] could have been easily settled, had the Administration been rid 
of this outside pressure, the Panama delegation, with their control of the Press” (Maiming 1935).
279
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In a letter from Bowlin to Marcy dated 17 September 1856, a few months after the riots, Bowlin 
commented on new mail and tonnage taxes:
These provisions are calculated to inspire the semi bart>arous negro population to more 
desperate deeds, as with them, they can be easily made to believe, that they have a 
personal interest in these sums, and they are unjustly withheld from them by our 
Government and people ....
And in a letter from Bowlin to Pombo dated 10 November 1856, Bowlin claimed in colorful 
terms to the Colombian representative that tonnage and mail taxes were being held out to the 
urban Black population as some kind of reward to them, encouraging them to attack American 
citizens.
The point of exploiting dissident or unemployed masses in Panama City against 
American passengers, besides capturing domestic support, was to embarrass the national 
govenunent at Bogota in the eyes o f the United States as being imwilling or luiable to protect 
American citizens and property. The reaction by the United States was predictable. American 
representatives would demand that the Colombian Government take control of the situation on 
the Isthmus of Panama or else the United States would be forced to take matters into its own 
hands. Unwilling to be a colonial power, the United States would likely try to establish a 
protectorate over the Isthmus of Panama. As it turned out, that is exactly what representatives of 
the United States proposed to Colombia in a 6scinating document called the 1857 project.
In the middle of this triangular arrangement lay the State of Panama, looking to a 
maritime power to promote its sovereign ambitions. The central government at Bogota was no 
doubt aware that acceding to a United States request to interpose itself between the State o f 
Panama and American citizens and property in transit would create a volatile or even 
secessionist condition. Secretary of State Marcy wrote to Special Conunissioners Morse and 
Bowlin on 3 December 1856:
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Minister of Foreign afiairs [Lino de Pombo] bad not only censured the Governor of 
Panama [Francisco de Fabrega] & other ofiBciais for their conduct on that occasion, but 
had asked of the Senate then in special session, that power be given to the Executive to 
bring to justice, before the Supreme Court, the Governor of Panama & the other 
functionaries of the state, in case of reclamation by a foreign power for acts conunitted 
by said Governor and other officials of the state affecting the interest of said foreign 
Power to open a direct investigation of the facts ... and declare the pecuniary 
responsibilities incurred, for which, said functionaries, the parties criminated, and even 
the State Treasury are to held responsible. Mr. Corwine is o f opinion that am attempt 
on the part o f the Mew Granadian Govt, to redress the wrongs ... [to] our countrymen, 
will meet with resistance, [if] it is does not lead to revolution. Such a feeling he states 
was exhibited at Panama on the receipt o f the above-mentioned despatches [emphasis 
added].
However, if the central government at Bogota did nothing, it risked American intervention. It 
was exceptionally clear that representatives o f the United States, including Secretary of State 
James L. Marcy and the two Special Commissioners James B. Bowlin and 1 E Morse, had 
become altogether fed up with the Colombian national goverrunent s apparent unwillingness to 
punish anyone for the April 1856 riots as well as its demonstrated inability to protect American 
lives and property. Special Commissioner Bowlin reported to Secretary of State Marcy on 9 
January 1857, in a fixed determination,' the Colombian Attorney General found nothing 
reprehensible in the conduct of the Panamanian Governor and stated that he would not consent 
to read the evidence obtained by the United States. A memorandum signed by Colombian 
Special Commissioners Lino de Pombo and Florentino Gonzalez on 12 February 1857. stated:
The present Executive Administration considers the republic inespon[s]ible respecting 
the United States for the said events or for their consequences: and could not consent 
that the Government of that country should pronounce a definitive sentence upon the 
question of responsibility, even though the notorious partiality which unfortunately 
characterizes the grounds and reports upon which it has lüd to rest its judgement he not 
taken into consideration.
The decision that the United States would take matters into its own hands was made 
long before any definitive statement by Colombian authorities that they would do nothing about
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the 15 April 1856 riots. A detailed American proposal had already been drafted and was 
included with a 3 December 1856 letter from Secretary of State Marcy to Special 
Commissioners Morse and Bowlin. The conclusion from Corwine's report on the 15 April 1856 
riot, part of the 3 December 1856 letter, was that authorities o f Colombia were incapable of 
offering adequate protection for passengers and cargo in transit across the Isthmus of Panama;
[T]he Government of N. Granada is unable to maintain law & enforce order on this 
Istlunus & afford adequate protection to the transiL This is shown by the repeated 
outbreaks at this place during the past six years, and by the admissions of the Governor, 
Prefect & others, that the Mob could not be restrained or controlled on the night of 15“* 
April last.
No doubt on the basis of Corwine’s findings about the riots, Marcy explained to Morse and 
Bowlin the rationale behind the American proposal:
It carmot be expected that this Government should be satisfied with the bare assurance 
of future protection, after what has happened, and New Granada is apparently without 
the means of restraining and controlling the population which occupies the Isthmus. 
She has not shown herself able to punish the well known perpetrators of a most 
aggravated wrong, nor has she taken any effective measures to guard against the 
recurrence of such scenes as they are.
The proposal was for the Colombian Confederation to cede its control over a portion of the 
Isthmus of Panama so that it might become something like a semi-independent maritime 
municipality imder the protection of the United States. The principle of the American plan was 
in line with what had long been a goal of prominent Panamanian political leaders, dreaming 
Panama would become a ‘Hanseatic State’ under the protection of the maritime powers ever 
since the first non-dependence uprising against Gran Colombia in 1830-1831. The commitment 
of the United States to protect its citizens and property in transit across the Isthmus of Panama 
had become the means to a Panamanian political ambition.
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11.7 THE 1857 PROJECT
In the letter from Secretary of State Marcy to Morse and Bowlin dated 3 December
1856. Marcy said that the 1857 project was similar to British proposals for Greytown at the 
terminus of the Rio San Juan route in Nicaragua and the Bay Islands off the north coast of 
Honduras. He stated that it in fact had the approval o f  Great Britain:
So far as respects the establishment of municipalities at Panama and Aspinwall [Colon] 
to which the most reluctance is apprehended, it is to be observed that this arrangement 
is, in all its essential features, sirnilar to the one recommended by this Government and 
that of Great Britain to be established at San Juan de Nicaragua or Greytown. It is also 
similar to that made between Great Britain and the Republic of Honduras in regard to 
the Bay Islands. San Juan is situated in relation to the Nicaragua route as Aspinwall and 
Panama are in regard to the route which terminates at those two places, and the measure 
deemed appropriate for the safety of the former, is equally required for the safety of the 
latter. Boüi of these precedents, which have the approval of Great Britain, and the latter 
the further approval of this Govenunent may, with great force be urged upon New 
Granada, as inducements, to the acceptance of a similar arrangement at Paiiama and 
Aspinwall.
Secretary of State Marcy then claims that the 1857 project is not a full cession o f territory but is 
a federalist arrangement, like the United States Constitution. He noted that certain powers are 
transferred to a higher authority while others are reserved to the original sovereignty of the 
territory (see Tables 11.2 and 11.3). The solution, typically American, was not to armex territory 
as if a colonial power but to annex' sovereign rights with a federalist transfer.
The arrangement does not propose a full cession of the sovereign rights of New 
Granada over the territory included in the two municipalities, though it is to a 
considerable extent a restriction upon those rights. This arrangement is not believed of 
an unusual character. In organizing the General Govenunent of the United States, the 
several States reserved to themselves a large portion of their original Sovereign rights.
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Table 11.2. Selected sections from the 1857 agreement, detailing an American municipal 
protectorate over the transit cities of Panama City and Colon (Manning 1935).
Excerpts from  the 1857 Project
1. (from Article 1)
‘That a district of country. Twenty English miles in width, bounded on the North and South by 
lines running from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean in the general direction equi distant, or as 
nearly so as practicable, from the present line of the Panama Railroad, and including within the 
same ports and Cities of Aspinwall (Colon) and Panama shall be under the exclusive municipal 
jurisdiction of the inhabitants residing therein -  New Granada still retaining the sovereignty over 
the same, to be exercised in any manner not inconsistent with the municipal jurisdiction and
powers herein conceded to the residents of said District [Tjhe inhabitants of each shall have
the following rights and privileges subject to the specified restrictions: (A) The right to govern 
themselves by means of their own municipal Governments, to be administered by legislative, 
executive, and judicial officers elected according to their own regulations The right to vote at all 
elections shall be confined to freeholders and residents owning personal property to the amount
of $--------- [left blank]. (B) Trial by jury in their own Courts. (C) Perfect (î eedom of religious
belief and of worship, pubic and private. (D) Neither of the said municipal Governments shall lay 
any duties on goods exported nor any duties of tonnage on vessels except such as may be 
necessary for the police of the ports, and the maintenance of light houses and beacons; nothing 
herein contained shall impair or abridge the right of the municipal authority of the said 
governments to levy taxes by the ordinary mode of taxation on the real and personal property of 
the inhabitants for the purpose of raising the necessary sums for defraying the expenses incident 
to the due administration of public affairs in all branches thereof. (E) Exemption from military 
service except for the defence of either of the territories aforesaid.”
2. (from Article I)
‘The high contracting parties hereby agree to respect the municipal governments hereby 
authorized to be established, and not to interfere in any way with the exercise of any of the 
powers granted or privileges conceded to the same, but will maintain with them friendly 
relations. Should either party at any time encroach upon the rights and privileges hereby granted 
and conceded, the other party may. at its discretion, and in any way it may deem proper, aid the 
said municipal Governments, or either of them, in resisting such encroachments. Should any 
foreign power invade the territories of the said municipal Governments, or interfere with their 
rights and privileges, either party to this Convention may assist these governments in defence of 
their territory and municipal rights.”
3. (from Article II)
“And it is hereby furthermore agreed and stipulated that the United States shall have and enjoy in 
regard to the said Rail Road Company all the rights and authority in and over the said Road that 
New Granada has at any time had and enjoyed and they shall have full power and authority to 
alter, modify or extend the charter of the said Panama Rail Road Company and to make any 
agreement with it in relation to the use of the said Road; and they shall also [ “have full and 
exclusive power to” penciled in. Manning (1935: 401)] grant any charter or make any provision 
for the construction of any other rail road or passage way across the Isthmus of Panama within 
the district of country mentioned in the next preceding article on such terms as they may deem 
proper.”__________________________________________________________________
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Table 113. Two versions of Article VT of the 1857 agreement, the preferred version 
proposing annexation and an alternative version proposing American jurisdiction in 
Colombian territory (Manning 1935).
Article VI (Version No, i) Article VI (Version No. 2 not given to Colombia)
"In order to protect and render secure the 
transportation of persons and property across 
the Isthmus o f Panama, and for the full 
enjoyment of the advantages o f  that 
interoceanic communication to the 
Government and people o f the United States, 
it is important that there should be a safe and 
commodious harbor for merchant vessels and 
national ships near the termination o f  
communication on the Pacific. New Granada 
does for that purpose cede to the United 
States, the Island o f Taboga and the other 
Islands in the harbor o f  Panama to wit: 
Flamingo. [Ilenao. Perico. Culebra.] with all 
the rights and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging, in full sovereignty to be owned and 
held forever by the United States in as full and 
ample a manner, as they are or have been 
heretofore held by New Granada; it is 
understood that the cession now made o f the 
said Islands, shall not impair the title of 
individuals to any part of the said Islands, 
holding the same by bona fide grants from the 
Republic of New Granada, or as assignees of 
such grants. Without other restriction the 
United States may hereafter exercise full and 
exclusive jurisdiction o f the said Islands of 
[Taboga. Ramingo. Ilenao. Perico. Culebra.
i t  being important to the interests o f both the high 
contracting parties that there should be a safe and 
commodious harbor and shipyard or naval station, at or 
near the termination o f  the route or transit way across the 
Isthmus on the Pacific -  it is hereby agreed and stipulated 
that the Islands o f  [left blank] in or near the harbor o f  
Panama including the Island o f  Taboga shall be included 
within the municipality o f  Panama in the same manner 
and to the same extent as is the City of Panama; and that 
in case the United States shall see fit to establish on the 
said Islands or any o f  them a ship yard and marine Depot, 
or to occupy any place on the same as a naval station, 
they shall and may be under the authority o f the United 
States. The said islands and the waters around them 
necessary for the purposes herein mentioned shall be 
placed under the control and jurisdiction o f the United 
States; and the United States shall have full authority and 
power to make such laws and regulations as may be 
deemed by them necessary or proper for the security of 
ships, merchandise and persons on the said Islands, and 
for the protection o f the piers, wharves, workshops, 
buildings or any other structures that may be erected or 
constructed thereon. And they may also make such 
provision for maintaining order, peace and the good 
conduct o f persons on the said islands, and to punish 
offenders against the rules and regulations which may be 
there established by the United States or under their 
authority, and the authority and jurisdiction herein 
conferred on the United States over the said Islands and 
adjacent waters around the same, shall be independent o f  
any control by the municipal authority of the City or State 
of Panama, or the Republic of New Granada without the 
express consent o f  the United States -  and then under 
such restrictions as may be imposed by them. The United 
States agree not to protect offenders against the laws or 
government o f the said City. State or Republic who may 
flee to the said Islands, but on proper demand made, to 
deliver them up or permit them to be taken therefrom The 
property o f every description on the said Islands and 
waters afmut the same shall be exempt from all taxation, 
except that which may be imposed by the United States or 
by their consent, and the persons thereon shall be exempt 
from the civil and criminal jurisdiction o f the City and 
State of Panama or the Republic o f New Granada, unless 
the extent o f jurisdiction ... [or] authority o f the 
municipality or the State o f  Panama, or of the republic o f 
New Granada shall be such as the United States may from 
time to time designate. Nothing herein contained, shall 
interfere with the rights, title or interest o f  the owners of 
the real estate on the said islands.”
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That representatives from the State of Panama were more than willing to accept this 
windfall o f  entangling the United States is proven by a âscinating commentary from a letter 
from Special Commissioner Bowlin to Secretary of State Marcy on 6 February 1857. Bowlin 
says that the day after he submitted the 1857 project to Colombian authorities for their review, a 
senator from the State of Panama proposed the same thing to the Colombian Senate,
Another curious thing about this matter. Day before yesterday we had our interview and 
submitted our plans; and yesterday a Panama Senator, submitted to the Senate I 
understand, a proposition for free municipalities, which must have evidently been 
derived from our plan.— The inference I draw from this movement is favourable -  as 1 
think this is a scheme to familiarize the senators with the subject, before it shall be laid 
before them in a treaty.
The federalist arrangement for the maritime cities was not approved by the Colombian Senate 
despite being endorsed by Panamanian officials and despite the forcible American intervention 
that the 15 April 1856, riots had provoked. What Secretary of State Marcy considered a gentle 
federalist arrangement for the maritime cities. Lino de Pombo and Gonzalez considered;
[A|n entire and gratuitous, inconstitutional and discgraceful cession to the United States 
of the territory of the State of Panama; a cession which neither the Government ouglit 
to apply for or exact, nor the other can concede, in conformity with the principles which 
serve as a basis for the political institutions of the two Republics .... Once adopted, the 
predominant influence of the United States, or to speak plainer, the direct and constant 
interference of its Government even by force of arms, in whatever concerned the 
transit way across that neck of land, would constitute "de facto’ a privilege in favor of 
the Union, of its citizens, and of its interests as well political and mercantile.
As for the other matter of American concern following from the April 1856 riots, the demand 
for an indemnity, de Pombo and Gonzalez had this to say:
Chileans and Mexicans, our brothers, are driven from their possessions by force of 
arms, plundered, banged, persecuted in hunting parties, as though th ^  were wild 
beasts, in California, without protection or compensation: American citizens, having 
seized upon the power, after the marmer of conquerors, shoot, confiscate property and 
raze the cities to their foundations in Nicaragua: and New Granada, the classic land of
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patriotism, should consent to debase heiseif remunerating the insults heaped upon 
her!'“
It did not appear that de Pombo and Gonzalez were willing to consider much of any kind of 
diplomatic solution to the 15 April 1856 riots. Bowlin later accused Colombians of intentionally 
precipitating a conflict with the United States merely as a device to pass to the succeeding 
administration a major conflict which it might be able to take advantage o f.'^
It is important to note that at the time the 1857 project was submitted, some 
Panamanians supported the principle o f  Panamanian separation under foreign protection and 
even introduced such plans onto the floor o f the Colombian Senate. Bowlin wrote to Secretary 
of State Cass on 10 April 1857, concerning a Senator from the State of Panama had proposed to 
make Panama an independent state under the protection of four or five foreign powers. Bowlin 
claimed that the whole arrangement was too impractical as it proposed a set of entangling 
alliances with European powers:
Panama
Enclosed I send you a slip, cut from the ‘Tiempo’ of yesterday, containing the project 
of a law. just introduced into Congress by a Senator form Panama, as a remedy for 
existing evils. The project seems to be to make Panama an independent state, quarter 
her upon four or Gve powers who are to guaranty her security, for support and in 
adjusting matters, make New Granada without any commerce, and Sardinia -  with none 
in this quarter, equal in voice with the United States, with her hundred and forty 
millions of commerce and thirty five thousand passengers in transit If the whole 
scheme was not rediculous [sicj. it is too intricate for practicle [sicf working, and 
proposes a set of entangling alUances. with European powers about the destiny of 
American soil, which. I take it the United States are not prepared to sanction.
Letter from de Pombo and Gonzalez to Morse and Bowlirt 23 February 1857 (Manning 1935).
' In a note from Bowlin to Marcy on 20 March 1857. Bowlin reported: “The Press of the same day came 
out and charged the President elect who is here and who will be inaugerated on the first day of april. 
with being adverse to their whole conduct on this question: and flatters itself, that they have gotten things 
in such a situation, that he cannot alter them, or change them if he would. This only confirms, what 1 have 
repeatedly suggested, that the hostile and unfriendly attitude assumed by the present adminisuation 
towards the United States; was a mere scheme to involve the Country in all kinds of difficulty, 
preparitory to delivering it over to its succesor. with the ultimate view, of breaking down the new 
adrninistration with a revolution, the universal resource of the defeated party in this Country.- This is the
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In any event, the curious 1857 project did not surAce again in the next few year's diplomatic 
correspondence and seemingly it became a dead letter.
11.8 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN NOVEMBER 1903
It is likely that President Theodore Roosevelt’s disgust with the Colombian Senate's 
unanimous rejection of the 1902 Hay-Herràn Treaty was due to the fact that Roosevelt believed 
the decision was based purely on greed. A common understanding of the Hay-Herràn Treaty 's 
failure is that Colombian rejection was intended as a stalling tactic until the French company's 
contract expired, meaning that the $40 million meant for the French company would go to the 
Republic of Colombia. But consider the timing of the Hay-Herràn Treaty ratification in the 
Colombian Senate. Early 1903 was a very unstable time coming off the heels o f  a disastrous 
civil vsar in Colombia, the Thousand Day's War. What Roosevelt does not appear to have had 
much patience for was that in an unstable situation a  Colombian president would never have 
stuck his neck out for a treaty obliging the RepubUc of Colombia to yield its sovereignty over 
the Isthmus of Panama to the United States, at least not for anything less than a king's ransom.
A canal treaty was a made to order situation for the political opposition who would 
manipulate critical Colombian public opinion by calling the ratification of the treaty an 
unpatriotic sell-out of a Colombian national asset, and for a mere pittance compared to what it 
was really worth. The best and perhaps only defense a Colombian president had was to proclaim 
that the expected compensation from the treaty was extraordinarily substantial. The president 
could claim that he would make sure that the direct and derived benefits of the canal found their 
way into the pockets o f each and every Colombian citizen in as 6 ir  a maimer as possible. Collin 
(1990. 219-220) notes:
whole secret of their harsh conduct on our friendly proposals to settle our difficulties by negotiation”
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Both chief executives, Roosevelt in America and Mairoquin in Colombia, had to deal 
with demanding senates, sensitive to any extension of executive power, even in foreign 
relations. Marroquin. the head of a nation divided by civil war, and Roosevelt, an 
elevated vice-president battling for unprecedented renomination and reelection, were on 
equally precarious political ground: both were dealing with sensitive senators jealous of 
yielding political power to vulnerable chief executives. Marroquin faced a newly 
elected Senate unified only by its opposition to the Marroquin government, its policies, 
and its responsibility for Colombia’s devastating civil war. The Colombian Congress 
that was elected to debate the Hay-Herran Treaty gathered instead to debate Marroquin 
himself.***
The nature o f the domestic political enviroiunent in the Republic of Colombia during 
the ratification of an agreement with the United States was noted in a  particularly perceptive 
letter by Minister T. C. Dawson to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox dated 29 March 1909. 
concerning the Tripartite Treaties. The Tripartite Treaties were a series o f  three linked 
agreements, considered supplementary to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, signed between the 
United States, Republic o f Colombia, and the Republic o f Panama in January 1909. Though 
rejected by the Colombian Senate, the treaties were intended to settle the differences between 
the three states over the 3 November 1903, Panamanian secession. An important part of the 
treaty was that the Republic o f Colombia would receive certain compensation in exchange for 
acknowledging the independence of the Republic of Panama.
Minister Dawson described how the political opposition was very effectively able to 
arouse popular sentiments against the incumbent administration by means o f attacking the 
ratification of the Tripartite Treaties. Dawson said:
The opponents of the government had succeeded in arousing the latent popular 
sentiment of indignation that had never ceased to exist against the Pana man leaders
(Manning 1935).
*** Bergquist (1978, 217-218) says: “[RJeform forces, especially prominent dissident Conservatives, 
found themselves on the losing side of the canal treaty debate, they were ultimately able to turn the issue 
of the loss of Panama, which occurred soon after the Senate's rejection of the treaty, to great political 
advantage. Within the climate of bipartisan solidarity and national soul-searching engendered by the 
secession of Panama, the reformists succeeded in thoroughly discrediting the Nationalist’s policies of 
political exclusivism and managed to elect a president committed in large part to their economic and 
political program.”
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who took part in the declaration of independence and against the United States for its 
alleged complicitŷ  with their acts. Opposition members of the assembly had succeeded 
in further exacerbating public sentiment by insisting that certain articles of the treaties 
were susceptible of a construction that would be ruinous to Colombia .... From about 
the 12"' it had seemed to me that the popular sentiment against the treaties was being 
swallowed up in the feeling against the Govenunent and considerations of internal 
politics and personal ambition."^
Dawson concluded that if the treaties were manipulated as a major issue in the elections they 
would inevitably fall victim to domestic politics. If. on the other hand, the Colombian electorate 
found other issues more consequential. Dawson felt that the treaties would have a chance of 
ratification. In an interesting twist at the end of the statement Dawson contemplates the 
reluctant role he may find himself playing as part of Colombian election year politics;
If the treaties become the principal issue in the elections, the chances are against their 
latificatioiL If internal politics, decentralization, liberty of the press, and fiscal and 
administrative reforms preoccupy the unthinking and prejudiced public, the treaties 
may have a chance .... The pressure upon me to become, as it were, a center of intrigue 
-  to take part in the irmer workings of Colombian party politics -  has been strong and 
will become stronger as the parties line up for the elections.
Nikoi and Holbrook (1977), using evidence of naval deployments during late 1903 fi-om 
the Area Files of the Naval Record Collection, assert that President Theodore Roosevelt 
expected the Panamanian secession to occur and had ordered American warships to advance 
positions ready to rush into the area afterwards. Nikol and Holbrook (1977) describe American 
naval movements just prior to the 3 November 1903, secession as a  planned deployment, where 
the U.S.S. Nashville was sent to Jamaica on 24 October and the U.S.S. Dixie, with a marine 
batallion was sent from Philadelphia to Jamaica on 23 October. The Nashville and the Dixie 
were to stay in Jamaica awaiting further orders, a situation that would make sense only if the 
two vessels were being staged for a possible intervention on the Isthmus of Panama. Otherwise, 
the two vessels would have been kept at an American base like Guantanamo or Puerto Rico.
U.S. Congress (1977b. 584-586).
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The geographic movements o f American vessels to a ready point in Jamaica more than a week 
before the secession. Nikol and Holbrook (1977) claim, effectively proves President 
Roosevelt's complicity or at least his foreknowledge of the Panamanian secession of 3 
November 1903.
Nikol and Holbrook's (1977) conclusion is not a  revelation and fails to prove 
complicity in starting the Pa n a m a n ian  revolt. President Roosevelt himself stated that he ordered 
American vessels to be in ready positions for a  possible secession on the Isthmus of Panama. 
During President Roosevelt's message to Congress on 4 January 1904. he said:
In view of all these facts I directed the Navy Department to issue instructions such as 
would insure our having ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of need 
arising.'®"
In the same speech. Roosevelt also stated that he had specifically counted on Panamanian 
secession as a  possible third alternative with respect to American interests in an interoceanic 
canal. The other alternatives were negotiation with the Republic of Nicaragua over the San Juan 
route or another round of negotiations with the Republic of Colombia over the Panama route. If 
given all three alternatives, Roosevelt said he would support Panamanian independence. 
However, he denied any role in creating a  Panamanian revolution.
The argument made by President Roosevelt and Secretary of State John Hay was that 
Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty was never intended to obligate the United 
States to guarantee the sovereignty of Colombia (New Granada) over the Isthmus of Panama 
against itself i.e.. its administrative authority over its o w t i  citizens. The principle behind signing 
Article XXXV was to protect the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama against hostilities between 
the maritime powers, which was then accomplished by means o f guaranteeing the sovereignty 
of Colombia. In other words. Article XXXV did not obligate the United States to simply
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guarantee Colombia’s sovereignty over the Isthmus of Panama as an end in itself. This seems to 
be a correct interpretation o f Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty.
As to whether President Roosevelt had any special knowledge concerning a 
Panamanian secession, Roosevelt said that he was as fully aware as any ordinary person that a 
Panamanian secession was a  possibility:
[ think proper to say. therefore, that no one connected with this Government had any 
previous knowledge of the revolution except such as was accessible to any person of 
ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers and kept up a current acquaintance with 
public afifairs.’̂ '
Could it be that the President o f the United States was no better informed about matters of 
national security than any person o f ordinary intelUgence reading the newspaper? Roosevelt 
insists that the secession was common knowledge but this statement does not seem entirely 
forthright. McCullough (1977) describes Philippe Bunau-Varilla's audience with President 
Roosevelt prior to the November 1903 revolt, in which Bunau-Varilla allegedly interpreted 
silence as consent when he asked whether the United States would support an independence 
movement on the Isthmus of Panama. The meeting with Bunau-Varilla suggests that President 
Roosevelt had more insight about the planned secession than any ordinary person reading a 
newspaper did. President Roosevelt claims to have done nothing to support Panamanian 
independence before 3 November 1903, which would include filin g  to deny that the United 
States would lend military protection to an independent Republic of Panama against the 
Republic o f Colombia when asked. But what justified American military action denying the 
Republic of Colombia the ability to send its own forces to the Isthmus of Panama in November 
1903? President Roosevelt claimed that the interests of the United States and the interests of
U.S. Congress (1977b, 307).
U.S. Congress (1977b. 313).
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world commerce justified American action in support o f an independent Republic of Panama 
"willing to do its share in this great work for civilization/’
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C h a p t e r  12. T h e  Us e  o f  Am e r ic a n  Ar m e d  Fo r c e s  d u r in g  t h e  J a n u a r y  1964 C a n a l
Z o n e  R io t s
On 2 May 1958, several students planted Panamanian flags in the Canal Zone in a 
symbolic demonstration against the terms of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. The exalted name 
for the flag planting was Operation Sovereignty.” On 21 October 1959, with advance 
knowledge that a demonstration would take place in the coming weeks, the United States 
Ambassador made a formal request to the Govenunent of the Republic of Panama to take 
whatever steps were necessary in order to ensure public order.
Nonetheless, a few weeks later on 3 November 1959, the anniversary of Panamanian 
independence from Colombia, approximately 150 people tore down the American flag and 
destroyed property at the Chancery o f  the United States Embassy and the offices of the United 
States Information Service. Groups gathering to raise the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone 
became violent and in the absence of any Panamanian National Guard support, the Governor of 
the Canal Zone called on United States armed forces to quell the crowd.
The next day, the Panamanian Minister of Foreign Relations responded to the American 
Ambassador's protest against the Republic of Panama by lodging a counter protest. The 
minister alleged the desecration of a Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone and the use of 
American armed forces against unarmed Panamanians sparked the riots. Strangely failing to 
recall that it was the National Guard that 6iled to do anything to deter the crowd, the 
Panamanian Minister asked that United States authorities act with greater prudence so that such 
events might be avoided in the future:
According to information received by the Government up to the present, the acts 
committed in front of the Chancery of the U.S. A Embassy were preceded by analogous 
acts involving a Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone .... [M]y Government has 
information regarding certain unjustifiable acts, such as firing against groups of 
unarmed Panamanians and launching tear gas bombs in various sectors of the city, that 
resulted in the woimding of more than forty Panamanian citizens by action of the U.S. 
armed forces. My Goverrunent formally protests the attitude assumed and the acts 
committed at certain moments by the police forces of the Canal Zone and the military
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forces that came later to reinforce them And in presenting this formal protest my 
Government trusts that the civilian and military authorities of the U.S. in the Canal 
Zone will act in future with greater consideration and pmdence so that the repetition of 
the events we lament today might be avoided.'^
In a Department of State issue dated 10 November 1959. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom 
claimed:
[T]he absence of Panamanian police from the scene of violence at the Canal Zone
border ... the United States considers a major factor contributing to the unfortunate
events.'^
Unlike the situation earlier in the month, on 28 November 1959. the aimiversary of colonial 
independence from Spain, both Panamanian National Guard and United States troops 
cooperated to disperse the crowd attempting to enter the Canal Zone. Afterwards the crowd 
focused its efforts outside the Canal Zone and several blocks of downtown Panama City were 
looted.
Nationalist activism involving the symbolic gesture of planting a Panamanian flag in 
Canal Zone territory whether accomplished peacefully or violently as in 1959 was something 
that United States representatives appear to have taken quite seriously. Flag-related nationalist 
demonstrations in or near the Canal Zone affected diplomatic relations with the Republic of 
Panama at a time when United States representatives believed the situation would be exploited 
by Communist insurgents (Figure 12.1). The specter o f Communism in the Caribbean and 
Central America seemed to capture the attention o f American representatives during the 1960s 
much as the specter of British armexation transfixed American representatives during the 1840s. 
What seems to have been lost on American representatives during the 1960s was that domestic 
politics prey upon geopolitical conflicts, not just the other way around.
U.S. Congress (1977b. 1044). 
U.S. Congress (1977b, 1044).
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To ward ofif the potential for Communist-inspired activism, on 27 September 1963, the 
Governor of the Canal Zone initiated a compromise solution in 17 selected sites where both the 
United States and Panamanian flags were to be flown at the same time. All other sites including 
high schools were to have no flag at all;
This method of implementing the agreement between the two Presidents satisfied 
neither the Panamanian population nor the American inhabitants of the Canal Zone. 
The Panamanians were resentful that the Panamanian flag nas not hoisted alongside the 
United States flag at all the places where the United States flag bad been previously 
flown on land by the civilian authorities. The Americans in the Zone, on the other hand, 
did not easily accept the removal of their flag from the fiont of the schools where, 
according to American custom, it was usually flown.'^
The governor's solution to the flag dilemma in late 1963 did not exactly do the trick. The 
following January 1964 the issue of flags came up again. Flag demonstrations were probably a 
twice-per-November event for student activists within the Republic of Panama. But this time the 
flag demonstrations occurred in January and the consequences o f the flag issue were a  week of 
rioting and several deaths. The 1964 Canal Zone riots were in fact the worst breakdown in the 
American-Panamanian relationship since the 1856 riots more than a century earlier.
The similarities between the November 1959 riots and the January 1964 riots are 
striking the major differences being only a matter of proportion. Both supposedly started over 
the issue of flags. Both, according to Panamanian political representatives, began on account of 
an alleged desecration of the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone. In both cases the Panamanian 
National Guard was kept out the area requiring Canal Zone police and later United States armed 
forces to defend the Canal Zone against mob violence. And in both cases, Panamanian 
representatives made formal protests against the use o f American armed forces against its 
citizens.
U.S. Congress (1977b, 1109).
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Figure 12.2. American students at Balboa High School awaiting an international incident (National Archives),
A synthesis of testimony and facts about the 1 9 6 4  Canal Zone riots is provided by the 
International Commission o f  Jurists Report on Events January 9-12, 1964, herein referred to as 
the ICJ report. The ICJ report was to be considered the authors themselves declared, "an 
impartial and objective assessment o f the issues involved." The report was commissioned by 
Panamanian request. Citing articles o f the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, the National 
Bar Association of Panama on 2 1  January 1 9 6 4 , petitioned the International Commission of 
Jurists Investigating Committee to examine charges the United States had violated the human 
rights of citizens o f the Republic o f Panama during the Canal Zone riots.
According the ICJ report, on the day before the beginning of the riots on 8 January 
1964, three Panamanian students questioned the principal of Balboa High School and the 
Panama Canal Information Officer about the presence of an American flag in front of the high 
school. None of the three students announced that they were planning a demonstration in front 
of Balboa High School the next day (Figure 12.2).'^ As for the American flag, it had been taken 
down by school authorities but was raised again and subsequently guarded by several American 
high school students, supported by their parents, in defiance of the Governor's ruling.
Around 4:45 PM on 9 January 1964, a  group of 200 Panamanian students marched into 
the Canal Zone. The ICJ report states that the student's march appeared to have been very 
carefully prepared" and was not a spontaneous movement, no doubt based on the Act that the 
students had photographers and film operators with them.'®’ The purpose of the Panamanian
The judgement of the ICJ was that there was no evidence the United States violated the human rights 
of Panamanian citizens dining the 1964 Canal Zone riots. The ICJ report concludes. "Considering all the 
above surrounding circumstances, and in particular the grave acts of violence and the threat to life and 
securit)' involved, we have come to the conclusion that, even if the force used by the Canal Zone 
Authorities and the United States Army may have been at certain stages somewhat in excess of what was 
absolutely necessary at the time, the force used seems to have been justified; taking into account such 
rapidly moving, critical, and violent conditions, it is impossible to lay down a fine distinguishing line of 
what should have been the absolute minimum necessary.” (U.S. Congress 1977b. 1133-1134).
U.S. Congress (1977b).
U.S. Congress (1977b) stated: "This march appears to have been very carefully prepared and did not 
appear to have been a spontaneous movement by the students .... The students were accompanied by 
photographers and film operators ....”
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student’s march into the Canal Zone seemed to have been to protest the presence of the 
American flag flying all by itself in front o f  Balboa High School. The student’s concern had 
already lodged to the principal and the Panama Canal Information Officer the previous day. 
Afrer entering the Canal Zone, the Panamanian student demonstrators were escorted by Canal 
Zone Police to a point near Balboa High School but were kept at a distance.
It appears that the Panamanian students were simply asking that the Panamanian flag be 
flovvTi alongside the American flag, not an altogether unfair request given the ruling of the 
Governor of the Canal Zone about flag flying. It might have been more proper had the 
Panamanian students simply demanded that the American flag taken down in accordance with 
the Canal Zone Governor’s ruling. But then again, a group of Panamanian students should not 
have had to remind Canal Zone Police or Balboa High School authorities, a  second time, about 
what the Governor of the Canal Zone had already ruled about the flying of the American flag in 
front of high schools.
After some negotiation with Canal Zone police, a small number o f Panamanian students 
were allowed to proceed to where the American flag was being displayed and hold, but not 
raise, their flag while singing the Panamanian national anthem, i.e., right in front o f the large 
assembly of American high school students and their parents. It is difficult to see how the 
Panamanian students would not have understood the effect this might provoke, namely, jeering 
or other insults by the crowd of American high school students. But what is even more difficult 
to believe is that the Canal Zone Police did not understand this as well. If  the Governor of the 
Canal Zone had ruled that the American flag was not to fly in front o f  any high school, then the 
Canal Zone Police should have done their duty and enforced the law. The American flag should 
have been taken down immediately. As it was, an ad hoc and very questionable decision was 
made by the Canal Zone Police to escort a  few Panamanian students into a middle of a 
potentially hostile crowd to hold their flag in their hands and sing their national anthem.
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Problems developed when the Canal Zone Police Guled to calm the crowd. Obviously, 
the assembly of American students and their parents was becoming more than a little agitated 
by the audacity of the Panamanian students. But in defense of the Panamanian students, it was 
the poor judgement of Canal Zone Police themselves that put them there in the first place.'®* 
Because of the growing ill-will, the Panamanian student demonstration was cancelled by Canal 
Zone Police and in the confusion the Panamanian flag was tom. According to the ICJ report, it 
was not clear who tore the flag. The ICJ Investigating Committee concluded that in the disorder 
of the moment the flag, which was not made of sturdy material, simply did not survive the 
strain. The ICJ reports states;
The cancelling of the demonstration, the retreat with a tom flag, the hostile behaviour 
of the Americans in front of the Balboa High School, as well as during the retreat of the 
students, and the lack of any effective attempt by the police to quieten the American 
students and adults, had apparently caused a certain panic and resentment among the 
Panamanian students.'®®
One is instantly struck by two things in the ICJ report’s minute by minute explanation 
of the pivotal series of events that occurred in front o f Balboa High School on the afternoon of 9 
January 1964. First, is the incredibly irony of the flags, symbolic of the quintessential problem 
of Canal Zone territory. The dilemma of how to get two sovereigns in the same space at the 
same time had now come to this: how to get two flags to fly on the same flagpole at the same 
time in front of a high school. The Governor of the Canal Zone had decided that the best 
solution was to fly both the American and Panamanian flag together in certain locations, 
conceivably on two different flagpoles, or else fly none at all. The solution engineered by the 
Canal Zone Police on the spot showed less judgement and obviously did more to aggravate the
'®* The ICJ report criticizes the way the Canal Zone Police handled, if not indirectly encouraged, the 
behavior of the American students and their parents.
'®® U.S. Congress (1977b, page. Sec. 33).
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situation than dissipate it. One is at a loss why the Canal Zone Police did not simply uphold the 
law, as was their duty, and demand the American flag be taken down.
The second thing one is instantly struck by is how frankly petty the entire series of 
events was. To think that such an incident would lead to several days of disastrous rioting and 
loss of life is inconceivable if it were not for the 6 c t that it actually happened. It would be a 
mistake to try to lend dignity to the events by calling the dispute between these two groups of 
high school students and their parents a matter o f national honor. Either group's behavior might 
just as easily have been over defacing each other's high school mascots before a Friday night 
football game. Yet somehow one is to believe that the incident in the front of Balboa High 
School was such an assault on national honor that it demanded a break in diplomatic relations 
between two countries and four days of rioting including several deaths. Such is probably the 
reason most sovereign states do not leave their international relations to high school students.
The series o f events that occurred after the incident in front of the high school, as 
explained in the ICJ report, is more than a bit peculiar. Before the student convoy had left the 
Canal Zone a large crowd perhaps in the hundreds was already waiting for them on the edge of 
the Zone."“  The ICJ Investigating Committee seems to have been dumbfounded how such a 
large crowd could have possibly heard the news of the flag incident so quickly, and why the 
event was supposedly spreading like wildfire through Panama City. On the gathering crowds, 
the ICJ report states;
[S|omehow, even before the Panamanian students reached the Panamanian Border, the 
news of the flag incidents and of the tom flag had, as vividly expressed by some of the 
witnesses, "spread like wildfire through the City of Panama’, and a large crowd had 
already gathered in Calle G, which is adjacent to 4* of July Avenue, at about 6:30 PM 
At this time the crowd that had gathered ran into the several hundreds.^'
The ICJ report notes that on their way out of the Canal Zone, the flustered Panamanian students 
vandalized Caiml Zone proper^, broke windows, etc.
U.S. Congress (1977b).
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Not only was a large crowd building on the edge o f the Canal Zone before the students 
had arrived, but the President of the Republic o f Panama himself, Roberto F. Chiari. received 
the student delegation immediately upon their return. The implication in the ICJ report was that 
the president’s office had prior knowledge of the student’s demonstration. The report declared 
that, in any case, Panamanian authorities in the Ministry o f External Af&irs had been informed 
in advance of the student’s plans for a demonstration in the Canal Zone:
Before they [the students] had returned to the territory of the Republic of Panama, the 
news of their demonstration had spread among the population and a crow d was already 
waiting for their return in the streets near the frontier of the Canal Zone. The fact that a 
delegation of students was received, immediately after their return, by the President of 
the Republic of Panama suggests that the Panamanian authorities may have had prior 
knowledge of the student’s demonstration. In any case, the Ministry of External Affairs 
was informed by the students of their proposed demonstration before they took off.~°̂
The report also noted that within half an hour, the crow d had grown to several thousand and had 
become more violent.^
Several pieces of evidence in the ICJ report suggest that representatives of the Republic 
of Panama were negligent. During the very early hours o f the rioting, several calls were made 
by American authorities to the Panamanian National Guard to control the violent crowd on the 
border of the Canal Zone. The fact that most of the rioters were on the border of the Canal 
Zone, but not inside, meant they were within the jurisdiction of the National Guard. According 
to the ICJ report, the National Guard was deliberately kept away from troubled areas in Panama 
City until after the riots had run their course (Figure 12.3):
U.S. Congress (1977b)
U.S. Congress (1977b) said: “The crowd grew rapidly and within about half an hour there were several 
thousand people all along the border extending from the Balboa Road entrance to the Ancon railway 
station. The violence of the crowd increased; there were repeated attempts at several points all along the 
border to enter the Canal Zone territory with the object not only of planting Panamanian flags but also of 
setting fire to property and otherwise threatening public safety.”
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Figure 12.3. Photograph, Januar>' 1964. Aftermath for Americans who parked their cars too close to the edge of the Canal Zone 
(National Archives).
In the meantime, repeated attempts were made by the Canal Zone authorities to call to 
their aid the Guaidia Nacional of Panama to take effective measures to control the 
violent crowd. Between 6:30 and 8:30 p m.. 7 or 8 telephone calls were made by the 
American authorities but no effective action was taken by the Guardia Nacional. On the 
contrary, the Guardia Nacional was purposely kept away from the trouble-spots in the 
City of Panama until early on January 13.^
The situation was similar to the 3 November 1959, flag riots in which the National Guard was 
conspicuously absent. Perhaps it was standard protocol not to use the National Guard to 
disperse rioters, but rather simply let things dissipate on their own. On the other hand, during 
the 28 November 1959, riots the National Guard worked in conjunction with United States 
troops to dispel demonstrators. Therefore, there was a precedent for the National Guard 
cooperating with United States troops against demonstrators.
In Colon, on the Caribbean side, the situation seems to have been different. The 
Panamanian National Guard conununicated and worked in tandem with United States Army 
troops to restore order. However, the ICJ report notes that National Guard troops were totally 
disarmed during the riots, an unusual situation given the circumstances:
The Investigating Committee was satisfied on the evidence that from time to time, the 
U.S. Army and police ofBcials of the Canal Zone [in Colon) were in commiuiication 
with the ofBcials of the Guardia, who appear to have cooperated and endeavoured, 
within their limits, to restore order. Curiously, it was also proved that the Guardia were 
totally disarmed during these difBcult days; the Guardia are usually equipped with 
pistols and batons. No explanation was given as to why the Guardia were ordered not to 
cany their usual arms diuing these days.“ ®
It should be remembered that the purpose of the ICJ report was not to interrogate Panamanian 
officials about their conduct or decisions, but rather to decide whether United States officials 
had violated the human rights of Panamanian citizens in defense of the Canal Zone. 
Nonetheless, the ICJ report clearly implicates Panamanian officials for failing to control the
U.S. Congress (1977b). 
U.S. Congress (1977b).
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crowd. The ICJ report does not suggest that officials o f the Republic o f Panama were part of 
any premeditated plan. The report only said that there was evidence of ^some degree of 
premeditation and planning” by someone, and that after the riots had begun, authorities of the 
Republic o f  Panama took no steps to control it:
[T]here was no evidence before us that any attempts were made by the authorities of the 
Panamanian Republic to assuage, calm or otherwise control the crowds. Indeed, on the 
contrary, from the materials made available, it would appear that statements made 
through the radio and the television were of an inflammatory nature. Incendiary bombs, 
or 'Molotov Cocktails,’ were used during the rioting. These must have been made for 
this purpose. When, where and by whom th^r were made was not disclosed to the 
Investigating Committee. The fact that these were made and used would indicate some 
degree of premeditation and planning.'"^
The great question in the 1964 riots is why the mere tearing of a flag would provoke 
such a raving response by so many people so rapidly. So rapidly, in fact, that large crowds had 
begun to form before the students had even left the Canal Zone with the tom flag. It seems very 
odd that after the first evening of rioting, before anyone should have reasonably been able to 
make a fair assessment of what had happened, representatives of the Republic of Panama had 
already drafted urgent letters calling for the intervention of the Organization of American States 
and the United Nations against the United States. At the same time, Panamanian representatives 
failed to take steps to control the situation by simply calling for the intervention of their own 
National Guard. On 10 January 1964. the Panamanian representative to the United Nations sent 
a letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council asking for consideration of 
urgent matters between Panama and the United States. What is interesting about his letter is that 
less than a decade later, in March 1973, officials in the Republic o f Panama arranged for the 
United Nations Securit} Council to assemble in Panama City in a special meeting to settle
U.S. Congress (1977b). Among the candidates are natiotialist activists and students, or perhaps even 
nationalist opposition leaders who were trying to force the administration into pitting the National Guard 
against the demonstrators and other patriots of the state.
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peacefully the Canal Zone situation. Panamanian officials proclaimed that the festering Canal 
Zone issue was a danger to peace and international security thus a proper subject for 
consideration by the Security Council. The 10 January 1964, letter stated:
The tragic situation with which we are now confionted in the Isthmus of Panama has 
been brought about by the repeated threats and acts of aggression committed by the 
Government of the United Slates of America in the Republic of Panama, which infiinge 
our territorial sovereignty, violate our territorial integrity and constitute in practice a 
serious danger to peace and international security.
In a note of the same date, the Goverrunent of Panama informed the United States that it 
considered its diplomatic relations with the United States broken and had recalled its 
ambassador.
The most cotrunon explanation for the curiously rapid and condemning response by 
Panamanians is that nationalist fiustration against the presence of the Canal Zone was ruiming 
at fever pitch by the 1960s. Anything, no matter how slight, would have set it off. In other 
words, despite the unfortunate tragedy in lives and property, Americans living on the Isthmus 
for the most part brought it upon themselves with their cultural snobbery and long-standing 
disrespect of their sovereign hosts (witness the insults of the American high school students and 
their parents). As the explanation goes, charges of negligence leveled against Panamanian 
authorities for failing to use force against their own citizens in January 1964 should be qualified 
by the circumstances that gave rise to the riots in the first place. It was hypocritical to expect the 
Republic of Panama to enforce order over its own population because of a  violent situation that 
the people of the United States themselves had brought about through their occupation of Canal 
Zone territory. Recall that the same argument was offered to absolve officials from Panama of 
negligence during the April 1856 riots in Panama City.
U.S. Congress (1977b, 1070).
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The problem with this explanation is that it is difficult to rectify the changes in the 
policy of the United States Federal Government in the Canal Zone with the excesses seen in 
January 1964. Negotiations to further modify, albeit not abrogate, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
arrangement and improve the status of Panamanian labor in the Canal Zone were in progress 
immediately prior to the 1964 riots, perhaps as a result of earlier flag-related disturbances.'”* 
The ongoing treaty negotiations with the United States after 1959 should have decreased not 
increased the likelihood of a major disturbance in 1964. If four days of rioting by thousands of 
people was supposed to have been triggered by no more than a tom flag then I suppose one is 
merely to take it for granted that the people of Panama are about the most immoderate and 
irrational people on the face o f the earth.^ Somehow that does not ring tme.
It was only four years after the Canal Zone riots that the National Guard took over the 
Panamanian State in a military coup. It does not seem unreasonable to think that the remarkable 
changes that occurred in Panamanian domestic politics in 1968 may be somehow related to the 
Canal Zone riots of just a few years earlier. The way to see the connection between January 
1964 and October 1968 is to blur the line separating domestic politics from foreign relations 
with the United States. Historically, anti-American posturing by the elite leadership of the 
Republic of Panama has been quite common but was usually limited to political rhetoric or 
opposition to a proposed treaty. In Act. rhetoric aimed at the jurisdiction of the United States 
Federal Government in the Canal Zone has been such a routine platform of Panamanian 
domestic politics that the only way to distinguish one Action from another with respect to their
■”* On 2 December 1959, President Eisenhower remarked: “I do. in some form of other, believe we 
should have visual evidence that Panama does have titular sovereignty over the region.^ On 19 April 
1960. a nine-point program for improving relations with Panama wiA respect to the Canal Zone was 
approved by President Eisenhower. Several points focused on improving status of Panamanians in Canal 
Zone labor regime, including pay increases, training, and pAcement of Panamanians in skilled and 
supervisory positions. On 17 September 1960. the United States agreed to allow the Panamanian flag to 
fly beside the American flag m the area known as Shalers Triangle in the Canal Zone (U.S. Congress 
1977b).
The same could be said about how masses of Panama Ci^ residents reacted to an unpaid piece of Bruit 
on 15 April 1856.
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policy on the Canal Zone is to call it a matter of degree. But widespread nationalist 
demonstrations, flag-plantings and violence directed against the United States by middle-class 
students and other activists during the late 1950s and early 1960s was something relatively new. 
Violent nationalism against the Canal Zone in 1964 was illustrative of the emergence o f a 
political opposition seeking to replace the traditional political order of the Panamanian elite
At the time of the 1964 riots, various factions o f the Liberal Party elite were struggling 
to maintain control of the state against nationalist opposition leaders. One Liberal faction even 
found itself allying with long time rival Amulfb Arias in an effort to appeal to the middle-class 
and the interior. The ascent of Amulfb Arias in the next election was. at least indirectly, the 
intended consequence o f  the Canal Zone riots. Student activism in the Republic of Panama was 
not just a spontaneous reaction it was a political fixture, created in part by Amulfb and 
Harmodio Arias. The National University was established in 1935 during the presidency of 
Harmcdio Arias, and according to LaFeber (1989, 80), was the institutional descendent o f what 
the January 1931 coup by Amulfb Arias was all about: middle-class activism against the 
traditional oligarchy. LaFeber (1989, 80) says:
The university, and especially the Federation [Federation of Panamanian Students |. 
became ladders for middle-and lower-class students who determined to succeed 
economically, were willing to challenge the government in the streets, and advocated a 
political program that was to the left
The more the incumbent administration ûiiled to make a charismatic appeal to the middle-class 
and student activists, the greater the chance that opposition leaders like Arias would gain 
ground.
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If the incumbent administration had used the National Guard against student 
demonstrators and rioters in January 1964 it would have been tantamount to supporting the 
jurisdiction of the United States in the Canal Zone. A healthy dose of anti-American posturing 
was exactly what the tottering Liberal administration needed in the wake o f the January 1964 
riots. Nonetheless, a more permanent solution had to be found.
The challenge for the next Liberal Panamanian administration in 1968 was to find a 
way of controlling nationalist opposition so that a repeat of the embarrassing and costly 
diplomatic scandal with the United States could be avoided, without forsaking their own 
interests. The January 1964 riots had awakened American attention to its standing in the 
Republic of Panama. Representatives o f the United States would undoubtedly endeavor to 
influence internal politics in any way so that a  stronger administrative leadership could take 
over and establish some order on the Isthmus. The American objective was to prevent another 
embarrassing nationalist uprising that might be exploited by Communist insurgents. And it was 
no doubt well understood that the specter o f Communist agitation in Panama would cause the 
United States to bring its own power to bear if the Liberal party could not maintain order over 
its own population. The choice for the Liberal elite was between popular leaders like Amulfb 
Arias, with whom they at least had dealings with in the Union Club, and the military leaders of 
the National Guard, who came from a different society entirely. As it was, the Liberal and 
Araulfista alliance enjoyed perhaps one o f the shortest-lived successes in political history, just 
ten days, after which the Government o f the Republic of Panama fell to the unchosen, the 
National Guard.
Negligence or even encouragement during the 1964 Canal Zone riots is not proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt by the report o f  the ICJ Investigating Committee, because such was 
not its mission in Panama. The purpose o f the ICJ report was to investigate charges of human 
rights violations brought against the United States by the National Bar Association of Panama.
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Nonetheless, the strongest censure to be found in the ICJ report is against officials of the 
Republic of Panama for failing to control the demonstrators;
We regret deeply that the Panamanian authorities made no attempt dtuing the critical 
early hours, as well as for almost three days thereafter, to curb arid control the violent 
activities of the milling crowds. On the contrary, there is considerable evidence to 
indicate that broadcasts over radio, television and loud-speakers, newspapers, and other 
means were adopted to incite and misinform the Panamanian public without any action 
by the Panamanian authorities to curtail or moderate such acti\ities.~'°
The peculiar unwillingness of Panamanian authorities to control the situation, the 6 c t that 
Panamanian officials at the highest levels had prior knowledge of the student's activities yet 
subtracted rather than added to National Guard enforcement capability around the Canal Zone, 
the familiarity o f  the pattern in other cases of conflict with the United States, and the political 
insecurity of the traditional Panamanian elite leadership at the time suggests beyond a 
reasonable suspicion at least two possibilities.
One possibility is that the January 1964 riots themselves were encouraged by officials 
of the Liberal administration and veiled as negligence for much needed domestic political gain. 
But whatever nationalist support might be created would have only been a quick fix for the 
flailing Liberal elite. A more likely possibility is that the January 1964 riots were arranged by 
nationalist activists to embarrass and discredit the incumbent Liberal administration in the eyes 
of the United States as being incapable o f controlling the mass of Panamanians, and in the eyes 
of the mass of Panamanians, as being in support of the jurisdiction of the United States in the 
Canal Zone. Ancillary to this second possibility is the reaction by the Chiari administration to 
tr\' as best as they could to use the situation to their advantage in the domestic arena while at the 
same time repairing the diplomatic damage with the United States.
Strange as it may sound the riots were probably not intended as an attack on the United 
States in the Canal Zone. The January 1964 Canal Zone riots were a symptom of political crisis
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within the Republic o f Panama and served as a  pre6ce to the election of Amulfb Arias on 1 
October 1968, and the military coup ten days later on II October 1968. In their conspicuous 
Ailure to control the demonstrators in 1964 and their subsequent anti-American posturing, the 
politically vulnerable incumbent Liberal elite tried to use an age-old stratagem. The Liberal 
leadership %iled to prevent and then politically manipulated the aftermath of the 1964 riots in 
the hopes of harnessing, or perhaps simply deflecting, nationalist forces within the country that 
were undercutting their hold on the state.
It is not clear why the business elite lost administrative control in one fell swoop instead 
of evolving in a  new political coalition with Amulfb Arias. The United States Federal 
Government indirectly contributed to the series of events leading to the October 1968 coup. The 
maritime-commercial elite were not able to co-opt local American authorities in the Canal Zone 
Administration because o f its highly centralized ties to the Department of the Army, Congress, 
and the president in Washington, D C As a result the business elite were forced to negotiate by 
treaty the elimination o f American interference from their ambitions over the direct and derived 
benefits of Panama Canal technology and the Canal Zone infiastmcture, one commercial 
privilege at a time. The creation of a Canal Zone resembling a kind of foreign intmsion 
seemingly sanctioned by an economically advantaged elite leadership was an irresistible ploy 
for the inland Panamanian opposition. Political hopefuls like Amulfb Arias gained widespread 
support by proclaiming the incumbent leadership o f the Republic of Panama was letting the 
national patrimony be swindled by the United States and was too timid or unwilling to 
challenge the United States fbr the benefits Panamanians deserved from the Panama Canal and 
Canal Zone.
One of the significant differences between the urban elite and Amulfb Arias coalition 
that took office on 1 October 1968, and the National Guard leadership that seized control of the
-'“U.S. Congress(1977b).
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State on 11 October 1968, was that the National Guard leadership was more thoroughly rural 
and middle-class. In the past, Panamanian politics was fbr the most part a chess match between 
the urban elite. It was a social level which Amulfb Arias himself was adept at working within 
because o f his Harvard education and his frequent dealings in the Union Club. But the coup by 
the National Guard was a political move straight from the rural middle-class, a class displaced 
one step down and one step geographically removed from the urban elite's interests.
Among the members of the Liberal Par^ only a refbrmist faction supported the 
National Guard leadership immediately after the 11 October 1968 coup. Unlike Amulfb Arias 
and the urban elite, the leaders of the National Guard in 1968 did not cultivate a close 
fellowship with immigrant maritime-commercial families in Panama City and Colon."” To 
many in the interior, the recent maritime-commercial immigrants were a society of intmsive 
foreigners intercepting the natural flow of economic benefits to them. In particular, lower and 
middle-class members of maritime-commercial society including Antillean Blacks. East Asians. 
South Asians and Middle Eastemers did not exemplify the traditional Hispanic and Catholic 
virtues o f interior Panamanians. Ultimately, the major difference was that Torrijos controlled 
the only real source of intimidation, the National Guard, and Arias did not. A Washington Post 
article dated 19 November 1968, alleged that, in fact, the 11 October coup coincided with Arias' 
ordering of the transfer of Torrijos, Martinez, and Boyd."'"
Omar Torrijos was not unwilling to enforce his authority using the National Guard but 
was certainly less willing than his follower, the ambitious head of G-2 intelligence Colonel 
Manuel Noriega. Noriega probably sensed that the withdrawal o f Omar Torrijos from the day-
"” Ropp (1982) says: “Access of majority wing members of the business community to government 
policy makers remained extremely limited from 1968 to 1974.” In fact, the 1972 Labor Code was 
probably the high water mark. But between February and December 1976, Law 95 was created which 
modified the 1972 Labor Code. Ropp (1982,64) says that the period of the 1970s “exacerbated the social 
gap separating the National Guard from the business communi^.” Torrijos’ support groups, according to 
Ropp (1982, 75), were organized labor, peasants in cooperatives in the interior provinces, workers in 
government agro-industry, and government employees.
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to-day running of the Panamanian state in 1978 meant that Noriega’s only real opportunity for 
reaping state power might soon slip away."'^ An electoral contest was neither in Noriega's favor 
nor would it be playing to his strengths as commander o f a paramilitary police force. Noriega no 
doubt understood that most Panamanians would not consider him an attractive presidential 
candidate in any sense of the term.
Leaders like Omar Torrijos Herrera, Manuel Antonio Noreiga, and to some extent Juan 
Antonio Remôn did not waste &vors courting an elite business-minded upper class. Rather they 
used them to command the loyalty o f a  mostly middle-class paramilitary police force.*'** Ropp 
(1982, 46) explains;
As with the Mafia the recent trend in the Guard has been toward participation in more 
respectable business activities. Frequently, a well-placed officer will participate in such 
activities through a relative who has been strategically placed in a particular private 
firm or government agency. Under Torrijos, these practices became so common that the 
officer corps was sometimes viewed as a new branch of the commercial elite.
What the maritime-commercial elite had been doing on the Isthmus of Panama since the 
sixteenth century as a kind of oligarchy of elite Emilies, controlling the state and indulging their 
commercial leanings, Omar Torrijos and later Manuel Noriega did as individuals. General 
Torrijos receded from active duty as Maximum Revolutionary Leader of the Republic of 
Panama amid allegations that he and his extended family were personally profiting from his 
control of the state.
U.S. Congress (1977-78.3:242).
*' ̂  Though Omar Torrijos may have found himself leading a genuine reformist coalition after the October 
1968 coup, his regime was never a democratically elected institution.
*'"' Natioiial Police Chief Juan Antonio Remôn was able to challenge traditional political leaders at a time 
when Chiari Liberals and Arias Panamenistas fought between each other to build coalitions with minor 
parties since the Chiari Liberals could no longer work through Amulfo Arias. Remôn, first cousin of 
Roberto Chiari but a product of Harmodio Arias’ establishment of a National Police, turned beholden to 
no one when the traditional elites were divided and ascended to the presidency himself in October 1952. 
(PhilUpps 1991. 32).
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The January 1964 riots may have been tragic, but abuse o f nationalism and anti- 
American posturing by Panamanian leaders under duress reached altogether new heights during 
the last years of the Manuel Noriega regime. But by the time of Manuel Noriega's removal by 
force in December 1989, the military government’s nationalist appeal seemed to have run its 
course among a majority of Panamanians dissatisfied with life under a  non-democratic 
authority. From the Panamanian perspective. Operation Just Cause was probably not altogether 
the most preferable means for a change in their government. But the desired end of change to a 
more representative system of government, reversing the military coup o f 11 October 1968. 
does not appear to have been much in debate.
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Ch a p t e r  13. A n  Am e r ic a n  V e t o  D u r in g  t h e  Ma r c h  1973 Un it e d  Na t io n s  S e c u r it y
C o u n c il  M e e t in g
On 21 March 1973, during a special session in Panama City, the United Nations 
Security Council voted on a draft resolution concerning future negotiations between the United 
States and the Republic of Panama to replace the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. Guinea, India. 
Indonesia. Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan and Yugoslavia sponsored the resolution. Speaking in 
support of the resolution, the Panamanian representative said that the Canal Zone was a matter 
that affected international peace and security and had to be brought before the Security Council. 
The Panamanian representative also said that passing the draft resolution, in the form in which it 
was being presented on 21 March 1973, would help the Republic of Panama achieve its goal of 
incorporating the Canal Zone politically, economically and culturally with the rest of the 
c o u n t r y , T h e  resolution received 13 afhrmative votes (Australia, Austria, China, France. 
Guinea. India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru. Sudan, USSR, Yugoslavia), 1 opposed (United 
States), and 1 abstention (United Kingdom). The resolution was not adopted because of the 
negative vote of a permanent member o f the Security Council, the United States. At the time it 
was only the third time ever that a representative of the United States had cast a negative vote in 
the United Nations.
Although it was the United States that cast the only negative vote. American 
Ambassador to the United Nations John Scali claimed that his sincere efforts to arrive at a 
mutually acceptable resolution were rejected by Panamanian representatives.Scali felt that
U.S. Congress (1977b. 1453).
U.S. Congress (1977b. 1453): ‘The United States said it regretted having had to cast a negative vote, 
because there was much in the draft resolution with which it could agree. The United States had made 
strenuous and repeated efforts in friendly conversations with its Panamatuan hosts to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable form for a resolution, but its sincere efforts had been rejected.” Scab’s explanation of the 
United States veto was siunmarized as follows. ”The United States had voted against the resolution 
because the matters involved were in the process of bilateral negotiations and it was inappropriate for the 
Security Council to adopt a resolution dealing with matters of substance in a continuing negotiation. 
Moreover, the draft resolution was unbalanced and incomplete and contained sweeping generalities, 
whereas the real difficulty lay in the application of those generalities. Further, the resolution dealt with 
points of interest to Panama but ignored legitimate interests important to the United States. Finally, the
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the Republic o f  Panama was attempting to use the Security Council improperly, as a means for 
putting pressure on bilateral negotiations with the United States. By voting against the draft 
resolution, Scali rejected a role for the Security Council in dictating terms for the United States 
in its bilateral negotiations and criticized the use of the Security Council meeting by 
representatives o f the Republic o f Panama. On the day of the vote Scali spoke before the 
Securitv Council:
[T]he United States made clear its serious concern that a meeting designed to put 
pressure on one party to an on-going bilateral negotiation could make those 
negotiations more difficult and impair the utility of this organ of the United Nations. Up 
to the moment or our departure for Panama, we continued to receive assurances that 
everything would be done to maintain an atmosphere of moderation and restrainL I 
regret to say that while this proved true of the situation outside this chamber ... it has 
not been true of some of the statements made here .... We believe it would be a 
disservice to the negotiations and an improper use of the Security Council if bilateral 
negotiations were subjected to this kind of outside pressure.
No other nation cast a negative vote on the resolution. The United Kingdom abstained 
from voting on the grounds that if the draft resolution was unacceptable to one of the parties in 
what was essentially a bilateral issue, it effectively served no purpose."'^ The opinion of the 
British representative seemed to represent a consensus viewpoint o f the members of the 
Security Council, despite the differences in voting. Most representatives, while expressing their 
support for the aspirations of their Panamanian hosts, pointed out that the question at hand was 
essentially a matter of bilateral negotiation between the United States and the Republic of
United States considered that the outcome of the meetings should be assessed with great care so as to 
avoid any repetition of a course of action that could prove damaging to the role and reputation of the 
Security Coimcil.”
"The representative of the United Kingdom said that, if, as in the present case which was essentially a 
bilateral issue, a draft resolution was unacceptable to one of the two parties concerned, it did not serve 
any useful purpose” (U.S. Congress 1977b).
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Panama. They hoped that the matter could be resolved without the need for foreign 
intervention."'*
If the consensus was that the issue was essentially a bilateral one, and not a  matter for 
the Security Council to conclude, then what explains the differences in voting on the draft 
resolution? As one o f the principal parties in the bilateral negotiation, the United States 
representative cast the negative vote because, as he explained, it was inappropriate for the 
Security Council to adopt a draft resolution dealing with matters of substance in a continuing 
negotiation. The British representative seemed to agree that the draft r^olution pertained to 
matters of substance in a continuing bilateral negotiation, and felt that if  the United States did 
not want to agree to such a draft resolution it was certainly free not to do so. The British 
representative was taking a technical stand, voting on the usefulness of the draft resolution as an 
instrument for resolving a bilateral negotiation, not necessarily on whether he agreed one way 
or another with the general ideals in the resolution.
The argument in fovor of the draft resolution made by the French representative 
deserves attention. The representative from France said.
[T]he Security Council should not dictate the specific terms of a settlement but could 
indicate the general principles for such a settlement. [France) therefore supported the 
draft resolution, which expressed the hope that the parties would reach agreement in the 
near future.
As opposed to the British and American view'points, France voted in favor of the 
resolution because it was believed that a Security Council draft resolution did not pertain to 
matters of substance in a bilateral negotiation, it only indicated 'general principles” for a 
potential settlement. According to the French argument, merely agreeing to general principles
"'* U.S. Congress (1977b, 1457) stated: "... a number of representatives, while expressing their support 
for the aspirations of the Panamanian people, had pointed out that the question was the subject of
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was not the same as dictating terms. The answer to this technical question is unclear. Does a 
draft resolution on a bilateral issue adopted by the United Nations Security Council merely 
indicate support fbr general principles or is it somehow more binding than that?
Like several others, the Kenyan representative agreed with the overarching principles in 
the resolution and did not scrutinize the usefulness or applicability o f the draft resolution as an 
instrument for resolving a bilateral i s s u e . T h e  Kenyan representative supported the notion that 
the Panama Canal represented the Republic of Panama's natural resource and that every 
sovereign state had the right to dispose o f its natural resources as it saw fit.
[f the United Nations Security Council meeting in March 1973 represented a contest 
between the United States and the Republic of Panama over who would appear the more 
uncooperative in the eyes of the rest of the world, the United States won hands down. By 
casting, at the time, only its third negative vote and in being the only country to vote against the 
draft resolution, the United States appeared determined to cling to its anachronistic privileges in 
the Canal Zone through the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Trea^ against the opinions of the rest of the 
world.
Ambassador Scali's answers before the House Committee on Foreign Aftairs. 3 April 
1973. as to why he conunitted the United States to a rare negative vote are enlightening as to 
what transpired behind the scenes to create the appearance that the United States was being 
uncooperative and unfair with respect to the Canal Zone. Scali said that he had reservations 
about even going to a special meeting of the Security Council in Panama City, outside of its 
normal meeting place in New York City saying:
negotiations between the parties principally concerned and had expressed the hope that the negotiations 
would be resumed and a settlement reached without foreign intervention.”
U.S. Congress (1977b, 1453-1454) stated: “Kenya said that the Panamanian case for more equitable 
control of the Canal was fair and just; the sovereign right of every State to dispose of its natural resources 
must be respected...”
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We left for this meeting in Panama with serious reservations about whether it would 
contribute to an improvement of relations with the Panamanian Government, and 
whether the whole concept was one which would assist the United Nations Sectuity 
Council to strengthen peace and security ... the agenda item did not include Panama per 
se. but was a broad sweep, catch-all which permitted Panama to be discussed as the 
main issue.^
Ambassador Scali claimed that the group o f 15 countries voting to have the meeting in 
Panama City instead of New York was the result of "persistent and skillful" persuasion by 
Panamanian representatives. Scali explained that the United States could not veto a procedural 
move such as holding the meetings in Panama City, it could only veto a substantive move such 
as the adoption of a draft resolution.
Conunenting about the resolution itself. Scali says that it had gone through about six 
different drafts beginning with what he called a "fairly hard line resolution" proposed by 
Panama and Peru and subsequently joined by four or five other countries. Scali then says that as 
a result of "many, many discussions behind the scenes with the Panamanian Foreign Minister 
and twice with General Torrijos,” he and the Panamanian representatives had come within five 
words of a resolution he felt he could accept, meeting what he called the legitimate interests of 
the United States and the just aspirations o f the Republic of Panama. Scali said that after 
consulting with the Department of State as to what the five remaining words could say and 
returning to see Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack, he found that Tack had returned to the 
earlier hard line resolution. This must have been the situation Scali was referring to when he 
said, after casting the negative vote, that the Republic of Panama and not the United States had 
rejected attempts to come to a mutually agreeable resolution.
The agenda was "Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international 
peace and security in Latin America in conformity with provisions and principles of the charter" U.S. 
Congress (1977b, 1461).
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Table 13.1 is a  comparison between what Ambassador Scali says had been all but 
agreed to between the United States and the Republic of Panama just hours prior to the 21 
March 1973. vote in the Security Council, on the left, and the draft resolution that was 
ultimately put up for the vote, on the right.” ’ The major difference between the two resolutions 
is in section two. Section two of the draft resolution put before the Security Council for the vote 
is more one-sided in comparison with the draft that the United States had agreed to in principle 
hours before. Although substantial mention is made of the aspirations of the Republic of 
Panama in section two on the right, the phrase referring to the legitimate interests of the United 
States is absent. The other major difference between the two drafts is that no mention of the 
phrase “prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between them” exists in the draft agreed to 
by the United States before the vote.
Ambassador Scali explained to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs the details of 
the behind the scenes negotiations just prior to the 21 March vote;
A few hours before the vote. I had been told that this draft was acceptable with the 
insertion of just five words. The five words had to do with Panama’s sovereignty and 
independence. At that point. I said I would consider this. I got in touch with 
Washington and came back with a formula which more than met the Panamanian desire 
for words which would indicate Panama’s sovereignty and independence. But 
unhappily at that time. Foreign Minster Tack, who had accepted the draft in a 
conversation several hours previously, then reversed field and described it as an 
American draft. He then went back to earlier positions and a more detailed resolution of 
the kind which would put the United Nations Security Council in the business of 
dictating what a bilateral settlement shoidd be in an ongoing negotiation. Foreign 
Minister Tack and his advisers knew that as a matter of principle from day one we had 
said that we did not believe that the SecuriW Coimcil should be placed in a position 
where it could prescribe point by point on key principles what the result of an ongoing 
bilateral negotiation should be. I can only decide in my own mind at that time that when 
we came that close there had been a decision made not to acc^t a compromise but 
indeed to solicit a veto from the United States [emphasis added].
f  U.S. Congress (1977b, 1470) 
~  U.S. Congress (1977b. 1464)
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Table 13.1. Comparison o f draft resolutions during the March 1973 United Nations 
Security Council Meeting in Panama City (U.S. Congress 1977b).
Draft resolution negotiated between the I  D raft resolution tha t was ultim ately put up for a 
Republic of Panam a and the United | vote in the Security Council on M arch 21,1973 
States hours before the Security 1 
Council vote on M arch 21,1973 •
'Having heard the statements made 
before it by the representatives of the 
Republic of Panama and the United States 
of America.
1 "Having heard the statements made before it by the 
1 representatives of the members of the Council by 
1 Latin American Ministers fbr Foreign Afiairs and 
i by representatives of other States and organizations 
specially invited.
I. Takes note that both governments, in 
the joint declaration signed before the 
Council of the Organization of American 
States on April 3, 1964, agreed to reach a 
fair and just agreement
1. Takes note that the Governments of the Republic 
of Panama and the United States of America in the 
Joint Declaration signed before the Council of the 
Organization of American States. acting 
provisionally as Organ of Consultation, on 3 April 
1964, had agreed to reach a just and fair agreement, 
with a view to the prompt elimination of the causes 
of conflict between them.
2. Takes note that negotiations have been 
taking place between the two parties with 
a view to replacing the Isthmian Canal 
Convention of 1903 and its amendments 
with a new treaty that would 
accommodate the just aspirations of 
Panama and the legitimate interests of the 
United States and that would insure the 
continued availability of a trans-Isthmian 
Canal to world commerce on a 
nondiscriminatoiy basis.
2. Takes note also of the willingness shown by the 
Govenunents of the United States of America and 
the Repubhc of Panama to estabUsh in a formal 
instrument agreements on the abrogation of the 
1903 convention on the Isthmian Canal and its 
amendments and to conclude a new, just and fair 
trea^ concerning the present Panama Canal which 
would fulfill Panama's legitimate aspirations and 
guarantee full respect for Panama's effective 
sovereignty over all of its territory
3. Urges the Governments of the United 
States of America and the Republic of 
Panama to continue negotiations in a 
spirit of friendship, mutual respect and 
cooperation.”
3. Urges the Goverrunents of the United States of 
America and the Republic of Panama to continue 
negotiations in a h i^  spirit of friendship, mutual 
respect and co-operation and to conclude without 
delay a new treaty aimed at the prompt elimination 
of the causes of conflict between them
Plus, the insertion o f five words having to | 4. Decides to keep the question imder 
do with Panama’s sovereignty and j  consideration.” 
independence. j
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In the opinion of United States Ambassador to the United Nations John Scali, the only 
explanation for Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack's reversal was that a  decision 
had been made to, in his words, ^solicit” a veto from the United States. Scali does not offer an 
explanation for why he thinks representatives o f  the Republic of Panama would have found it 
more useful to make the United States veto the resolution.
In defense of former Foreign Minister Tack's actions. Foreign Minister Nicolas 
Gonzalez Revilla stated to the Panamanian Assembly of Corregimiento Representatives at Justo 
Arosemena Palace on 19 August 1977, that the foreign policy objective o f the Torrijos 
administration was to turn bilateral relations with the United States into an international issue. 
Foreign Minister Gonzalez says.
But this is another of the great difiTcrences between this revolutionary govenunent and 
our past General Torrijos understood that a  struggle for national liberation carried out 
at only a bilateral level was a struggle without a future, for the simple reason that it was 
the struggle of a very small country against the major power in the world. Then he 
decided, using one of his typical phrases, that the problem of Panama, the canal 
problem, would not be a real problem until it became a problem of the American 
continent and of the world. An independent international policy was drafted on this 
basis .... This policy continued with the meeting of the U.N. Security Council in this 
same building. We were strongly criticized on that occasion by local sectors and 
received threats from the United States and bribe offers from U.S. Government 
ofBcials. General Torrijos stood firm on that occasion. U.S. colonialist policy was 
denounced in this same building and all the countries of the world supported us. The 
United States was forced to veto the resolution. We were told we had done something 
crazy, but it is these things which have given dignity and strength to our country’s 
presence in the eyes of the world.^
Having a United Nations Security Council meeting in Panama City to discuss the Canal Zone 
was one thing. But in order to make a real impact the Torrijos administration seemed to have 
felt that they were better served by soliciting a rare veto from the United States.
To be foir, there may have been the perception by Omar Torrijos or Juan Antonio Tack 
that they had few diplomatic options other than world opinion to deal with the United States.
^  U.S. Congress (1977-78.2:15-16)
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Representatives o f the Republic o f Panama had claimed that negotiations with the United States 
were inherently unbalanced because of the power differential between the two countries. Unless 
the United States was compelled to abrogate the Hay-Bunau-Varilla arrangement because of 
outside pressure, political leverage that the Republic o f Panama needed in order to balance the 
scales, the United States would never consent to negotiate fairly. According to Panamanian 
representatives.
So far ... there had been no real bilateral negotiations between Panama and the United 
States. There had been ... American proposals designed to disguise, in perpetuity, the 
colonialist enclave. Panamanian proposals intended to put an end to that enclave w ere 
not and had never beeit accepted by the United States. Basically, the United States 
wished to maintain the status quo. digging it only in name.~'*
Suppose that the Security Council meetings represented the Republic of Panama's only 
opportunity to counterbalance the political will o f the United States and insure a fair bilateral 
negotiation. From the Panamanian perspective, it would have better to force the United States to 
agree to a one-sided resolution in the United Nations Security Council. But recall that 
Ambassador Scali expressly stated he would not consent to a draft resolution by the United 
Nations Security Council dealing with matters o f substance in bilateral negotiations. Naturally, 
if a draft resolution happened to be in the interests o f  the United States, Ambassador Scali 
would have been fully in favor of it. But as it was. Ambassador Scali's testimony on 3 April 
1973. to the House Committee on Foreign AfWrs makes it clear he knew going in to the 
Security Council meetings that it was very likely Panamanian representatives would use the 
opportunity to proffer their own case for a lopsided resolution. Scali’s pre-emptive defense was 
to deny that the Security Council could rule on matters o f substance in a bilateral negotiation. 
Scali’s argument really amounts to denying a role for the Security Council in dictating on 
matters o f substance if those matters of substance were not in the national interest of the United
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States. If Scali bad no reason to believe tbe Security Council meetings were going to be a  setup 
he might not have made tbe same kind of argument
If the Republic o f Panama could not force tbe United States into agreeing to a  lopsided 
draft resolution dealing with matters o f substance in bilateral negotiations, tbe next best option 
was to embarrass tbe United States in tbe eyes o f tbe world. Tbe third and perhaps last option 
for the Torrijos administration would have been to agree to the draft resolution negotiated with 
the United States hours before tbe vote, plus tbe five remaining words. Considering tbe three 
options, it would have been umeasonable from tbe very start to think tbe United States would 
agree to an unbalanced resolution not in its national interests. Thus there were only two realistic 
options. Tbe only mistake in Panamanian negotiation with the United States behind the scenes 
at the Security Council meetings was in having come so close to an agreement and then 
suddenly turning around to tbe earlier draft. If negotiations behind tbe scenes bad not 
progressed to tbe point they bad, it may have been easier fbr Foreign Minister Tack and Omar 
Torrijos to justify that tbe United States was an unwilling partner in treaty negotiations, 
requiring the vigilance of the world.
The effect that a United States veto would have on world opinion was probably worth 
ten Security Council draft resolutions in terms of drawing in outside attention to the Canal Zone 
issue. But for the Torrijos administration to really transform treaty negotiations with the United 
States it would have to do more than just broadcast its David versus Goliath predicament to the 
world. Even at the Security Council meeting in Panama City, the consensus was that the Canal 
Zone represented a bilateral issue and should be settled between tbe United States and tbe 
Republic of Panama without foreign intervention.
To make a difference in bilateral negotiations, the Canal Zone issue bad to be noticed 
by that portion of tbe American public willing to perceive it as an embarrassment to inter-
U.S. Congress (1977b. 1451)
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American relations, an anachronistic privilege gained through questionable means, and an issue 
reflecting on the moral conduct of American foreign relations in a post-Vietnam era. In 1977 
and 1978, it was President Jimmy Carter and the Democratic Party who made the political 
decision to advocate the moral issue behind the Panama Canal treaties during the debate in the 
United States Senate. At the same time. Republican California Governor Ronald Reagan made 
the political decision to lead the criticism against President Carter's treaty ratification efforts by 
calling it another example of a cowardly withdrawal of American power around the world. 
United States relations with the Republic o f Panama, never really a  top priority in American 
foreign policy and seldom attracting permanent nationwide attention, found itself expedient to 
American domestic politics at least for a few years. The last time that United States relations 
with the Republic of Panama attracted as much attention in the American public as the 1977- 
1978 Senate Panama Canal treaties debate was during near-election year politics in late 1903 
and early 1904 when President Theodore Roosevelt was accused o f complicity in the 
Panamanian secession of 3 November 1903. by leaders of the Democratic Party
It is not easy to accept that representatives of the Republic o f Panama were out of 
diplomatic options by March 1973 such that they had no choice but to call in the assistance o f 
the United Nations Security Council. Ten days after Ambassador John Scali's testimony to the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Representative o f the United States for 
Interoceanic Canal Negotiations David H. Ward testified before the House Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries on 13 April 1973. that not only did the Republic of Panama 
have diplomatic options, but after 1971 the Torrijos administration preferred to let them lay and 
instead worked towards a Security Council meeting in Panama City.
Special Representative Ward said that negotiations looking towards "'substantial 
changes'' in United States involvement with the operation of the Panama Canal began after the 
January 1964 riots. In 1967, negotiators fbr the Republic of Panama and the United States had
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reached an agreement on three treaties to replace the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. The 
complicated 1967 arrangement would change the Panama Canal regime so that it would be run 
by a special corporation independent o f both governments but represented by an American 
majority on its board of directors. Special Representative Ward stated that because the Republic 
of Panama never submitted the treaties for ratification, they were never submitted to the United 
States Senate. Given election year politics within the Republic of Panama in 1968 and the 
impending demise of the Liberal administration in October of that year, submitting such an 
important canal treaty to the Panamanian Legislature would not have been even a remote 
possibility.
Negotiations resumed in Jime 1971 after the military government had been established, 
and took a different route by proposing to retain United States Federal Government operation 
and defense of the Panama Canal fbr a fixed period and granting the United States exclusive 
rights to construct a third set of locks or a sea-level canal. At the same time, the Republic of 
Panama would begin to re-exercise its civil jurisdiction in Canal Zone territory. Private 
enterprise would replace United States government services in the Canal Zone provided that 
government employees were assured o f necessary services. And particular Canal Zone 
territories would be immediately returned to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama, 
including a substantial financial package. Ward says.
By the end of that year the United States had submitted draft treaty articles of position 
papers on all of the major issues in the negotiations, and these, taken together, 
constituted a comprehensive and detailed U.S. offer. Negotiations were specific, and 
were concerned with the details of drafting, as well as the broad principles of the treaty. 
In mid-December, 1971, the Panamanian negotiating team returned to Panama to 
consult with its govenunent For several months thereafter, although we had periodic 
discussions, we were unable to elicit any Panamanian position on our proposals, and no 
counteroffer was made by Panama. In December 1972 we were invitW to travel to 
Panama for negotiations. At this meeting Panama furnished us a disappointing 
statement of its position on the negotiations. It reflected Panama’s maximum 
aspirations as put forward at the very outset of the negotiations and seemed to repudiate 
the tentative steps toward compromise which had been taken during 1971. Although we 
replied informally to and discussed the paper at length, we were unable to persuade 
Panama to deviate from its terms in even the slightest regard. The United States
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formally replied to the Panamanian position in February of this year and concluded 
with the suggestion that negotiations resume at the earliest possible moment We have 
not yet received other than an interim acknowledgement However, we should 
recognize that Panama has taken a position far &om our own. On virtually every major 
issue there are serious dififerences. Panama wants a much shorter duration for the treaty 
than we have proposed, full control of zone lands, financial benefits that would 
necessitate an inordinately large toll increase, and the complete cessation by the United 
States within S years of canal functions which could be construed as being of a 
jurisdictional or sovereign natirre. Nor does Panama offer tempting options in regard to 
the expansion of the existing canal, or the construction of a sea level canal.^
Special Representative Ward concluded that the future course of negotiations depended on 
representatives of the Republic of Panama negotiating ^in a spirit of compromise ̂  from a hard 
line position. If Omar Torrijos was attempting to justify his leadership to the Panamanian 
population as a  shrewd bargainer unwilling to compromise the national patrimony, he was 
certainly doing so.
The Statement o f Principles signed between Kissinger and Tack on 7 February 1974, 
seemed to reflect much of what Special Representative Ward said was being negotiated with the 
Republic of Panama at least as early as June 1971.^ The Statement of Principles are listed in 
Table 13.2. All that was left unfinished in the Statement of Principles was filling in several 
blanks; the exact time period over which United States jurisdiction in the Canal Zone would be 
terminated in number two, the amount in dollars and other benefits that the Republic o f Panama 
could expect as a just and equitable share o f  the derived benefits of the Panama Canal in 
number five, and what privileges and obligations the United States might retain with respect to 
canal defense after the termination date in number seven. The terms for future improvements to 
the capacity o f the Panama Canal, and perhaps a new sea-level canal although the wording is 
not specific, would also be incorporated into the new treaties.
The only puzzling statement lies in number five: ' It is recognized that the geographic 
position of its territory constitutes the principal resource of the Republic of Panama. The
225 U.S. Congress (1977b. 1473)
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relative location of the Isthmus of Panama is not a  natural resource that lies within the territory 
of the Republic of Panama. The United States must recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of 
Panama over the territory o f the Isthmus of Panama including everything within it or passing 
through it such as foreign flows in transit using the Panama Canal. To recognize that 'the 
geographic position o f its territory constitutes the principal resource of the Republic of Panama” 
is incomprehensible. Without the benefit o f an attached explanation, one can only suppose that 
number 5 represented a concession of words by Secretary of State Kissinger. Since the United 
States decided to recognize the relative location o f Panama as resource of the Republic of 
Panama, the implication must be that the Republic o f Panama can rightfully claim compensation 
for the social savings that the United States and other maritime nations may earn from using that 
resource. Global social savings represent a figure probably running into the several billions per 
year.
U.S. Congress (1977b, 1478-1479)
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Table 13.2. Hie Kissinger-Tack Agreement (U.S. Congress 1977b).
The treaty of 1903 and its amendments will be abrogated by the conclusion of an entirely 
new interoceanic canal treaty.
The concept of perpetui^ will be eliminated. The new treaity concerning the lock canal shall 
have a Gxed termination date.
Termination of United States jurisdiction over Panamanian territory shall take place 
promptly in accordance with terms specified in the treaty.
The Panamanian territory in which the canal is situated shall be retiuned to the jurisdiction 
of the Republic of Panama. The Republic of Panama, in its capacity as territorial sovereign, 
shall grant to the United States of America, fbr the duration of the new interoceanic canal 
treaty and in accordance with what that treaty states, the right to use the lands, waters, and 
airspace which may be necessary for the operation, maintenance, protection and defense of 
the canal and the transit of ships.
The Republic of Panama shall have a just and equitable share of the benefits derived from 
the operation of the canal in its territory. It is recognized that the geographic position of its 
territory constitutes the principal resource of the Republic o f Panama.
The Republic of Panama shall participate in the administration of the canal, in accordance 
with a procedure to be agreed upon in the neare. The treaty shall also provide that Panama 
will assume total responsibility for the operation of the canal upon the termination of the 
neaty. The Republic of Panama shall grant to the United States of America the rights 
necessary to regulate the transit of ships through the canaL to operate, maintain, protect and 
defend the canal and to undertake any other specific activity related to those ends, as may 
be agreed upon in the treaty.
The Republic of Panama shall participate with the United States of America in the 
protection and defense of the caral in accordance with what is agreed upon in the new 
treatv.
The United States of America and the Republic of Panama, recognizing the important 
services rendered by the interoceanic Panam a Canal to international maritime traflSc, and 
bearing in mind the possibility that the present canal could become inadequate for said 
traffic, shall agree bilaterally on provisions for new projects which will enlarge canal 
capacity. Such provisions will be incorporated in the new treaty in accord with the concepts 
established in principle 2.
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C h a p t e r  14. Am e r ic a n  In t e r p o s it io n  T h r o u g h  t h e  1977 p e r m a n e n t  Ne u t r a l it y
T r e a t y
Not all o f the more important conflicts conflicts involving the United States and the 
sovereign of the Isthmus o f Panama since the entangling Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty entered into 
force in June 1848 were considered in this dissertation, but a comprehensive list would include 
the following; the April 1856 riots, the April 1885 uprising, the November 1903 secession, the 
December 1947 rejection of the military bases agreement, the January 1964 Canal Zone riots, 
the March 1973 United Nations Security Council meeting, and the December 1989 military 
intervention. Other important events involving the United States on the Isthmus of Panama 
include American diplomatic efforts to resolve the Colombian civil war between 1899 and 
1901. early diplomatic discussions over the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty between Secretary of 
State John Hay and Panamanian representatives in 1904 leading to the Taft Agreement, and the 
debates during all three o f the major modifications to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty in the 1936 
treaty, the 1955 treaty, and 1977 Panama Canal treaties.
The December 1989 intervention did not receive as detailed a treatment as other 
conflicts between Americans and Panamanians. The December invasion has already received 
substantial treatment elsewhere while other cases of conflict have been seriously neglected. It 
was Omar Torrijos' leadership in the 11 October 1968, National Guard coup coming off the 
heels of the January 1964 Canal Zone riots that created the military government. Manuel 
Noriega continued to operate the authoritative machinery that Omar Torrijos had created, doing 
so without the degree o f domestic support that Torrijos seemed to have had. One would not 
expect to learn as much about how Panamanian leaders craft coalitions of political support or 
manipulate conflicts with the United States by studying a continuing military dictatorship that 
one might just as easily find in Central Aftica or Southeast Asia.
A significant body o f recent work has been done on the relationship between the
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Reagan and Bush Administrations and Manuel Noriega. The overwhelming attention given to 
Manuel Noreiga and the December 1989 invasion by American journalists and other researchers 
relative to the conflicts listed above or for that matter anything else about the Isthmus of 
Panama belies more o f an interest in a  self-critique of American foreign policy in Central 
America. For a study like this one whose purpose is to see how long-term dynamics in 
Panamanian politics intersect with American imperatives. Manuel Noriega is not as interesting.
14.1 PROVOKING A Neu tra lity  T reaty  Violation  After  2000
A letter written by an American foreign minister in Bogota to a Colombian 
representative in April 1880 concerning a French company's new contract to build an 
interoceanic canal might suffice fbr any contemporary concerns of American representatives 
after the vear 2000:
This government cannot consider itself excluded, by any arrangement between other 
powers or individual to which it is not a party, ftom a direct interest and if necessary a 
positive supervision and interposition in the execution of any project which, by 
completing an interoceanic connection through the Isthmus, would materially affect its 
commercial interests, change the territorial relations of its own sovereignty, and impose 
upon it the necessity of a foreign policy, which, whether in its feature of wariike 
preparation or entangling alliance, has been hitherto sedulously avoided.
Two recent front page articles in the Washington Times reported that Republican 
Senator Majority Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi became concerned about possible 
connections between Hutchison Whampoa Ltd.. a Hong Kong ports company that won the 
contract to maintain and operate portions o f Panama Canal operations over an American 
company, and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.“ * Senator Lott's concerns are not new. A 
House hearing in 1995 focused on potential Chinese government involvement in Panama Canal
U.S. Congress (1977b. 46-47).
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operations through Hutchison Whampoa after the official turnover by the United States on 3 1 
December 1999 (U.S. Congress 1995). PubUshed as part of the hearing documents were the 
statements o f former Conunander-in-Chief o f the Pacific Fleet Admiral Moorer who claimed;
The architect of our present Naval superiority was Alfred Thayer Mahan who. in the 
late 19"’ Century began to point out the importance of the interaction of commercial and 
strategic considerations in the Pacific in particular. Ironically, as we cone to the end of 
this century we seem to have forgotten those lessons. Our nodal analysis’ of key 
strategic points in ocean shipping underlying and necessary to the operation of our two 
ocean and forward deployed strategy in times of conflict seems to have been neglected 
even as the Chinese have increased their study of these matters and quietly moved to 
cut off our ability to support our technical Naval and military superiority where they 
realize they could not confront it directly for a number of years yet (U.S. Congress 
1995. 58).
The fact that a company with ties to the Chinese government won a  contract over an American 
company, possibly by corrupt means, probably has more to do with Panamanian strategic 
thinking than Chinese strategic thinking. It was, after all, the government of Panama that 
awarded Hutchison Whampoa the port operations contract.
Panamanian leaders who made the final decision may have been trying to multiply their 
political and business relations with foreign powers, especially those not thought of as close 
allies of the United States, in order to gain diplomatic leverage. Panamanians could be sending 
United States representatives a warning. The United States must continue to provide some form 
of financial or other assistance to Panama after the official turnover in December 1999 if they 
wish to prevent Panamanians from making any more such deals with Chinese companies 
potentially giving away strategic Panama Canal operations or former military base lands. On the 
other hand, given the recent Panamanian presidential elections, it was entirely probable that 
Panamanian political opposition leaders were trying to spin, leak or otherwise advertise the fact 
that the administration of President Emesto Perez Balladares and his political party were taking
^  “China company grabs power over Panama Canal,” Washington Times. August 12. 1997: A1 and
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bribes from foreign companies with links to the Chinese government to run the Panama Canal. 
It could be claimed that Balladares' political party was jeopardizing American strategic 
interests, so as to provoke criticism from the United States and put pressure on the incumbent 
Panamanian leadership. As for Senator Lott, he appears to using the Panama Canal issue as a 
means to a larger end of adding controversy to President Bill Clinton's relations with Chinese 
officials and business interests close to an election year.
The 1977 Permanent Neutrality Treaty gives the United States unilateral rights of 
interposition against any perceived threat to the operations of the Panama Canal. An amendment 
to the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal inserted 
the following statement to the end of Article IV:
Under the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama 
Canal (the Neutrality Treaty). Panama and the United States have the responsibility to 
assure that the Panama Canal will remain open and secure to ships of all nations. The 
correct interpretation of this principle is that each of the two countries shall in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the canal against any 
threat to the regime of neutrality, and consequently shall have the right to act against 
any aggression or threat directed against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of 
vessels through the Canal .... Notwithstanding the provisions of Article V or any other 
provisions of the treaty, if the canal is closed, or its operations are interfered with, the 
United States o f America and the Republic o f Panama shall each independently have 
the right to take such steps as each deems necessary, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, including the use ofmilitary force in the Republic o f Panama, 
to reopen the Canal or restore the operations o f the Canal, as the case may be 
[emphasis added]
American representatives have not lost positive supervision over an interoceanic canal in 
Panama. On the contrary, the United States has too much of an obligation in the 1977 Neutrality 
Treaty.
As has been the case for the last one himdred and fifty years, after the year 2000 
American representatives will seek to prevent the involvement of foreign powers like China or
2U.S. won’t allow China to close Panama Canal, " Washington Times, August 13, 1997: Al. 
" 33 UST Panama-Canal Neutrahty-SepL 7, 1977.Z 2 9
334
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Japan in strategic control over the operations o f the Panama Canal or any potential sea-level 
canal. And as in the past, American representatives will insure that the United States is the only 
foreign power controlling a global maritime choke point near American waters. Where 
American representatives will Ail is being able to prevent themselves from invoking their 
obligations in the 1977 Neutrality Treaty against threats to the operation of the Panama Canal 
generated by a Panamanian political opposition.
Far from some exotic Chinese or Japanese geopolitical intrigue, the disagreement over 
the constitutionality o f Panama Canal employee's right to strike is the more likely threat that 
will require the United States to invoke the 1977 Neutrality Treaty afrer the year 2000. 
According to Attorney-General {La Procuradora de la Administraciôri) Alma Montenegro de 
Fletcher and the Panamanian Supreme Court, canal workers do not have the right to strike (see 
Table 14.1):
[Tlie Panamanian Constituion| recognizes the right to strike, but so too adds that the 
law will regulate its exercise and subject the right to strike to special restrictions in the 
public services that it so determines [Author’s translation!.^
Labor negotiators for Panama Canal Authority employees argue that all Panamanians have a 
constitutional right to strike, with certain restrictions for employees in public service. The 
disagreement is not merely a technicality. Panamanian labor leaders fear that after the official 
turnover of the Panama Canal, a financially strapped Panama will begin to systematically strip 
many of the benefits that Panama Canal labor has always enjoyed under the United States 
Panama Canal Commission, not to mention firing large numbers of employees. Uncertainty 
about what a fickle or tyrannical Panama Canal Authority will do to skilled labor is fueling
“Reiteran prohibicion de huelga en el Canal de Panama” in El Universal de Panama. May 11. 1997:
lA
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resentment and attempts to find outside political leverage.^' For Panama Canal skilled labor, 
outside political leverage comes from two places: nationalist Panamanian leaders and the United 
States Federal Government.
A labor group called the Association of Canal Commission Employees (ASODECO) 
conceded that as former employees of the United States Federal Government they have never 
worked with the right to strike so therefore nothing is changed. But others claim that workers 
"will not have the guarantees and protection that American laws offered for the resolution of 
labor conflicts,"’ which is exactly why they need the right to strike.^* The Panama Canal Pilots, 
a skilled and not easily replaced part of Panama Canal operations, printed a position piece in the 
Panamanian newspaper Im  Prensa on 25 May 1996 stating that putting the constitutional rights 
of canal laborers in the hands of the Panama Canal Authorities Board of Directors would create 
a 'veritable Pandora’s Box in terms of labor conflicts,”
We have already expressed our idea that the labor formulas of the new Constitutional 
Title compels the "Law” that refers to canal labor matters, ought to contain specific and 
detailed guidelines, if what is to be desired is to develop such constitutional precepts 
relative to labor .... If all the rights of canal laborers remain held in the bands of the 
[Board of Directors), to the detriment of its Regulations, we would be creating a 
veritable Pandora’s Box in terms of labor conflicts in the Canal. From their first day. 
those Regulations could be changed and reformed at the discretion of the [Board of 
Directors) and whatever its II directors arc going to be tlünking. This permanent 
insecurity is not a propitious climate for a labor relationship that has as its object the 
Stable, Secure and Permanent functioning of the Canal [Author’s translation).
Mark FalcoGf testified to the House Committee on Foreign Relations in 1995 that. "Panama does have 
a fairly high unemployment rate for a country of its level of development and now President Perez 
Balladares has talked about or is suspected of wanting to modernize the canal administration, and there 
already arc labor problems developing because there is fear. I do not know how well justified, that if he is 
able to win a second term he is going to fire a large number of canal employees to try to keep expenses 
down” (U.S. Congress 1995, 35).
"Piden al la Asamblea legislar contra el derecho a huelga en el canal” in El Universal de Panama. 
March 20, 1997: B1 "los trabajadores argumenten que no tendrân las garantfas y protecciôn que les 
brindan las leyes norteamericanos para la soluciôn de los conflictos laborales.”
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Table 14.1. A source o f future trouble. Contradictions between the Organic Law and the 
Panamanian Constitution and Labor Code concerning the right to strike in the Panama 
Canal.







Article 92: T o  ensure that the 
international public service for which 
the Panama Canal was created is not 
affected, its operation may not be 
interrupted, neither fully nor 
partially, nor impaired in any way. 
Strikes, slowdowns, and any other 
unjustified work stoppages are 
prohibited. If any such actions occur, 
the Administration of the Authority 
shall proceed to adopt the necessary 
measures to immediately restore the 
service and shall apply the sanctions 
established in the Law and the 
Regulations, including that of
dismissal"
Article 109: The following are unfair 
labor practices — “7. To call, or 
participate in, a strike, work 
stoppage, or slowdown, or picketing 
the Authori^ during a labor-
management dispute. 8. To condone 
any of the activities described in item 
7 of this Article by failing to take 







Article 316: T he Panama Canal 
Authority shall be subject to a special 
employment regime..."
Article 64: T he right to strike is 
recognized. The law shall regulate its 
exercise and may subject it to special 
restrictions in those public services that it 
may designate."
Article 310: “An autonomous legal entity 
by the name of Panama Canal Authority 
is hereby established under pubic law, 
which shall be exclusively in charge of 
the administration. operation, 
conservation, maintenance, and 
modernization of the Panama Canal and 
its related activities, pursuant to current 







(as of July, 
1996)
Article 482: T he right to strike is non­
revocable. Void will be the clause in a 
collective agreement, individual contract 
or any other pact that implies a 
renimciation or limitation of the right to 
strike."
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A representative for the Association of Captains and Pilots o f the Panama Canal. Lina Boza. 
called the right to strike a ‘universal right’ as well as a constitutional right.^^ Boza made a 
nationalist appeal that if Panama Canal Authority employees are not permitted to exercise their 
right to strike, tomorrow other workers in Panama would lose their right to strike. Boza offered 
a plan whereby only 50% of the workers could strike leaving the other half to operate the canal, 
similar to the terms of the Labor C ode.^
The irony of the position taken by the Panama Canal Authority is that it resembles the 
same pro mundi bénéficia principle that representatives of the United States have insisted upon 
since the time of the Panama Railroad. Current Panama Canal Commission Administrator 
Alberto Aleman Zubieta. a Panamanian, said that because the canal provides an international 
service it must never 6 il to function due to domestic labor differences.^^ Alfonso Regis, the 
president of the Association o f  Canal Employees (ASODECO). said it would be a serious error 
to give the right to strike to workers thereby putting the fate o f the canal, the interests of the 
Republic of Panama, and the interests of the world in the hands of a few workers over a few 
dollars.^
In the past. American representatives justified restricting the jurisdiction of the 
Republic of Panama in the Canal Zone and the operations o f the Panama Canal through the 
terms of a mutual agreement, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty o f 1903. The Organic Law of the 
Panama Canal Authority, the new legislation that goes into effect after the turnover in 
December 1999. restricts the constitutional jurisdiction o f the Republic o f Panama in the 
administration of the Panama Canal with respect to Panamanian's right to strike. Jorge Ritter. 
President of the Panama Canal Transition Commission, admitted that the issue over the right to
"Prohibicion de hueigas en el Canal se mantiene en firme” in La Prensa, May 6, 1997: 1A 
"No hay derecho a huelga en el Canal: Ritter” in La Prensa, April 23. 1997: na 
"Ley de la Autoridad del Canal debe resolver conflictos laborales” in El Universal de Panama, March 
18. 1997: na
^  "Seria un grave error aprobar derecho a huelga en el Canal” in La Prensa, November 24. 1993: 14A
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strike was the only one that did not gain the desired consensus. However he defended the 
necessity to suppress the right to strike. Ritter said that the constitutional right to strike in the 
Labor Code does not apply in the Panama Canal because Article 316 of the Organic Law of the 
Panama Canal Authority placed it under a special regime that does not assimilate it to the Labor 
Code (Table 14.1). Ritter said:
[I]t will be completely different than the regime that governed Panamanian public 
employees and the Labor Code.^’
It is no doubt on account of statements like those of Jorge Ritter above that Panama 
Canal employees feel they will be employed by an administrative authority acting as if it were a 
separate Republic o f the Transit Zone. The situation would be similar in some ways to the 
former Canal Zone but minus most o f the labor benefits. Panamanian constitutional and 
sovereign law would be decided by an eleven member Board of Directors imdoubtedly drawn in 
large part fi-om the traditional maritime-commercial elite:
The commissioners were questioned by reporters about the danger of the future 
administrative organism of the Canal booming a new "empire” or a "little republic” 
due to the excessive autonomy that was conceded.
Jorge A. Teran, president of the Association of Panama C a n a l Pilots and the Pilot's Union 
{Sindicato de Pilotas), insisted that Panamanian political parties participate in the discussion of 
the law creating the Panama Canal Authority.^’ Apparently, Terân had met with leaders of the
"sera completamente diferente del regimen que rige a los empleados pùblicos panamados y al Codigo 
de Trabajo.” "Obreros del Canal no se regiiân por el Codigo de Trabajo” in La Prensa, December 24. 
1995: lA
"Trabajadores del Canal deben mantenerse en sus puestos” in El Panama America. October 14, 1993: 
5 A. "Los comisionados fueron interpelados por los periodistas sob re el peligro de que el fiitiuD 
organismo administrativo del Canal se convierta en un nuevo "imperio” o en una "republiquita” debido a 
la excesiva autonomia que le conceden.”
"Pilotos rechazan 1q' que créa Autoridad del Canal” in El Panamà América, May 30, 1996: I2E
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opposition Araulfista Party, the political party that claims its legacy from the ideas of Amulfo 
Arias, in order to solicit help when the document containing most of the disputed material hit 
the Legislative Assembly for debate. Teran said that the labor sector o f the Panama Canal is in 
danger because there do not exist weights and counterweights' ensuring that Panama Canal 
Authority employees are given justice. Teran proposed that there be 'an external entity 
[Author's translation]” that watches and maintains leadership in the worker employer 
relationship and establish possible avenues so that problems can be dissolved in a reasonable 
and expeditious way."'*” Joaquin Vallarino, named to the Presidential Commission of the Canal, 
is quoted as saying that for Panama Canal employees to use outside leverage including their 
international labor affiliations (e.g., AFL-CIO), ones they will be able to keep after the official 
turnover of the Panama Canal to the Panama Canal Authority on 31 December 1999, was "not a 
verv nationalist” attitude:
Concerning the threats of the Panama Canal Commission workers to call to their 
international affiliations if their suggestions are not considered. Vallarino expressed 
that that was "not a very nationalist” attitude, because those problems have to be 
resolved at home, determined by the representative of the Presidential Commission of 
tlie Canal.""**
Over the last one-hundred fifty years of American involvement in Panama, diplomatic 
breakthroughs almost always occurred when one or another party agreed to conditional non- 
exercise of their rights in return for some kind o f compensation. The United States and 
Colombia nearly came to war in 1857 over what both countries' representatives saw as their 
inviolable rights. For Colombia it was its sovereignty in Panama. For the United States it was its
"■*” "Adversan anteproyecto de ley,” in La Prensa, July 2, 19%: "Transfondo”
""*' "Condiciones laborales de Comisiôn del Canal permanecetan iguales” in La Prensa, December 27. 
1993: lA. "Sobre las amenazas de los trabajadores de la Comisiôn del Canal de acudir a sus filiales 
intemacionales si no se toman en cuenta sus sugerencias, Vallarino expreso que esa es una actitud "no 
muy nacionalista”. porque esos problemas se tienen que resolver en casa, précisé el représentante de la 
Comisiôn Presidencial del Canal.”
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treaty rights in Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-MaUarino Treaty. In a memo dated 1 August 
1857. Tomas Herràn declared that Colombia would not consent to renounce its sovereign rights 
to impose duties on tormage, but it might agree to a  non-exercise of them if due considerations
were given:
Notwithstanding this. New Granada would not hold it incommodious to impose 
volimtarily upon herself a reasonable restriction with respect to the tonnage duty which 
is to be collected in the ports of Panama and Colon.
The solution of a non-exercise of sovereign rights proposed by Herràn in August 1857 to end 
the dispute over Article XXXV of the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty was precisely the same 
solution engineered by Secretary of War William H. Taft in November 1904 to solve the dispute 
over the 1903 Hay-Bimau-Varilla Treaty:
Now, I am not in a position to waive absolutely - 1 mean to give up the right to exercise 
-  those powers, but I am given authority by the President to establish now. subject to 
action by Congress, a nonexercise o f those powers, such as I hope will be satisfactory 
to the Govenunent of the Republic, and will continue indefinitely until the construction 
of the canal shall so affect the relations and conditions existing as to require a new 
adjustment of the relations between the two Govenunents [emphasis added).
The same logic may help neutralize difficulties now brewing within the Republic of Panama 
over the constitutional right of Panama Canal Authority skilled labor to strike. Rather than 
disputing the meaning of the Panamanian Constitution, labor negotiators might simply agree to 
a non-exercise of their right to strike if due consideration or compensation were given. 
Negotiators for the Panama Canal Authority ought to accept this line of reasoning as it provides
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the same guarantee against a  strike as does the Organic Law o f the Panama Canal Authority^ 
without contradicting the Panamanian Constitution.^
But what is the price of a Panamanian's constitutional rights? It represents the same 
dilemma that confronted representatives of the United States and Panama over the price o f 
Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone. Just as politically ambitious leaders like Amulfo 
Arias manipulated the non-exercise of Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone, politically 
ambitious labor negotiators and members of the Legislative Assembly will claim that the 
constitutional rights o f  all Panamanians to strike, rights established by the Labor Code reforms 
of the Torrijos military government after 1968. can never be sacrificed at any price. Within 
Panama, the accusation will be leveled that the elite bureaucrats of the Panama Canal Authority 
supported by whatever incumbent party happened to hold the Panamanian presidency, would 
deny Panamanians their constitutional rights in order to protect their own selfish interests and 
the interests of foreign businessmen using the canal. The stage will be set for an activist group 
to create trouble in the operations of the Panama Canal in order to embarrass the Panama Canal 
Authority in the eyes of the world as unwilling or unable to fulfill its international obligation to 
operate and maintain the Panama Canal and manage its own workforce. By threatening to strike 
or create trouble in the operations of the Panama Canal, organized labor and their nationalist 
supporters will hope to force elite officials of the Panama Canal Authority to compromise or 
else face harsh criticism from American representatives.
A critical event may occur, ranging from a simple sit-in strike to a showy but not 
necessarily damaging sabotage attempt on the Panama Canal or Panama Canal Authority 
offices. Representatives o f the United States will feel pressured to invoke the 1977 Neutrality 
Treaty. The interposition of the United States will find support in Congress and the Office o f the
On the other hand, the Panama Canal Authori^ may choose to simply uphold the current 
interpretation of the Organic Law and deny that employees have the constitutional exercise of the right to 
strike.
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President because many Americans are willing to accept that the Government of the Republic of 
Panama and the semi-autonomous Panama Canal Authority will prove incompetent managers of 
the Panama Canal. A recent Time magazine article published on 15 December 1997, entitled 
“Panama; The big switch” decided to make a story of how the Panama Canal will be run by a 
Panama Canal Authority potentially full o f cronyism, nepotism and political favoritism.*'*^
Within the United States, those with a conservative political agenda will undoubtedly 
see an opportunity to criticize the actions o f  the Democratic Party in 1978 for creating the very 
situation which now obligates the United States to invoke the 1977 Permanent Neutrality 
Treaty. Some will claim that not only was the turnover of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone 
after 1978 a cowardly withdrawal of American power and prestige it has now come back to 
haunt the country in practical terms since now the Panama Canal is being mismanaged by an 
untrustworthy junior partner. Others with a liberal political agenda will claim that an 
anachronistic intervention by the United States into the internal affairs of a Latin American 
country damages the United States' reputation and demonstrates that Americans hold little real 
regard for their partnerships with smaller countries.
If a decision were made to invoke the Neutrality Treaty after 2000. United States 
representatives would have to choose what form interposition would take. The range of options 
includes everything from offering the services o f expert American labor negotiators, to a rather 
embarrassing option o f temporarily taking over the operations of the Panama Canal, by force if 
necessary. The use o f military force by the United States is likely if some part of the Panama 
Canal or its operations is damaged by a flashy sabotage attempt. Regardless of what form it 
takes, interposition by United States representatives through the 1977 Neutrality Treaty will be 
publicly berated within Panama by all sides. This author gives it about twenty years for the
The article was written on the heels of the 1*̂ Universal Congress of the Panama Canal held in Panama 
City a few months earlier in September. The by-line of the article reads, “In two years, the U.S. will 
finally give up the canal, but fears are starting to rise about the results of the transfer.”
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labor dispute to create a serious problem — call it 3 November 2020 -  when traffic through the 
Panama Canal has reached a maximum threshold and the Panama Canal Authority, financially 
strapped and already having postponed expensive improvements to existing Panama Canal 
technology like the third set of locks, will attempt to cut costs by eliminating highly-paid skilled 
positions.
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C h a p t e r  15. C o n c l u s io n
On 20 June 1853, Secretary of State William L. Colombian Charge d'Afiaires Paredes wrote 
Marcy wrote to Colombian Charge d’Affaires back to Secretary of State Marcy on 19 July
Victoriano de Paredes; 1853:
When, however, independent 
States enter into treaties with 
foreign powers, they expect to 
relinquish their sovereignty in part 
with the expectation of receiving 
from the power with which thqr 
treaty, full equivalents therefor. 
The Undersigned considers that 
by the treaty above referred to. 
New Granada has received &om 
the United States an ample 
equivalent for any sacrifices she 
may have made in entering into it
[I]t is no less certain, on the other 
side, that nations, in surrendering 
a portion of their sovereignty, do 
so in an explicit and conclusive 
manner, and by clearly explaining 
the limits or restrictions of the 
concessions which they stipulate, 
as it was done in the case of the 
treaty of 1846 .... if it be true, that 
the treaty through[ou|t is 
essentially liberal to both parties, 
this liberality could not have been 
carried to such an extreme, on the 
part of New Granada, as to 
involve the siurender of her 
sovereignty and the sacrifice of 
her most precious rights ....
What President George Washington said in his farewell address on 17 September 1796. would 
just as easily apply to both the opinions of Chargé Paredes and Secretary of State Marcy:
'[T]is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors fr̂ om another, that it must pay 
with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character that 
by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for 
nominal favors, and yet with being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. 
There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to 
nation. Tis all illusion, which experience must cure - which a just pride ought to 
discard. In offering to you. my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate 
friend. I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; 
that they will control the usual current of the passions, or prevent our nation from 
ruiming the coiuse which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations; but if I may even 
flatter myself that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit to 
warn against the mischiefr of foreign intrigues, to guard against the impostures of
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pretended patriotism; this hope will be a lull recompense for the solicimde for yoiir 
welfare by which they have been dictated . .
If the Western Hemisphere had been shaped differently President Washington might have been 
right about avoiding permanent alliances with any part of the foreign world. But the geographic 
imperatives of being a transcontinental United States made it impossible to uphold the high 
principles of foreign relations belonging to an antique United States that barely extended past 
the Appalachian Mountains.
15.1 Conflicts Betw een  Americans and  Panam anians in GEOGRAPmc Perspective
Geography does not force unwilling human participants into a  century and a half of 
entangling alliances and conflicts. Ordinary human jealousies and misunderstandings about the 
relative location of the Isthmus of Panama caused political conflict. Though it may seem like a 
stab at geographic determinism, stating that the relative geographic location of the Isthmus of 
Panama itself created conditions for conflict is merely a  statement of perspective with which to 
begin. It is invariably more difRcult to relate it in a meaningful way to what is most dramatic 
and surprising about those conflicts. However, failing to consider geography in an analysis of 
American and Panamanian relations commits a colossal oversight.
It is no mystery that a long line of engineers, politicians and entrepreneurial quacks 
backed up from here to the sixteenth century have entertained notions about acquiring exclusive 
rights to construct an interoceanic technology across the Isthmus o f  Central America. 
Christopher Columbus himself was looking for something like a natural Strait of Central 
America but never found one. An artificial strait had to be constructed. The geographic 
imperatives of being a  transcontinental United States and the technical and financial burdens of 
the interoceanic canal project made it practically inevitable that the United States Federal
Cited in Gantenbein (1971,6).
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Government would construct and operate the canal technology. Only the United States 
Government could justify the expense of Panama Canal technology, without establishing ver\ 
high tolls, through the public social savings earned by American shippers.
Several authors believe that the United States was becoming more commercially 
proactive during the second half of the nineteenth century. American involvement on the 
Isthmus of Panama may have been designed to aid the expansion of American business 
opportunities overseas in order to absorb American surplus production. However, there is little 
reason to think that had the Panama Canal been constructed during the late nineteenth century it 
would have transformed the geography of American foreign business relations or provided an 
overseas solution to domestic economic welAre. The Panama Canal was not indispensable. The 
potential contribution of an interoceanic canal to American foreign commerce and investment 
would have been relatively modest during the nineteenth century and even the first part of the 
twentieth century. As a coastwise option, use of the Isthmus o f Panama was subordinate to the 
transcontinental railroads with the exception of the brief period between 1848 and 1869. Even 
after the canal's opening in August 1914, use of the Panama Canal by American foreign trade 
remained relatively static and did not experience a significant increase until after World War U. 
As a proportion of American waterborne commerce, not only has proportional use of the 
Panama Canal not decreased it has slightly increased.
Early American involvement on the Isthmus of Panama during the nineteenth century 
was designed to prevent foreign maritime powers from encroaching on strategic sites near 
American shores. Though a  non-contiguous foreign territory, the Isthmus of Panama was treated 
by American representatives as was if it were virtually a contiguous frontier o f the United 
States, echoing President Hayes statement in March 1880:
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An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will essentially change the 
geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States and 
the rest of the world. It will be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and 
our Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United States.
The United States' solution for preventing European control over the Isthmus of Panama was to 
guarantee the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama through Article XXXV of 
the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty Article XXXV of the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty was 
probably the United States first entangling alliance. That a  similar agreement failed with 
Nicaragua over the Rio San Juan route bears explanation, as a Nicaragua route would have 
served exactly the same purpose as a Panama route and should have been treated no less 
jealously by American representatives. The addition of Article XXXV to the 1846 Bidlack- 
Mallarino Treaty was a product o f the triangular diplomacy of Colombian representatives who 
lured American representatives into guaranteeing Colombian sovereignty over the Isthmus of 
Panama for their own internal purposes.
The long-standing American obligation to guarantee the neutrality of the Isthmus of 
Panama by guaranteeing the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus in Article XXXV of the 
1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty was crossed out and rewritten on 23 February 1904, when 
President Roosevelt and the United States Senate approved the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 
guaranteeing the sovereignty of an independent Republic o f  Panama over the Isthmus of 
Panama.*'*̂  The possibility that the United States might eventually shift to this alternate plan 
plagued the Colombian central government in Bogota throughout the life of the 1846 Bidlack- 
Mallarino Treatv.
In a letter from Rivas to Clayton on 2 January 1850, Rivas said: "... the Government of New Granada, 
is firmly convinced and certain, that in the event of any attack or disturbance, being made by any foreign 
power whatsoever, on its possessions in the Isthmus of Panama, the Government of the United States 
will, in compliance with this treaty, afford to it immediately every assistance, and protection” [emphasis 
added).
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Panamanian political leaders roused conflicts with the United States not because of 
some foolish hatred of Americans but for practical goals. The Panamanian agenda was to force 
the government of Colombia at Bogota to institute state's rights reforms, and foiling that, to 
force the United States into creating a  Panamanian protectorate. The logic was that if Colombia 
did not see fit to reform its political arrangement with Panamanians, then Panamanians would 
see fit to cause problems in the transit port cities for Americans. Colombian representatives 
would be forced to justif>' their sovereign authority against claims of incompetence and criminal 
negligence by fiustrated American policymakers who, entirely predictably, would feel no 
choice but to call for American warships and possibly more permanent forms of intervention.
During his message to Congress in January 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt 
justified his decision to send American warships to protect the 3 November 1903. revolution. 
Roosevelt said that the United States would no longer consent to be entangled in Colombia's 
internal troubles on account of the inability of authorities in Bogota to maintain order on the 
Isthmus of Panama. On the other hand, Roosevelt said, the United States would not forsake its 
geographic obligation to establish the free and neutral use of the Isthmus of Panama for 
maritime communication:
That our wise and patriotic ancestors, with all their dread of entangling alliances, would 
have entered into a treaty with New Granada solely ... to continue from Bogota to rule 
over the Isthmus of Panama, is a conception that would in itself be incredible, even if 
the contrary did not clearly appear. It is true that since the treaty was made the United 
States has again and again b^n  obliged forcibly to intervene for the preservation of 
order and the maintenance of an open transit, and tliat this intervention has usually 
operated to the advantage of the titular Government of Colombia, but it is equally tme 
that the United States in intervening, with or without Colombia’s consent, for the 
protection of the transit, has disclaimed any du^ to defend the Colombian government 
against domestic insurrection or against the erection of an independent government on 
the Isthmus of Panama .... It was under these circumstances that the United States, 
instead o f using its forces to destroy those who sought to make the engagements o f the 
treaty a reality, recognized them as the proper custodians o f the sovereignty o f the 
Isthmus [emphasis added|."^
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The principle o f avoiding entangling alliances with foreign nations served President Roosevelt 
well when it came to rebuking the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino T rea^ with the Republic o f 
Colombia. Yet the principle of American geographic imperative served President Roosevelt 
well when it came to justifying the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with the new Republic o f 
Panama. What President Roosevelt may not have understood was that the 1903 Hay-Bunau- 
Varilla Treaty would become even more entangling for the United States than the 1846 Bidlack- 
Mallarino Treaty.
The 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty has become the scapegoat for difficulties between 
the United States and the Republic o f Panama. Most authors writing about American- 
Panamanian relations make two basic points about the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. One is that 
the exercise of sovereignty in Article HI was a privilege designed to secure American interests 
not directly related to the construction and operation of the Panama Canal. American privileges 
in the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty were not included in earlier drafts like the 1902 Hay- 
Herràn Treaty and were supposedly conceded by the Republic o f Panama only because o f 
Philippe Bunau-Varilla's personal meddling and the threat of Colombian repossession. Another 
point is that the root of all diplomatic problems between the United States and the Republic o f 
Panama comes from the sovereignty provision of Article III. Both points are incorrect.
The sovereignty formula in Article HI of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty did not spring 
from the brow of Philippe Bunau-Varilla during his all-night treaty redraft at the Waldorf- 
Astoria Hotel. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 reflected the requirements of Article I 
Section Eight and Article IV Section Three of the United States Constitution. Without 
something like Article III in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, the Panama Canal would have 
risked being an unconstitutional use of federal funds beyond the powers of the Congress. The 
Republic o f Panama may have had to bear the negative consequences of what was a purely 
internal procedure of the United States Government. But representatives of the Republic o f
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Panama chose to do so through mutual agreement. It is neither 6 i r  nor accurate to say that 
representatives of the Committee of Provisional Government of the Republic of Panama were 
misled into ratifying the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty or its subsequent modifications because of 
Philippe Bunau-Varilla or the threats of American representatives. Given the failures of private 
capital, it was probably understood that it was going to be a  United States Federal Government 
Panama Canal with a Canal Zone or else no Panama Canal at all.
It is not easy to see what alternative or leeway there was to Article III of the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty. Exercising any more sovereignty in the Canal Zone than provided for in 
Article HI meant territorial annexation. Exercising any less sovereignty in the Canal Zone risked 
unconstitutionality unless the Constitution were amended so that the United States Federal 
Government might construct an interoceanic canal. In the case of Wilson v. Shaw (1907) the 
Supreme Court did not enforce a strict interpretation of the Constitution concerning the use o f 
federal funds in Canal Zone territory. One must bear in mind that the judgement of the Supreme 
Court in Wilson v. Shaw rested on the precise wording of Article III o f  the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty. The Supreme Court decided that being granted the exercise of all rights, power and 
authority of sovereignty in the Canal Zone to the entire exclusion of a  similar exercise of rights, 
power and authority by the Republic of Panama was close enough to a United States territory or 
possession for the use o f federal funds. A strict interpretation of the Constitution might find the 
wording of Article m  of the treaty insufficient for the use of federal funds because the Canal 
Zone remained a territory of the Republic of Panama. If something less endowing than Article 
III had been signed one can only wonder what the Supreme Court might have done. After all. 
what was the minimum' language in any Panama Canal Treaty that would still satisfy 
constitutional provisions about the use of federal funds for regulating commerce?
It is generally believed that the Hay-Herran Treaty was less conciliatory than the Hay- 
Bunau-Varilla Treaty. To think that all would have been well in diplomatic relations had only
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the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty been more like the Hay-Herran draft is utterly wishful 
thinking."'*^ Criticism of Article III of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was a  pretense for 
manipulating national sentiments within the Republic of Panama and moral sentiments within 
the United States. There is every reason to think that a nationalist opposition within the 
Republic o f Panama would have just as easily seized upon the terms o f any treaty granting 
exercise o f  sovereignty by the United States. To use an apt nautical metaphor there was simply 
no safe passage for the Panama Canal between the Scylla of United States strategic objectives 
and constitutional requirements and the Charybdis o f Panamanian domestic politics.
Domestic conflict in Panama represents the legacy of a social and geographic division 
between the maritime cities and the western interior that predates the formation of the Republic 
of Panama by almost three hundred years. Ambitious political leaders like Amulfo Arias from 
the interior city of Penonomé and student activists with middle-class backgrounds used the 
involvement o f the United States in the Panama Canal and Canal Zone to provoke American 
intervention and embarrass the maritime-commercial political elite o f the Republic of Panama. 
The middle-class and rural interior political opposition within the Republic of Panama used the 
same logic as Panamanian secessionists against Colombia during the nineteenth century. If the 
Panamanian maritime-commercial urban elite did not see fit to reform their political and 
economic arrangement with the middle-class and the interior, then activist groups would see fit 
to cause problems in the Canal Zone for Americans. The Liberal maritime-commercial elite 
would be forced to justify their administrative authority against accusations of cronyism, lack of 
touch with the people of the western interior or lower and middle urban classes, and 
dangerously ineffective authority in containing Communist agitation. Frustrated American 
policymakers would feel no choice but to call for American interposition.
President Roosevelt said during his 4 January 1904, message executing Spooner Act of 1902: "It is 
plain that no nation could construct and guarantee the neutrality of the canal with a less degree of control 
than was stipulated in the Hay-Herran treaty” (U.S. Congress 1977b).
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When the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was abrogated the 1977 Treaty Concerning the 
Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal entered into force and w ill continue 
after the official turnover of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone on 31 December 1999. 
According to the terms of the 1977 Neutrality Treaty, the United States is obligated to interpose 
itself against any threat to the continued maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal. The 
entangling alliance that began with Article XXXV o f the 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty and 
which was passed along to the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty has now been entrusted to the 
1977 Neutrality Treaty.
The 1977 Permanent Neutrality Treaty is not a  privilege. It is the contemporary 
manifestation of a  long-standing obligation. The treaty itself can be triggered by no more than a 
threat to the operation of the Panama Canal. There is every reason to think that after 31 
December 1999, if  the new Panama Canal Authority does not see fit to reform its arrangements 
with Panama Canal skilled labor over issues like the right to strike, then activists among 
Panama Canal skilled labor in league with nationalist elements will see fit to cause problems in 
the operation of the Panama Canal. A vigorous reaction by the United States will be entirely 
predictable.
If an entangling obligation to interpose itself on the Isthmus of Panama is to continue to 
be the foreign policy of tlie United States even if  in the service of American geographic 
imperatives which cannot be dismissed then representatives of the United States are to be held 
fully accountable to the American people should they fail to prevent this entangling obligation 
from being misused by activist elements within the Republic of Panama such that the 
consequences require any expenditure of federal funds or loss of life. It is one thing to sign an 
entangling alliance. It is another thing to allow oneself to be entangled by it. It would be 
mistaken to indict ambitious Panamanians for trying to find ways of making the certain 
interposition of the United States with respect to the Panama Canal expedient to their domestic
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political agendas. One could only expect as much from any politically-minded group o f people 
who far from being some sort of hapless victims have cleverly adapted to the commanding 
influence of the great maritime powers in their affairs for the last two centuries if not longer.
There seems little to delight in from the idea that human conflict is somehow 
geographically unavoidable. The case of the Isthmus of Panama may be rare. It would be 
thoughtless to simply assume that geographic conditions can have the same kind o f  influence 
everywhere. Yet it would be even more thoughtless to purposely Ail to examine the influence of 
geographic conditions and instead revel in the special dignity, complexity and uniqueness of 
individual human endeavors merely as a  matter of intellectual taste. It is often compulsory for 
geographers these days to indulge in humanistic sensibilities for their own sake just to cleanse 
themselves of geographic determinism. If geographic conditions cannot affect human history in 
a place like the Isthmus of Panama then why should we think geographic conditions can affect 
human history anywhere? And geography is of no account. Only a stage was set for conflict by 
geography. It was people who more than willingly chose to follow what changing geographic 
conditions had scripted. They managed to produce an historical record full of often undignified, 
ordinary, and not so unique confrontations over the course of the last one hundred and fift\' 
years of American entanglement in the Isthmus of Panama.
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APPENDIX: TREATY AGREEMENTS
382

























Table A .I. A detailed comparison of several major agreements relating to Panama and an interoceanic technology.
No. Treaty or Contract Signed U.S. Senate advice Entered into force Concluded Duration o f contract and
and consent extensions







January 25, 1955 
treaty.
Executed by various 
acts of Congress
34 Mutual Understanding and 
Cooperation
January 25, 1955 at 
Panama City, 
Panama
July 29, 1955; 
Ratified by Panama 
August 15, 1955
August 23, 1955 1977 PCX

































32 Agreement for Lease of Defense 
Sites
May 18, 1942 at 
Panama City, 
Panama
May 11, 1943 February 19, 1948 Until one year after the definitive 
treaty of peace that brings about 
the end of the present war, or, if 
conditions of international 
insecurity continue, to continue if 
a mutual agreement can be arrived 
at.
31 Hull-Alfaro Treaty (quotes from 
BD 907-910)
March 2,1936 at 
Washington, D C.
July 25.1939 July 27,1939 1977 PCT Amended by convention of May 
24,1950 and treaty of January 25, 
1955
30 Treaty between the United 
States and Panattut
July 28,1926 at 
Washington, DC.
Not approved by 
Panama; continuing 
negotiations led to 
1936 treaty
29 Claims; Damages Caused by 
Riots
November 27,1915 
at Panama City, 
Panama
November 27,1915 December 9, 1916 
on payment of award 
by Panama




entered into force by 

































27 Decree No. 130, Wireless 
Telegraph Stations




26 Canal Rights (Thoin.wn- 
Urrutia)
April 6, 1914 at 
Bogota, Colombia
April 20, 1921 March 1, 1922
25 Canal Zone Boundaries September 2, 1914 
at Panama City, 
Panama
October 22, 1914 February 11, 1915; 
Amended May 24, 
1950 and January 
25,1955
24 Bryan-Chamorro Treaty August 5,1914 at 
Washington, DC.
February 18,1916 June 22,1916 April 25,1971 by 
convention of July 
14,1970
In perpetuity for canal rights; 99 
year lease with the option of a 99 
year renewal on Corn Islands and 
territory bordering the Gulf of 
Fonseca
23 Transit o f U.S. Troops July 18 and 20,1912 
notes exchanged at 
Panama City, 
Panama
July 20,1912 March 2,1936 
superseded
2 ? Tripartite Treaties ( United 
States and Republic o f Panama)
January 9,1909 at 
Washington, D C.
March 3,1909 by 
U.S. Senate; January 
30, 1909 by Panama
Failed to enter into 
force due to non- 
ratillcation by 
Colombia

































21 Tripartite Treaties ( United 
States and Republic of 
Colombia)
January 9, 1909 at 
Washington. D C.
February 24, 1909 
by U.S. Senate
Failed to enter into 
force due to non- 
ratification by 
Colombia
Supplementary to Hay-Bunau- 
Varilla Treaty
20 Tripartite Treaties (Republic of 
Panama and Republic of 
Colontbia)
January 9, 1909 at 
Washington, D C.
January 27, 1909 by 
Panama
Failed to enter into 
force due to non- 
ratification by 
Colombia
Supplementary to Hay-Bunau- 
Varilla Treaty
19 "Taft Agreement” with Panama 
concerning tariff's, ports, post 
offices, etc.
Executive orders 
signed at Panama 
and Washington, 
DC. December 3,6, 
and 28, 1904; 
January 7, 1905; 
January 5,1911.
December 12, 1904 June 1, 1924 Supplementary to Hay-Bunau- 
Varilla Treaty
18 Hay-Bunau- Varilla November 18,1903 
at Washington, D C.
February 23, 1904 
without amendment; 
66 ayes to 14 nays 
(52 needed for 
consent) 1 December 





February 26, 1904 1977 PCT In perpetuity. The work on an 
interoceanic transit, land or water, 




































January 22, 1903 at 
Washington, D C.
Working draft 
submitted to Hay by 
Corea in letter dated 
May 14, 1902.
November 18,1901 
at Washington, D C.
March 17, 1903 
without atnendment; 
73 ayes to 5 nays
December 16,1901 February 21, 1902
II. 100 years, renewable at the sole 
and absoute option of the United 
States, for periods of similar 
duration so long as the United 
States may desire. XXIV. Within 
2 years of exchange of 
ratifications the main works of the 
canal will commence; within 12 
years after the initial 2 years the 
canal will be opened; with a 12 
year extension; if a sea-level canal 
is chosen then the period will be 
extended an additional 10 years. 
XXVIII. The convention must be 
signed within eight months from 


























14 Concession front Republic of 
Nicaragua to Nicaragua Canai 







Extensions o f Wyse Concession; 
1890, 1893, 1900
March 23, 1887 at 
Managua, Nicaragua
December I, 1884 at 
Washington, D C.
December 10, 1890 
at Bogota; April 4, 
1893 at Bogota; 




recognized as begun 
on October 8, 1889. 
Company went in 
receivership on 
August 30, 1893. 




99 years from the day of opening 
with the possibility of a 99 year 
extension. The company has ten 
years to complete the canal, and 
construction officially "begins" 
only after two million dollars have 
been spent. Extensions are 
possible.
Work on a canal must begin 
within two years of ratification 
and must be completed ten years 
after that, with an indefinite 
extension period
First contract, an extension of ten 
years on the original contract of 
March 23, 1878. Third contract, a 
further extension of six years to 
begin on October 31,1904 
(apparently October 31, 1904 was 
the end of the first contract). 
According to Committee on 
Foreign Affairs in 1912 (Rainey 
Resolution), Colombia denied 
legality of last contract extension 
























II Concession Originul concession 
May, 1876. 
Enlarged March 23, 
1878 at Bogota
May 18, 1878 99 years from the day of the 
canal’s opening or when tolls are 
collected. The canal must be 
constructed within 12 years with a 
6 year extension.
10 Convention between the United 
States atid the Repttblic of New 
Granada, for the adjustment of 
daims o f citizeits o f the Utiited 
States and for settling other 
differences between the parties
Not signed. 
Proposed by 
Secretary of State 
Marcy, December 3, 
1856 to American 
treaty negotiators
9 Clayton-Bulwer April 19,1850 at 
Washington, D.C.
May 22, 1850 July 4,1850 February 21,1902 
by treaty of 
November 18,1901
8 Contract between Nicaragua 
and American Atlantic and 
Pacific Ship-Canal Company
.August 27, 1849 at 
Leon, Nicaragua
85 years from the time of the end 
of construction. Construction of a 
ship-canal must be completed 
within twelve years.
7 Hise June 21,1849 at 
Guatemala City, 
Guatemala
Not approved by 
adminstration and 
not submitted to the 
Senate; Hise 
recalled.
In perpetuity. The work on an 
interoceanic transit, land or water, 





























Contract between New Granada 
and the Panama Railroad 
Company (N.B. terms o f 
reformed and amended 
contract, 18911
Bidlack-Mallaritw
CotUract between New Granada 
and Mateo Klein ("Panama 
Company")
December 28, 1848; 
Reformed April, 15, 
1850 and August 16, 
1867; articles 
inserted 1876 and 
1880; amended 
August 18, 1891
December 12, 1846 
at Bogota, New 
Granada
May 6 (2) and 10, 
1847 at Bogota, 
New Granada
June 3, 1848; 29 




June 8, 1847 c. June, 1848; The 
French (& British?) 
private "Panama 
Company" failed to 
make the deposit.
Original terms, 49 years from the 
day of its completion or until New 
Granada desires to purchase the 
railroad (1US|$5 million after 20 
years, $4 million after 30 years, $2 
million after 40 years). A railroad 
must be completed within six 
years with a two year extension 
period. The railroad was 
completed on January 27,1855. 
Reformed terms called for 99 
years from the dale of August 16, 
1867.
Twenty years. Afterwards, treaty 
will continue until 12 months after 
one party voices intention to 
modify it.
99 years from the day of its 
completion. A railroad must be 
begun within 18 months counted 
four months after the date of 
approval of the contract, and must 
be completed within six years with 
a two year grace period if at least 

























3 Convention for Isthmian Mail 
Transit between New Granada 
and the United States
March 6, 1844 at 
(Bogota, New 
Granada?)
February 22, 1845 Eight years, and if 
not denounced six 
months prior to 
expiration, four 
years more, until six 
months after either 
party announces its 
intent to denounce,
2 Abstract of Instructions by 
Granadian Government for 
concluding a treaty with the 
Maritime Nations for a Panama 
Canal
In Blackford to 
Upshur, November 
3. 1843
Commencement of a canal 
enterprise must begin within two 
years of the treaty’s conclusion. 
There is a call for two treaties (?): 
a multilateral neutrality 
agreement, and an agreement with 
a private company.
1 Decree granting privilege for 







Robert William Aguirre III was bom in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on July 8, 1968. He 
has one sister, o f whom he is relatively fond.
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